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[Imam Ali Ibn Abi Taleb, the first Imam in Shia Islam, who ruled over 
the Islamic Cal iphate from 656 to 661 , writes in a letter to Maalik, hi s 
governor in Egypt, "Remember, Maalik, that amongst your subjects there 
are two kinds of people: those who have the same religion as you have; they 
are brothers to you, and those who have re ligions other than that of yours, 
they are human beings like you. Men of either category suffer from the 
same weaknesses and di sabilities that human beings are inc li ned to 
(Nahjolbalagheh, Letter No. 53). 
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Abstract: 
This thesis is a study on the notion of practical rationality. Its main 
objective is to explore whether there is a shared way of reasoning in 
practical and moral issues between different cultures and traditions. For th is 
purpose, T chose Maclntyre 's notion of tradition-constituted and tradition-
constitutive rationality and justice (constitution thesis) as the key topic of 
the thes is, which holds there is no rational ity and justice independent of a 
tradition. Rationality here is main ly practical rationality a most important 
outcome of which is the idea of justice. 
We can understand Macintyre 's constitution thes is in contrast to 
Cartesian epi stemology and Kant's moral phi losophy as they are understood 
by hi m. The constitution thes is runs counter to Cartesian epistemology by 
its anti-epistemological tendencies; that is to say, we do not and cannot start 
our substantial intellectual enquiries based on some indubitable ideas whose 
evidence can be shown to any rational human being. 
The constitution thesis runs also counter to Kantian moral philosophy by 
its opposition to providing a universa li stic rule-based account of morality. 
The constitution thesis in this sense is related to virtue-ethics which 
emphasizes the importance of moral education and following moral masters 
for knowing moral duties. 
l wil l argue that we can have an account ofmoraJjty that does not depend 
on the notion of the final good; rather, it assumes basic facts about human 
beings, which include their basic and intellectual needs the failure to sati sfy 
which damages their normal and desirable funct ioning. The mark of rea l 
needs is that the ir satisfaction sustains and improves our normal and 
des irab le functioning, and thi s point lets us di stinguish rea l needs from our 
acquired desires and expectations. This would be against Maclntyre 's claim 
that the justification of morali ty requires the notion of the human good. 
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Abbreviations: 
CT Constitution Thesis (the idea of tradition-constituted and 
tradition-constitutive rationality and justice) 
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NE The Nicomachean Ethics 
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Introduction 
I have been drawn into Maclntyre's work, in parti cular into his idea of 
tradition-constituted rationality, from questions mostly related to religion 
and the philosophy of religion; questions concerning the language of 
re ligion, the attributes of God, the relation between modem ideas of human 
rights and religion, and the mechanisms for keeping religion, in parti cular 
Islam, abreast with the new requirements of modem social life. 
Hav ing been born into and grown up in a religious Muslim commun ity, 
it was quite natural for me to face questions related to di fferent aspects of 
religious thought; for instance, the question regarding the measures of the 
j ustice of God when He describes Himself as a just Creator who "does not 
do injusti ce to the weight of a grain" (Quran 4:40, Shakir Translation with 
modification). A question ari ses as to whether the measures of the justness 
of God are independent of His revelation and decree, or rather, are they 
deri ved from His word, such that we can know them using our own 
conventional and secular reason? A related question is whether there is a 
justification fo r human rights independent of parti cular traditions on the 
basis of which we can evaluate these traditions. If there is such an 
independent justification, what would be its relation to the particular ethics 
of those communities? If there is a conflict between international nonns of 
human rights and the ethics of a communi ty, which one should be given 
priority? 
Macintyre's notion of tradition-constituted rationa li ty and justice 
seemed attractive to me, as due to hi s emphas is on the notion of trad ition, l 
thought that this would be a good way of attend ing to questions li ke the 
ones mentioned above. I did my master's thes is on Maclntyre's critique of 
liberalism. At that stage, my understanding of him was that every trad ition 
has its own measures of practica l rational ity and j ustice, and one tradition 
cannot legitimately impose its own measures on others. When I started my 
PhD thes is, as a result of a full er engagement with his works, I gradua lly 
came to know that my earlier account of Macln tyre's ideas had been 
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inadequate. At that stage, I did not take into account Macintyre ' s method for 
inter-traditional intellectual exchanges, and I did not appreciate that my 
earl ier understanding would be open to the charge of relativism and 
perspectivism from which MacIntyre has distanced himself. Nevertheless, it 
was and still is difficult for me to understand how it is possible, on the one 
hand, to emphasize the relativity of practical rationality to traditions, and on 
the other hand, to hold that a tradition might acknowledge in certain 
circumstances the rational superiority of its rivals. This issue, I think, is the 
most difficult part ofMacintyre's work to understand. 
To solve this issue, MacIntyre holds that the acknowledgement of the 
superiority of a rival tradition might take place on the basis of the internal 
measures of a tradition; in other words, the tradition might become refuted 
on the basis of its own measures of rationality. MacIntyre, thus, thinks thi s 
method is cons istent with hi s idea of tradition-constituted rationality, and 
differentiates it from relativism. I will di scuss in chapter 4 the inadequacy of 
this approach, and propose that there should be some substantial measures 
of rationality independent of ail trad itions if we seek to rebut relativism. 
Another issue that occupied my mind, which I sti ll think MacIntyre 
struggles to overcome, is an inconsistency immanent in his work, which 
issues from his Marxist background combined with hi s Thomism. Marx 
(1845) denies the existence of any inherent essence for human beings 
independent of their economic and social settings; whereas for Aquinas 
human beings are created in the image of God, in the sense that they have 
essences that require particular social relationships for flourishing. This 
inconsistency comes to the fore when MacIntyre denies the notion of the 
individual as a substantial moral notion independent of its social and 
cultural settings. If we take human beings as possessing an inherent essence 
or some capacities, this enjoins upon them some rights and responsibilities 
independently of their social roles, which are necessary for flouri shing these 
capaciti es. These are issues that will be discussed later in the course of the 
thesis . 
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An interesting aspect of Maclntyre's thought is that though he is a 
critic of libera li sm his theory has a strong democratic aura, which I think 
can be best described as a deliberative or participatory democracy in which 
people actively participate in di scussions about the good and about policy-
making. The relation of this democracy with Maclntyre's virtue-ethics 
deserves much attention. Accord ing to virtue-ethics, the virtuous have a 
privileged status regarding truth and practical rational ity, which the 
unvirtuous are deprived of. This makes the relationsh ip between the two an 
asymmetric one, because the apprentice should take as true things for which 
he is still not able to appreciate the justification, and so he would not be ab le 
to question the moral master in a way that he is required to do in modem 
democracy. The issues rai sed above are among the most interesting aspects 
of Maclntyre's thought to me, and which, excludi ng the democracy issue 
that I skip due to the confines of space, wi ll be di scussed in the following 
chapters. 
My general approach in this thesis is to justify a basic minimal 
universa l morality for all human beings qua human beings. I am not 
satisfied with Maclntyre's contention that all morality is the morality of a 
particular group (I 994a, p. 143). I wi ll try to establish this minimal universa l 
morality using a vulnerabi li ty approach, which addresses human basic needs 
related to the animal and intellectual aspects of human beings. My position 
is that these two aspects of human beings can serve to justi fy a morality 
without appealing to the notion of the human fina l good. This di scussion is, 
in fact, my main contribution to the ex isting li terature on MacIntyre. 
My experi ence of living for some years in a secular country like 
Australia has also been effective in convincing me of the truth of thi s 
conclusion. Most of the va lues that are honoured in a religious community 
are also taken as such in a secular context. Truth-te ll ing, prom ise-keeping, 
charity, respecting the rights of others, etc., are honoured and promoted in a 
secular context as well as in a religious one, and in some respects the former 
excels the latter. Nevertheless, there are many insights for the secular 
culture to learn from Maclntyre's work, one of which is to rev ise the 
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individualistic notion of autonomy according to which moral agents at a 
specific stage of their lives become morally and legally autonomous to the 
degree that their parents lack the legal authority to direct them. We can use 
Macintyre's approach to introduce a virtue-informed notion of autonomy, 
which I take to entail that moral agents will or should become autonomous 
much later in their lives than _we in a liberal context imagine. However, this 
should not be at the expense of holding that without a notion of the human 
good all systems of morality would lack rational justification. As wi ll be 
explained in chapter 6, even if we cannot resolve all ethical disputes 
informed by the particularities of cultures, we can justify a wide range of 
moral norms based on what is required by the animal and intellectual 
aspects of human beings as rational beings. The needs that human beings 
have as animals to serve their basic needs such as security, hygiene, 
nourishment, and as rational beings to serve some higher goods such as self-
respect, a right to justification, and participation in their social and political 
life can be the basis of a morality, which applies to human beings qua 
human beings. 
This thesis consists of six chapters. In the fust chapter, I wi ll explain 
Maclntyre's account of tradition, and discuss what functions traditions play 
in his approach. In this chapter, I will point to Maclntyre' s normative 
account of tradition under the rubric of traditions in an ideal sense. 
In the second chapter, I will explain Macintyre's notion of tradition-
constituted and tradition-constitutive rationality and justice. In this chapter, 
I wi ll explain this notion based on the functions of traditions that are 
introduced in chapter I. One major theme of this chapter is to show that 
MacIntyre is not a conservative advocate of traditions. 
In the third chapter, the discussion shifts from the issue of rationality to 
that of truth, two notions that MacIntyre thinks are related to, but 
distinguished from each other. As MacIntyre has adopted Aquinas ' account 
of the correspondence theory of truth, I have devoted this chapter to 
Macintyre's interpretation of Aquinas ' theory of truth, and to the 
consequences of this interpretation for Maclntyre' s own theory. 
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The fourth chapter is about Maclntyre's theory of truth. In this chapter, 
will compare Maclntyre 's theory of truth and his notion of tradition-
constituted rationality with relativism and perspectivism. I will al so propose 
my own suggestions to strengthen Maclntyre 's account against these 
charges along the lines that he needs to put more emphasis on the existence 
of some shared measures of rationality across traditions. 
In the fifth chapter, I will follow up the results of the di scussions in 
chapter 4. I wi ll there argue whether Maclntyre 's claim about the rational 
superiority of Thomism over its riva ls holds on the basis of the internal 
measures of these ri val traditions; which is an issue that MacIntyre has 
emphasized in his method based on epistemological crises. My view here is 
that thi s superiority is not internal ly acknowledged by these traditions, and 
that Maclntyre's meta-ethical positions regarding the objectivity of the good 
and the natTative unity account of intelligibility have moved him toward his 
conclusion. 
In the final chapter, l wi ll argue that these two meta-ethical positions 
are not required for morality as di stinct from and an integral part of any 
reasonable ethics. In this chapter, I wi ll introduce my vu lnerabi lity 
approach, which is based on the necessity of fulfillin g human animality and 
intellectual needs as conditions for their nonnal and desirable functioning. 
This is, in fact, required by Maclntyre's espousal the natural law tradition. 
In swn, the main questions that I shall try to address in this thesis 
include whether there is a practical rationality va lid for different cultures, 
whether there are some nonns and values attributable to all human beings 
qua human beings, and whether there is a way to justify a morality that does 
justice to both our similarities and di versi ti es. 
I have used male-language throughout the thesis in order to avo id 
making the sentences longer by bringing in , as does MacIntyre, "he or she" 
or "his or her". This, however, should not be interpreted as espous ing 
masculinism. I also, as a Muslim student, wi ll refer on some occasions, 
particularly in the final chapter, to some verses of Quran to answer the 
questions that were raised above regarding God and His justice. 
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I-Chapter 1: the Role of Traditions in Maclntyre's 
Works 
1.1 Introduction 
Any discussion of Maclntyre's views should pay due attention to his 
account of tradition. As the title of my thesis indicates, my main objectives 
are to investigate the relationship between tradition and practical rationality, 
the ways they interact with each other, whether there are norms of practical 
rationality independent of particular traditions, and whether in Maclntyre's 
view, there remains a way for inter-traditional appraisal, as opposed to 
relativism 's claims; therefore, a clear understanding of Maclntyre's account 
of tradition paves the way for a better grasp of his ideas about practical 
rationality. 
The notion of tradition is a pivotal one for MacIntyre. MacIntyre 
criticizes the individualistic understanding of the self and autonomy, which 
he thinks is central to Liberalism. The identity of the self, in Maclntyre ' s 
account, is formed through its relationships with others in its community, 
and the individual in order to achieve autonomy needs to learn from others 
and rely on his relationships with them to understand what his true good is 
(1999a, p.xi). 
Maclntyre's espousal of the notion of tradition also reveals itself Ln his 
vtrtue-ethics. As will be explained in chapter 2, MacIntyre states that the 
individual in order to be able to understand the practical rationality of his 
obligations should at least to some degree possess the virtues upon which he 
seeks to reflect. In other words, individuals' characters precede the process 
of practical rationality, and these characters should be constituted in 
traditions in which notions of the common good and the good prevail. 
Accordingly, Macintyre' s opposition to the individualism of Liberalism can 
be summed up in his attitude toward tradition; however, we should note, as 
will be discussed below, that he does not defend tradition as such; rather, he 
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has a nonnative view of tradition, and defends traditions that fo llow the 
model of Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions. The reason for this will be 
explained in the present chapter. To this end, in what follows, I seek to 
explore what account of tradition MacIntyre has in mind, and what 
functions traditions play in his approach. The main aim of this chapter is to 
clarify Macintyre's notion of tradition, and why he has a positive attitude 
toward the classical , Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions. In other words, 
as the main aim ofmy thesis is to explain Maclntyre 's view concerning the 
relationship between traditions and practical rationality, as a first step I 
should clarify what he means by the notion of tradition, and how traditions 
can constitute practical rationalities. 
1.2 Maclntyre's Application of the Term Tradition 
MacIntyre has used the term tradition in different ways and with 
different attributes. A survey shows him using this term in the following 
contexts: 
Catholic philosophical tradition (2009a, p.33) 1, tradition of the virtues 
(1981, p.xi), tradition of enquiry (1981, p.xii) , moral tradition (1981, p.xii), 
long tradition of moral commentary (1981, p.25), dramatic tradition (1981 , 
p.27), traditional societies (1981 , p.33), traditional authority (1981, p.42) , 
European tradition (1981, p.44), traditional Christian prohibition of suicide 
(1981, p.47), classical tradition (1981, p.58), Aristotelian tradition (1981 , 
p.58), Thomistic tradition (1988a, p.403), traditional structure (198 l , p.60), 
traditional morality (1981, p.62), traditional concept of justice ( l 981 , p.70), 
sophistic tradition (1981 , p.140), modem tradition ( 1981 , p.233) , scientific 
tradition (1990a, p.118), tradition of moral thought (1981 , p.147), rational 
tradition (1981, p.147) , medieva l tradition (1981 , p.167), Neoplatonic 
tradition ( 198 l , p.175), corrupt traditions (1981 , p.223), social and 
intellectual tradition ( 1988a, p. 7), tradition-constituted and tradition-
constitutive enquiry (1988a, p.354), cultural tradition (1990a, p.228), 
1 For the sake of brevity, throughout the enti re thesis, whenever the name of an author in 
parentheses is not mentioned, and is not preceded in the sentence before the parenthesis , the 
author is Alasdai r Macintyre, as in the above examples . 
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theological tradition (1988a, p.253), Scottish tradition (1988a, p.252), 
transformation of Liberalism into a tradition (1988a, ch.xvii), the 
Enlightenment tradition (1981, p.93), among the other applications of the 
term. 
In my view, some of these applications seem to be in tension with one 
another. On the one hand, MacIntyre in After Virtue speaks of the classical 
and Aristotelian tradition, traditional morality, the Thomistic tradition, a 
traditional account of justification, tradition-constituted and tradition-
constitutive rational enquiry and the like. In the same book, he represents 
modem individualistic Libera lism as containing fragments of the classical 
tradition (1981, p.111 ). These applications of the term tradition indicate 
Maclntyre's normative attitude, that is, modem morality is undergoing a 
crisis as a result of leaving behind the classical and Aristotelian tradition in 
which human beings were understood in terms of their social or natural 
functions or of their telos (1981, p.60). On the other hand, the list includes 
the application of the term tradition in cases, like the Enlightenment or 
Liberalism, of which MacIntyre has a negative opinion. 
As the list above indicates, MacIntyre has also spoken of the 
En lightenment tradition, modem tradition, scientific tradition and the 
transformation of Liberalism into a tradition. This is slightly strange, since 
he has also referred to the marginalization of the concept of tradition and the 
traditional mode of thought and of rational justification in the 
Enlightenment era (1981, ch.4); if so, how can he ascribe consistently the 
notion of tradition to Liberalism and Modernism? 
To put this in another way, the reader of Macintyre's works who reads 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? fo llowing After Virtue might find some 
inconsistencies in Maclntyre ' s use of the term tradition. One aspect of this 
incoherence, or seeming incoherence, taking into account the distinction I 
wi ll make below between the general and ideal senses of tradition, is the 
following. 
MacIntyre starts After Virtue with the contention that modern liberal 
morality is in a catastrophic situation, since it has lost the background in 
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which it used to find meaning and justification, and consequently 
degenerating into fragments wrenched from their context (1981 , p.60). This 
is the overall idea of MacIntyre, covering the bulk of After Virtue as the 
predicament of modem morality. However, in chapter 17 of Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality?, entitled "Liberalism Transformed into a Tradition", he 
depicts Liberalism as a tradition with its own particular notions of the 
human good, rational justification and justice; while the idea expressed in 
After Virtue was that Liberalism has lost the classical and the functional 
concept ofa human being (1981 , pp.60-61), which logically should have the 
result that Liberalism lacks the capacity for any rational justification of its 
morality even in its own terms, rather than the idea that Liberalism is a 
particular tradition with its own measures of practical rationality and justice, 
a view that is upheld in chapter 17 of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? as 
stated above. 
To resolve this problem, I suggest dividing Maclntyre ' s terminology of 
tradition into two groups as follows: !-Tradition in a general sense, and 2-
tradition in an ideal sense. By the general sense of tradition, I mean the view 
that there are different existing de facto traditions, each with its own norms 
and values, which impose some limitations on inter-traditional 
understanding and communication. By the ideal sense of tradition, I mean 
that different traditions do not enjoy equal resources and capacities to tackle 
their own problems, but some of them, due to their particular structures and 
resources, are more resourced to successfully pass an "epistemological 
crisis"2, and to avoid sterility, as is the case with Thomism in Macintyre 's 
view (1990a, pp.146). As MacIntyre (2006d, p. l 11) puts it, some social 
settings only embody "di storted and fragmented or otherwi se counterfeit 
versions" of practical and moral concepts; whereas, some others embody 
rationally adequate practical and moral concepts. The former type describes 
what I named as the general , and the latter type describes the ideal sense of 
traditions. 
2This is a pivotal expression for MacIntyre, which will be explained in detail in chapter 4. It 
points to a state in which a tradition fails to progress and solve its problems using its own 
resources and by its own measures of rationality and progress. 
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On the basis of this distinction, in Maclntyre's view (1988a, p.345), 
Liberalism is a tradition, that is "the voice of a tradition", in the general 
sense with its own particular notion of the good and of justice; however, this 
tradition is not an ideal tradition, in the sense that its conceptual scheme is 
not ri ch enough to save it from sterility; a sterility that reveals itself through 
symptoms like the intractabi lity of moral disputes within its frame. Thus, 
though there are different traditions each with its own notions of practical 
rationality and justice, some deserve more rational confidence of their 
proponents concerning their accounts of practical rationality and justice: 
Those who have thought their way through the topics of 
justice and practical rationa lity, from the standpoint 
constructed by and in the direction pointed out first by 
Aristotle and then by Aquinas, have every reason at least so 
far to hold that the rationality of their tradition has been 
confirmed in its encounters with other traditions . . . (1988a, 
pp.402-403). 
Also : 
We still, in spite of the efforts of three centuries of moral 
phi losophy and one of sociology, lack any coherent 
rationally defensible statement of a liberal individualist 
point of view; [while] , on the other hand, the· Aristotelian 
tradition can be restated in a way that restores intelligibility 
and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and 
commitments (1981, p.259). 
The preceding remarks show that MacIntyre is not neutral toward 
different traditions; rather, he is, since writing After Virtue or even before 
that, oriented toward a kind of tradition exemplified in Aristotelianism and 
later in Thomism. This way of approaching MacIntyre lets us understand 
some difficult and complicated aspects of his view, including his distance 
from relativism and communitarianism, by offering a consistent picture of 
his theory. Accordingly, some appl ications of the term tradition mentioned 
above fall into the category of tradition in the general sense, like the 
Enlightenment tradition, the modem tradition, the liberal tradition, the 
philosophical tradition, the scie.ntific tradition; and some belong to the 
category of tradition in the ideal sense, like the classical tradition, the 
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Aristotelian tradition, the tradition of the virtues and the like. In light of th is 
di stinction, a social or historical structure might embody a tradition in the 
general sense but not a tradition in the ideal sense. In the section, I wi ll 
consider features of traditions in both general and ideal senses. 
1.3 The Features of Traditions in Maclntyre's Work 
After explaining the two different notions of tradition, it is worth 
considering what constitutes the two senses of tradition. According to the 
picture offered by MacIntyre, it is possible to summarize the features of a 
tradition in the general sense as follows. 
1.3.1 The Features of Traditions in the General Sense 
The first feature concerns the time-bound nature of tradition. A 
tradition is an accumulation of discussions and disputes on a single subject 
or related subjects through a relatively long period of time. When there are 
intractable and ongoing disputes, or there is a long history of commentary 
on a subj ect, a tradition of the subject would be formed, even if its content is 
contrary to the notion of tradition in the ideal sense. The quote below 
reveals this idea clearly. 
Liberalism, beginning as a repudiation of tradition in the 
name of abstract, universal principles of reason, turned 
itself into a politically embodied power, whose inability to 
bring its debates on the nature and context of those 
universal principles to a conclusion has had the unintended 
effect of transforming liberali sm into a tradition (1988a, 
p.349). 
As indicated above, the inconclusiveness of disputes within Liberalism 
has produced through time arguments and counter-arguments, which might 
be called a tradition of Liberalism, though a common feature of these 
arguments is their individualistic hostility to the notion of tradition in the 
ideal sense. 
The second feature concerns the ex istence of some kind of simil arity, 
continui ty or core concepts in a tradition. There should be someth ing 
constant in a tradition, joining its different and succeeding periods and parts 
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to characterize it as a single tradition. Based upon this description, what 
makes the Enlightenment or Liberalism a tradition is basic principle or 
principles emerging in different shapes through their history; otherwise and 
if the continuities or similarities were not distinguished enough, there would 
be traditions (plural) of Liberalism and the Enlightenment. Thus, when 
MacIntyre dismisses the neutrality of Liberalism, I take him to be saying 
that while Liberalism has the notion of neutrality as an ideal , throughout its 
history a somehow constant, specific and thus non-neutral view of the 
human good has accumulated in its different versions. This view of human 
nature and its good, inter alia, makes these versions counted as forming the 
tradition of Liberalism, even if a basic principle of Liberalism is the 
opposition to any notion of traditional mode of thought and authority. 
The third feature of tradition in the general sense is that its assumptions 
may be unnoticed and unacknowledged. Those who are reasoning in the 
context of a given tradition are usually unaware of the presuppositions 
provided to them by the tradition. Contacts with other traditions might 
reveal to them these assumptions. For instance, in Maclntyre's terms, 
"Aristotle's importance therefore can only be specified in terms of a kind of 
tradition whose existence he himself did not and could not have 
acknowledged" (1981 , p.14 7). Based upon these features , I think the 
following definition by MacIntyre holds for tradition in the general sense. 
A tradition is an argument extended through time in which 
certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined 
in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics and 
enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least 
key parts of those fundamental agreements, and those 
internal, interpretati ve debates ... (! 988a, p. I 2). 
This account of tradition mainly applies to tradition as it has been used 
in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, which concerns largely traditions of 
intellectual and moral enqui ry. In what fo llows, I wi ll explain the features of 
tradition in the ideal sense in Maclntyre ' s view, and what conditions apply 
for a tradition in the genera l sense to quali fy as a tradition in the ideal sense. 
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1.3.2 The Features of Traditions in the Ideal Sense 
One feature of a tradition in the ideal sense, or as MacIntyre 
sometimes describes it , a tradition in good order, concerns its progressive 
and cumulative aspect. There certainly might be substantial agreements and 
disputes in a tradition, but in a well-ordered tradition, there is a progressive 
direction in arguments within the history of the tradition, as well as in the 
arguments between the tradition and its predecessors. The tradition in its 
relation to its predecessors moves toward making itself more adequate, and 
resolving the defects or epistemological crises that might have occurred to 
its predecessors and to itself. The lack of progress, in Mac!ntyre's view, is a 
sign of deficit of some kind in a tradition (1981 , p.xiii). 
Traditions, when they are progressive, are marked with some 
substantial agreements; thus, in Maclntyre's view (1981, pp.6-8), the 
insolvability of liberal moral arguments in cases like abortion and just war is 
a sign of the loss that has happened to thi s tradition; since the contending 
arguments are finally based on some incommensurable concepts like justice, 
human rights, equality, universali zability etc. , such that proponents of 
arguments are unable to convince each other rationally; in other words, 
there is no encompassing concept like the notion of the good which can rank 
order these incommensurable measures. Therefore, though the aggregation 
of arguments and counter-arguments might construct a tradition, these 
arguments should have a progressive direction in order to develop 
widespread agreements to transcend the limits of past arguments, and not to 
remain in a state of epistemological crisis and intellectual sterility; so as 
MacIntyre (1981, pp.146-147) puts it, "when a tradition is in good order, 
when progress is taking place, there is always a certain cumulative element 
to a tradition". 
Another feature of an ideal tradition, which pertains to moral traditions, 
is that it consists of agreements and arguments about the vi rtues and the 
good of its members; as MacIntyre puts it, " .. when a tradition is in good 
order it is always partially constituted by an argument about the goods the 
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pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particular point and purpose" 
( 1981 , p.222). 
According to this condition, Liberalism, unlike Aristotelianism, is not 
an ideal tradition, because it has, in Maclntyre 's account, discarded any 
notion of the common good by the privatization ofit: 
Allegiance to any particular conception of human good 
ought, on this libera l view, to be a matter of private 
individual preference and choice, and it is contrary to 
rationality to require of anyone that he or she should agree 
with anyone else in giving his or her allegiance to some 
particular view (1990b, p.346). 
The importance of the notion of the good and an overall consensus 
upon it lies in that it gives integrity to a tradition; also, the notion of the 
common good provides a common basis for the rational justification of 
morality and for the intelligibility of actions. 
In response to a possible objection that there are common moral norms 
in a liberal society, like the principle of respecting all people regardless of 
their notions of the good, which can terminate moral and practical tensions 
in the absence of the notion of the common good, MacIntyre would argue 
that our moral and political life is deeply affected by moral di sagreements, 
and these disagreements are disguised and concealed by the invention of "an 
idiom of consensus with regard to values". In his view, there are conflicting 
accounts of the virtues, like the Aristotelian and the Humean ones, and so a 
public moral theory cannot be neutral between these alternatives, and yet be 
substantial enough to adjudicate moral and practical conflicts (1991a, p.5). 
Having explained the different features of the general and ideal senses 
of tradition, I should also di scuss different functions of traditions in 
Maclntyre 's account. I here only briefly refer to these functions, and will 
discuss them fully in the next chapter. Ideal traditions, in fact, differ from 
general traditions as they serve these functions better that do other 
traditions. These functions include I-providing consistent conceptual 
schemes, as is the case with Aristotelian and Thomistic morality in which 
the accounts of human nature, the human good and morality offer a 
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consistent conceptual scheme in which an objective rationality can be based 
on interactions between its elements, as will be explained in the next section 
in this chapter; 2-traditions as a context for the defin ition and exercise of the 
virtues, which points to Maclntyre's virtue-ethics and the necessity of 
having virtues for practical rationality; 3-the methodological function of 
traditions, which refers to Maclntyre 's anti-epistemological account of first 
principles, that is, his view that we do not have access to these principles at 
the beginning of our enquiries and we should begin with our traditions' 
contingent starting-points in order to arrive later at more adequate accounts 
and finally at first principles of our enquiries. I will return to this issue in the 
next chapter. 
Having explained Maclntyre 's application of the term tradition, the 
ideal and general senses of traditions and their features, and traditions ' 
functions, in the next section I shall discuss why the ideal sense of tradition 
for MacIntyre is best exemplified in the Aristotelian and Thomistic 
traditions. This is because these traditions provide consistent conceptual 
schemes, promote the virtues and possess intellectual resources that enable 
them to pass epistemological cri ses. 
1.4 The Structure of the Classical and Thomistic Moral Traditions 
and the Rational Justification of Morality 
Maclntyre's appraisal of the classical and in particular the Aristotelian 
and Thomistic traditions in part stems tacitly from an account of rationality 
that, in his view, can be provided best in the classical tradition.3 MacIntyre 
has taken rationality in ethics as the ideal of objectivity; i.e. what is 
derivable from practical syllogisms independently of individuals' 
preferences. Objectivity here stands opposite to subjectivity which in turn 
means an idea is dependent on personal judgments.This objective deri vation 
3 Also, as will be explained in this and forthcoming chapter, one reason behind Maclntyre's 
advocacy of Thomism as a tradition of intellectual and moral enquiry is that this tradition 
invokes dialectical and fallibilistic reasoning which MacIntyre thinks is necessary for 
attaining truth. 
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is possible in the Aristotelian tradition, due the existence of the notion of the 
hwnan good in this tradition. 
MacIntyre, thus, looks for a deductive kind of practical rationality. A 
cogent argwnent is deductive when the truth of its conclusion is the logical 
consequence of the premises, where they themselves are true. This picture 
of practical rationality is the opposite of emotivism which emphasizes the 
relativity of moral statements to subjective moral preferences, and denies 
the cognitive nature of moral propositions; that is to say, we cannot speak of 
the objective rightness or wrongness of these propositions. 
MacIntyre (1988a, p.301) holds that for Hume, as a moral emotivist, 
passions are original existences, which means motivating passions are 
neither reasonable nor unreasonable; in other words, we cannot appeal to 
any criteria other than passions to deem them as reasonable or unreasonable. 
As opposed to this, in the classical tradition, internal goods of practices, 
narrative hwnan life and tradition, in Maclntyre's social view as presented 
in After Virtue, can serve as objective measures independently of personal 
preferences to justify moral statements. These goods can serve as major 
premises of practical syllogisms, which in conjunction with minor premises 
yield a conclusion that is independent of our individual subjective 
preferences, and indeed corrects these preferences (1988a, p.129). 
The independent nature of the results of the practical syllogism in the 
Aristotelian scheme is such that it does not leave any room for human free 
will to decide upon the action. According to the Aristotelian account of 
practical rationality, if there is enough knowledge of the good, and tbe agent 
is sufficiently virtuous, the conclusion would terminate in an action 
accordant with the results, without there being any place for the will to 
deliberate further; in tbis case, MacIntyre holds, "There is no logical space 
for something else to intervene: a decision, for example. For the full y 
rational agent, there is nothing remaining to be decided" (1988a, p.140). 
The teleological view employed in Aristotelian ethics makes a 
conceptual scheme in which different parts fit together to provide an 
objective justification for ethics. This conceptual scheme consists of three 
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parts, i.e. an account of hwnan-nature-as-it is, an account of human-nature-
as-it shou ld be, and an account of moral principles as what makes the 
transition from the former to the latter poss ible. In a tradition of virtue in the 
ideal sense, there is extensive agreement on human nature, the hwnan good 
and the precepts of morality, which all refer to each other to make an 
intelligible scheme (1981, p.52). 
The appeal to human nature here points to the existence of 
metaphysical elements in Maclntyre 's social approach; but his metaphysical 
approach at this stage is overshadowed by his social teleology, which will 
be explained below, and is different from the natural law trad ition he 
espouses later according to which every individual qua a human being has a 
potentia lity to flouri sh through a life of virtue. It seems that at this social 
stage, human nature is what is constituted as a social identity in a tradition 
through the eyes of others, rather than in the image of God. 
In this social teleology, individuals pursue their goods by subjecting 
their desires to the internal goods of practices, narratives and traditions. In 
what fo llows, I shall explain further, from Maclntyre's perspective, why the 
classica l tradition has been able to provide this kind of rational justification 
for its morality. 
This account of practical rational ity, which consists in concl usions 
derived from the conjunction of major and minor premises, is also 
compatible with Maclntyre's dialectical account of rationality; as he writes, 
the rationality of a tradition " is in key and essentia l part a matter of the kind 
of progress which it makes through a number of well -defined types of 
stage" ( 1988a, p.354).The app lication of dialectic, as a method of constant 
questioning from contingent beliefs toward necessary truths, gradually 
improves our understanding of major and minor premises, which both 
concern respective ly what our goods are and the particular situations that 
conduce to our good. 
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I.4.1 The Process of Practice-Narrative-Tradition 
MacIntyre started out his criticism of the Enlightenment project and the 
modem liberal tradition by offering a social teleology in order to avoid what 
he then took to be untenable Aristotelian metaphysical and biological 
assumptions. By a socia l teleology, he had in mind firstly the view that we 
need the notion of the good in order to have an intelligible system of moral 
justification. Secondly, he used to think that this notion of the good should 
not be metaphysically Aristotelian, because there are elements in such a 
view which are not tenable, for instance, Aristotelian biological metaphysics 
or the Aristotelian view of the natural inferior position of women or slaves 
(2007, p.xi). 
In order to avoid these indefensible views, MacIntyre introduced social 
goods, which are defined in tum in practices, in human life as a unified 
picture and in moral traditions. MacIntyre used this three-phase process as a 
context for the definition of the virtues and right actions. The first two 
phases are tentative locations for this definition, which needs to be 
articulated into the final phase, that is, a moral tradition. This social 
teleology paves the way for an objective justification of morality based on 
the internal goods of practices, narrative and traditions.· 
At this stage, MacIntyre was criticized on the grounds that his social 
teleology was open to the charge of formalism unless he provided this 
account with a substantial account of the good.4 He later on accepted that he 
should base his moral theory on some metaphysical grounds, but insisted 
that his general view from After Virtue onwards would not be affected by 
this metaphysical tum (2007, p.xi; 2008, p.276). 
Maclntyre' s emphasis on continuity in his works indicates that I can 
still refer to the process of practices- narrative- tradition in his social 
teleol ogy as an existing element of Maclntyre's current moral thought. 
What has happened is that his notion of the good in this process has become 
'See for instance A. Gewirth (1984, p.43), W. K. Frankena (1983, p.586), D. Miller (1984, 
p.58), R. J. Wallace (1989, p.336) among others. 
29 
more metaphysical than it was before. This process in its social vers ion runs 
as fo llows. 
The first stage of the process is the practice. By a practice MacIntyre 
means "any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realized" (1981, p.1 87). According to this definition, MacIntyre identifies 
two related concepts: I) standards of excellence and rules, and 2) the 
achievement of internal goods. A practice for MacIntyre is constituted by 
the achievement of internal goods which, in tum, determine some standards 
as the standards of excellence. 
Internal goods are the main aims of practices. The characteristic of 
these goods is that " their achievement is a good for the whole community 
who participate in the practice"; by contrast, the characteristic of external 
goods is that the more someone has of them, the less remains for others 
(1981, p.190). Consider, for instance, the playing of chess as a practice 
whose final end is to strengthen one's mental power and the ability to think 
and manage strategically, or simply, to have some kind of entertainment and 
enjoyment. Some points are apposite as follows. 
There is an internal good, here strategic thinking or fair entertainment, 
which constitutes the playing of chess. This concept is used to define the 
game's regulations. Ideally, it classifies actions that occur within the 
practice as right or wrong, allowed or disallowed. The achievement of this 
internal good is the main criterion for right actions in the play. Th e rules of 
chess, if they are supposed to be in the service of its original interna l goods, 
should be fomrnlated such that they secure those goods. 
MacIntyre (1981, p.191) defines a virtue at this provisional stage as 
"an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to 
enable us to achieve those goods which are in terna l to practices and the lack 
of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods." This 
definition, MacIntyre asserts, is a tentati ve one and needs to be completed 
further. 
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There also are some external or peripheral goods acquired by the 
pursuit of the game, such as wealth, fa me and pride, which in some cases 
are necessary for sustaining institutions that support a practice; but if these 
external goods replace the internal goods or are placed before them, the 
whole character of the game wou ld degenerate fundamentally. Suppose that 
the dominant goal of a chess player is to achieve fame; in thi s case he can 
rig the game, if he is sure that the fra ud will not be detected, without 
missing the good he has in mind. A better example is the invention of 
"nursery cannons"5 in billiards, as a measure within the game's rules, wh ich 
ruins the cooperative and competitive nature of the game for the sake of 
winning, unless a limitation is placed on the number that can be played 
consecutively. 
The last point above indicates the possibility of the deviation of 
practices from their main interna l goods. This deviation may be explained in 
terms of human beings' motivations and self-interest, or as a result of the 
gradua l neglect of internal goods over the course of time. Accordingly, 
practices need some traits and characteristics on the part of those 
participating in them to avoid divergence, and to keep their own integrity. 
These traits, or the virtues in Maclntyre ' s terms like the virtues of justice, 
courage and honesty, prevent the participants from considering the practices 
as mere devices to achieve external goods (198 1, p.191 ). 
The common aspect of a ll these characteristics-justice, courage and 
honesty-which leads MacIntyre to describe them as "genuine virtues" is 
that they subordinate the participants in the practice to its internal good(s); 
all of these virtues require people to appeal to some impersonal criteria in 
thei r relationships and judgments (198 1, p.192). In other words, the virtues 
serve as objective criteria to subordinate individual desires, and to direct 
them toward the good of practices; a view that is, in Maclntyre 's account, at 
odds with moral emotivism according to which moral statements are simply 
the expression of personal preferences. Among the virtues that fu lfi ll this 
5 I owe this example to Jeremy Shearmur, at the Australian National University, School of 
Philosophy. 
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function are the virtues of justice, truthfulness and courage. Wi thout these 
virtues "practices cannot be sustained", because individual self-interest wi ll 
prevail and degenerate practices which were based on some objective 
measures to realize their internal goods (1981 , p.1 92). This subj ection of 
desires to the virtues offers the objective account of practical rationality 
which I claimed MacIntyre is seeking for. 
I should note here that Maclntyre 's picture of the virtues defined in 
social terms has a restricted pluralistic sense; that is to say, though the 
virtues converge on having the function of managing and directing 
individual desires, there might be different versions of these virtues in 
different traditions; for instance, as MacIntyre notes: 
Lutheran pietists brought up their children to believe that 
one ought to tell the truth to everybody at all times, 
whatever the circumstances or consequences, and Kant was 
one of their children. Traditional Bantu parents brought up 
their children not to tell the truth to unknown strangers, 
since they believed that this could render the family 
vulnerable to witchcraft. In our culture many of us have 
been brought up not to tell the truth to elderly great-aunts 
who invite us to admire their new hats. But each of these 
codes embodies an acknowledgment of the virtue of 
truthfulness. So it is also with varying codes of justice and 
of courage (1981, pp.191-192). 
In my view, MacIntyre here should have emphasized the restricted 
sense in which virtues vary between traditions. For instance, the inter-
traditional variance regarding the virtue of truth-telling is limited to the 
exceptions to th is general virtue, and does not concern the valid ity of thi s 
vi rtue. In other words, all moral traditions should value truthfulness, and 
they might partly differ only in terms of occasions on which lying is 
pennitted. MacIntyre also agrees with this interpretation where he endorses 
Aquinas' view that the primary precepts of the natural law are va lid across 
cultures, and only the secondary precepts which concern the implication of 
these p1imary precepts might vary (2009b, p.6). 
So far, the notion of practice and its role in defining the virtues and 
vices have been explained. In passing, I need also to show how MacIntyre 
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maintains that this notion relates to the notions of narrative and tradition. 
MacIntyre has taken three strategies to justify the necessity for the merging 
of practices into a tradition that is informed by a unified picture of human 
Ii fe. The three strategies are as follows. 
I-MacIntyre (1981, p.191) states that his account of the virtues in 
terms of practices could only be a partial and provisional account which 
needs something to complement it to preclude arbitrariness in practices. ln 
his view, if different and incompatible practices are not put in a broader 
context, that is a unified human life, individuals will find themselves 
oscillating arbitrarily between practices; as a consequence, it may seem that 
practices finally derive their authority from subjective individual decisions, 
which runs contrary to the ideal of objectivity. 
The claims of different practices might conflict with each other, putting 
the agent in a tragic conflict; a position in which the agent cannot 
understand or exercise di fferent goods consistently. Thus, in Macintyre's 
view, defining the virtues in terms of the internal goods of practices does 
not suffice to prevent clashes between the virtues of different practices. For 
instance, a chess player when he sees a child is drowning nearby faces a 
clash bet\veen the practice of chess, and the practice of swimming in order 
to save the child. Here the chess player needs to rank order the two practices 
to remove the clash, which requires the wider context oftbe human good.6 
MacIntyre maintains that Aristotle, by putting the virtues in the context 
of a whole human life, was able to predicate them as good, and to disallow 
the possibility of moral tragic conflicts (1981, p.201); "both Plato and 
Aristotle treat conflict as an evil and Aristotle treats it as an eliminable evil" 
(1981, p.157). The elimination of conflicts for Aristotle occurs by locating 
them in a unified picture of human life with a final good, which can be used 
to adjudicate among conflicting goods. 
6I, however, will argue in chapter 6 that the removal of conflicts in these cases does not 
require the final human good; instead, we can appeal to human basic goods for this 
purpose. 
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2-The second strategy is that the virtues such as justice and patience 
presuppose a hierarchical order of goods. Justice in an Aristotelian scheme 
is defined as giving each person his due or desert; so MacIntyre (198 1, 
p.202) holds that "goods internal to practices need to be ordered and 
evaluated in some way ifwe are to assess relati ve deserts." 
There are two equally intelligible ways of understanding Maclntyre's 
claim. The first is that some practices might have more than one internal 
good, so the assessment of individuals ' deserts entai ls having a hierarchical 
order of the goods in order to evaluate what is truly their due. The second is 
that there are different practices with different interna l goods the assessment 
of which needs to be based on a hierarchical order of these goods. 
3-The third way in which MacIntyre attempts to articu late practices 
into the narrative of human life is by appeal to the virtue of constancy or 
integrity which is the virtue that, in hi s view, cannot be specified at all 
except with reference to the wholeness of a human life (1981 , p.203). In 
other words, the notion of singleness of purpose as a basis for this virtue is 
only applicab le in the context of a unified human life.7 Accordingly, 
MacIntyre (1981, p.203) concludes that, unless there is a concept of a final 
telos that transcends the limited goods of practices, it will be both the case 
that (1) a certain subversive arbitrariness wi ll invade a person's moral li fe , 
and (2) we sha ll be unable to specify the context of certain virtues 
adequately. The word that MacIntyre uses to describe the uni ty of human 
life is "narrative". A narrative possesses integrity with respect to its subject, 
such that its different episodes are connected to each other to convey a 
unified picture of the subject; the same MacIntyre suggests should be the 
case for a human life (1981, pp.218-219). 
The notion of narrative which gives a unity to human li fe is also 
associated with Maclntyre's account of the intelligibility of actions. 
MacIntyre holds that the intelligibility of an action li es in its relation to the 
agent' s antecedent states and actions. An action is different from a bodily 
71, however, think this argument begs the question of why we need such an account of 
singleness of life. 
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movement in that the latter requires causes for its explanation; while an 
action requires reasons that have relationships to the agent'·s wider narrative 
of life (1987b, pp.24-25). In chapter 6, I will criticize this account of 
intelligibility which requires a unified picture of human life. 
MacIntyre so far has finished the second stage of the process of 
defining the virtues. Up to this point, he has located the virtues in the 
context of a good life for a human being, elevating it from the context of 
practices; thus he defines a vi rtue as follows : 
The virtues therefore are to be understood as those 
dispositions which will not only sustain practices and 
enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but 
which wi ll also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for 
the good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, 
temptation and distractions which we encounter and which 
wi ll furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and 
increasing knowledge of the good (1981, p.219). 
MacIntyre continues to locate the virtues in the wider context of a 
moral tradition. He argues that to enter into a practice, " is to enter into a 
relationship with others not only with its contemporary practitioners, but 
also with those who preceded us in the practice, particularly those whose 
achievements extended the reach of the practice to its present point" (1981 , 
p.194). 
If we suppose that every person from the past to the present point has a 
unified life, which is a narrative, we admit that they have social and 
historical identities, and that their narratives are intertwined; "the narrative 
of any one life is part ofan interlocking set of narratives" (1981 , p.218). It is 
these interlocked narratives and the discussions about those narratives that 
make a tradition; a tradition that MacIntyre defines as follows, "A living 
tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and 
an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that 
tradition" (1981 , p.222). 
As we have seen so far, MacIntyre in this social account has offered a 
three-phase definition of genuine virtues, that is, practice-narrative- moral 
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tradition, maintaining that a trait needs to meet al l the three phases to be 
qualified as a virtue, "no human quality is to be accounted a virtue unless it 
satisfies the conditions specified at each of the three stages" ( 198 I , p.27 5). 
The practice, thus, articulates into a tradition both in terms of the virtues 
that we need to regulate our relationships with other people in our tradition 
on the basis of the common good, and in tern1 s of a rationa li ty that is 
defined as a progress in a tradition as a fonn of enquiry, as was expla ined 
above regarding the methodological function of traditions. 
In this section , after explaining the different funct ions of traditions, I 
discussed the structure of the classical moral tradition, which shed some 
light on why MacIntyre espouses this tradition. The main reason fo r 
Maclntyre 's advocacy of the classical tradition, as a tradition in the idea l 
sense, consists in the kind of objectivity and narrative unity that thi s 
tradition bestows on moral li fe. Distinguishing goods into internal and 
external goods, and emphasizing the notions of the common good and the 
virtues for subordinating individual desires have made the class ica l tradition 
capable of providing an adequate account of mora lity, which can rationa lly 
justi fy its c laims. In other words, the structure of Aristotelian and Thom istic 
morality, which is based on the notions of the common good and 
individuals' good, provides a convincing justifi cation for individua ls to 
subordinate their personal preferences to the good which is independent of 
their preferences. Also, the di chotomy between individual and the common 
good would cease to exist as a result of the ordering of the fonner to the 
latter (1998b, p.24 1). In the fina l chapter, I will , however, argue that the 
notions of the objectivity of the good and the narrative uni ty of life are not 
required for the morality and intelligibility of actions, and that the bas ic 
fea tures of human beings as vulnerable and rational beings provide a 
platform fo r the rational j ustifica tion of mora lity without the need for the 
notion of the human good. 
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1.5 The Dialectical and Fallibilistic Aspect in Maclntyre's defence of 
Aquinas' Thought 
Besides the objectivity point mentioned above, there is another aspect 
to Thomism that explains Maclntyre's espousal of this tradi tion as a 
tradition of intellectual and moral enquiry; that is to say, this tradition 
exemplifies dialectical and fallibilistic reasoning that MacIntyre thinks is 
necessary for approaching the truth, as wil l be explained further in chapters 
3 and 4. Thus, the ideal sense of tradition for MacIntyre is better presented 
in Thomism than in Augustinianism. The difference lies in the emphasis that 
MacIntyre places on the necessity of rational appraisal and constant 
openness to the revision and falsification of traditions, which can be seen in 
Aquinas' thought. 
J. Porter (2003, p.62) argues that for MacIntyre the Augustinian 
account of moral enquiry which emphasizes the role of obedience to 
authority as a pre-rational condition for rational enquiries has not been 
superseded by Aquinas' synthesis. By Augustinian moral enquiry, Porter 
(2003, p.63) has in mind Maclntyre's reference to the "continuous 
authority" of masters; as MacIntyre puts it: 
So continuous authority receives its just1fication as 
indispensable to a continuing progress, the narrative of 
which we first learned bow to recount from that authority 
and the truth of which is confirmed by our own further 
progress, including that progress made by means of 
dialectical enquiry. The practice of specifically Augustinian 
dialectic and the belief of the Augustinian dialectician that 
this practice is a movement towards a truth never as yet 
wholly grasped thus presupposes the guidance of authori ty 
(1990a, pp.92-93). 
Maclntyre 's espousal of authority culminates, Porter (2003, p.63) 
observes, in the way he espouses the acceptance of the verdict of the church 
by Peter Abelard regarding his heresy (1990a, p.91 ). Nevertheless, I think 
Porter's point with regard to Maclntyre's continuous approval of 
Augustinian authority is flawed and at odds wi th Maclntyre 's major themes 
regarding the rational superiority of Thomism over Aristotelianism and 
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Augustiniani sm, and also with hi s fallibili stic interpretation of Aquinas to 
be explained in chapters 3 and 4. 
MacIntyre, in the quote above, narrates the acknowledgement of the 
heresy charge by Abelard from an Augustini an perspective, and is not 
stating hi s own point of view (1990a, p.9 1). From the Augustin ian 
perspective quoted above, the authority of genuine masters is unchallenged; 
otherwise, pride that is the origin of a ll sins appears. For Augustine pride is 
affiliated with vices (see City of God, xix.25). 
There are many reasons to think that Maclntyre 's account of authority 
is not purely Augustinian , and that it is mixed with Thomistic inclinations. 
Maclntyre 's account of virtue-ethics, which will be explained in the next 
chapter, refl ects most of the Augustin ian elements regarding the necess ity of 
obedience to moral masters in order to become virtuous and practica lly 
rational. These Augustin ian elements, however, are mixed with Maclntyre 's 
emphasis on the necess ity of rational appraisa l, and with hi s fa llibilistic 
interpretation of Aquinas' thought (2006f, p.163). This mixture is not totally 
devoid of tensions, as it is not clear, for instance, to what extent the 
authority of moral masters is or should be open to eva luation. 
MacIntyre (199 I a, p.64) holds that standards of achievement in any 
craft or practice are justifi ed hi storically through the criticism of their 
predecessors by transcending past limitations. This view is different from 
the continuing authority of a master in terms of which MacIntyre described 
Augustine 's view. Accordingly, though there is surely an element of 
authori ty and apprenticeship in Maclntyre 's virtue-ethics, his dialectical 
method approaches more Aquinas' view than Augustine's . This is an area in 
which MacIntyre thinks Aquinas has transcended Augustine's view 
regarding the incompatibility of fa ith and reason (2009a, pp. 74-75).After 
explaining Maclntyre's social teleo logy, and why this method is app lauded 
by hi m, that is, hi s account of rationa l justification as providing obj ecti vity, 
I shall di scuss Maclntyre's reasons for turning to a metaphys ical te leo logy, 
and explain what new contributi ons thi s shi ft can bring about for him. 
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J.6 Maclntyre's Turn to Metaphysical Account of the Good 
The main reason for Maclntyre's tum to a metaphysica l account of the 
virtues and the good is that this account saves Maclntyre's approach from 
the charge of forma lism; that is to say, the metaphysica l account renders his 
social teleology substantial, as a position that can reject some traits as vices, 
though they are functional to . a practice or a tradition. Let me begin with 
some explanation regarding why this social approach might lead to 
formalism. 
Some critics have pointed to the indeterminacy of Maclntyre's social 
approach to the virtues; i.e. they argue his position consists only of some 
procedures which are indeterminate regarding the content of the virtues. 
A.Gewirth (1984, p.43), W. K. Frankena (1983, p.586), D. Miller (1984, 
p.58), R. J. Wallace (I 989, p.336) among others have, on similar grounds, 
charged Maclntyre 's initial social theory with formalism ; for instance, 
Gewirth (1984, p.43) maintains that Maclntyre's definition of the good in 
terms of living best a unitary life does not differ from Kanti an universalism 
which MacIntyre has rejected as being formal. By formali sm here is meant 
that a method does not offer substantial criteria for its subjects, and that it 
only specifies some procedures that might equally apply to conflicting 
subjects. To explain the charge of formalism against MacIntyre, I shall 
explain his definition of the good life based on his social approach as 
follows. 
The good life for ma□ is the life spent in seeking for the 
good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking 
are those which will enable us to understand what more and 
what else the good life for man is (1981, p.219). 
This definition covers Maclntyre 's social approach up to the stage of 
narratives. He the□ continues to complete this definition as follows, which 
covers the full stage of practice-narrative- tradition: 
I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the virtues 
o□Jy qua individual. This is partly because what it is to live 
the good life concretely varies from circumstance to 
circumstance even when it is one and the same conception 
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of the good life and one and the same set of virtues which 
are being embodied in a human life. What the good life is 
for a fifth-century Athenian general will not be the same as 
what it was for a medieval nun or a seventeenth-century 
farmer ( 1981 , p.220). [Ital ics added] 
Clearly, defining the good in terms of seeking the good life is not 
substantially informative about the content of the good, unless we notice the 
latent Aristotelian-Thomistic inclination in this definition. The kind of the 
good and internal goods MacIntyre has in mind is Aristotelian, which for 
example, excludes the unlimited greed for wea lth as a genuine good. As 
Aristotle (Politics, I, 8-9) writes about two different senses of wealth-
accumulation, the good li fe sets some limits on the accumulation of wealth. 
Since Macintyre's notion of the good in social terms does not have adequate 
content, which is clear in his statement that "The good life for man is the 
life spent in seeking for the good life for man", I think he cannot at this 
stage as a result of this formalism dismiss evi l practices as genuine 
practices, because evil practices might have thei r own internal goods which 
sat isfy Macintyre's social approach outlined above. His model of the good 
life does not have a clear content either, without considering his Aristotelian 
and Thomistic background, as is clear in his saying that "the good life is for 
a fifth-century Athenian genera l wi ll not be the same as what it was for a 
medieval nun or a seventeenth-century farmer" (1981 , p.220).Based on this, 
I disagree with C. S. Lutz (2004, p.98) where he defends Maclntyre 's 
position on evil practices on the grounds that evil practices like running a 
slave labour camp cannot be a genuine practice because "there is nothing 
internal to that activity that can motivate a person to engage in it": 
Even the perverse pleasure one might take in dominating 
other people cannot be accounted an internal good, since it 
may be achieved by so many other sinister means. Some 
vicious people may be drawn to such activity merely fo r 
prestige, or for the pleasure of power, but these "goods" are 
external to the actual exercise of running a slave labor camp 
(Lutz 2004, p.98). 
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The problem with Lutz's view is that the way we define "sinister 
means" or "vicious people" as negative features, or define some ends such 
as prestige as external goods depends on our presupposed values. This 
social method cannot simply rule out some ends as external goods without 
involving those background values. Nothing can bar us from taking the 
pleasure of power as an internal good in Maclntyre's definition, unless we 
have some firm foundations to think otherwise; foundations which cannot 
be justified by the social approach, as we can imagine a community in 
which the practice of torturing is prevalent and is not dysfunctional to 
keeping that oppressive community running. 8 
This social approach is, indeed, more formalist than Kant's method of 
the categorical imperative. I can use Kant's notion to hold that enslaving 
others involves using them as instruments to my ends or not treating 
humanity as an end in itself. Kant's method is more substantial than 
Macintyre's, since it is based on the notion of human dignity; as A. Wood 
(2002, p.13) puts it : 
In Kant's theory, of course such a [rational] principle is a 
categorical imperative and the corresponding end or value 
is the dignity of humanity. This is not a relative end to be 
brought about- a not yet existing object to be pursued just 
because we desire it. It is something already existing that is 
an end in the sense that we are to act for the sake of its 
worth, which is to be respected in all our actions. [Italics 
added] 
8 C. S. Lutz (20 I 3) has responded to me in a personal communicat ion as follows. "German 
National Socialists who ran slave labor camps in German occupied Poland during WWIJ 
did not become better human beings through their management of those camps; they 
became hardened against concern for the needs of their laborers. The defects of character 
that would enable a person to run a slave labor cam p efficiently would not function as 
excellences in the second stage of Macintyre 's virtue definition in AV, and would disable 
the critical responsibility for one's social setting demanded by the third stage of the 
definition". 
I completely agree with Lutz that the Nazi officers did not become better human beings by 
running labor camps, as they did not respect the needs and digni ty of a group of human 
beings; however, I think this moral judgment is not derived solely from Maclntyre 's 
definition of practices at any of its levels independent of what we substantially and 
normatively think about human beings and their needs. Maclntyre's definition of the good 
life as "the life spent in seeking for the good life for man" per se does not yie ld such a 
normative judgment, unless we have a picture of the true human life in the background, 
which is responsive to human needs and dignity. 
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The criticism of Macintyre 's socia l theory of the virtues as being 
formalist resembles the same charge levelled by MacIntyre himself against 
Kant 's notion of the categorical imperative: 
I can without any inconsistency whatsoever flout it [the 
categorical imperative] ; "Let everyone except me be treated 
as a means" may be immoral , but it is not inconsistent and 
there is not even any inconsistency in willing a universe of 
egotists all of whom live by this maxim (1981 , p.46). 
MacIntyre is here referring to the first formulation of the categorical 
imperative based on the universali zability of the maxims of our actions as 
the condition of their morality. ln his view, in a world of egoists the 
instrumental treatment of others can consistently become a universal code of 
conduct. 
With regard to Maclntyre's own social theory, by the same token, we 
can imagine a world of egotists for whom evil practices contain internal 
goods, and also can form narratives and traditions based on some norms that 
are in the service of their tradition, and thus would count as virtues and yet 
are different from what we take to be the virtues; accordingly, Maclntyre 's 
social method is formal , and indeed more fonnal than Kant's method. 
MacIntyre later on admits the charge of formalism and the need for 
supplementing hi s social theory with metaphysical grounds regarding 
human nature and human flourishing; as he writes: 
But I had now learned from Aquinas that my attempt to 
provide an account of the human good purely in socia l 
tenns, in terms of practices, traditions, and the narrative 
unity of human lives, was bound to be inadequate until I 
had provided it with a metaphysical grounding. It is only 
because human beings have an end towards which they are 
directed by reason of their specific nature, that practices, 
trad itions, and the like are able to function as they do (2007, 
pp.x-xi) . 
There are two related strands to Maclntyre ' s metaphysica l approach; 
one is hi s metaphysica l view of the natural law tradition and the second is 
his view of human vu lnerability, which w ill be explained below. 
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l.6.1 Maclntyre's Metaphysical Account Based on the Notion of the 
Human Good 
The natural law tradition generally stands opposed to legal positivism 
according to which the issue of legality is a separate issue from the issue of 
morality. What makes a law, according to legal positivism, is some kind of 
authority and sovereignty behind the law. By contrast, according to the 
natural law tradition questions about legality are related to questions about 
morality, in the sense that no rule can legitimately be a law unless it 
conforms to some degree to the precepts of the natural law such as justice 
(2000, p.96). The natural law follows Aristotle's distinction between natural 
and conventional justice the former of which is independent of what counts 
as just in different cities, and is related to facts about human nature which 
do not vary from city to city (2000, p.96). 
According to MacIntyre, the necessary features of a Thomistic version 
of the natural law are as follows. The first is that knowledge of the precepts 
of the natural law is accessible to all plain persons, who have not received 
specialized training in law or ethics. Plain persons, in this view, do not need 
to refer to lawyers for this knowledge. They have the capacity within 
themselves to understand the content of this law; the lawyers and the 
professors of law should learn the content from these plain persons in so far 
as they remain plain persons, unless plain persons are corrupted in certain 
social circumstances (2000, p.92). 
The second feature of the Thomistic natural law is that it can secure 
widespread, if not universal , rational consent of rational human beings. The 
way to discover the precepts of the natural law in Maclntyre's view, 
following the French Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), is 
to reflect on ourselves as rational human beings to see what precepts we 
need if we want to function normally (2000, p. l 08). In Maclntyre 's terms, 
we should enquire of ourselves what my good and our common good are if 
we want to function normally (2000, p.109). The result of this investigation 
is that we cannot function normally if we do not value norms such as 
truthfulness, justice, non-violence, respect for others' lives and property, 
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etc. (2000, p. l l 0). Although MacIntyre here refers to the notion of human 
beings' normal functioning in the articulation of his natural law tradition, he 
also brings in the notion of the human good and telos (l 981 , p.52), which 
goes beyond the idea of normal functioning, as the final justification of 
morality, which I think as will be discussed in chapter 6 poses problems for 
his view in conditions in which we lack agreement on this notion. 
This view of the precepts of the natural law is metaphysical, because it 
is based on facts about nature and human nature. The fact that nature's 
resources are limited, and our own human resources and strength are more 
and less equal leads us to the view that if we are supposed to function 
nonnally and move toward our individual and common good we should 
abide by these precepts of the natural law (2000, p.109). These precepts 
should govern our individual choices to order our individual desi res and 
move us toward the good; otherwise, the result would be "the culture of 
advanced modernity" in which the individual is the centre of moral life, and 
chooses what principles should rule over him (1983b, p.9). By contrast, 
from the Thomistic perspective, the precepts of the natura l law should be 
discovered and not chosen (2000, p. I 12). 
Maclntyre's metaphysical view of natural law is different from other 
Thomistic non-metaphysical views such as John Finnis' and Germain 
Grisez's. The non-metaphysical views do not derive the oughts of the 
natural law from the facts of hwnan nature, yet they do not deny that the 
observance of these precepts fulfill s hwnan nature. Our knowledge of "the 
basic goods", according to this view, does not derive from our knowledge 
about human nature; rather, we know them by reflection on ourselves and 
others, on our experiences and the findings of anthropology and psychology 
(2000, p.106). 
MacIntyre (2000, p. I 06), by contrast, believes that this theory of the 
natural law needs resources from Aquinas's account of human nature, which 
is a revi sed and unified Aristotelian view ofhwnan nature; the very position 
he earlier rejected as "metaphysical biology". Based on the facts of human 
nature-that we are rational hwnan beings, we have some natural end to 
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achieve, and that we are by nature vulnerable to natural threats and the 
threats posed by other hwnan beings- we need to obey the precepts of the 
natural law. 9 
This view of the natural law, in addition to having some metaphysical 
foundation, in Maclntyre 's view, has the advantage over modem theories of 
the natural law that it is capable of explaining its widespread rejection in 
modern culture; as he points out, "if the Thomist's view of natural law is 
true, we should expect that under certain types of circumstance it wi ll be 
widely rejected" (2000, p. l 08). 
As was noted above, a feature of the natural law is that it posits plain 
persons as those who possess knowledge of the precepts of the natural law; 
so in Maclntyre 's account (2000, p.94), it is at first sight paradoxical to see 
that the more a version of the theory of the natural law approaches to the 
truth, the less likely it is to be accepted by modern persons. However, 
MacIntyre contends, Thomism has sufficient resources to explain this 
rejection as follows. According to Thomism, MacIntyre (2000, p.111) holds, 
individuals as a result of "mischance" or certain social circumstances, like 
the culture of advanced modernity, might not have the opportunity to 
develop their knowledge of the good and the common good; therefore, they 
lack the knowledge of how to order their individual desires and how to 
govern their choices; as Macintyre (2000, p. l 08) writes: 
An Aristotelian Thomism has implicit within it a theory of 
moral and legal error, a theory that explains why what is at 
one level evident to every plain person may nonetheless be 
expected to be ignored or flouted by significant numbers of 
those same plain persons, let alone by legal theorists and 
moral philosophers. 
9 A question that arises here is whether this metaphysical explanation can sooth Maclntyre's 
concerns about Aristotle's metaphysical biology such as the natural inferiority of slaves and 
women. In my view, not all metaphysical explanations necessarily face these problems. 
These untenable views are not essential part of all metaphysical explanat ions or indeed of 
Aristotle's own metaphysical view; rather, they stem from Aristot le's own or his age's 
convictions. Instead, the problem for Macintyre's metaphysical view concerns how we can 
acquire in secular terms a shared account of the human good and flouri shing. To solve this 
problem, I propose basing our moral theory on the notion of human normal functioning, 
which is very much easier to agree upon, and to remove the notion of telos from the idea of 
human flourishing. My vulnerability approach in the fina l chapter is based on this view. 
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As Aquinas (ST, I-II, Question 93, Article 6) ho lds in thi s respect, "The 
natural inclination to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, 
the natural knowledge of good is darkened by passions and habits of sin." 
In modem conditions, as a result of forgetting that the self becomes a 
self through its communal relationships in family , social and political 
community, individual choice has become "morally sovereign", while the 
individual lacks any rational method to choose between different options 
(1983b, p.9; 2000, p. 111). Any Thomistic vers ion of the natura l law in thi s 
culture is regarded as inim ical to liberty (2000, p.112). In the fina l chapter, I 
will explain further Maclntyre 's metaphysica l account of the human good, 
which is based on a view of human beings as having essences that will be 
realized as a result of the observance of the precepts of the natura l law. I 
there wi ll argue that we do not need such a notion for the justifi cation of 
morality as di stinct from ethics, the former of which has a more 
universa li stic aspect than the latter, as it deals with basic human goods and 
not necessari ly with the final good. 
After explaining Maclntyre's view of the natural law, I now attend to 
the second strand to his metaphysical view, that is, his view of human 
vulnerability and the virtues that this vulnerability demands. This view is 
indispensable to Macintyre's account of the natural law, as it is about the 
facts of human nature. This account is also similar to my vulnerabi li ty 
approach which wi ll be expla ined in the final chapter. 
1.6.2 Macintyre's Metaphysical Account Rega rding the Essential 
Vulnerability of Human Beings 
MacIntyre, using a biological approach, emphasizes the vu lnerability 
of human beings and their dependence on each other as a way to justify his 
particular Thomistic ethics. In Maclntyre's view, one way in which Aquinas 
has completed Aristotle 's ethics is by pointing to the 
vulnerabi li ty/dependence aspect of human beings, and by amending 
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Aristotle ' s account of morality accordingly. MacIntyre states the point as 
follows: 
I was first struck by this [the role of vulnerability of human 
beings in Aquinas ' ethics] when reading a prayer composed 
by Aquinas in which he asks God to grant that he may 
happily share with those in need what he has, while humbly 
asking for what he needs from those who have, a prayer that 
in effect, although not by Aquinas' own intention, asks that 
we may not share some of the attitudes of Aristotle' s 
megalopsychos. This led me to reflect upon how Aquinas 's 
account of the virtues not only supplements, but also 
corrects Aristotle ' s to a significantly greater extent than I 
had realized (I 999a, p.xi). 
MacIntyre here underlies the animal aspect of human nature in respect 
of which human beings are essentially dependent on each other. He then 
tries to outline the virtues and the kind of social structures and relationships, 
i.e. apprenticeship and parental relationships, that are necessary for moving 
human beings, through this mutual dependence relationships, to the state of 
independent practical reasoners; a state in which agents move from merely 
having reasons for actions to the ability to evaluate those reasons ( 1999a, 
pp. 71 -72); however, we should note that this state of independent practical 
reasoning does not deny human beings ' essential vulnerability, which 
applies to all stages of human beings' lives, but is most obvious in early 
childhood and old age (1999a, p. l ). The state of independent practical 
reasoning, thus, is a normative capacity to form and have our own practical 
reasons on the basis of what our good is. 
According to this biological approach, human beings as vulnerable and 
dependent beings need to have "the virtues of acknowledged dependence". 
This view of human vulnerability is a contribution made by Aquinas, which 
is clear in the quote above, to Aristotle 's ethics in which, MacIntyre (1999a, 
p.127) maintains, there is "an illusion of self-sufficiency" with regard to the 
noble man-megalopsychos. The noble man is "ashamed to receive benefits 
... he is forgetful of what he has received, but remembers what he has given 
(N E 1124b, pp.12-18, cited in MacIntyre (1999a, pp.7&127)). This 
illusion, MacIntyre holds, excludes the rich and the powerful from 
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communal relationships. By contrast, in Maclntyre 's Thomistic view, the 
virtues of receiving are necessary as much as the virtues of giving to sustain 
communal relationships in which people depend mutually on each other 
(I 999a, p .1 27). 
Based on thi s approach, MacIntyre (I 999a, p.124) refers to some 
vi rtues as the virtues of giving such as "misericordia" which means mercy 
and showing "grief or sorrow over someone else's distressas one's own", 
the virtue of just generosity which leads us not to act calculatively, by 
transcending strict proportionalities in our interactions. There are also 
virtues of receiving such as expressing gratitude, courtesy toward graceless 
givers, and forbearance toward the inadequate giver. The exercise of these 
virtues requires "a truthful acknowledgment of dependence" (1999a, 
pp. I 26-1 27). 
Individuals as dependent and vulnerable beings, if they participate in 
communal relationships that are governed by the virtues of giving and 
receiving, move gradually from the state of being dependent practical 
reasoners to independent practical reasoners. Through these relationships 
they acquire a gradually more complete understanding of the good by 
learning to distinguish between the relations that are conducive to the good 
from the relations that are impediments to it. Through practica l experience, 
individuals acquire "an adequate and refl ective grasp of what human 
flouri shing is" (1999a, p.113); they then can use thi s notion of the good in 
their own premises of practical reasoning. 
The di scuss ion in this section illustrates Macintyre ' s move from a 
social moral te leology to a more metaphysical one which centres on some 
facts about hwnan beings' nature. This move gives more content to hi s 
moral theory than does his social theory. As his view is based on some 
undeniable facts of hun1an nature such as its weakness and vulnerability, it 
forms a firm basis for the definition of at least a minimal list of the virtues 
and vices. If we are naturally weak, or natural resources are limited, it 
fol lows that we cannot value theft or usurpation , because these codes of 
conduct would impede our normal functioning. This view approaches 
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Hobbes' account of mora lity as a human beings' invention to save 
themselves from the insecurities of the state of nature. I have much 
sympathy with Maclntyre's view of human vulnerability in his metaphysical 
approach; nevertheless, I will argue in chapter 6 for a vulnerability approach 
that is not necessarily associated with a notion of the final human good, in 
order to show that modem morality can be corrected without the need for 
the Aristotelian and Thomistic moral resources. Also, I will there discuss 
that Maclntyre's objection to the idea of human rights runs counter to his 
own vulnerability approach, as the protection of human beings against 
vulnerability requires appeal to some rights for human beings qua human 
beings. 
I. 7 Investigating the Consistency in Maclntyre's Thought 
Concerning his Account of the Natural Law Tradition 
An interesting feature of Maclntyre's metaphysical moral theory is its 
universalistic aspect which seems to conflict with his criticism of the 
Enlightenment. MacIntyre (I 98 1, p.45) started criticizing the Enlightenment 
project in morality concerning its attempt to formulate a universal pattern of 
rationality and practical reasoning independent of traditions. Now 
MacIntyre in his alternative based on the natural law tra.dition appeals to the 
notions of human essence and the precepts of the natural law which are 
universal. 
In Maclntyre 's view, the biological features of human beings are not 
sufficient to make a human being independent of the influence of cultures 
( I 98 I, p.161 ). But MacIntyre here in his metaphysical approach is 
employing the facts of human nature as the bases of morality. These facts, 
as they belong to human beings qua human beings, might seem not to leave 
much room for the effects of variable intellectual and moral traditions on 
practical rationality. One way to tackle this problem is by holding that these 
facts constitute a minimum of morality which holds true in all traditions and 
in different accounts of ethics. By this line of reasoning, which I will 
elaborate in chapter 6, we can accommodate both the elements of the 
universality and those of the locality.In other words, I assume MacIntyre 
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thin.ks that vulnerability is a universal feature of human beings, irrespective 
of their other different attributes constituted in different traditions, and this 
leaves much room for the kind of cultural differences that MacIntyre 
emphas izes, and saves MacIntyre from the charge of being inconsistent; 
nevertheless, I think by highl ighting and elaborating this shared aspect of 
human beings we can, as I will try to show in the final chapter, define and 
justify a limited universal account of morality. 
The primary premises of the natural law are, in Aquinas ' and 
Macintyre 's views, uni versal moral principles such as the prohibition of 
theft or of killing the innocent. There do, of course, remain secondary 
premises regarding the application of the primary precepts that vary across 
cultures (2009a, p.89); however, thi s universality of the primary precepts of 
the natural law qualifies Macintyre 's earlier emphasis on the existence of 
different norms of practical rationality, as he puts it: 
What hi storical enquiry discloses is the situatedness of all 
enquiry, the extent to which what are taken to be the 
standards of truth and of rational justification in the 
contexts of practice vary from one time and place to another 
(2007, p.xii). 
Unless we qualify Maclntyre's criticism of universali sm regarding 
practica l rationality, hi s account of the natural law tradition would reveal an 
inconsistency in his anthropology throughout his works. The explanation is 
that MacIntyre, on the one hand, from the perspective of the natura l law 
tradition argues that plain persons have the capacity of understanding the 
precepts of the natural law, and on the other hand, he holds that the 
individual qua individual is not a "substantive moral agent" : 
The individual qua rational person as substantive moral 
agent, characterizable independently of hi s or her socia l role 
and situation, has left to join unicorns , glass mountains, and 
squared circles in the realm that they share. The mora l 
agents who actually exist are all living at some particu lar 
time and place, situated in some highly specific type of 
social role and situation, itse lf embedded to greater or lesser 
degree in some tradition or some confluence of trad iti ons 
(1983a, p.454). 
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Clearly, plain persons, who possess the inherent knowledge of the 
good, are individuals and substantive moral agents, becau·se they have in 
their hearts a knowledge of the good and of moral precepts independently of 
their social roles. I am aware that MacIntyre, as was mentioned above, 
believes the plain person might lose this knowledge in certain social 
circumstances like that of modernity; however, there is surely a sign ificant 
difference between holding that certain social circumstances are inimical to 
this knowledge, and holding that the individual is not a mora l agent at all 
independent of his culture or social ro les. 10 The former is compatible with 
the natural law, because the knowledge of the good is a fea ture of human 
beings, who have it by their natures prior to contingent cultures. The latter is 
incompatible with the natural law, because it deprives the individua l of his 
inherent knowledge of the good. In other words, it is compatible with the 
natural law tradition to hold that cultivating the inherent knowledge of plain 
persons of the good requires parti cular social and cultural settings like those 
based on Thomism; but it is not consistent with the natural law tradition to 
state that all practical rationalities are the products of traditions and cul tural 
settings, or that the individual per se is not a substantial moral agent; a view 
which does not do j ustice to cross-cultural similarities. 
The natural law tradition as introduced by MacIntyre has both 
individualistic and collectivist aspects. It is individualistic, as it takes 
individual plain persons as being aware of moral precepts (2000, p.92); it is 
collectivist, as it holds that individuals need appropriate cultural and social 
IO Lutz (2013) in a personal communication to me points out that this interpretation of 
MacIntyre is wrong, because in his view MacIntyre does not deny the individual 
independent of his social roles and sett ings to be a substantial moral agent, rather, for 
MacIntyre such an individual without a particular social setting does not, in fact, exist. I 
will explain further Maclntyre's account of the individual on page 70 where 1 think I can 
depict better Maclntyre's negative view of the very idea of the individual; however, even if 
we accept Lutz's nuanced distinction mentioned above, my worry is that the idea of the 
individual and his morality could be reduced to his social setting and roles in a way that it 
leads to moral relativism. To avoid this, I attempt to show in this thesis that the 
vulnerability of human beings is a fact that remains unchanged in different social settings, 
which can serve as basis for a shared morality. By doing this, I am not denying the ro le of 
social settings in determining a moral system; rather, I am pointing to a fact that I claim 
holds true of all human social settings to different degrees. 
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settings in order to cultivate this capacity. But if MacIntyre denies that 
individual moral agents independent of their social and cultural contexts are 
substantial moral agents, it would contradict this individualistic aspect. This 
inconsistency becomes more obvious if we take into account theistic 
assumptions of the natural law tradition, for instance, the view that human 
beings are created in the image of God. This means that the individual in his 
solitude has a knowledge of rightness and goodness, though thi s capacity 
requires development. This account of the individual is not compatible with 
holding that he, independent of his social roles and contexts, is not a 
substantial moral agent. As a result, in my view, Maclntyre 's overall moral 
thought needs some revision to become consistent along the lines of his idea 
of the natural law tradition. In my conclusion to the thesis, I will expand on 
this metaphysica l/biological approach to morality to argue for the necessity 
of holding a minimal trans-cultural and substantial account of mora lity. 
In thi s section, I claimed that for MacIntyre practical rationality is 
ideally a kind of objectivity in the sense of subordinating our desires and 
preferences. Also, his ideal of theoretical rational ity involves fa llibil istic 
and di scursive reasoning which is exemplified best in Thomism. Then, I 
explained how the process of practice, narrative and tradition, as is best 
represented in Aristotelianism and Thomism, yields this objectivity by 
subjecting the participants in practices to non-subj ective measures, that is, 
internal goods of practices and the notion of the good. That is why Thomism 
encourages fallibili sm; what this means wi ll be explained in chapters 3 and 
4. I then attended to some criticisms of MacIntyre on the forma li ty of hi s 
social approach. I argued that, without bringing into the picture the implicit 
Aristotelian/Thomistic account of the good, Maclntyre's social teleology 
lacks sufficient content to determine what the good life is, and to rule out 
some practices as evil. I then continued by explaining Maclntyre's 
metaphysical approach, that is, his natura l law theory, as designed to fi ll thi s 
vacuum, and also his view regarding the essential vu lnerabi li ty of human 
beings, which requires some virtues to be addressed. I also argued that the 
universa li stic aspect of Maclntyre 's natura l law theory is not fu ll y 
compatible with an unqualified account of hi s notion of tradi tion-constituted 
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rationality, and that there are inconsistencies between Maclntyre's different 
accounts of anthropology, that is, between the individualism of the natural 
law and Maclntyre's anti-individualistic approach. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter was intended to explain the concept and the role of 
tradition in Macintyre's major works in and subsequent to After Virtue. To 
this end, I explained the different appl ications of the notion of tradition in 
his works, invented two terms- traditions in the general and in the ideal 
sense-to yield a better understanding of his use of this term, and discussed 
the features of traditions. 
Among the three functions, which are conceptual scheme, 
methodological and contextual functions, I claimed that, in Maclntyre 's 
view, these functions are discharged well by the classical, the Aristotelian 
and Thomistic traditions. 
Regarding the role of traditions as conceptual schemes, I stated that the 
liberal tradition, a tradition in the genera l sense, could not accomplish the 
task of rendering its moral concepts meaningful and intelligible, because 
this tradition is constituted by a dislocated melange of fragments of the 
classical and the Aristotelian tradition (1981, p.60). Liberalism, in 
Maclntyre's view, also does not possess the required background to serve as 
a context to define and justify a sufficient morality, due to its lack of the 
notion of the human good. 
The methodological function is shared in different degrees between 
traditions in the general and in the ideal sense. The latter type has more 
resources to guide its arguments through different stages of the progress of 
tradition, and does not become mired in epistemological crises. A tradition 
that progresses well in respect of the methodological function becomes a 
tradition of intellectual and moral enquiry, and dialectically proceeds toward 
truths. 
I then explained the internal structure of the classical, the Aristotelian 
and Thomistic traditions, i.e. the trajectory of practice- narrative-tradition 
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that, in Maclntyre's view, has given them this privileged posi tion. I argued 
that MacIntyre here is interpreting rationality in ethics as the objectivity of 
mora l claims, which can be provided best in the Aristotelian and Thomistic 
schemes based on the notion of the common good, which is prior to and 
other than the sum of individual goods. I also di scussed Macintyre's 
metaphysical tum to the natural law tradition to provide a more concrete 
account of the good based on the facts of human nature. 
This chapter provided an introduction to Maclntyre's notion of 
tradition-constituted rational ity, which will be explained further in the next 
chapter based on the functions of traditions discussed in this chapter. 
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II-Chapter 2: Tradition-Constituted and Tradition-
Constitutive Rationality and Justice 
11.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I seek to expla in what MacIntyre means by his notions 
o f tradition-constituted and traditi on-constitutive rationality and justice. For 
the sake of brevity, and following M . Colby (1995, p.55) I wi ll ca ll these 
two notions "the constitution thesis" ( or the CT) in this chapter and in the 
thesis generally. In what foll ows, I will explain this thesis in relation to the 
di fferent functions of traditions, which were introduced in the previous 
chapter. In my view, one of these functions, i.e. traditions as conceptual 
schemes, might be a source of some misunderstandings of MacIntyre on the 
CT. To explain thi s, I will continue by explaining the CT on the basis of 
each function . These functions in tandem capture what MacIntyre means by 
this phrase. 
The CT is, in principle, against the Enlightenment view of rationality 
according to which there is a paradigmatic and universal model of 
rationality independent of di fferent traditions. MacIntyre criti cizes this 
model of rationality on the grounds that there are no substantive principles 
of rationality that stand independent of particular traditions. By way of 
introduction to Maclntyre's account of the CT, I will expla in briefl y his 
critici sm of the Enlightenment and its heirs, i.e. the contributors to the 
N ineteenth Century 9th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and 20th 
century analytical philosophy. 
11.2 The Enlightenment and the Encyclopaedia Brittanica's Notions 
of Practical Rationality 
According to MacIntyre, morality in the late 17th and 18th century 
became a realm independent from theology, law and aesthetics, since it was 
assumed that it is possible to base moral claims on independent reasonable 
grounds so that they do not need to be held on reasons internal to other 
rea lms such as religion or the law ( 198 1, p.39). 
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Such a view concerning the independence of morality, in Macintyre's 
opinion, stems from a particular account of practical rationality as a facu lty 
in human beings that is capable of producing uni versally binding moral 
ideas; for instance, according to Kant, MacIntyre (1981 , p.45) maintains, " It 
is of the essence of reason that it lays down principles which are universa l, 
categorical and internally cons istent. Hence a rational morality will lay 
down principles, which both can and ought to be held by all men, 
independent of circumstances and conditions, and which could consistently 
be obeyed by every rational agent on every occasion" . 
The above quote clearly indicates the point that this view of practical 
rationality, in Maclntyre 's interpretation (1981 , p.32), is based on a 
particular account of human nature according to which it has the capacity to 
detach itself from all particularities without losing its faculty for practica l 
reasoning. In thi s view, nothing should evade rational scrutiny, and human 
conduct is the subject of the rules and procedures issued by a uni versa l 
practical rationality. The logica l consequence of this view is that practical 
rationality is not determined or constituted by a framework or a conceptual 
scheme that itself is pre-rational and not subj ect to the procedures of 
practical rationality . 
This view of practical rationality, which lent plausibility to a uni versa l 
practical rationality, is also taken by the contributors to the ninth ed ition of 
Encyclopaedia Britannica in the 19th century. The overa ll view of these 
Encyclopaedists had the fo llowing characteristics. A Kantian view of 
reasoning as emancipation from the tutelage of authority, the primacy of 
epistemology as trying to find a general rationality based on some truths 
evident to all rational minds, the belief in reason as being progressive, and 
the idea that nothing li es beyond the realm of reason so understood ( 1990a, 
pp.64, 68-69, 78). 
In this view, though our knowledge of the world is limited, in principle 
there is not any logical limitation upon the attainment of knowledge. The 
pre-rational elements of rational ity provided by tradit ions are regarded as 
prejudices that should be discarded in order to achieve a universal 
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rationality. Morality is an emerging phenomenon whose distinctness from 
rituals and superstitions would be visible to the civilized; and not to the 
primitive (1990a, p.1 76). A central claim of these authors has been that their 
19th century account of duties and obligations is morally and rationally 
superior to the taboos of primitive people or savages (1990a, p.178). 
In Maclntyre's account (1990a, p.178), anthropologists such as J. G. 
Frazer (1854-1941) and E. B. Tylor (I 832-1917) studied taboos in isolation 
from the wider cultural and social contexts in which they had a role or 
application, and as a result understood them as "primarily negative 
prohibitions"; the view that is called "the intellectualist theory of magic". 
Frazer defines taboo as "a system of religious prohibitions". The main point 
of thi s intellectualist theory is that we can evaluate primitive ways of life 
and thought, employing our own standards of rationality and show their 
inadequacies based on these standards. 
As E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1965 , p.27) states, in Frazer's view, 
humankind everywhere passes through three stages of intellectual 
development: magic to religion, and from religion to science. In Tylor' s 
view, Evans-Pritchard (1965, pp.26 & 29) narrates, the genuine methods of 
observation and logical deduction that we use in science are applied 
inadequately to primitive magic by primitive people; their mistake is that 
they establish mystical links between things based on their similarities, and 
that they mistake ideal connections for real ones; the causal connections 
they establish are in the mind, not in nature. 
The above remarks indicate that according to this intellectualist theory 
the standards of rationality and logic are the same across cultures, and can 
be used for the evaluation of other traditions and systems of thought. In 
contrast to this, in Maclntyre's view, what were presented by these authors 
as taboos have had enabling functions in the process of practical reasoning, 
and are far more than mere prohibitive mechanisms and impediments on the 
way to discovering a civilized notion of morality (1990a, p.178). 
MacIntyre (1994c, p.145) also criticizes the contemporary heirs of the 
Enlightenment in analytical philosophy, stating that although analytical 
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arguments are clear and rigorous, they cannot lead to substantive 
agreements, and if they do, it is because they are derived from their shared 
liberal background, not from the resources of analytical philosophy. This 
means that the power of these arguments is based on their liberal 
assumptions about human nature and its good, so they are not universa lly 
binding argun1ents and independent of a particular cultural setting. As 
opposed to this view, MacIntyre (1 994c, p.144) is against "tbe 
abstractionism tbat detaches principles from socially embodied practice." 
The present introduction gives us a general sketch ofMaclntyre 's view 
of rational ity . While tbe Enlightenment project and its heirs, as depicted by 
MacIntyre, sought to discover the norms and rules of rationality that can 
explain and justify tbe substantial beliefs and codes of behaviour in di ffe rent 
traditions, in Maclntyre's view (2006f, p.147), the universal norms of 
rationality cannot serve such a function, as it is only formal norms such as 
tbe law of non-contradiction that apply universa lly. This view is tbe heart of 
tbe CT, as wi ll be explained below. 
I start the main argument by defining the term "constitute" which is 
used in the phrase. The Oxford English Dictiona,y defines the term as being 
part of a whole, and contributing to form a whole. Based on this, the CT 
means tbat traditions, or some concepts essentially related to them, are 
determining parts of tbe accounts of rationality and justice, which conduce 
to tbeir formation . 
Rationality here is basically practical rationali ty, which is the process 
by which we determine what to do or what not to do. The notion of justice is 
among the outcomes of practical rationality; that is to say, by tbe exercise of 
practical rationality among other things we come to know what justice is 
and what it requires us to do; as MacIntyre (1988a, p.2) puts it, "to know 
whar justice is, so ii may seem, we must first learn what rationality in 
practice requires of us.·· Accordingly, the CT with regard to practical 
rationality and justice is the claim tbat some elements that are integral and 
particular to traditions have a strong bearing on the way we think about 
moral issues. This effect is indispensable and cannot be eliminated in order 
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to formulate a universal account of practical thinking; however, I think 
MacIntyre based on his fallibilistic approach, which will be explained in 
chapters 3 and 4, would hold that whole structures of practical rationalities 
should be evaluated against each other, the same as he thinks regarding first 
principles which should be assessed in virtue of the whole systems in which 
they operate (2006f, p.160). In what follows, I explain the CT in relation to 
the different functions of traditions introduced in the previous chapter. 
11.3 Explaining the Three Senses of the CT 
IT.3.1 The CT Based on the Function of Traditions as Conceptual 
Schemes 
MacIntyre (1988a, pp.370-371) holds there can be conceptual schemes 
different from ours. In his view, there exists a "variety of moral practices, 
beliefs and conceptual schemes". An example of a conceptual scheme is 
scholasticism in which concepts such as potentiality, act and essence exist in 
tandem, and form a consistent meaningful system (1981 , p.54). Conceptual 
schemes, sometimes, become barren and incoherent, as MacIntyre claims to 
be the case with regard to modem liberal morality in which the relation 
between different parts of this scheme has become muddled (198 1, p.68). 
As another example, the heroic society portrayed in Homeric poems 
embodies a conceptual scheme that is based on fulfilling the requirements of 
social roles; in this scheme obligations and virtues are defined by social 
roles. An essential element of this scheme is the vulnerability of human 
beings to death and destiny, which means the virtues require not avoiding 
vulnerability, but according it its due. Different aspects of this conceptual 
scheme refer to each other for their intelligibility (1981 , p.129). In this 
archaic conceptual scheme, the notion of friendship is conceived either in 
terms of a kin relationship or a relationship that rests on some obligations 
similar to those that arise from kinship. Established social relations define 
the obligations that friends owe to each other (1988a, p.42). Modem 
individualism is a different conceptual scheme in which the notion of 
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tradition, in the ideal sense explained in the preceding chapter, is alien, and 
the autonomy of individuals has become a salient feature (1981, p.222). 
Accordingly, in Macintyre's account traditions have basic roles in 
making our conceptions and conceptual schemes. In this view, tradition is 
not an external feature related contingently to an individual , but it is, 
sometimes, a thoroughgoing element that provides a particular world-view 
and a system to define our moral regulations. 
In my view, the term "constituted" used by MacIntyre has made it 
more apt to be understood in connection with the function of traditions as 
conceptual schemes and the ontological function than with the two others, 
which are the methodological and the contextual functions; however, as wi ll 
be explained below, this might lead to some misunderstanding of 
Maclntyre's point. 
Among the notions that are constructed in traditions and affect 
practical rationality are the notions of human nature and the human good. 
The explanation is that different versions of practical reasoning are based on 
different norn1ative features of human beings, for instance human good, 
human rights, utility, etc. , which all give rise to different versions of 
practical rationality; for instance, in Aristotelianism the notion of the human 
good is central, and is construed as a non-subjective attribute of human 
nature; as a result, practical reasoning in this scheme is different from a 
practical rationality that is based on subjective human desires. 
Mac!ntyre 's description of different practical rationalities in the 
Homeric and post-Homeric schemes can be used to spell out the role of 
different accounts of human nature and the good in practical reasoning. In 
Maclntyre's narrative, different views of human nature form a spectrum, 
with a Homeric account on the one side and a liberal account on the other. 
In the Homeric scheme, the universe is thought to have a single fundamental 
order, which governs both nature and society. Dike, which means justice, in 
the Homeric scheme consists of the accordance of actions with this order, 
expressing itself in a hierarchy of social roles. It is required of any person to 
know his place in that structure and to fulfill its requirements. Thinking well 
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in this context is a kind of reminder regarding what dike or excellence in a 
particular social role requires of agents (1988a, p.14). Everyone has a 
thumos, that is, the spirited part of the soul, which carries him forward. 
Passions may lead agents astray. They need a reminder to give them the 
strength of purpose needed by their thumos to overcome passions. 
Accordingly, in this view of human nature, firstly, passions are not in a 
position to afford reasons for actions; rather, they should be controlled in 
order to act properly (1988a, p.16). Secondly, the Homeric agent knows 
what he has to do independently of the process of reasoning. When he is 
reasoning, he is not assessing different reasons for action; rather, "he calls 
on his arete to give him strength of purpose to overcome the passion" 
(I 988a, p. 16); in other words, some passions might prevent him from doing 
what he should do, and the agent needs to control them. 
In Maclntyre's view, the main distinction between the Homeric and 
later types of reasoning is that the former only secondarily concerns the 
question of "what am I to do?" . The Homeric agent, due to his fixed 
position in a social order with determinate and known requirements, is 
aware of his obligations, and only needs a reminder and strengthening of his 
thumos ( 1988a, p.19). 
This type of practical rationality differs from the practical rationality of 
5th and 4th century Athens and from its successors in that in the later 
versions, agents do not know what to do prior to reasoning; they come to 
know what to do only after answering the question "what am I to do?" 
(I 988a, p.20). 
MacIntyre (1981 , p.161) goes on to spell out the differences between 
Aristotelian practical rationality and Humean and post-Hurnean versions. 
He maintains that one of the features of Aristotelian practical rationality is 
that it would be necessarily followed by an action compatible with its 
premises. In this scheme, actions have truth-value; while in the Humean and 
post-Humean schemes of practical rationality only statements and 
sentences, and not actions, are thought to have truth-value. In addition, 
MacIntyre seems to hold that from the Aristotelian perspective moral 
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statements are cognitive statements, in the sense that they can be taken as 
true or fa lse, whi le in the Humean account, moral statements lack this 
cognitive aspect. 
The reason for this is that in the Aristotelian view and more generally 
according to the natural law, MacIntyre (I 98 1, p.59) holds, moral 
statements are identical in meaning with factual statements about hwnan 
nature. The "oughts" of morality can be construed as the precepts the 
observance of which as a matter of fact amounts to human beings' 
flourishing; morality in this system is a kind of "move from potentiality to 
act, [it tells us] how to rea lize our true nature and to reach our true end" 
(1981 , p.52). 
In Aristotel ian practical rationality, the good provides a bas is for the 
education of desires, and so it provides a measure for the truth or fa lsity of 
actions (1981, p.162). Consequently, in this scheme, actions attain truth-
value and the gap between the facts of hwnan nature and the "oughts" of 
morality, as assumed by Hume, is bridged, because for Aristotle human 
nature per se is a normative entity that enjoins some actions as moral in line 
with its flouri shing. As a result, the principle of "no ought from is", is not a 
universa l truth about morality, because moral judgments in the Aristotelian 
scheme tum into "factual judgments" that are more than personal 
preferences, contrary to what is claimed by emotivism, and are based on 
facts about human nature (1981, p.59). 
Once functional accounts of subjects are employed in moral 
statements, these statements accrue the status of factua l judgments; for 
instance, when I say a watch is a good one, as the notion of a watch is a 
functi onal notion in the sense that it has a function to fulfill , the normative 
judgment about the watch turns into a factua l judgment that is informative 
about the rea l operation of the watch (198 1, p.59). 
So far, I have explained Macintyre 's cognitive view of morality; but 
this does not capture his entire claim regarding the truth-value of moral 
actions in the Aristotel ian scheme. MacIntyre is not just claim ing that moral 
judgments are cognitive and thus capab le of being predicated as true or 
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false; he is claiming further that actions themselves have also truth-value, 
and not only moral judgments about these actions; in other' words, we can 
say that this act is true or fa lse. As he writes, "actions can of course express 
beliefs as certainly, although not always as clearly and unambiguously, as 
utterances can" (1981 , p.161). 
To explain this, I appeal to Aristotle 's and Aquinas' notion of practical 
truth, which will be explained further in chapters 3 and 4. According to the 
practical sense of truth, the notion of te/os can serve as the measure of the 
truth of things. In this view, an entity is true if it satisfies the functi ons it is 
designed for. From thi s perspective, actions are true if they accord with the 
agent's good, and so they attain truth-value on the basis of the good. 
I am using here Maclntyre's notions of the goods of excellence and the 
goods of effectiveness, which respectively refer to the notions of internal 
goods and external goods of practices as explained in the previous chapter, 
as different conceptual schemes. The goods of excellence are the goods that 
are constitutive of practices independently of the desires of the participants 
in them. The goods of effectiveness are defined in terms of the people ' s 
desires, and relate only to the effective satisfaction of these desires ( 1988a, 
p.45). 
According to the Aristote lian version of practical rationality, the goods 
of excellence should be moral agents ' main reasons for acts, and they 
provide a hierarchical order with the good at the top and different desires 
and passions at the bottom. The good is expected to harmonize desires; as a 
result, the goods of excellence provide a unified picture of an agent's 
desires. In thi s view, what pleases the agent will not be per sea good reason 
for acts; rather, what is conducive to hi s good would be a good reason for 
him to act upon. 
The difference in the role played by desires between this and a view 
based on the goods of effectiveness results in different structures of 
practical rationality. In a practica l rationality based on the goods of 
effecti veness, like in Humean practical rationality, there is no vantage point 
for desires to comply with, and there would be no necessary or causal 
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relation between the outcome of a practical syllogism and an action; in other 
words, a practical syllogism does not necessari ly terminate in an action 
( 1981 , p.160- 161 ). As MacIntyre ( I 981 , p. I 6 I) writes, "The notion that an 
argument can [or should necessaril y) terminate in an action of course 
offends Humean and post-Humean phi losophical prejudices .... " 
In my view, the indeterminism of practical rational ity, i. e. that practical 
reasoning does not terminate in an action, is related to the heterogeneous 
character of human desires. In the absence of the notion of a final good to 
di scipline the desires, some of the agent's desires might impede the 
realization of the conclusion of a practical sy llogism that is based on his 
other desires. 
MacIntyre (1988a, p.21) pointing to Hume, holds that in the modem 
account of practical rationality desires are psychologically basic items, in 
the sense that there is no more fundamental basis by which to evaluate 
practical reasoning than by reference to these desires. 11 Modem practical 
rationality, MacIntyre maintains, is based on premises such as " I want" or 
" it pleases me", which depend on the motivations of particular agents 
(I 988a, p.21 ). 
The foregoing remarks suffice to show how the structure of practical 
rationa lity varies from a conceptual scheme and world-view in which social 
positions are fixed and obligations are known, to the post-Homeric era in 
which the di stinction between the goods of effectiveness and excellence has 
started to emerge, and then to some conceptua l schemes in which the 
teleologica l and functiona l notions of human beings are absent. 
11 It might be responded to MacIntyre here that surely there are moral principles offered 
on different grounds in modern morality with an aim to control our desires so as to make 
social life possible. Even if the modem agent might lack the Aristote lian notion of the 
good, he has many other considerations by which to assess his desires; so Maclntyre's 
contention that modem practical rationality is based on individual desires and wants seems 
to be an exaggeration. I assume Maclntyre's answer to this line of reasoning would be that, 
modern theories of morality are divorced from psychology; i.e. they do not have a 
convincing psychology to explain how egoistic agents become convinced to act aga inst 
their desires. To this, it might be replied that considerations based on long-term benefits 
can convince an egoistic agent to act against his immediate impulses. 
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In Aristotelian practical rationality, desires and pleasures do not count 
as good reasons for actions; rather, what conduces to the good is a good 
reason for action. The prevalence of the common good in such a tradition 
gives practical rationality a non-personal character, which means the agent 
should tailor his individual desires according to the good; whereas in 
modem notions of practical rationality individual desires and autonomy 
provide the fundamental premises of a good practical reasoning. 
Accordingly, we can claim that distinct types of practical rationality have 
been constituted differently in different traditions based on their different 
notions of human nature and the good; as MacIntyre writes: 
That one's rationality should be not merely supported by 
but partly constituted by one's membership in and 
integration into a social institution of some one particular 
type is a contention very much at odds with 
characteristically modem views of rationality (I 988a, 
p.123). 
However, it is extremely important here to note that MacIntyre is not 
arguing that these different accounts of practical rationality represent an 
unrestricted pluralism or relativism in which we cannot say which account 
of practical rationality is superior; as MacIntyre holds, ·"we can recognize 
and give respect to a variety of points of view, so remaining moral 
pluralists, without becoming moral relativists" (1999c, p.8). 
MacIntyre (1981 , p.259) thinks that Aristotelian/Thomistic practical 
rationality is superior to its rivals. Nevertheless, the above discussion 
indicates that, in Maclntyre's view, as a matter of fact there are different 
ways of thinking in ethics which are related to and are constituted in 
different conceptual schemes, though some of them might be overwhelmed 
according to their own standards in the face of "epistemological crises". 
After explaining the role of different conceptual schemes in constituting 
practical rationalities, in the next section I will consider the different 
meanings that some of the outcomes of practical reasoning get in these 
different schemes. 
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IT.3.1.1 Different Accounts of the Virtues in Different Conceptual 
Schemes 
Pointing to the different accounts of practical rationality, MacIntyre 
also mentions the different accounts of the virtues that have resulted from 
them. MacIntyre does so by comparing different accounts of practical 
rationality and the virtues in the contexts of the goods of effectiveness and 
exce llence. 
The goods of excellence are internal goods of practices, which will be 
achieved by the exercise of practices following their norms; whi le the goods 
of effectiveness, like fame and wea lth, are external goods which are the 
obj ects of desires prior to any notion of excellence in practices (I 988a, 
p.32). These are two different contexts for practical reasoning, which give 
rise to the different structures of practical rationality, as was discussed 
above, and to different accounts of the virtues as follows. 
I-In both contexts, obedience to the rules of justice counts as a virtue, 
but these rules differ in terms of their justification, content and their abid ing 
force for those who accept their authority in the two contexts (1988a, pp.32-
33). Justice in the context of the goods of excel lence is definable 
independently of and antecedently to the rules of justice, in terms of desert, 
and consists of giving to everyone what he deserves. It is not based on a 
contract or principles of cooperative activity. In other words, what people 
deserve and, more generally, the concept of the good is conceptually prior to 
any contract or agreed principle of cooperation among people; whereas 
justice in the context of effectiveness is nothing but obeying the rules of 
justice, which are fonnulated through reciprocal cooperative activity 
( 1988a, p.3 7). 
If the concept of desert in the context of the goods of excellence is not 
derivable from rules of justice, in Maclntyre 's view, it would be provided 
by traditions, estab li shed socia l roles, social and cultura l settings, etc. These 
contexts define people ' s moral commitments toward each other. As was 
argued in the previous chapter, in Macln tyre's view, when the appea l to 
moral rules, including the rules of justice, becomes foremost, thi s indicates 
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that moral ties between people have weakened. When communal ties and 
commitments between people are strong, they can manage their 
relationships by reference to what is their due based on these commitments 
and shared understandings. The appeal to external rules will be a last resort 
( 1980, p.32). 
II-Another difference between the two goods concerns the binding 
force of the rules of justice. The binding force of the goods of excellence 
stems from the fact that breaking these rules primarily harms the agent. The 
agent may not be aware of this fact, so punishments may be necessary to 
teach him that the fulfillment of the rules of justice is to his own good, and 
leads him to obtain his appropriate deserts; whereas the agents who abide by 
the rules of the justice of effectiveness follow cost-benefit analyses. 
Breaking these rules primarily hurts others, and the agent usually thinks he 
is benefiting from breaking them ifhe is not detected (1988a, pp.37-38). 
III-The concepts that acquire different meanings in the different 
contexts of effectiveness and excellence include the notions of politics, 
courage, temperateness and friendship. The politics of effectiveness consists 
of techniques to promote and reconcile different rival interests in a single 
working system. Politics in this sense does not encourage a shared 
understanding of the good; rather, it aims at constructing a regime whose 
work and efficiency lies in the pursuit of different rival interests. The claim 
of the modem state to neutrality is understandable in this regard (1988a, 
pp.217 &344). 
As opposed to this ideal of neutrality in the politics of effectiveness, 
the politics of excellence seeks to reinforce people' s allegiance to a shared 
understanding of the good and to a relevant account of justice; it seeks to 
integrate different practices in a life ordered toward the good. This politics 
concerns only secondarily conflicts of interests, and it is concerned with 
them especially when they prevent people from attaining the common good. 
Its first concern is to promote a conception of justice that improves the 
shared allegiance to the good (1988a, p.39). In this view, people 's identities 
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are partly constituted by their notions of the good, and there are no 
imaginary free persons to propose universal ru les of justice. 
By the same token, the temperateness of excellence consists in the 
education of the desires according to the good, such that what we judge or 
perform accords to the good; whereas the temperateness of effectiveness 
enjoins moving effective ly toward goods recognized as des irable; on thi s 
basis, as MacIntyre states, "temperateness is the virtue which overcomes 
frustration by oneself in one's pursuit of one's own satisfaction, just as 
justice is the virtue which overcomes frustration by others" ( I 988a, p.40). 
What is desirable, in the latter view, does not offer a good reason for action 
from the perspective of excellence. Desires should be disc iplined in order to 
lead us toward the good. 
The virtue of friendship in the context of the goods of effectiveness is 
based on mutual utili ty of the friends, whatever their private goods may be; 
whi le the friendship of excellence requires hav ing and promoting a shared 
allegiance to the good. The friendship of effectiveness does not concern the 
common good and people 's allegiance to it; rather, it addresses the effective 
and mutual satisfaction of the friends' desires (I 988a, p.42). In my 
terminology, the latter kind of friendship does not seek to make the friends 
better human beings by encouraging them to fo llow a particular conception 
of the good. 
The above remarks show the different structures of practical rationa lity 
which reflect themselves also in the meanings of the virtues. The underl yi ng 
difference between them is based on different conceptions of human nature 
and its good. In one moral conceptual scheme a functional and teleological 
conception of a human being is at work; while in the other, human beings 
are depicted as the maximizers of their own subjective desires in a context 
that lacks an objective moral order. 
Another feature of Maclntyre 's thought, which can explain the CT in 
connection with a conceptual scheme, is his view regarding the embodied 
se lf. It was argued in the foregoing chapter that, in Macintyre's view, the 
individual qua individual and irrespective of hi s place in a social setti ng is 
68 
not a substantive moral agent (I 983a, p.454). The individual is embodied in 
a social and cultural context that constitutes his features and obligations. 
The most salient aspect of this view of the self is Maclntyre ' s 
contention that individual objects of pleasures and pains are not universal 
features of human beings; that is to say, they do not apply to all human 
beings regardless of the way in which their characters have been constituted 
within traditions. In Maclntyre's view, the human being without a culture is 
a myth ( 1981, p.I61 ). This view of the self attaches MacIntyre to the 
communitarian tradition, even though he dislikes the label (2007, p.xiv). 
This view of the self is against the individualism of Liberalism. 
This individualism is noticeable in Hobbes ' picture of the state of 
nature in which it is as if men "sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like 
mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kinds of engagement to each 
other" (W. Molesworth 1962, p.109). By contrast, in Aristotle's view, 
understanding and implementing justice requires a social capacity, as 
MacIntyre puts it, "Aristotle however represents a tradition of thought, in 
which he is preceded by Homer and Sophocles, according to which the 
human being who is separated from his social group is also deprived of the 
capacity for justice" (1988a, p.96). This view, wnich reveals well 
Maclntyre's constitution thesis, is, however, more compatible with his 
initial social view of human nature, and not with his metaphysical 
interpretation of the natural law tradition, as was argued in the previous 
chapter, because according to the natural law tradition plain persons' 
knowledge of morality itself is not a product of social contexts, though they 
need proper conditions for its cultivation. 
ln this section, I argued how different conceptions of human nature 
affect practical reasoning. An Aristotelian view of human nature results in 
an approach to practical reasoning based on the education of desires, which 
terminates in an action, unlike an emotivistic view of human nature and its 
good. This difference reflects itself in the meanings of different virtues built 
upon different practical rationalities. Also, I showed that a social 
teleological view of human nature, as was Maclntyre's view in After Virtue, 
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resulted in the view that the self is not capable of practical reasoning 
independently of the resources and capacities developed by the tradition that 
forms it. This poses problems regarding how MacIntyre can reconcile his 
constitution thesis with rus later more metaphys ical view. 
As was remarked at the beginning of the chapter, the CT, particularly 
in the version affiliated with conceptual schemes, might lead to a 
misunderstandrng of MacIntyre. There are two ways in which MacIntyre 
might be misunderstood. The first is to assume that different accounts of 
rationality and justice are incommensurable, and so there is no way to 
compare them. I will discuss Maclntyre's account of incommensurability in 
chapter 4 to show how it is possible to attempt to make what might seem the 
incommensurable commensurable without the need for neutral grounds. 
Suffice it to note here that MacIntyre thrnks by drawing a narrative that 
explarns the move from one theory to another in terms of their merits and 
demerits, we can make them comparable (1991b, pp.117-118). 
The second misunderstandrng would be to read rum as a conservative 
commurutarian who sees no prospect of transcenrung the horizon of a given 
commurury. A conservati ve commurutarian emphasizes the limitedness of 
the moral capacities of agents to communities and their inherited traditions. 
R. Scruton, for example, adopts such a view, argurng that the liberals who 
propose versions of commurutariarusm like "Sandel , Walzer and Dworkintt 
are "not prepared to accept the real price of community: wruch is sancrit:y, 
intolerance, exclusion, and a sense that life's meanrng depends upon 
oberuence, and also on ,igilance agarnst the enemy" (R Scruton 1990, 
p.2 78). 
The role of rraditioDS in makrng conceptual schemes in Maclntyre's 
works sometrn1es approaches an ontological function by suggesting that 
traditions might go beyond makrng our concepts to constitute the identities 
of the agents who are operating in them. This ontological function supportS 
conse1Yative communitarianism as explarned above. by holrung that people 
in different rraditioDS have rufferent fixed identities, and so they cannot 
communicate and learn from each other. Maclntyre·s rejection of the 
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individual as a substantial moral agent might misleadingly strengthen this 
interpretation. 
MacIntyre dismisses the idea that individuals ' moral identi ty can be 
constituted independently of their social roles and relationships with each 
other in the context of a tradition. He (2008, p.266) holds that it is a crucial 
feature of "the self-understanding of modernity" that people generally think 
their decision-making powers belong to them qua individuals prior to and 
independently of their social identity; in his view, this picture of the self is 
"a liberal discovery" and a part of "the cult of the individual" . MacIntyre 
(1983a, p.454), by contrast, maintains that the individual is not a substantial 
moral agent; i.e. we cannot articulate a morality fo r him without taking into 
account his place in a social setting. 
Despite the existence of some evidence in Macintyre's works for the 
ontological function of traditions, as partly di scussed above, a closer reading 
of him shows that he criticizes the view that social and cultural orders can 
act as the total determinants and constituents of the self. The gist of his 
position is that some social orders threaten the understanding of oneself as a 
moral agent. This happens by reducing moral agency to the fulfillment of 
social requirements; whereas MacIntyre holds that moral agency is more 
than role-playing, and concerns the good of human beings qua human 
beings (1999b, p.3 14). Based on this, while tradition endows us with some 
kind of identity, and in some sense constitutes us, our intellectual and moral 
capacities are not or should not be limited to the resources made available to 
us by our traditions. In this view, the notion of moral ity as employed in the 
Homeric world is a limited notion of morality due to its exclusive emphasis 
on social requirements. The limitations of such a view, MacIntyre (1988, 
pp.84-85) contends, are surpassed in Aristotelianism in which there is a 
reference to human fl ouri shing, which goes beyond the fulfi llment of social 
requirements. This view is more compatible with Maclntyre 's later espousal 
of the natural law tradition than with his earli er social view in After Virtue. 
Maclntyre's later account of identity has become more metaphysical in line 
with the natural law tradition, which places emphasis on human nature and 
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the good as the identifying features of human kind independent of different 
traditions; nevertheless, Macintyre 's social and metaphys ical views 
sometimes conflict, for instance, in his rejection of the idea of natural or 
human rights as rights independent of traditions and practices (198 1, p.69), 
which wi ll be discussed in chapter 6. 
Despite the conservative communitarian claim, as will be seen in 
chapters 4 and 5, MacIntyre allows inter-conceptual understanding and 
communication. This approach lets MacIntyre, though not completely as 
will be explained in chapter 4, avoid the relativistic implications that might 
seem to follow from an emphasis on conceptual schemes. Accordingly, we 
should not take MacIntyre as an adherent of conservative communitarian ism 
which does not allow appeals to any ground beyond the community for 
evaluating its claims. 
Indeed, I will argue later in the present chapter that MacIntyre himself 
and some of his interpreters consider him as a revolutionary Aristotelian 
which is in stark contrast with conservative communitarianism. 
Nevertheless, a tension seems to lurk between, on the one hand, Macintyre's 
sometimes strong emphasis on the role of traditions, and on the other hand, 
his later metaphysical view of human nature which requires not seeing 
human beings as totally constituted by their traditions. 
In this section, I explained the CT in relation to the idea of conceptual 
schemes. I argued that practical rationality in the context in which the goods 
of excellence are paramount has structural differences with practical 
rationality based on the goods of effectiveness. I also discussed Maclntyre's 
anthropology according to which the self is embodied in its social setting. 
This view of the self, albeit with different degrees ofsituatedness of the self, 
is typical of different versions of communitarianism from conservative to 
liberal and to social versions (D. Mil ler 1999, p. l 07). This account of the 
CT based on the notion of conceptual schemes is more likely to be affiliated 
with the conservative vers ion of communitarianism, but to take this as a 
reading of MacIntyre might amount to the mi sinterpretation of his work. In 
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the next section, I attend to the CT based on the role of traditions as the 
contexts for the definition of the virtues. 
11.3.2 The CT Based on Traditions as Contexts of the Virtues 
As was noted in the previous chapter, a function of traditions in the 
ideal sense is to provide a context for the definition and the exercise of the 
virtues. Tradition in this sense is the community of past and present human 
lives each of which is directed toward the good. In Maclntyre's view, the 
life of virtue is related to practical rationality. In this section, I will explore 
further how the acquisition of the virtues relates to practical rationality, and 
how the virtues constitute practical rationality. 
MacIntyre, from an Aristotelian perspective, holds there is a relation 
between practical rationality and the virtues. That MacIntyre takes practical 
rationality itself as an intellectual virtue, which is phronesis, points to this 
relation. To spell out this issue better, let us consider what MacIntyre means 
by a virtue. 
For Macintyre, following Aristotle, virtues are dispositions not only to 
act but also to feel in a particular way. Virtuous action is not, as understood 
by Kant in Maclntyre 's interpretation, acting against inGlinations; rather, it 
requires the transformation of these inclinations such that the agent moves 
toward his good and the good on the basis of his cultivated desires ( l 98 l , 
p.149). This means that the virtues constitute and affect practical rationality 
by taming the desires. The process of taming desires occurs in an 
apprentice/master relationship. Intellectual virtues like wisdom, intelligence 
and prudence are acquired through teaching; moral virtues or the virtues of 
character like courage and justice are acquired by practice and habituation 
(1966, p.64; 1981, p.154). Aristotle (NE, Il.l) explains the relation between 
the virtues and habits as fo llows: 
Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral , 
intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its 
growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience 
and time), whi le moral virtue comes about as a result of 
habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed by 
a slight variation from the word ethos (habit) .... Neither by 
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nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in 
us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are 
made perfect by habit. 
The ro le of habituation in the development of the virtues is evident in 
the above passage. In Aristotle's v iew, practica l rationality is a kind of 
virtue that, like other virtues, cannot be reduced to rule-following 
behaviour. It is not possible to design some rules such as Kant's categorica l 
imperative to designate an action as practically rationa l (1981, p.236). 
From this Aristoteli an perspective, a novice learns how to act justly, in 
part from others, in a particular situation, and repeats his just actions in 
order to develop in himself the hab it of behaving justly; he can then figure 
out the unarticulated principles of justice in hi s particular actions (1988a, 
pp.92-93). By fathoming the unarticulated principles of right action ga ined 
through the habit of right-doing the agent might become able to apply these 
principles to other particular non-experienced cases. The habit of right 
action might lead to the virtue of phronesis, i. e. the knowledge of what to do 
in particular situations, and since in Aristotle's view right action is a subset 
of the good, it might result in a better knowledge of the good (I 988, p.92). 
In Aristotle's view, MacIntyre (2006 i, pp.3-4) maintains, "practical 
habituation in the exercise of the virtues has to precede education in moral 
theory." Only those who have acquired good habits are able "to theori ze 
well about issues of practice." Only the practically intelligent human being, 
in Aristotle's view, can judge the mean in any particular situation. Such a 
person does not have any external criterion to guide him, but he himself is 
"the standard of right judgment, passion, and action." Even true theoretical 
mora l judgments are on ly accessible to the good human being. These 
judgments, unlike theories in the physical sciences, require more than 
intell ectual virtues, and require participation in particular kinds of mora l and 
po litical practices (2006i, p.4). 
In practica l reasoning, unlike theoretica l enquiries, we do not start with 
"some partly articulated highly genera l conception of that end that can be 
stated in propositional form ." Rather, we begin with the directedness of our 
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action, which we find firstly by our nature, and then by habituation toward 
some ends. Our disagreements with others on moral issues prompt us to 
investigate into the nature of the habits and the education that we have 
acquired so far, and to provide resources to remove inadequacies (2006j , 
p.75). From Aristotle's perspective, MacIntyre (201 I, p.11) maintains, 
rational arguments with thos~ who do not have the required formed 
character is not useful. On this basis, Aristotle holds, it is impossible to 
teach politics and ethics to the young. 
There is a dialectical relation between the knowledge of the good and 
the knowledge of right action. What we take to be right in a particular 
situation, on the one hand, is reinforced by our notion of the good and the 
good life, and on the other hand, the exercise of practical rationality in 
particular situations strengthens our notion of the good ( 1988a, pp.117-118). 
The intellectual virtue of phronesis is achieved by moral virtues and 
the habit of undertaking right actions, which in tum depends on our 
performing right actions in particular situations. The habit of acting rightly 
in particular cases is developed through apprenticeship and learning from 
others. Therefore, an agent apart from an appropriate community, in 
Aristotle's terms a polis, lacks the capacity for practical rationality, since he 
lacks the opportunity to become initiated into the life and the education of 
the virtues, and he cannot cultivate the principles of right and virtuous 
action. Without these principles, he cannot exercise his capacity of practical 
rationality (1988a, pp.122-123). 
This view of practical reasoning, which heavily relies on the notion of 
following exemplars, is at odds with the Kantian view of morality which 
sees in Aristotle ' s view of morality a circularity; as Kant holds "Even the 
Holy One of the Gospel must first be compared with our ideal of moral 
perfection before he is cognized as such" (Kant [ 1785] 1996, Sec. 4:409, 
p.63). By contrast from an Aristotelian perspective, practical reasoning and 
theoretical reflection on the nature of moral concepts are conducted 
retrospectively. An agent experiencing righteous performance in a particular 
situation, and learning from others what morality requires him to do can 
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later understand what the good at stake is in that situation. Us ing a 
dialectica l method that moves between the experience of moral conduct and 
hi s partial conception of the good, he would be able to formulate the first 
principles, archai, of his practica l rationality. Accordingly, the dialectical 
method does not start from first principles; rather, it arrives finally at such 
principles ( 1988a, p.100). 
A novice is not able at the outset to understand the rationality of moral 
actions, since his untutored pass ions and desires impede him from 
understanding the relation of these actions and feelings to the good. 
Accepting the authority of moral masters lets him educate and harmonize 
his pass ions. In the first stages of the moral life, he acts according to moral 
principles with an incentive to please others around him, who are 
experienced in matters of morality. After acquiring sufficient moral 
education, he passes from mere conform ity to moral principles to achieving 
moral virtues and grasping the logic of moral principles. Only at this stage is 
the agent experienced enough to understand and present a rational 
justification for moral principles and mora l virtues ( 1988a, pp.114- 115). 
Becoming an independent practical reasoner is a process that starts 
from agents acknowledging their dependence on others. Agents are 
dependent on others not only for their physical and psychological needs but 
also for the formation of a process that eventually results in their 
independent practical reasoning. Children as incompetent moral agents act 
so as to please their mothers and those around them. It is the role of good 
mothers and good parents as immediate moral instructors to teach children 
that if they really want to please them, they should act according to the 
good, whether it pleases their elders or not (1999a, p.84). 
The acknowledgment of dependence on others has a crucial role in 
achieving independence in practica l reasoning. In this process, the external 
reasons for actions such as pleasing others would tum into internal reasons 
by transforming desi res and directing them to the good. Moral and 
in te ll ectual virtues are qualities a novice needs to develop in this process 
( 1999a, p. 87). Because of this transformation, a well-trained agent does not 
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act morally out of confrontation with his desires; rather, he finds moral 
conduct agreeable and enjoyable (1999a, p.88). In the course of this 
development, he learns how to separate himself from his desires, and to 
evaluate, revise and if necessary replace them according to his notion of the 
good. In doing so, he has surpassed the animal condition of simply having 
reasons for action, and has developed in its place a human capability of 
evaluating and modifying those reasons (1999a, p.91). 
Macintyre, emphasizing the role of moral education, emphasizes moral 
errors, besides intellectual mistakes, as sources of flawed practical 
reasoning. Some vices like insufficient sensitivity to others' sufferings or 
hatred of others might impede us from separating ourselves from our 
passions and according other people their due in the process of practical 
rationality. The best protections from these two kinds of errors, i.e. 
intellectual and moral , are found in friendship and collegiality. Our friends 
and colleagues can help us detect our intellectual and moral mistakes, and 
keep us on the right track in the process toward becoming an independent 
practical reasoner ( 1999a, p. 96). 
These remarks show that we should learn to become virtuous in moral 
traditions prior to being able to construct a practical rationality that informs 
us of the point of being virtuous, and of the goods which are at stake in 
moral conduct, and this is partly what is meant by the CT, because there are 
some elements, the virtues, that precede practical rationality. This sense of 
the CT relates to Macintyre's virtue-ethics. 
A quotation from another proponent of virtue-ethics and virtue-
epistemology might shed light on Maclntyre's approach here. J. McDowell 
( I 979, pp.331-332) explains the ro le of the virtues in practical reasoning in 
terms of the reliable sensitivity that they cause. He argues that a kind person 
or a virtuous person in general has "a reliable sensitivity" to the 
requirements of kindness in particular situations, letting him know when 
and how to behave kindly. The kind person has a "perceptual capacity", 
yielding him the knowledge of the requirements of kindness in particular 
cases. In other words, having the virtues gives the agent a perceptual 
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capability to recognize if a given situation requires behaving according to 
one virtue or another. This knowledge is not reducible to the application of 
the rules of moral action. McDowell, on th is basis, opposes principle-based 
ethics, and argues that "should statements" cannot function as reasons for 
justifying an obligation; rather, we need appropriate specific considerations 
to support these statements (McDowell 1978, p. 14). 
One feature of Aristotle's account of practical rationa lity related to the 
role of the virtues and apprenticeship is that agents rely on each other in 
practical reasoning about important issues (NE, 1112b, 10-11 , in A. 
MacIntyre (1999a, p.107)). In this view, MacIntyre contends that a 
collective questioning and answering about the good often talces place prior 
to individua l deliberation. Practical reasoning is a collecti ve and social 
enterprise in which agents reason with each other. An agent needs to engage 
in different social relations to achieve his own conception of the good in 
order to be qualified later as an independent practical reasoner (1999a, 
p. 107). 
MacIntyre also explains his idea of virtue-based practical rationality by 
describing moral phi losophy as a craft. He talces this view in his criticism of 
the Enlightenment and its heirs in the 19 th century. In Macintyre 's view, the 
Enlightenment's approach faced the following problem. The procedures of 
practical rationality, like Kant's categorical imperative, designed to 
distinguish moral from immoral action are not exclusively the products of a 
universa l practical rationality; rather, some elements of traditional values 
are present in what is assumed to be rationally right ( I 98 I, p.43). In other 
words, the procedures and the tests of practical rationality app ly only 
retrospectively to sets of conduct, in the sense that agents do not employ 
these procedures empty-heartedly to determine what actions are morally 
right or wrong; rather, the particularity of agents' lives would impact on the 
procedures adopted by them, and it is not the case that as Kant ([ 1785] 
1996, Sec.4:389, p.45) assumes " the ground of obligation here must not be 
sought in the nature of the human being or in the circumstances of the world 
in which he is placed, but a priori simply in the concepts of pure reason." 
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MacIntyre argues to the contrary that "Kant never doubted for a moment 
that the maxims which he had learnt from his own virtuou·s parents were 
those which had to be vindicated by a rational test Thus the content of 
Kant's morality was conservative" (1981 , p.44). 
In Macintyre's view, the conservative and particular elements present 
in agents ' moral lives play a significant role in constituting the structure of 
their practical rationality. This contention is at the heart of Macintyre ' s 
notion of tradition-constituted rationalities. The procedures of practical 
rationality are designed, whether we know this or not, to meet the demands 
of particular moral attitudes. In other words, the Enlightenment ' s moral 
philosophers like others have had some moral and intellectual virtues 
informing their notion of practical rationality. What Kant took to be a test 
for moral actions tacitly presupposed what was right according to his 
inherited Pietist Lutheran morality. If we take these characters and 
inclinations away, in Maclntyre ' s view, Kant ' s moral test of consistent 
universalizability would include as moral some non-moral or amoral 
principles: 
It is very easy to see that many immoral and trivial non-
moral maxims are vindicated by Kant' s test quite as 
convincingly- in some cases more convincingly-than the 
moral maxims which Kant aspires to uphold. So 'Keep all 
your promises throughout your entire life except one ', 
'Persecute all those who hold false religious beliefs ' and 
'Always eat mussels on Mondays in March' will all pass 
Kant ' s test, for all can be consistently universalized (198 I, 
pp.45-46). 
MacIntyre holds that Kant has tried to give substance to this formal 
moral test by adopting the view that morality enjoins treating others as ends 
in themselves. However, in Macintyre ' s view, the formal criterion of 
morality does not logically necessitate such a content It is, rather, possible 
to treat others as instruments without flouting the formal criterion of 
consistent universalizability; for instance, an egoistic person can 
consistently will that all people except him be treated as a means (198 1, 
p.46). 
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In my view, if we consider Kant's account of the good, which consists 
in the intrinsic dignity of human beings as a guiding principle of morality, 
then Macintyre's criticism loses its point, as Kant' s approach is not purely 
formal. Based on this point, the egoistic person in Macintyre's example is 
not acting morally even if he can will consistently to treat others as means, 
because by doing so he is taking other human beings as means and not as 
ends in themselves. However, I cannot here enter into di scussion about 
Kant 's moral theory, and restrict myself to Maclntyre ' s presentation of 
Kant's theory. 
The contrasting view espoused by MacIntyre is that of philosophy, 
including moral philosophy, as a craft. What distinguishes the craft-view of 
moral enquiry and phi losophy from the Enlightenment's and 19th century 
Encyclopaedist's perspective is two-fold. First, there is the role of 
apprenticeship in a craft. Second, there is the role of intellectual and moral 
virtues in exercising practical rationality and understanding moral concepts. 
While the Encyclopaedists and the Enlightenment phi losophers began 
with the rejection of authority and the adoption of an individual-centred 
epistemology, the craft-view emphasizes the role of authority and 
traineeship in obtaining knowledge. Thi s relationship assists an apprentice 
to di stinguish a genuine good from a seeming good, and also what is good 
for him based on his training level from what is good without qualification 
(1990a, p.61 ). 
In Maclntyre 's view, the relationship between virtue and practical 
rationality can resolve the dilemmas that one meets in , for example, Plato 's 
Meno paradox. The Meno paradox of practical rationality is the dil emma 
that ei ther we know something or we do not. If we know it, then what would 
be the point of enquiry, and if we do not know it, the question wou ld be how 
it is possible to undertake enqui ry about it, and how we can ensure that we 
have achieved the truth. 
ln response, Macintyre holds that unless we have the potentiali ty of 
moving toward particular theoretical and practical conclusions, we would be 
unable to learn . These potentialities are capacities for acqui ri ng moral and 
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intellectual virtues; also, we need a trainer to teach us what habits of mind 
and character to have, and how to develop them (1990a, pp. 63&130). 
The craft-view of moral enquiry emphasizes the existence of pre-
rational elements that "initially" are not open to rational scrutiny, and which 
constitute the structure of practical rationality. In the craft-view, the 
authority of the masters and virtues into which the apprentice is initiated are 
not the subjects of practical reasoning; as MacIntyre writes: 
The intending reader has to have inculcated into him or 
herself certain attitudes and dispositions, certain virtues, 
before he or she can know why these are to be accounted 
virtues. So a pre-rational reordering of the self has to occur 
before the reader can have an adequate standard by which 
to judge what is a good reason and what is not. And this 
reordering requires obedient trust, not only in the authority 
of this particular teacher, but in that of the whole tradition 
of interpretative commentary into which that teacher had 
had earlier him or herself to be initiated through his or her 
reordering and conversion (1990a, pp.82-83). 
This account of practical rationality, which emphasizes the role of the 
virtues, denotes the Augustinian aspect of Macintyre's thought; this view, 
however, in some respects conflicts with the democratic and fallibilistic 
aspects of Maclntyre's thought in which he argues, for instance, that a 
flourishing rational community should be a local one in which it is possible 
to put office-holders and the citizens to question by each other in order to 
arrive at a common mind (I 998b, p.248) 12, or that "corrigibility and 
refutability are necessary properties of any theory for which truth can be 
claimed" (2006g, p.187). The conflict is that the virtue-elements would 
surely put some limitations on the scope of questioning, as the virtuous 
might ask the novices to first become virtuous in order to understand the 
wisdom of their actions. The knowledge that is at the disposal of the 
virtuous cannot be easily revised or refuted by other people; the knowledge 
which has some character formation as its backdrop does not easily change 
12 MacIntyre (2006p, p.213) uses the expression "rational local community" to describe 
such a community. 
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upon the disclosure of its inadequacies. To modify this problem, I used 
above the qualification that the novice-master relationship is not "initially" 
open to revision, which means when the novice becomes experienced 
enough he can challenge the master. This modificat ion can to some extent 
solve the problem, as it ideally allows revision at the later stages of 
apprenticeship. 
In contrast with this craft-view, in the En lightenment's account, there 
should be rational grounds for agents' adoption of these initial elements. 
Agents should exert autonomous rationality and be able to reflect on the 
initial context in which they happen to reason; whereas in Maclntyre' s view, 
the practical rationality of these prior constituting elements is not 
recognizable by everyone; onl y a just person can recognize the justice of a 
given state of affairs; as MacIntyre (I 988a, p. l 06) states, "on Aristotle ' s 
view it is imposs ible genera lly to judge consistently aright concerning a 
particular virtue without possess ing the virtue". 
Accord ing to the tradition-constituted account of rationality explained 
above, the background given by a tradition provides the possibility for an 
agent to reason based on these starting-points. These points can serve their 
part as the starting premises of practical rationality if they are inculcated 
into an agent as intellectual and moral virtues. Hence, in Maclntyre 's view, 
there is no way to start a practical syllogism from self-j ustificatory and 
convincing-for-all first principles (1988a, pp.251-252). 
It is important to note here that Maclntyre' s emphasis on the 
significance of communities, and his referring to the idea of the "j ustice of a 
polis" (1988, p.34) in post-Homeric Greece are not intended to have 
relativistic implications. Argu ing about different meanings of the virtues in 
different Greek cities, Macin tyre (1988, p. 79) is aga inst the relativistic and 
the sophistic view that every claim is inevitably from a point of view. 
However, Maclntyre's constitution thesis and his view that "progress in 
rationality is achieved only from a point of view" might suggest the same 
sophistic point ( 1988a, p.144). 
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Macintyre, on the one hand, denies this relativistic understanding, 
which is evident in his rejection of the reduction of the idea of truth to 
warranted assertibili ty in traditions (1988a, p.363), and on the other hand, 
denies the possibility of leaving aside all one-sighted points of view in 
enquiries (1988a, p.80). To resolve thi s tension, I would suggest that, in 
Maclntyre ' s account, we start from contingent partial points of view; 
however, the outcomes of our enquiries can compete with each other, and 
the one(s) which survives challenges would be rationally superior (1988a, 
p.3 88) . As Macintyre puts it, "each of these stages [of progress in enquiries] 
wi ll have been marked both by less and less partial insight and yet also by a 
continuing one-sidedness" (1988a, p.80). 13 
Accordingly, I think M. Nussbaum 's criticism of MacIntyre based on 
her interpretation of Aristotle is not correct, because MacIntyre is not 
espousing a moral relativism by his CT. Nussbaum's point is as follows. 
Aristotle does not believe that people need to seek 
arguments to justify their beliefs only from within each 
single local tradition. He considers ideas from Persia and 
Sparta, from Cyme and Athens, all in an attempt to 
construct an account of the good life for any and every 
human being (M. Nussbaum 1989, p.41). 
Neither does Macintyre believe that rational justification should only 
be sought from within a single tradition, as rational accounts provided from 
each tradition should compete with others to check which one is more 
adequate. Macintyre 's point is that justification is inevitably from a point of 
view, but justified beliefs should compete with others to see which one is 
more adequate in terms of explanatory capacity, consistency, etc. After 
elaborating the relation of the virtues to practical rationality, and explaining 
the CT based on this relation, I shall try to address the charge of moral 
arbitrariness against Macintyre ' s account of virtue-ethics, as it is relevant to 
the current discussion. 
13 I will return to this issue more extensively in chapter 4 in my discussion of relativism and 
perspectivism. 
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II.3.2.1 Ma clatyre's Response to the Charge of Moral 
Arbitra riness 
By the charge of moral arbitrariness, I mean whether objective moral 
norms govern the relationship between masters and their pupi ls, or whatever 
moral masters ' commands serve as the measures of rightness. 
Maclntyre's response to this question would be that there are surely 
some moral norms that should guide the attitude of a master toward his 
students. The content of what a master is teaching and his conduct cannot be 
arbitrary if he wants to teach justice and other virtues. This view 
distinguishes MacIntyre from the conservative communitarianism, which I 
discussed earlier. Wbat is valued in different communities cannot 
necessarily be taken as morally true; as MacIntyre has declared he sees no 
value in community as such, and that many types of community are 
oppressive (2007, p.x.iv). He argues also that masters, including parents, 
should teach pupils to act according to their good, whether it pleases their 
masters or not. \1/hen pupils are not independent practical reasoners, 
pleasing masters might be a temporary sign of good behaviour; but they 
should gradually become independent practical reasoners, and act according 
to what they have been taught as being objectively good (1999a, p.84). This 
indicates that the good is independent of the master' s wishes and desires, 
though he might be more competent to know the good and the right than a 
novice. Furthern1ore, masters and teachers should have the virtues they try 
to teach. There should not be inconsistencies benveen masters' assertions 
and their actions (1999a, p.89). 
Although I agree that MacIntyre does not intend to have a virtue-theory 
that makes moral principles dependent on the arbitrary wills of moral 
masters.. the Aristotelian account of ,inue-ethics is more apt than the 
Kantian wrsion of , i rrue-ethics to lead toward moral a.rbirrariness . because 
Aristotle takes moral masters as the criteria of the me.an and the ,inues"; as 
1J. A.ristm le (SE. ll-6): ·•Virtue. then. is a slate of character concerned ,\;·th choice. l)ing in a 
mean. i.e. 1he mean relatiw to us. this being de1ermined by a rational principle. and by tha1 
principle b~- ,,·hich 11:e man of practical ,,·i.sdom ,,-ould de.1em1ine ii·· Otalics added). 
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was mentioned earlier, MacIntyre (2006i , pp.3-4) holds that for Aristotle the 
moral master who is practically wise does not have any external criterion for 
the good and the right, and he himself is the standard; whereas for Kant 
moral masters should be judged on the basis of moral ideals. As was 
explained earlier in this chapter, Kant holds "Even the Holy One of the 
Gospel must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before he 
is cognized as such" (Kant [ 1785) 1996, Sec. 4:409, p.63). 
Macintyre 's ([1978) 1985, pp. 129-130) denial of the idea of natural 
rights independent of practices and traditions might strengthen this 
interpretation, as this entails the lack of any context-independent measures 
for the evaluation of practices. Furthermore, Maclntyre 's espousal of the 
universal precepts of the natural law, like truth-telling and avoidance of 
gratuitous harming of others, can serve as such context-independent 
measures. By this, I mean there are conflicting aspects in Maclntyre 's work 
some of which might be invoked to offer an interpretation that leans toward 
moral arbitrariness, which is not compatible with the general tenor of his 
work. 
Based on this response from Maclntyre's perspective, I think M. T. 
Mitchell (2006) has laid excessive emphasis on the commonalities between 
Macintyre's and M. Polanyi's views concerning the role of tradition in 
knowledge. There are, of course, similarities between the two figures in that 
both place emphasis upon the role of submi ssion to authorities in acquiring 
knowledge and assessing its rationality. For both, rational justification is 
retrospective, and is preceded by trust in some sort of authority. However, 
as was argued in the previous chapter regarding Porter's interpretation of 
MacIntyre, the emphasis on Maclntyre's appeal to the notion of authority 
should be in tune with his fa llibi li sm and his insistence on constant rational 
evaluation of theories. 
Mitchell (2006, p.111) quotes Polanyi (1958, p.259) as saying that 
"any enquiry into our ultim ate beliefs can be consistent only if it 
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presupposes its own conclusions; it must be intentionally circular." As 
Mitchell notes, MacIntyre (1990a, pp.63&130) also refers to this circularity 
when he invokes the paradox of the Meno. Maclntyre ' s denial of neutrality 
in moral enquiries (1990a, pp.60-63), and his view that the objectivity of 
good is realized only from particular perspectives also reinforces this 
understanding (1990a, p.60). Nevertheless, we should recall that MacIntyre 
considers the charge of circularity to be a false one by which he means we 
can start our enquiries based on the limited potential knowledge that we 
have, and then move toward a more articulated one. MacIntyre attempts to 
avoid compromising his correspondence theory of truth according to which 
our theories can really escape the circularity and limitations of our 
conceptual scheme to accord with reality. 
Indeed, Mitchell (2006, p. l 19) points to the metaphysical realism of 
both MacIntyre and Polanyi; but besides this feature, he should take into 
account Maclntyre's epistemological realism according to which we should 
make our theories accordant with realities that exist independently of our 
thoughts. Highlighting the role of authority and the virtues should not 
compromise the realistic element in Maclntyre's theory of truth. Neither 
should it overlook the possibility of the revision and the falsification of 
intellectual authorities. 
MacIntyre (1988a, pp.206-207) maintains that in Aquinas ' view, we 
should counterpoise authorities against each other to identify the limitations 
of each point of view. This indicates that we are not trapped in what we are 
taught in our conceptual schemes or by an authority, and that we have the 
capacity to compare them with other accounts formed in other conceptual 
schemes. 
Though Macintyre from time to time has underscored the intemality of 
the standards of rational justification to traditions, he insists on the 
possibility and necessity of rational dialogue between traditions (1988a, 
p.387). He opposes the view that claims to rationality should be assessed 
only internally. This view is clear in his objection to the fideistic 
justification of religion, arguing that he no longer thinks, as he once used to 
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do with Karl Barth, we should try "to fence off the area of religious belief 
and practice from the rest of my life, by treating it as a sui generis form of 
life, with its own standards internal to it" (1994c, p.142). 
In fact, Macintyre's emphasis on the notion of tradition, despite the 
existence of some ideas to the contrary such as his objections to the idea of 
human rights or to the liberal idea of neutrality, is so non-conservative that 
it has prompted some theorists to think that his distinction from modem 
liberalism is blurred. W. Kymlicka ( 1989, pp.5 6-57), for example, argues 
that, since in Macintyre's view, the self does not have to accept the moral 
limitations of its community, and that it can rebel against its identity, " it is 
not clear how his view is any clifferent from the liberal individualist one he 
claims to reject". In the same vein, J. Porter (1993, p.5 16) remarks that 
"once Maclntyre 's theory of rationa lity and truth is seen in its proper 
intellectual context, it is apparent that it both presupposes and lends support 
to the classical liberal virtues of tolerance and openness to pluralism." The 
liberal interpretation of MacIntyre, in my view, conflicts with the bulk of 
Macintyre 's rhetoric which is against the Enlightenment, modernism and 
Liberalism. 
Indeed, Maclntyre 's account of the virtues sometimes takes on a 
revolutionary aspect rather than a conservative one. This revolutionary 
aspect stems from Maclntyre 's opposition to the reduction of the 
teleological account of the virtues to a functional account. The latter is, for 
instance in E. L. Pincoffs ' view, a conservative account. Pincoff (1986) 
defines the virtues of persons as "qualities of their functioning well in a way 
which is ' appropriate to the common life', a common life within which 
different individuals and groups will pursue a range of different ends" 
(Pincoff 1986, pp.6-7, cited in MacIntyre 1988b, p. l ). MacIntyre opposes 
Pincoff's account of the virtues, holding that "those qualities which have the 
best claim to be accounted virtues may be and are dysfunctional to and 
disruptive of certain types of social and cultural order" (1988b, p.2). 
What sort of social and cultural order are the virtuous · committed to 
overthrow? In Macintyre's view, it is the kind of social order that is based 
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on the Humean picture of morality rather than on the Aristotelian one. The 
explanation is that for Hume, MacIntyre (1988b, p.10) maintains, the virtue 
of temperance does not involve the transformation of our desires; it only 
consists of restraints on our "over-indulgence in pleasures for the sake of 
utility"; whereas for Aristotle, "sophrosune" or temperance not only 
restrains certain pleasures, but also consists in educating and altering the 
capacities for pleasure and pain (1988b, p.5). From this Aristotel ian 
perspective, temperance that consists in the education of desires is required 
for phronesis, which is practical reasoning (1988b, p.5). This education is 
directed toward the human good, and not necessarily toward preserving any 
social system in which the virtues are operating. Accordingly, the life of 
virtue might require overthrowing a social setting that poses threats to 
human flourishing. A feature of such a social setting is its gross inequality; 
as MacIntyre puts it: 
Aristotle pointed out long ago that a rational polity is one 
that cannot tolerate too great inequalities, because where 
there are such, citizens cannot deliberate together rationally. 
They are too divided by their sectional interests, so that they 
lose sight of their common good (20 11 , p.13). 
Accordingly, Maclntyre 's insistence on the role of the virtues m 
practical reasoning, and on the significance of apprenticeship does not 
always lead to a conformist attitude. This revolutionary attitude is both 
related to hi s Aristotelianism, as was explained above, and to hi s Marxism. 
MacIntyre from his earlier Marxist perspective argued that revolution 
against capitalism is necessary fo r winning freedom: 
The individual then cannot win hi s freedom by asserting 
himself against society; and he cannot win it through 
capita li st society. To be free is only possible in some new 
form of society which makes a radica l break with the 
various oppressions of capitalism. Thus the topic of 
freedom is also the topic of revo lution ([ 1960] 2008, p.1 30). 
As K. Knight (20 11 , pp.20-21) points out, Maclntyre 's theory of 
practice invo lves the critica l scrutiny of the exercise of power in practices, 
and thi s shows that Maclntyre's account of apprenticeship is far away from 
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the moral arbitrariness of moral masters. This critical scrutiny occurs on the 
basis of the internal goods of practices, which are not formed or changed 
arbitrari ly. Maclntyre's moral theory, in fact, gains a subversive aspect 
when it faces a social setting that is not suitable for the life of virtue, as is 
the case in Maclntyre ' s view with modern culture: 
What the morality of the virtues articulated in and defended 
by the moral rhetoric of our political culture provides is, it 
turns out, not an education in the virtues but, rather, an 
education in how to seem virtuous, without actually being 
so (1991a, p.14). 
The picture of the virtues as habits of the mind and character presented 
earlier in this chapter might misleadingly indicate that anything into which 
people are educated in a particular context that produces a kind of habit 
could count as a virtue. However, in Maclntyre 's Aristotelian and Thomistic 
view, agents are not neutral regarding what they receive from their social 
settings. They have capacities and inclinations for the good; this capacity 
itself is not the product of social settings; rather, it will become reali zed in 
appropriate social settings through apprenticeship and training; however, 
this training should be compatible with human beings ' capacities. 
To sum up this response to the charge of moral arbitrariness, masters 
are only means for educating novices. They themselves are subject to moral 
appraisal by independent practical reasoners. This position of Maclntyre's, 
which distinguishes him from conservative communitarianism, is consistent 
with his espousal of the natural law tradition according to which a human 
being has a nature that requires a particular morality for its flouri shing. This 
flourishing might not occur in just any cultural and social setting. 
In this section I attempted to explain the CT based on the function of 
traditions in the definition and practice of the virtues. The notion of the 
common good in traditions, as was di scussed in the previous chapter, makes 
the objective justification and practice of the virtues possible. In this 
section, I emphasized the ro le of the education of desires . in exercising 
practical reasoning. Practical reasoning occurs in the framework of some 
pre-rational reordering in moral agents, which can later be subject to moral 
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and rational reflection. I also di scussed how Maclntyre ' s view regarding the 
constitution of practical reasoning by the virtues is not a conservative 
account, and it indeed becomes subversive when it faces a social setting that 
is not suitable for the life of virtue. In the next section , I will explain the CT 
based on the methodological function of traditions. 
11.3.3 The CT Based on the Methodological Function of Traditions 
The third way to explain the CT is by the methodological function of 
traditions, which consist in the ways that traditions, as traditions of 
intellectual and moral enquiry, direct enquiries within themselves. Without 
the contingent starting-points provided by traditions the enquirers would 
have no place to begin their enquiries about either their traditions or the 
world. Based on this view, MacIntyre (1988a, p.354) holds that the 
rationality of tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive enquiry is a 
matter of the progress that is occurring in a tradition; a tradition whose life 
and enquiries begin from "some condition of pure historical contingency, 
from the beliefs, institutions, and practices of some particular community 
which constitute a given." 
The term "constitute", which appeared in the quote above, denotes the 
relation between the methodological function of traditions and the CT. The 
relation is that traditions constitute the starting-points , as well as the 
standards of justification and progress, for the enquiries that are occurring in 
them ; however, in my view, "constitute" in this sense should be far less 
robust in meaning than it is in the first two senses associated with 
conceptual schemes and the virtues explained above. This issue will be 
spe lled out later in this section. 
Maclntyre's emphas is on start ing enquiries from contingent starting-
points indicates his di fference from the Cartes ian and the Enlightenment' s 
modes of enquiry, as understood by him. MacIntyre (1988a, pp.25 1-252), 
contrary to the En lightenment's view, emphas izes the relevance of first 
principles to the conceptual schemes in which these first principles are 
working, and denies that there are first principles whose evidence can be 
known by all rational human beings irrespective of the traditions in which 
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the theories are formed. As MacIntyre (1988a, p.252) writes, "the 
evidentness of those principles is always relative to the conceptual scheme 
which that particular theory embodies and by its success or fai lure 
vindicates or fails to vindicate." 
By contrast, from a Cartesian perspective all rational enquiries should 
start from necessary and indubitable principles; in Macintyre's view (2006f, 
p.147), there are no such substantial first principles. There might be some 
formal logical rules, like the law of non-contradiction, which are necessarily 
true, but they are insufficient for building a substantial body of theory. We 
need substantial principles, which should of course conform to the formal 
rules of logic, but their substantive character belies the idea that they could 
be immediately evident to everybody, just because substantial principles 
might vary from tradition to tradition. 
In Maclntyre's account (1988a, p.360), first principles, themselves, 
like the whole structures in which they are operating, require justification; 
but this is to be accomplished historically and dialectically by showing their 
rational superiority to their predecessors and rivals: 
They [first principles] are justified in so far as in the history 
of this tradition they have, by surviving the process of 
dialectical questioning, vindicated themselves as superior to 
their historical predecessors. Hence such first principles are 
not self-sufficient, se lf-justifying epistemological first 
principles. They may indeed be regarded as both necessary 
and evident, but their necessity and their evidentness will be 
characterizable as such only to and by those whose thought 
is framed by the kind of conceptual scheme from which 
they emerge as a key element. .. ( 1988a, p.360). 
The key point here is that first principles require justification. This is 
against the modem commonsensical and the Cartesian view of firs t 
principles according to which the principles that are justificatory should 
finally be based upon self-evident first principles which do not need further 
justification. 
Macintyre's reason to think otherwise is that first principles for him 
include substantial statements that are accorded priority in the knowledge-
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process; but as they are substantial , in the sense that they are informative 
about the world, they cannot be justified ana lytically, like the rules of logic, 
and without reference to features of the world. 
J. Porter (2003, p.51) explains Maclntyre 's account of first principles 
by stating that for him first principles are logical and conceptual but not 
epistemic, which means for him, the claims of a completed science in fact 
logically and conceptually follow from its first principles, but "thi s may not 
be apparent until the science actuall y is completed, and the relation of its 
various claims is rendered perspicuous." 
Porter here points to Maclntyre's anti-epistemological account of first 
principles. His account is anti-epistemological, since these principles are 
substantive, and so do not have "the kind of justified immediate certitude" 
of an "epistemological starting point". MacIntyre is against the notion of 
epistemological first principles, and describes them as "mythological 
beasts" (2006f, p.14 7) . 
Maclntyre's notion of first principles is inspired by Aquinas' account 
which will be explained in the next chapter, according to which first 
principles include substantive principles, and refer to the metaphysical 
features of the subject; for instance, the predicate of rationality for human 
beings refers to some metaphysica l counterpart in human beings' natures, 
which explains the necessity of the truth of the proposition "a human being 
is a rationa l animal" . These principles are not epistemologically first in the 
sense that we should and could know them from the beginning, and that al l 
other propositions in the area of knowledge in question can be derived from 
them; rather, the point is that when we know the nature of the object we 
conclude that the predicate holds true for the object. First principles are 
metaphysical, in the sense that they refer to the rea l natures of objects; they 
are te leologica l, since they are first principles of practical rationality and 
concern the sphere of morality which is teleological for Aquinas, meaning 
that they refer to some real and fixed ends for the world including human 
beings. These can be used for the evaluation of individual choices. 
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"Genuine first principles", in Maclntyre 's Thomistic view, should have 
factual counterparts by reference to which they get their substance: 
This contemporary universe of discourse [the modem 
account of first principles which MacIntyre criticizes] thus 
has no p lace within it for any conception of fixed ends, of 
ends to be discovered rather than decided upon or invented, 
... Genuinely first principles, so I shall argue, can have a 
place only within a universe characterized in terms of 
certain determinate, fixed and unalterable ends, ends which 
provide a standard by reference to which our individual 
purposes, desires, interests and decisions can be evaluated 
as well or badly directed. For in practical life it is the telos 
which provides the arche, the first principle of practical 
reasoning ... (2006f, p.146). 
A question for this account of first principles might arise as follows. If 
first principles are metaphysical and substantial, such that they will be 
discovered at the end of our enquiries, why are they called "first" principles, 
rather than final principles? By answering this question, MacIntyre points to 
the difference between the Cartesian and the Aristotelian/Thomistic 
accounts of first principles. The point is that, in my terms, in the 
Aristotelian/Thomistic account the word "first" in the phrase "first 
principles" does not convey the timing of our awareness of the truth of first 
principles; rather, it points to the conceptually fundamental position that a 
first principle as a matter of fact has in our thinking; a position which we 
might become aware of later in our thinking-process. 
This view of first principles is based on Aristotle's contention 111 
Posterior Analytics, where he argues that " it is difficult to di scern whether 
one knows or not" (cited in MacIntyre (2006f, p.149)). Aquinas, MacIntyre 
(2006f, p.149) narrates, interprets this as that it is difficult to discern 
whether or not we know from appropriate principles. In this view, one may 
genuinely know without yet having knowledge of the first principles upon 
which that knowledge is based, as MacIntyre puts the point: 
All knowledge even in the initial stages of enquiry is a 
partial achievement . . . we can know without as yet 
knowing that we know that we know, while for the 
Cartesian, as I remarked earlier, if we know, we must know 
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that we know, since for the Cartesian it is always reference 
backwards to our starting-point that guarantees our 
knowledge and, hence, it is only through knowing that we 
know that we know that we know. By contrast, for the 
Thomist our present knowledge involves reference forward 
to that knowledge of the archelprincipium which will, ifwe 
achieve it, give us subsequent knowledge of the knowledge 
that we now have (2006f, p.149). 
Macintyre 's point is that we might come to know first principles in the 
course of enquiries by subjecting our current knowledge to revision and 
completion. When we have a fuller account of objects, and the mind is more 
adequate to these objects, we come closer to attaining knowledge of 
particular first principles that we have been employing in our knowledge-
process without knowing them explicitly. 
To return to the CT, Macintyre's account of first principles is related to 
the constitution thesis in its methodological sense. The explanation is that, 
as was argued above, first principles for MacIntyre include substantive 
principles the evidence for which is not initially known by every mind. 
Given that there are not any universal substantive first principles to move 
enquirers forward, they should start from contingent starting-points they 
come across in their traditions, and then progress using a dialectical and 
fallibilistic method; as MacIntyre (1988a, p.361) puts it: 
Traditions fail the Cartesian test of beginning from 
unassailable evident truths; not only do they begin from 
contingent positivity, but each begins from a point different 
from that of the others ... Traditions are always and 
ineradically (sic: ineradicably) to some degree local , 
informed by particularities of language and social and 
natural environment. 
While in demonstration we move from first principles toward 
subordinate truths, in dial ectic we move from what is agreed contingently 
toward first principles (1990a, p.88-89). The CT in the methodological 
sense is related to this dialectical method, since we start our enqu iries 
through a step by step questioning of contingent beliefs, to see what would 
finally survive this sifting process. These contingent beliefs and positions 
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are provided by traditions, and to some extent determine the direction of our 
enquiries. They also provide us with the norms that we · need for our 
evaluations in our enquiries. These norms and starting-points themselves 
could and should be subject to evaluation, but the important issue is that, in 
Macintyre ' s view, we cannot question all of them at once; as he puts it, "To 
say to oneself or to someone else 'Doubt all your beliefs here and now' 
without reference to historical or autobiographical context is not 
meaningless; but it is an invitation not to philosophy, but to mental 
breakdown, or rather to philosophy as a means of mental breakdown" 
(2006a, pp.12-13). 
Indeed, we use both demonstrative and dialectical methods in our 
enquiries, but unless we start from substantial contingent points, 
demonstration cannot move us forward. Demonstration works in a context 
of some substantial principles; otherwise, formal rules like the law of non-
contradiction cannot move the enquiry forward. We apply these rules to the 
sets of received beliefs the truths of which will be assessed according to the 
best standards that have appeared so far in the context of the tradition: 
The participant in a craft is rational qua participant in so far 
as he or she conforms to the best standards sif reason 
discovered so far, and the rationality in which he or she thus 
shares is always, therefore, unlike the rationality of the 
encyclopaedic mode, understood as a historically situated 
rationality, even if one which aims at a timeless formulation 
of its own standards ... (1990a, p.65). 
The role that is played by these contingent points in directing 
theoretical and practical enquiries underlies Maclntyre 's objection to what 
he thinks is the liberal ideal of impartiality and abstraction from 
particularities as a condition of rationality (1988a, p.3). Indeed, in 
Maclntyre's view, contrary to the notion of neutrality, enquiries about 
justice and other virtues assume a view of human nature and its good. A 
theory of virtue (1991a, p.9) in order to be sufficiently determinate cannot 
be neutral with regard to rival accounts of human nature and the good, and 
yet sufficiently determinate and substantial. There are Aristotelian, Stoic, 
Hurnean, Kantian, and Utilitarian accounts of the virtues, among others, 
95 
which hold ri va l views of human nature and the good, and so there are 
different views of genuine and counterfeit virtues. Each of these views leads 
to a particular system of moral education and enquiry (1991a, p.9). 
Two questions arise regarding Maclntyre' s anti-epistemological 
account of first principles. The first concerns the relation between this 
account and his fallibilism, which will be explained in chapters 3 and 4. The 
question is that if we do not start our enquiries from a knowledge of first 
principles, this-as will be explained more in the next chapter-would set 
some limits for the discursive nature of a true and rational theory upon 
which MacIntyre has laid emphasis, because di scursive and fallibilistic 
reasoning requires having access to reasons and subjecting these reasons to 
revision and argumentation; whi le MacIntyre in his account of first 
principles holds that we initially lack knowledge of the knowledge we have. 
If we lack knowledge of first principles, we might not be able, at least at the 
beginning of our enquiries when we lack this explicit knowledge, to enter 
into di scussions regarding the truth and adequacy of these principles. 
The second question is that Aquinas, as referred to above, insists on a 
metaphysical understanding of first principles that relies on grasping the 
quiddity and natures of objects, which as will be argued in the next chapter, 
assumes a very epistemologica lly optimistic view. What a thing's quiddity 
is, whether there is such a thing, and how we can know it are contentious 
issues. It would be difficult to rationally achieve an agreement about human 
beings' nature and good. To solve this problem, I will argue in the final 
chapter that we would better justify mora li ty on the basis of the 
requirements of human beings' normal and desirable functioning, which is 
distinct from a functioning directed toward the human good. By th is, we can 
avoid the disputes over human beings' essence. 
To return to my argument concerning the CT based on the 
methodological function , MacIntyre holds the standards of rationality and 
progress of traditions are justified historically by reference to their relative 
merits compared to their predecessors and rivals (1990a, p.64). This 
suggests that Maclntyre 's CT, in thi s third and methodological sense, is 
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fallibilistic, and requires the constant subjection of our theories to revision 
and falsification. In other words, the fact that our theories are 
methodologically constituted in a tradition does not necessarily make them 
always true and beyond criticism. We need these contingently given points 
to begin our enquiries, but it is possible to reflect critically on the theories 
and bodies of thought built upon them, as well as on the principles 
themselves. In fact, MacIntyre (1988a, p.358) holds that traditions, when 
they develop and are able to achieve more adequate accounts of things than 
their own earlier accounts, are "to greater or lesser degree a form of 
enquiry" . Being a form of enquiry suggests that a tradition is and should be 
open to other ways of enquiry; nevertheless, as pointed out above, 
Maclntyre ' s anti-epistemological view of first principles might set some 
limits for the possibility of reflection on first principles when we lack an 
explicit knowledge of them, because these principles refer to some 
contingent points in traditions, which other traditions might not share. If we 
uphold some first principles that refer to human basic aspects and needs, 
instead of human essence and the good, we can have some shared starting-
points to evaluate different traditions. 
In line with the methodological function of traditions, MacIntyre 
(1998d, p.121) holds that rationality is prima facie an attribute of social 
orders, and not of individuals qua individuals. Individuals as participants in 
social orders that embody some particular measures of rationality are able to 
evaluate themselves and others as rational or irrational. 
Practices in communities are rule-governed, and rationality in each 
practice means abiding by the rules that are recognized in that practice, like 
the practice of farming or mathematics (1998d, p.121 ). Practices have 
internal goods, and rationality in them is defined in terms of the regulations 
that guide agents toward those goods; in other words, rationality should 
honour the virtues and the goods of practices. As MacIntyre (1998d, p.121) 
puts it, "to learn to be rational is to be initiated into and trained in the habits 
of action and judgement which dispose one to be so moved" in practices. 
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When the notion of practice reaches the stage of narrative and tradition 
the notion of the good would become the final measure of practical 
rationa lity. MacIntyre ( 198 I , p. v) notes that since people in modem times 
do not share a notion of the good, moral philosophy has become stalemated 
over its task of providing rational justification for mora lity. This is because 
for modem morality the individual qua individual independent of social 
orders and communities has become the centre of theorizing. 
This view of Maclntyre' s regarding the relation between rationality 
and social contexts is inspired by Marx 's and Marxists ' contentions with 
respect to the relation between theori es and practices; as MacIntyre ( 1995, 
p.xxix) puts it: 
[What Christian theologians] had failed to focus upon 
sufficiently was the insistence by both Marx and Marxists 
on the close re lationships of theory to practice, on how all 
theory, including all theology, is the theory of some mode 
or modes of practice .. .. Detach any type of theorizing from 
the practical contexts in which it is legitimately at home, 
whether scientific, theological or political, and let it become 
a free-floating body of thought and it will be all too apt to 
be transformed into an ideology. 
Maclntyre's view that rationality is defined in practi ces bears some 
similarity with Wittgenstein 's argument against a private language offered 
in Philosophical Investigations ( 1953) parts §§244-271. Wittgenstein's 
main point here is that it is impossible to have a language that is onl y 
intelligible to its originator, and not to any other audience, because if the 
language is not in principle public, its originator cannot establ ish meaning 
for its signs . Meaning is not a matter of individual's interna l awareness; 
rather it depends on the knowledge of the proper use of the terms within a 
language-game. 
I wi ll here briefly sketch Maclntyre's resemblance to Wittgenstein , as 
this is re lated to the methodologica l function of traditions which I am 
expla ining here. One point of sim ilarity between the two is seen in 
Maclntyre's view explained above that rationa li ty is a matter of col lecti ve 
and socia l li fe. There is no notion of a private rationa lity, just as there is no 
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notion of a private language. Rationality is a matter of respecting the rules 
that are socially acknowledged as rules. An individual cannot invent rules if 
they are not later sanctioned by some others to be acted upon. 
MacIntyre (1957, p.177) invokes Wittgenstein's argument against a 
private language in order to reject the protestant theological idea that 
religious languages are meaningful only to believers who have had a 
religious experience. He presents and criticizes Karl Barth as holding that 
the Bible 's assertions are meaningless to those who have not received "a 
special miracle of grace" ; in the same vein, MacIntyre (1957, p.176) 
interprets Schleiermacher as holding that the statement "God created the 
world" points to believers' inner experience of absolute dependence on 
God. Contrary to this, MacIntyre (1957, p.1 77) maintains that if religious 
statements are expressed in a language, they should obey the rules of that 
language, which are essentially public and can be taught and learnt; as he 
puts it: 
It is not that we have private experiences and invent words 
for them. But we learn the words and find their application 
in our experience. The language is in a sense prior to-and 
even, although this could be misleading, in a sense 
formative of-the experience. This is as true of religious 
language as of any other (1957, p.177). 
MacIntyre (1957, p.178) concludes that "most religious language ... is 
of a thoroughly familiar kind [in that] theologians and believers generally 
want to assert some things, to deny others. But where everything is 
nonsense, there can be neither assertion nor denial." In other words, being 
sensible or not is not a private matter. 15 
MacIntyre also takes an explicitly Wittgensteinian approach based on 
the rejection of a private language in his essay "Colors, Cultures, and 
Practices" (2006b). MacIntyre there appeals to Wittgenstein's notion of 
15 It is possible here to object to MacIntyre that taking a religious language as only 
meaningful to a group of believers who have particular religious experiences does not 
render that language as a private language; because private language means a language for 
a solitary person not for a group of people. The believers in this group can communicate 
with each other as their religious experiences bear some similarities, and this would be 
enough for having a language. 
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rule-governed games to explain why we cannot have personal colour-
judgments. The main point here is that we learn from others in practices and 
through apprenticeship the correct definition and app lication of colours. A 
solitary individual cannot have intelligible colour-judgments, because one 
condition for intelligible utterances and actions is that others be able to 
understand and know how to respond to them. Individual colour-judgments, 
like other kinds of judgments, need corroboration and correction on the part 
of others to achieve impersonality (2006b, pp.30-32). 
Another resemblance between the two is in Maclntyre's anti-
epistemological interpretation of Aquinas' theory of knowledge and truth-
including his account of first principles- which was explained above, and 
will be elaborated further in the next chapter. The point here is that, as R. S. 
Smith (2003, p.40) points out, both Wittgenstein and MacIntyre are against 
the Cartesian method of providing certitude for an isolated and so litary 
human mind. The problem with this method in Maclntyre 's view is that, as 
expla ined earlier in this chapter, substantive first principles about the world 
and human beings cannot be known from the beginning of intellectual 
enquiries; rather, they are the outcomes of fallib le dialectical method, and 
are always open to revision and refutation. Individuals should start with the 
given points of departure in their traditions, and then critica ll y reflect on 
these points to arrive at more adequate accounts of things. However, we 
should note that MacIntyre adopts a reali st theory of truth that cannot be 
interpreted along the lines of philosophy after the linguistic tum. In hi s 
view, there is a real world whose features are independent of our thoughts 
and language, and act as the measures of truth (2006g, p.190). A fuller 
expos ition ofMacintyre ' s theory of truth will be offered in chapter 4. 
To sum up this section, I sought to elucidate the third sense of the CT, 
which is a methodological one. I argued that by this aspect of the CT, 
MacIntyre points to the notion of rationality as a progress from historically 
contingent beliefs toward what dialectica lly and demonstratively wi ll tum 
out to be more adequate accounts than their rivals. This is an account that 
can stand up, better than can its rivals, to close scrutiny in light of the best 
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available standards. The surviving principles, which serve foundational 
roles in the premises of practical reasoning, would be first · principles the 
evidence of which is not known by all rational agents. This discursive and 
dialectical reasoning is also reflected in Macintyre's fallibilism which will 
be explained in the next chapter. Nevertheless, this anti-epistemological 
account raises questions for Madntyre's discursive method, as will also be 
discussed in the next chapter. I also pointed to Macintyre's criticism of the 
notion of a private language, in which he emphasizes the connection of 
norms of rationality with practices. After this exposition of Macintyre's 
view, I will tum to some criticism related to his CT. 
11.3.4 A Criticism of Maclntyre's Account of the Notion of 
Neutrality 
The notion of impartiality as defended by people like John Rawls in his 
A Theory of Justice (1971) has been criticized by the proponents of 
community and communitarianism like M. Sandel and MacIntyre; however, 
I think MacIntyre has proffered a "straw man" picture of the liberal account 
of impartiality which is very easy to reject. 
As was argued above with regard to Macintyre ' s criticism of the 
Enlightenment, the liberal ideal involves, in Macintyre's view (1988a, p.3), 
detaching individuals from all their particularities to make them neutral as a 
condition to formulate universal rules of practical reasoning and justice. 
This presentation of the ideal of neutrality is blind to the distinction between 
ontological and normative detachment in Rawls' view, or to such an 
interpretation of him, according to which this detachment is meant to be 
normative and not ontological;As Rawls (1993 , p.24) puts it, 
The fact that we occupy a particular social position is not a 
good reason for us to propose, or to expect others to accept, 
a conception of justice that favors those in this position. 
Similarly, the fact that we affirm a particular religious, 
philosophical, or moral comprehensive doctrine with its 
associated conception of the good is not a reason for us to 
propose, or expect others to accept, a conception of justice 
that favors those of that persuasion. 
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Rawls' point here is that although we are inevitably situated in a 
particular social position, and are associated with a notion of the good, we 
should have the normative and intellectual capacity to consider others' 
associations; our sense of justice requires us to apply this capacity in our 
relationships with others. This view does not deny our onto logica l 
situatedness; it, rather, refers to the capacity for considering others ' notion 
of the good and their right to pursue those notions. Moral agents, whatever 
their theories of the good, have the capacity to think from the perspecti ves 
of other agents who have different accounts of the good. This does not mean 
that the agents should in fact detach themselves from their loyalties; rather, 
they as moral and reasonable agents can conceive what life from other 
perspecti ves means and requires, and so they as reasonable agents should 
give consent to live with others under fair and equal terms. 
In fact, I believe MacIntyre employs the same approach in hi s notion of 
"the second first language" (1988a, p.374), and in his metaphor of role-
playing, which wi ll be explained in chapter 4. Macintyre's point there is that 
it is different to play a role and to li ve the role in real life, but the role-
player, when he is playing the role, has the capacity to understand the 
requirements of a given role (1988a, p.395). By the same token, in my view, 
it is possib le to consider being in Rawls' original position to formulate the 
rules of justice as a role that competent moral agents, irrespective of their 
comprehensive theories of the good, are capable of assuming. MacIntyre 
(1988a, p.395) also employs a similar approach in hi s argument against 
perspectivi sm by stating that individuals are capable of understanding others 
in the latter' s own terms. This understanding does not require ontological 
detachment from all particular notions of the good, which is impossible; 
rather, it requires that people consider the requi sites of life on the bas is of 
other notions of the good as a condition of reasonableness. MacIntyre 
himself affirms this transcending capacity fo r the individual as fo llows. 
This capacity for recognition of the self as being already to 
some degree at home in some tradition sharply 
differentiates this kind of person and this kind of encounter 
with a tradition of enquiry from the person who finds him 
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or herself an alien to every tradition of enquiry which he or 
she encounters ... (1988a, p.395). 
The point that the self can be at home in alien traditions does not mean 
that it should di scard all its existing beliefs and values; rather, it points to 
the normative and intellectual capacity on the part of the individual to 
understand different notions of the good li fe and their requirements as are 
understood by their proponents. 
By this argument for the idea of reasonableness, I mean to suggest that 
the particularity of moral agents cannot bar them from envisaging basic 
structures that can accommodate people with different theories of the good. 
Accordingly, if it is the case that we need to move dialectically toward the 
first principles of practical reasoning from contingent positions of our own 
tradition, we need also to nurture a moral capacity in ourselves to 
understand the requirements of practical rationality based on particular 
positions different from ours. As a result, we need to include the principles 
of reasonableness and fair cooperation among our first principles of 
practical rationality and justice, particularly when there is no prospect of 
living under a shared substantial theory of the . good. Accordingly, 
Maclntyre 's notion of the CT should not be understood in such a way that 
denies this normative and intellectual capacity to the individual. In the next 
chapter on Aquinas' theory of knowledge, I will argue that Aquinas' view 
of the intellect, in fact, requires holding such a transcending capacity for the 
self. 
ll.3.5 Considering other Terminologies for the CT that Convey 
Better Maclntyre's Intention 
After explaining the three possible meanings of the CT, I claimed that 
the CT in its first sense, which is counterpart to the function of traditions as 
conceptual schemes, might conduce to the misunderstanding of Maclntyre's 
point by suggesting a relativistic account of his thought. I argued in the 
previous chapter that MacIntyre is not straightforward in his description of 
traditions as conceptual schemes. The reason is that he sometimes denies 
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substantiality to moral agents qua individuals, and insists that moral 
substantiality holds for individuals only in so far as they are located in 
traditions and assume social roles (1983a, p.454). Furthermore, I argued in 
the previous chapter that MacIntyre holds moral agency is not limited to the 
fulfillment of social requirements, and requires the discharging of 
responsibilities qua human beings. This latter position, unlike the former, is 
consistent with and required by a natural law tradition that is based on the 
existence of a shared essence in humankind as the basis of morality, or at 
least with the view that there is some meaning to humanity independently of 
social settings. Ironically, the wording of the CT, i.e. the terms "constituted" 
and "constitutive", is more suggestive of the first sense of the CT, that is, 
the self totally owes its moral capacity to its social and cultural setting, and 
so might lead to misunderstandings of the kind that I have described. 
Accordingly, in my view, MacIntyre should consider using other 
terminologies to convey better what he means by this thesis. The problem 
with the first sense of the CT is that it might portray agents as being 
constituted in different traditions to the extent that they are closed entities 
and unable to communicate and learn from those in other traditions. This 
view of the CT is at odds with Maclntyre's method of epistemological 
crisis, his fallibilistic method, and also his attachment to the natural law 
tradition, which will be explained further in chapters 3 and 4. 
Among the expressions that might better convey Macintyre ' s intention 
here we can consider "tradition-guided rationality", "tradition-directed 
rationality" or "tradition-related rationality". The tenn constitution is too 
robust for Macintyre's purpose. These alternative expressions suggest that 
traditions provide conceptual, methodological and moral guidance for their 
advocates, but do not limit them to the resources of those traditions. The 
terminology of the CT is more in tune with the conservative 
communitarianism explained in the present chapter, from which Macintyre 
has distanced himself. 
Macintyre's CT raises questions about its relation to the notions of 
truth, relativism and perspectivism. The question emerges regarding 
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whether traditions can hold truth-claims; if they do, what is Maclntyre's 
account of truth, and what is its relation to the CT? In other words, if 
rationality is constituted in traditions, can those people who are working in 
these traditions espouse a realist theory of truth which MacIntyre has 
adopted according to which the measure of truth is correspondence to 
reality? Before devoting a chapter to such questions, and since MacIntyre 
appeals to Aquinas ' theory of truth, by way of introduction I shall assign the 
next chapter to Aquinas' theory of truth as understood and employed by 
MacIntyre. 
II.3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I attempted to explain Maclntyre's CT by exploring its 
different meanings in relation to traditions' functions. With regard to the 
role of traditions as conceptual schemes, I argued that different moral 
conceptual schemes may be differentiated on the basis of their different 
views of human nature and the good, which produce different structures of 
practical rationality and different meanings for the virtues. I contrasted the 
polar positions of the goods of excellence and effectiveness which 
correspond respectively to Aristotelian and Humean practical rationality. I 
suggested that the term "constitution" suits best this conceptual explanation, 
as it can explain well the strict distinction between different versions of 
practical rationality; however, this might lead to a misunderstanding of 
MacIntyre by suggesting a pluralistic-relativistic-conservative interpretation 
of his work from which, as was noted, MacIntyre has distanced himself. 
With regard to the role of the virtues, I argued that practical training 
leads to the development of moral traits in moral agents, which instruct 
them to use moral rules correctly in particular situations. This practical 
knowledge, in Maclntyre's view, cannot be reduced to a priori moral 
principles that work in different contexts of practical life. Practical 
reasoning involves practical inte lligence which cannot be adequately treated 
in terms of procedural practical rationality. This aspect of the CT, MacIntyre 
holds, is at odds wi th the Kantian account of practical rationality, and points 
to Maclntyre's virtue-ethics and virtue-epistemology. 
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With regard to the methodological function of traditions, I explained 
Maclntyre 's view of first principles which, as they include substantial 
principles, cannot correctly be described as self-evident without 
qualification. They are evident for minds that have been formed in particular 
conceptual schemes. Traditions of moral enquiry begin dialectica lly with 
substantial contingent beliefs. After subjecting them to constant questions 
and objections, they arrive at some basic substantial principles which are in 
fact the foundation of those beliefs. These contingent starting-points 
constitute and direct intellectual and moral enquiries in the context of 
different traditions. In Maclntyre's view (I 988a, p.354), rationality consists 
of progress in successive phases of a tradition. Tradition in a given phase is 
rational if it goes beyond the limits of its earlier phases. We cannot extract 
the beliefs of a tradition at a specific stage of its progress, and assess their 
rationality according to some independent and objective measures. It is a 
major theme of Macintyre's thought that traditions should be evaluated 
according to their own standards; however, as will be argued in chapter 4 on 
his theory of truth, this does not entail that traditions wi ll always be 
vindicated in light of their own standards. As related to this methodologica l 
sense, I argued that for MacIntyre measures of rationality should have been 
acknowledged as such in social practices in order to count as such measures, 
as it is the case with the rules of the game of chess. 
The three functions which I have described work in tandem, and in a 
sense correct each other, to explain Macintyre's CT. Based on the account 
that I provided above, traditions in the ideal sense are consistent conceptual 
schemes which promote the life of virtue, as a cond ition for practical 
rationality, and provide starting-points and guiding procedures for enquiries. 
Ignoring one of these functions leads to misunderstanding MacIntyre on the 
part of other functions; for instance, placing excessive emphasis on 
traditions as conceptual schemes or lives of virtue leads us to overlook 
MacIntyre ' point regarding inter-traditional inte llectual exchanges. 
In sum, the CT explained in this chapter consists of two halves, which 
are tradition-constituted and tradition-constituti ve rationality. The first half 
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conveys that there are pre-rational elements, which detennine the structures 
of rationalities and are constituted in traditions as moral features of agents, 
or as contingent historical starting-points. These pre-rational elements and 
first principles of practical rationality can be evaluated later on the basis of 
the adequacy of the systems in which they are operating. 
The second half of the CT, that is, tradition-constitutive rationality 
denotes that tradition-constituted rationalities themselves are features of 
their relevant traditions and represent them. In other words, tradition-
constituted rationality points out that rationalities are formed in different 
traditions, and that there are internal measures for rationality, besides the 
universal formal rules oflogic. Tradition-constitutive rationality, in turn, has 
an additional meaning compared to the first half of the constitution thesis; 
that is to say, these constituted rationalities in the long-term info rm and 
sustain the traditions in which they have been formed. The CT, thus, 
provides an introduction to Maclntyre's di scussion of justice; as he puts it, 
The discussion of the nature of tradition-constituted and 
tradition-constitutive enquiry has been undertaken not for 
its own sake but in order to arrive, so fa r as is poss ible, at a 
true account of justice and of practical rationality. The 
enquiry into justice and practical rationali ty was from the 
outset informed by a conviction that each particular 
conception of justice requires as its counterpart some 
particular conception of practical rationality and vice versa 
(1988a, p.3 89). 
In this view, what justice requires is related to an account of practical 
rational ity; for instance for Aristotle (NE, II-Ill), justice like other virtues 
lies in a mean between defect and excess. This view is related to an account 
of practical rationality according to which the man of practical knowledge 
has a determining role in defining the mean points. Clearly, thi s view is 
associated with a particular social and moral scheme in which the education 
of desires has a significant position. 
I criticized MacIntyre in this chapter on three grounds. The first was 
that the terminology of the CT is too demanding for Macintyre's purposes, 
and might lead to a misunderstanding of his views. The second was about 
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Maclntyre's criticism of the notion of neutrality, which as I explained does 
not take into account the distinction between normative and ontological 
impartiality. The third was that Maclntyre 's emphasis on traditions ' 
enquiries starting from their contingent points leaves unanswered the 
question of how we can assess these starting-points and first principles. 
We should also note that Maclntyre ' s emphasis on an account of 
rationality as progress in a tradition is not limited to the tradition itself. 
Mere progress in a tradition and according to its own internal standards is 
not sufficient to qualify this progress as approaching truth16, because-
according to the natural law tradition advocated by MacIntyre- the facts of 
human nature posit some requirements that go beyond single traditions, and 
the tradition should be exposed to rival traditions to check the adequacy of 
its accounts. The assessment of a tradition in the light of an objective reality 
or rivals ' accounts is related to Maclntyre 's realist theory of truth which wi ll 
be explained in the next two chapters. A major theme of Maclntyre 's 
concerning his interpretation of Aquinas ' theory of truth and knowledge is 
his espousal of fallibilism in reasoning. Fallibilism is closely related to the 
CT in its methodological sense, as both emphasize a gradual movement 
from particular points of view to more universal and adequate accounts by 
holding theories open to revision and refutation. 
16Indeed, I think the mere progress of a tradition according to its internal measures is not a 
sufficient condition, neither for its truth nor for its rationality. As I wil l discuss in chapter 6, 
there are at least some minimal constraints that all traditions should comply with if they 
want to be rational and reasonable. 
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III- Chapter 3: Maclntyre's Account of Aquinas' Theory 
of Truth 
III. I Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I discussed Maclntyre's account of 
tradition, the functions of traditions, and how each of these functions relates 
to his CT. The main theme of the CT, as was argued at length in the 
previous chapter, is that moral reasoning cannot be a form of reasoning in 
which the agent appeals just to universal rational procedures to determine 
what he ought to do. There should be, rather, some background elements 
against which sound practical reasoning occurs. This background includes 
the virtuous education of agents, and direction and guidance that traditions 
provide for enquiries. The rationality of these background elements is 
known only to the virtuous and to the wise, who have had their character 
educated and disciplined under the guidance of moral masters, or in their 
relationships with other more competent moral agents. 
The chapters so far have dealt with Maclntyre's account of practical 
rationality. In this and the next chapter, I shall discuss his account of truth; 
accordingly, I am entering into a new phase of discus·sion whose relation to 
the former phase, which is rationality, needs some explanation. Before 
starting, I should clarify the relevance of this discussion about Maclntyre's 
theory of truth, and his interpretation of Aquinas' theory of truth, to the 
overall subject of my thesis. I need to add that the focus of my concern here 
is Maclntyre's account of rationality and truth with regard to morality, that 
is, practical rationality and a practical sense of truth. 
The subject of my thesis is Maclntyre's tradition-constituted rationality 
and justice. The main issue that I should concern myself with is the way 
MacIntyre thinks traditions form and constitute different practical 
rationa lities. This is what was dealt with largely in the previous two 
chapters on the different functions of traditions. A question that now 
surfaces is whether a tradition can take its own measures of rationality as 
superior to those of other traditions. The ultimate criterion of superiority in 
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this context, in Macintyre 's view, is correspondence to reality; in other 
words, a tradition can claim superiority for its substantive claims if it can 
show that these claims describe reality as it is better than do other traditions' 
claims. Accordingly, the question that arises after discussing the role of 
traditions in constituting rationalities is whether traditions are closed entities 
without the possibility to tell which one is a better and more adequate 
tradition; something which is, in Macintyre 's view, to be decided in tenns 
of a correspondence relationship with a reality. Thus the issue of the 
rationality of different traditions inevitably leads to the issue of truth when 
we compare their measures of rationality in the realist framework that 
MacIntyre affinns according to which reality is independent of our mind 
and we should adjust our mental categories and theories to relate better to 
reality (2006h, p.207). 
To claim a realist sense of truth for the outcomes of practical reason is 
not an easy claim. That moral oughts are more than our personal or 
conventional preferences which are valued in a particular community, and 
that they should be evaluated in the light of some reality, for instance a 
human essence as a reality that should flourish , is what we can infer from 
Macintyre 's account of truth in the field of morality. This suggests that for 
MacIntyre, contrary to philosophy after the linguistic tum, firstly reality is 
independent of our thought and our language, and secondl y, thi s 
independent reality is perceptible as it is by us. Thus, the issue of rationality, 
including practical rationality, in Maclntyre 's reali st fram ework, links to the 
issue of truth, and understanding his account of truth will shed light on his 
account of rationality, at least, by clarifying his position that tradition-
constituted rationality does not amount to relativism and perspectivism. 
A second issue that should be explained is the necess ity of di scuss ing 
Maclntyre's interpretation of Aquinas' theory of truth in my project. 
Granted that Maclntyre's accow1t of rationality is linked to his account of 
truth , I again need to explain the position of Aquinas in thi s traj ectory, as 
MacIntyre explicitly adopts Aquinas' account of the correspondence theory 
of truth. I hope the reader will fully understand the point of this di scussion 
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after reading this and the next chapter; however, I shall by way of 
introduction sketch the main points the fuller explanation of which wi ll be 
provided through these two chapters. 
MacIntyre explicitly upholds Aquinas' account of the correspondence 
theory of truth, and takes it to be different from and superior to modem 
versions of this theory. It is different from the modem account of the 
correspondence theory of truth in that the correspondence relation primarily 
obtains between the intellect and the object, not between propositions and 
facts. This then, as MacIntyre presents it, contributes to a fall ibilistic and a 
gradualist account of truth by invoking the notion of the intellect's 
adequation. The intellect gradually becomes adequate to its object by being 
open to revision and refutation, which might even be initiated from a rival 
tradition. This view again indicates that traditions for MacIntyre are not 
closed entities that cannot learn from each other. 
Another subject related to this gradualist view is a non-epistemological 
interpretation of first principles, which was explained in the foregoing 
chapter, and MacIntyre thinks is a true interpretation of Aquinas' thought. 
The kind of certitude which a Cartesian expects, in this view, might be 
acquired at the end of our enquiries for a mind which is formed in a 
tradition (2006f, p.148). After these introductory remarks, I shall, in more 
detail, discuss Maclntyre's interpretation of Aquinas ' account of truth, as 
this interpretation is essentially related to Maclntyre' s CT and his account 
of truth. 
111.2 The Move from the Discussion of Rationality to That of Truth 
MacIntyre (2006h, p.207) distinguishes between rationality and truth. 
Rationality for him is a matter of warranted assertibility according to which 
a theory is rational or warranted if it satisfies appropriate standards of its 
tradition at a particular stage. As contrasted with this, truth concerns how 
things are in the real word. The corollary of such a reali st theory of truth is 
that, MacIntyre believes, we can transcend the conceptuaJ scheme in which 
we are making our enquiries about the world to know the world as it is 
independent of our conceptual schemes and our thoughts (2006h, p.207). 
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Although MacIntyre thinks there is a difference between a theory of 
rationality and a theory of truth, he believes they are connected to each 
other. For MacIntyre the notion of truth is not totally captured by the notion 
of rationality; that is to say, what we take to be a rational account of 
something is not necessarily a true account; however, we should have some 
rational account from our own perspective, or alternatively, we should 
believe that it is, in principle, possible to offer such an account in the future , 
for what we take to be true. We as rational beings must have some reasons 
for our beliefs, i.e. what we take as true knowledge. This connection 
between the notions of rationality and truth partly underlies Maclntyre's 
espousal of Thomism, as I shall explain. 
A question that arises is how MacIntyre bridges the gap between 
rationality and truth. In other words, in what circumstances we can claim 
that a rational account is a true account? MacIntyre here espouses Aquinas ' 
theory of truth according to which the intellect is active, and should become 
adequate for its objects over time. The truth holds in the intellect's relation 
to the object for which it has become adequate. The adequate intellect has a 
fuller account of the object, and can explain its different aspects better than 
can other intellects or the same intellect in its previous stages. An adequate 
account can overcome intellectual impasses, and in addition, explain why its 
rivals have failed to do so, and how the rivals can remove their deficiencies 
in order to withstand these challenges (1990a, pp.145-146).For instance, in 
Maclntyre's view (1990a, pp.146), Thomism can provide us with a more 
adequate moral theory than can each of Aristotelianism, Augustinianism and 
particularly Liberalism, because it has gathered the positive points of the 
first two views, and so has transcended them, and can also explain how the 
libera l account of morality fai ls to justify morality, that is, partly as a 
consequence of rejecting the notion of the human final good. 17 
17 I am aware that what is the most adequate account so far might tum out not to be true in 
the sense of correspondence with reality; however, I think Maclntyre's position here would 
be that we take that account as true in the above sense, unti l we find new conflicting 
evidence that casts doubt on its truth; but in the interim we should not be agnostic with 
regard to its truth, although we take it always open to revision and refuta lion. 
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MacIntyre (2006g, p.188) holds a condition for obtaining a state of 
adequacy is that the intellect and its accounts of objects be open to revision 
and falsification based on the best available standards. Macintyre's theory 
of truth here approaches a Popperian account. When the intellect is 
adequate, which is in terms of the best standards of rationality in a tradition 
and also in inter-traditional encounters, this is a sign of the tentative truth of 
such an adequate account; that is to say, we can rationally claim that reality 
is as the theory describes, but the theory should remain open to revision and 
falsification at any time (2006g, p.188); and this is what I referred to above 
as the relation between rationality and truth. 
Although Maclntyre's account of truth is general and applies to 
different kinds of objects including nature and factual objects, my main 
concern here with his theory of truth lies in his moral realism, i.e. his 
account of truth when it applies to the moral realm. I argued in the first 
chapter that MacIntyre is a cognitivist moral theorist, who thinks it is 
possible to speak of the truth of moral judgments as factual statements. This 
view is indeed required by his metaphysical interpretation of the natural law 
tradition according to which morality is related to facts about human nature, 
in such a way that moral judgments are a species of faetual judgments. This 
does not mean that there are moral facts like external observational facts 
outside us, available to be used as parts of a realist theory of truth in 
morality; rather, it means that the observance of moral principles which are 
the precepts of the natural law leads to our real flourishing as human beings, 
and that this can be used as the measure of the truth of these moral 
judgments. For instance, from such a perspective, the proposition "killing an 
innocent person is wrong" is true not because we conventionally think it bad 
to kill the innocent; rather, its truth is due to the fact that our normal 
functioning as human beings, upon which our flourishing depends, enjoins 
the prohibition of this deed (2000, p. l 08). The failure to abide by this moral 
principle causes a factual state of affairs to exist, that is, an unfulfilled 
human nature, or an existing state of affairs that is not suitable for human 
beings' normal functioning. 
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Macintyre ' s justification of moral principles is inspired by Aquinas 
who does not see a contradiction between divine revelation and reason. 
Reason is introduced by Aquinas as "a proper image" of the eternal law (ST 
I-II, Q. 19, Art. 4). This method is based on discursive reasoning which 
attempts to arrive at more adequate accounts of objects than do rival moral 
theories by holding theories open to revision. This method is seen in 
Aquinas' works in which he proposes a metaphysical or moral statement, 
then introduces different objections to it, and finally attempts to offer 
adequate answers to them. 
III.3 Maclntyre's Interpretation of Aquinas' Theory of Truth as in 
Line with Fallibilism and the CT 
I discussed above the relation between truth and rationality m 
Maclntyre's view. The relation is that truth for MacIntyre is partly an 
epistemic notion, which means we should have reason for the truth of what 
we take to be true. 18 This point pushes MacIntyre toward endorsing a 
fallibilism like that ofC. S. Peirce and Karl Popper. What we take to be true 
should be capable of establishing its rational superiori ty in a process of 
revision and refutation over its rivals (2006g, p.1 88). 
This epistemic interpretation of truth does not mean that what we have 
reason for might not turn out to be false in the future ; rather, it requires that 
once the falsity of a hitherto true theory is exposed, we should be able to 
justify rationally the change from this view to a better one; that is to say, we 
should be ab le to show the inadequacies of the previous reasons and have 
more adequate reasons for the new theory than we had for the previous one. 
True theories are arrived at by the best standards that have appeared so 
far in the history of a tradition and should withstand epistemological 
18That Maclntyre's theory of truth is partly epistemic should not be conflated with his non-
epistemological interpretation of first principles explained in the previous chapter. By his 
theory of truth as being epistemic, I mean that we should have reasons from our own 
perspective for what we take as true; but these reasons are not necessarily available to all 
rational agents across traditions, or are not adequately recognizable at the beginning of our 
enquiries. The qualification "partly" seems to dispel any contradiction between the two, as 
this refers to the limitations in the way of justification at the beginnings of enquiries or for 
agents outside a given tradition. 
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challenges that are made from outside the tradition. Based on this approach, 
MacIntyre holds that "corrigibility and refutability are necessary properties 
of any theory for which truth can be claimed" (2006g, p.187). 
MacIntyre (2006g, p.187) contends that although Aquinas advocated 
dialectical reasoning in his theology, the central place of fallibilism, which 
MacIntyre takes to be a necessary property of any adequate theory of truth, 
was the contribution of non-Thomistic philosophers, especially C. S. Peirce 
and Karl Popper. In other words, though the roots of fallibili stic reasoning 
were present in Aquinas ' dialectical thought, fallibilism in a full-fledged 
form only appeared later in modern times. 
It is necessary here to consider the relation of the idea of fallibilism to 
the CT. To recall , I argued in the foregoing chapter that the CT is the view 
that there are pre-rational elements which are necessary for practical 
rationality. These e lements are either moral agents' characters which are 
informed by the virtues, or the measures of rationality which are internal to 
traditions at different stages of their development. Fallibilism, thus, relates 
to the CT in this methodological sense, as it refers to the progress which 
offers in a tradition through revision and refutation. 
If fallibi lism originates from within a tradition, such that theories are 
open to falsification in light of new evidence in that tradition, clearly this 
notion is compatible with the CT, because in this case falsification is based 
on the resources of the tradition from which a theory has emerged, and so 
there is no problem with this fa lsification, because any tradition might 
generate new standards of rationality from within itself that might falsify its 
own previous truth-claims. 
If fa llibilism originates from outside a tradition, such that the bases of 
falsification are not derived from within the tradition but from outside and 
from alien traditions, thi s can still be construed as being compatible with the 
CT, ifwe do not mean by it a restriction to a tradition. MacIntyre employs a 
mechanism based on the notion of epistemological crisis to show how this 
inter-traditional fallibilism occurs; nevertheless, in my view he needs to 
allow the existence of some cross-traditional measures of rationality to 
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make this wider sense of fallibilism, which originates from outside a 
tradition, consistent with his CT; otherwise, if there are not tradition-
transcending measures of rationality, a tradition may not see any convincing 
reason for subjecting itself to a correction that stems from outside itself. 
For MacIntyre, even first principles of practical rationality, which are 
substantial rather than being self-evident due to their analytic nature, should 
be open to refutation, and they gain their justification by the comparative 
advantage of the system of thought, in which they are working, over its 
rivals (2006f, p.160). The view that first principles are open to revision 
differentiates Macintyre's theory from that of another Thomist, Bernard 
Lonergan, who like MacIntyre thinks that a tradition-constituted rationality 
is compatible with Aquinas ' thought and with the Thomistic tradition. M. P. 
Maxwell (1993, p.386) states the point as follows: 
Lonergan argues that these first principles of reason express 
the immanent nonns constitutive of the rationality of all 
traditions of enquiry and, therefore, are not subject to 
revision. In other words, although they are tradition-
constituted, they are also trans-traditionally normative. 
Macintyre's claim that his CT and a fallibilistic understanding of the 
notion of truth, which includes even the first principles of enquiries, are 
compatible with Thomism, has been criticized by several authors. Some 
critics, including R. P. George (1989) and J. Coleman (1994), have objected 
to MacIntyre at this point, stating that the fallibilism that he is reading into 
Thomism is not compatible with it, as there are eternal truths in Thomism 
that are thought to be irrefutable and accessible to all; as Coleman (1994, 
p.81) puts it, "a definition [for Aristotle and Aquinas] is not culture bound 
nor is it temporal. Both names and definitions which grasp the essence of a 
subject have no temporality." George (1989, p.593) similarly argues that 
Macintyre's account of moral particularism, the view that there are different 
rationalities and justices in different traditions, is not compatible with 
Aquinas' account of evident truths which are available to all competent 
rational human beings. J. Haldane (1994, p. 104) also raises the question 
whether Maclntyre 's view of reason as being shaped and advanced through 
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traditions of enquiry is faithful to the character of Aquinas's epistemology 
and metaphysics. In Haldane's account (1994, p. 105), Maclntyre's view 
(1990a, p.202) that "all claims to knowledge are the claims of some 
particular person, and are developed out of the claims of other particular 
persons", and they are possessed "only in and through participation in a 
history of dialectical encounters" might lead to a relativism that is at odds 
with Aquinas ' thought. I will return to this line of criticism in the next 
chapter on the issue of relativism. 
The quotes above indicate that Maclntyre's interpretation of Aquinas 
in which he attempts to accommodate his CT and his fallibilism, which is 
entailed by the CT in its methodological sense, with Aquinas' thought is a 
controversial enterprise and against the mainstream interpretation. The 
mainstream interpretation of Aquinas holds that there are eternal truths that 
are in principle accessible to all rational human beings . 
Let us look briefly at this issue. There are, in Aquinas' view, universal 
principles of practical reason, as there are universal principles of speculative 
reason, which he calls the precepts of the natural law: 
.. . to the natural law belong those things to which a man is 
inclined naturally: and among these it is propedo man to be 
inclined to act according to reason. The speculative reason 
is busied chiefly with necessary things, which cannot be 
otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the 
universal principles, contain the truth without fail (ST, I.II, 
Q. 94, Art. 3). 
As the quote indicates, Aquinas speaks of "a man" who is inclined 
naturally to the precepts of the natural law. These precepts are not 
incumbent only upon some groups of people in a tradition, or who have 
dialectically arrived at the truth of these precepts. Human beings in virtue of 
the natural light of their reason are expected to admit the truth of these 
practical principles, though- as MacIntyre himself (2006j, p.66) stresses-
there remain, in Aquinas' view, places for occasional mistakes and lapses in 
knowing the details of the natural law; as Aquinas writes: 
Although there is necessity in the general principles [ of 
practical reason) , the more we descend to matters of detail , 
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the more frequently we encounter defects .... But in matters 
of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, 
as to matters of detail , but only as to the general principles 
(ST, I.II, Q. 94, Art. 3). 
Aquinas' view here conflicts with Maclntyre's CT if that thesis does 
not admit any sort of universality regarding human beings' nature and 
practical rationality. The natural law and human reason which is, in 
Aquinas ' tenns, "a proper image of the eternal law" assume a universa li stic 
account of human nature and human reason. This view is at odds with a 
thick interpretation ofMaclntyre's CT. By a thick interpretation of the CT, I 
mean the view that human beings independent of their social and cultural 
locations are not substantial moral agents in the sense of having inherent 
moral inclinations, or the view that denies the necessity of some nonns for 
human beings qua human beings required for their nonnal or des irable 
functioning. As was explained in the preceding chapter, some parts of 
Maclntyre's account of practical rationality move in this direction. 
I do not deny the necessity of proper education and social contexts for 
cultivating a moral sense in human beings; but, I seek to argue that this 
moral sense is not the sole product of social conditions; in other words, it is 
not the case that human beings are completely malleable beings and can be 
shaped as social conditions require. Human nature certainly imposes some 
limits upon this conditioning. For instance, we as human beings cannot 
systematically value theft or murder, because these acts create conditions 
that are destructive to human nonnal functioning. In the fina l chapter, I wi ll 
return to this issue, attempting to justify a mora lity that app li es to human 
beings as rational beings. 
There is some evidence in Maclntyre ' s work to support a thick 
interpretation of the CT, particularly when he (l 983a, p.454) denies the 
notion of the individual as a substantial moral agent independent of hi s 
social setting as was discussed in the foregoi ng chapter, which I think is not 
compatible with his account of the natural law tradition; however, the thrust 
of Maclntyre's view is that, as I explained in the previous chapter, his CT 
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does not limit agents to the resources of their traditions (1988a, p.364); he 
also does accept the universality of the primary precepts of the natural law, 
though there remain qualifications regarding the application of these 
precepts (2009a, p.89). In the next chapter, I will also explain Maclntyre 's 
method for inter-traditional exchanges, which is in line with his CT. 
Accordingly, MacIntyre should not be, in principle, opposed to the 
existence of some inter-traditional theoretical and practical truths, and this 
position can save him from the criticisms mentioned above concerning the 
compatibility of Maclntyre ' s thought with Aquinas '; nevertheless, 
MacIntyre needs to make this position more explicit. In what follows, I 
attempt to reconstruct Maclntyre 's reasons for his fallibilistic interpretation 
of Aquinas' theory of truth. 
111.3.1 Possible Reasons for MacIntyre to Offer a Fallibilistic 
interpretation of Aquinas' Theory of Truth 
111.3.1.1 Aquinas' Argumentative and Dialectical Methodology 
One reason for Maclntyre ' s fa llibilistic interpretation of Aquinas is 
Aquinas' argumentative and dialectical methodology. Ifwe look at the style 
of Aquinas' arguments throughout his works, we notice the attention he 
pays to collecting different possible objections to his positions, and to 
replying to them compellingly. Using this method, Aquinas had, as 
MacIntyre argues, been able to transcend the limitations of Aristotle and 
Augustine by providing a synthesis of them, and in consequence a theory 
that was more adequate in various aspects such as the relation between 
human secular rationality and revealed truths, and the relation of free wi ll 
and practical rationality. This methodology points out that an adequate 
theory should be open to all existing or possible criticisms, and be able to 
respond to them; as MacIntyre (1988a, p.172) puts the point: 
The length and detail of the Summa are not accidental 
features of it, but integral to its purpose and more 
particularly to providing both Aquinas himself and his 
readers with the assurance that the arguments adduced for 
particular articles were the strongest produced so far from 
any known point of view. 
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The emphasis on openness to different criticisms means that the theory 
should be revised or finally left aside if it cannot meet these challenges, and 
this is what is meant by fallibilism. 
IIl.3.1.2The Moral Aspect of Aquinas' Theory of Knowledge and 
Truth 
Another reason for the fallibilistic interpretation of Aquinas ' thought is 
the moral aspect of Aquinas' theory of knowledge and truth. I discussed in 
the previous chapter that certain virtues are necessary for practical 
rationality. These virtues include the virtues of character and of intellect. 
One of the virtues of the intellect which MacIntyre (2006g, p.187) 
emphasizes as relevant to fallibilism is openness to difficulties and 
objections concerning our accepted beliefs. This virtue or habit of mind 
forms the basis of a fallibilistic approach in the knowledge-process. Being 
open to revision, which MacIntyre introduces here as a virtue, is a necessary 
condition for attaining an adequate knowledge of things. 
MacIntyre (2006j, p. 79) also holds that the precepts of the natural law 
are required for all shared practical enquiries, because enquirers need to 
observe them in order to retain intellectual impartiality in their enquiries; as 
he puts it: 
What is necessary in order to counter that influence [ of 
material and psychological interests] is a form of 
intellectual and moral asceticism, both in our thinking and 
in the ways in which we invite others to assent to our theses 
and arguments. We need simultaneously to avoid allowing 
our own thinking to give expression to and so to be guided 
by our preferences and aversions and to abstain from a 
rhetoric that is designed to move others, not by the reasons 
adduced, but by the passions to which the utterance of those 
reasons gives expression (2006j , p. 78). 
That we should refrain from endangering "gratuitously each other's 
life, liberty or property" is a precept of the natural law, which requires the 
mutual commitment of participants in enquiries (2006j , p.78). Impartiality 
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in enquiries requires that a more adequate account be always preferred to a 
less adequate one: 
... Amore adequate understanding in respect of truth is 
always to be preferred to a less adequate, no matter how 
profitable it may be to remain with the less adequate or how 
painful it may be to exchange it for the more adequate 
(2006j, p. 78). 
This moral aspect also reflects itself in what MacIntyre calls the ethics 
of enquiry by which he means enquirers in tum should be given appropriate 
time and length to participate in a discussion, as is required by "justice in 
conversation", and that they in their discussions should attend to the 
substance of arguments and not to those who utter these arguments (I 999c, 
p.6). MacIntyre also uses this notion of the ethics of enquiry against moral 
relativism, as will be explained in the next chapter. 
Another way to understand the fa llibilistic interpretation of Aquinas is 
by appeal to Maclntyre 's account of Aquinas' correspondence theory of 
truth which is based on the notion of the intellect's adequacy and its activity 
in the knowledge-process, as will be explained below. 
ITI.3.1.3 The Notion of the Intellect's Adequacy and the Active 
Intellect in Aquinas's Theory of Truth 
One way to explain Maclntyre's interpretation of Aquinas is by taking 
account of Aquinas's theory of truth. It is almost a commonplace that 
Aquinas' theory of truth, in the wake of Aristotle's, is a correspondence 
theory of truth according to which a theory or judgment is true if it describes 
reality as it is. Aristotle (Metaphysics, 4.7) maintains "to say of what is that 
it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, 
and of what is not that it is not, is true" . In the same way, Aquinas argues 
that truth consists in "adaequatio men/is ad rem" translated as "the 
conformity of thing and intellect" (De Veritate, Q.1, Art.2). 
The idea of correspondence in Aquinas' theory of truth is conveyed by 
his notion of adequacy. As the definition above from Aquinas indicates, the 
adequacy of the intellect for the object means that its account of the object 
conforms to the reality of that object. According to this theory, the 
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adequation of the intellect with the object is the criterion of truth. The 
adequation can occur in both directions. For truth to be obtained, the object 
should conform to its concept in its creator 's mind, in either God ' s or its 
human designer 's mind. This account of truth is the basis of practical, 
ontological and divine senses of truth in all of which there is a design as the 
measure of truth. 19 
When there is no designer at stake, as in the ordinary sense of knowing 
things, the concept in the intellect should be adequate to the object. In other 
words, in the case of the practical intellect, the norms in the designer' s mind 
are the measures of truth; but in the case of the speculative intellect, the 
thing itself is the measure of truth; as Aquinas puts it: 
Since the practical intellect causes things, it is a measure of 
what it causes. But, since the speculative intellect is 
receptive in regard to th ings, it is, in a certain sense, moved 
by things and consequently measured by them (Aquinas, 
Questiones Disputatae de Veritate , 1.4). 
The term adequation in this realist theory means an agreement, and 
implies some sort of accordance, here in form not in substance, between the 
intellect and the object, which indicates their formal identity. Truth occurs 
when the object and the intellect share the same form . As in certain modem 
correspondence theories, truth here is also a relational property that holds 
formally between the intellect, and secondarily its concepts, that is, its 
intelligible species2°, and the object; whereas in the modem version truth is 
19 Albert Hofstadter (1965) has a useful d iscuss ion about ontological and practical trulh, 
which applies well to Aquinas' account of practical truth. In his view ( 1965, p. 168), 
practical truth consists in the conform ity of a thing, an action or a person to a norm or a 
model. Here the adequacy relat ion is reversed, and runs from the thing to the inte llect that 
contains the norms. According to practical truth, to be out of true is to be out of a proper 
alignment. The Latin word verus does not mean only true, but also right and fitting, as it is 
the case with the word rec/us. In Hofstadter's view ( 1965, p. I 68 - I 69) the central word in 
the practical sphere is "right", and not "true". What is right confom,s to a law or a norm. A 
true person is a trustv,orthy and reliable person who does not deviate from true norms. A 
true person is a steady and constant person in rris loyalty. In Middle English, the terms true, 
faithful and trustworthy are cognate words coming from •~trewe". It is also connected with 
the word "tree" that is strong, thick and upright (Hofstadter 1965, p. 176). 
2° For the view that Aquinas' notion of intelligible species, as mental representations with 
general content, function as sub-propositional units of thought, and that this notion can 
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based on the relation between propositions and facts; as C. D. Novaes 
(2011, p.1343) puts the point: 
Truth is thus [for Aquinas) again viewed as a relational 
property, as in modem correspondence theories of truth , but 
this time it involves concepts and objects instead of 
propositions and facts as its relata. Aquinas does discuss the 
truth of propositions as well (in ST Ia q. 16 a. 8 and 3), but 
their truth is derivative from truth in the intellect. 
The adequacy relation between the thought and the object is a two-way 
relation. For Anselm, the adequacy relation was one-sided from object to 
divine concept. Aquinas attempted to reconcile the two-way direction of this 
relation in his theory of truth to generate a more adequate theory of truth. 
Truth, for Aquinas, primarily resides in the intellect when its fonns confonn 
to their objects, and secondarily and by analogy in objects as they are 
related to some true forms; "truth is predicated primarily of a true intellect 
and secondarily of a thing conformed with intellect" (Aquinas, Questiones 
Disputatae de Veritale, 1.2). 
In Macintyre ' s view, there have been different interpretations of the 
notion of correspondence, including the one that takes correspondence as 
describing a relation between propositions and facts. This interpretation , in 
Macintyre's account (1988a, p.358), is a recent interpretation and cannot 
properly be read into the older interpretations of correspondence like 
Aquinas' account, "adaequatio mentis ad rem", which means the adequacy 
of the intellect for its objects (De Veritate, Q.I, Art.2). MacIntyre (1988a, 
p.358), accordingly, holds that if a present mindset is more adequate than its 
earlier versions to meet the challenges addressed to it-such that we do not 
expect its inadequacy in the future, even though it is in fact open to 
falsification-it counts as true, which means it is an adequate theory and 
that it corresponds to the reality it describes . Adequacy for MacIntyre here 
means the ability of a theory to survive against objections. 
roughly be taken as the contemporary notion of a concept see J. E. Brower and S. Brower-
Toland (2008, p.194). 
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MacIntyre sometimes conflates the notion of correspondence with the 
notion of adequacy, such that it sounds as if he is totally against the 
conventional notion of correspondence to reality. MacIntyre, in other cases, 
distinguishes between these two notions, but takes the notion of adequacy as 
a sign of the notion of correspondence and thus of truth. The passage below 
confinns this conflation: 
Those who have reached a certain stage in that development 
[ of tradition] are then able to look back and to identify their 
own previous intellectual inadequacy or the intellectual 
inadequacy of their predecessors by comparing what they 
now judge the world, or at least part of it, to be with what it 
was then judged to be. To claim truth for one's present 
mindset and the judgments which are its expression is to 
claim that this kind of inadequacy, this kind of discrepancy, 
will never appear in any possible future situation, no matter 
how searching the enquiry, no matter how much evidence is 
provided, no matter what developments in rational enquiry 
may occur ( 1988a, p.358). [Italics added] 
In this passage, being true has been taken as being adequate. The 
passage below indicates the second approach in which the adequacy of a 
theory is the sign of its correspondence to reality. MacIntyre here seems not 
to have been reducing the notion of correspondence to the notion of 
adequacy; rather, it seems that he has taken the notion of adequacy as the 
mark and the result of a true theory, which corresponds to reality. 
The explanation is that, in non-trivial cases, unlike the trivial cases 
such as "snow is white", we cannot check directly the correspondence of a 
true theory to reality; for instance, in moral propositions, which according to 
the moral realism of the natural law tradition concern some truths about 
human nature, we cannot use the conventional sense of correspondence as is 
used in an empirical proposition (1988a, p.358).21 In these cases, in 
21 Surely, the observance of moral principles has some observational consequences, as these 
principles are prerequisites ofa normal human life. For instance, in a social setting in which 
telling lies, and doing injustice are tolerated its way of life and established social 
relationships can be observed to be different from another society or the same society were 
it not that these norms are valued. This view is in line with the vulnerability approach 
which I will adopt in the final chapter. Nevertheless, the observation in this case is different 
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MacTntyre's view, the adequacy of theories against existing challenges 
signifies their truth: 
To claim that some thesis is true is not only to claim for all 
possible times and places that it cannot be shown to fai l to 
correspond to reality in the sense of "correspond" 
elucidated earlier but also that the mind which expresses its 
thought in that thesis is in fact adequate to its object ( 1988a, 
p.363) [Italics added]. 
How does the notion of adequacy relate to Maclntyre's fa llibilistic 
interpretation of Aquinas? The answer is that, as the quote above indicates, 
the condition for hav ing an adequate account or theory is to evaluate it 
constantly against the most challenging evidence, which might uncover the 
theory ' s defects, and this is what MacIntyre means by advocating a 
dialectical and fallibilistic account of truth. 
Another notion in Aquinas ' theory of knowledge that is related to the 
notion of adequacy and to fa llibilism is the idea that the intellect is active in 
the knowledge-process. The intellect makes intelligible species out of 
phantasms which, themselves , arise in the imagination, as a product of 
sensation (See Aquinas ' On the Uniqueness of Intellect against Averroists, 
ch. IV). 
Phantasm arises in the imagination from disparate perceived sense 
experiences, which represent the thing in its completeness, and is the thing's 
likeness. ln the next stage, the universal features of the thing are abstracted 
from the phantasm by the intellect, and so the intelligible species are 
produced. Intelligible species is also the likeness of a thing, but unlike the 
phantasm it is totally de-individualized and de-materialized. For instance, 
the phantasm of a red car still pertains to one particular red car, but its 
intelligible species includes only the nature of a car, leaving aside all 
particular conditions that pertain to this particular car (P. S. Eardley and 
C.N. Still 2011 , pp.5 1-56). Likewise, in Maclntyre's view, the mind is 
from the kind of observation that is at stake in conventional empirical contexts, for 
instance. in that in the former the long-term consequences are also taken into account. 
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active and engages in assessing the adequacy of its current understanding to 
the prior understandings of its objects: 
This is a point at which it is important to remember that the 
presupposed conception of mind is not Cartesian. It is rather 
of mind as activity, of mind as engaging with the natural 
and social world in such activities as identification, 
reidentification, collecting, separating, classifying, and 
naming and all this by touching, grasping, pointing, 
breaking down, building up, calling to, answering to and so 
on (1988a, p.356). [Italics added] 22 
The relation between these two notions, the activity and adequacy of 
the intellect, is that the intellect is adequate for an object when it can meet 
the expectations that are the bases of its activities or arise from its activities 
with regard to the subject; as MacIntyre puts it: 
The intellect is adequate to its objects in so far as the 
expectations which it frames on the basis of these activities 
[identification, reidentification, collecting, separating, 
classifying ... ] are not liable to disappointment ( 1988a, 
p.356). 
An adequate theory, which is the outcome of an active intellect, should 
be able to explain the different aspects of its object, to predict its behaviour, 
221. Lamont has, in his personal communicati on to me, ra ised the point that "These are 
rather different kinds of activit ies from the one Aquinas has in mind when he ta lks about 
the agent [agent's] intel lect; the latter acts simply by extracting universals from the 
phantasms of their particulars. The activity of the intellect as descri bed by Aquinas and the 
activity of the intel lect as described by MacI ntyre in the passages you cite here are 
extremely different. That does not mean that the two accounts of inte ll ectual activity need 
be contradictory rather than complementary; but the issue of whether they are or not has to 
be examined and discussed in deta il - the two accounts cannot simply be subsumed under 
the general remark that both th inkers hold that the inte llect is act ive". 
However, I am not claiming here that these two senses of activity, that is, act ivity as 
making universals from phantasms, and activity as being involved in critical appraisal are 
totally identical in meaning; but, this is almost the path pursued by MacIntyre as the quote 
above indicates. In the passage above, reference is given to both "collecti ng, separating, 
classifyi ng" and engagement with the social world and answering, which represent these 
two senses of the intellect's activity respectively, that is , what Aquinas has in mind when 
he describes the intellect's operation, and what MacIntyre concludes from it, which are a 
fallibilistic and discursive reasoning and an anti-epistemological view of enquiries. As this 
chapter is about Maclntyre's interpretation and application of Aquinas' theory of truth and 
knowledge, and is not an independent study of Aquinas, I cannot go into more detail 
concerning this issue here. 
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and to specify, if it is in a moral field , the particular setting that is necessary 
for normal functioning and flouri shing of the subject. Thus, such a theory 
should always be open to revision. Although the progress of a theory from 
less to more adequate stages occurs in the context of a tradition based on its 
own contingent starting-points, the theory should be also exposed to 
counter-evidences from rival traditions. On this basis, for instance, a 
libertarian theory of justice that allows only the most minimal activities on 
the part of the state to correct social and economic inequalities would be, 
from Aristotle's and Maclntyre ' s perspective, an inadequate theory 
regarding the needs of human beings, because this theory does not take into 
account the way in which great inequities might impede the pursuit of the 
common good and even the exercise of philosophical reasoning, as was 
pointed to in chapter 2. 
Moral theories should be rendered more adequate than their earl ier 
versions or their rival s, in part, by meeting better the needs of human 
beings, some of which apply to them qua human beings. I will use such an 
approach in the final chapter to argue that we can base morality on basic 
characteristics of human beings which relate to ani!Tlal and intellectual 
aspects required for their normal functioning. 
In this section, I argued how Maclntyre ' s account of Aquinas ' theory 
of truth based on the notions of adequacy and activity of the intellect relates 
to his CT and fallibilism. In sum, the point is that the intellect for Aquinas is 
active, and it attempts on the basis of its activities to proceed from less 
adequate stages to more adequate stages of thought. The intellect is 
inevitably located in a particular context wherein its activities occur. The 
intellect in order to have the most adequate account of things should hold 
itself open to revision and refutation, which might even originate from rival 
traditions. As Aquinas holds "All men by nature desire to know the truth; 
they also have a natural desire to avoid error and to refute it when the 
opportunity arises" (Aquinas, On the Uniqueness of intellect against 
Averroists, chapter I. I ). In the next section, I shall discuss another way in 
which we can make sense of Maclntyre's fallibi listic interpretation of 
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Aquinas' thought, which is through a weak interpretation of Aquinas ' 
notion of the Intellect's veracity. 
IIl.3.1.4Maclntyre's Weak Interpretation of the Intellect's 
Veracity 
An issue that is related to Aquinas' fallibilism is his optimistic view 
regarding the capacity of the intellect to know its proper objects, that is, the 
quiddity of material things, which as will be explained below is compatible 
with a fallibilistic understanding that MacIntyre espouses. 
Aquinas has discussed in Summa Theologica the directedness of the 
intellect toward its proper objects. He there takes up a very optimistic view 
of the intellect ' s capacities, according to which the intellect, like any other 
cognitive faculty , does not or even cannot err in cognizing its proper object 
in its first operation, that is, in knowing the quiddity or the essential 
attributes of a thing: 
Hence, as long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its 
own proper object does not fail. Now the proper object of the 
intellect is the "quiddity" of a material thing; and hence, 
properly speaking, the intellect is not at fault concerning this 
quiddity (ST, I. Q.85, Art.6). 
For Aquinas, J. I. Jenkins (1997, pp.112-113) argues, "each potency 
receives intrinsic ordination [direction] to its proper object"; errors only 
enter in the operation of potencies that are under the control of the will, and 
have the possibility to act in different ways. The intellect as a potency has 
the quiddity of things as its objects, and is not deceived in its grasp of the 
quiddities. This is the same as for sight when the organ is healthy, and there 
is not any impediment to seeing, and this is what the veracity of the intellect 
means. In Aquinas' view, the possible errors of the intellect come in its 
second operation, when it composes and divides concepts in a way that does 
not correspond to reality: 
By accident, however, falsity can occur in thi s knowing of 
quiddities, if the intellect falsely joins and separates. This 
happens in two ways: when it attributes the definition of 
one thing to another, as wou ld happen were it to conceive 
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that "mortal rational animal" were the definition of an ass; 
or when it joins together parts of definitions that cannot be 
joined, as would happen were it to conceive that " irrational, 
immortal animal" were the definition of an ass (Questiones 
Disputatae de Veritate, J-X/1). 
For Aquinas error does not enter into the intellect's first operation of 
defining things as it is dealing with the quiddity of things as its proper 
object. The intellect, in other words, has the capacity to apprehend the 
essences of things by its natural light (Jenkins 1997, pp.113-114). Jenkins 
(1997, p.115) states that although, as explained above, the intellect in its 
first operation grasps the essences fully , there is some textual evidence in 
which Aquinas speaks about our imperfect apprehensions of some natural 
essences like flies, fire and bees. Jenkins (1997, p.115) concludes that 
though, in Aquinas ' view, the intellect is veracious in identifying natural 
kinds and distinguishing them according to their essences, or in other words 
it is able "to cut the world at its joints", it is not able at least initially to 
apprehend the whole essence of some things; the intellect in these cases uses 
reasoning to move from an imperfect to a full grasp of the essences. In this 
interpretation, we should use fallible discursive reason to obtain a full grasp 
of some essences, and since our grasp of the essentials is deficient we 
should instead use accidents in our definitions of the things (Jenkins 199 1, 
p.632); however, in Jenkins ' view (1997, p.117), Aquinas may still hold that 
the intellect due to its abi lities and natural light can claim the 
correspondence of its ideas to the essences. Our intellect in its initial 
understanding "cuts the world at its joints", though it has many things to 
learn through discursive reasoning. In Jenkins ' view (1997, p. 126), this 
assurance about the correspondence of the intellect's ideas to reality, despite 
the incomplete understanding of essences, indicates that Aquinas is 
epistemologically optimistic.23 However, the important point is that, in 
Aquinas ' s view, the kind of justification acquired based on the cognition of 
23 1 think this is one reason why Aquinas infers the correspondence of a so far adequate 
theory with reality, which is always possible to turn out be untrue. There is a simplist ic and 
optimistic realist element working here. 
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natures is an ideal and paradigmatic justification which is quite difficult to 
attain. This is an important point for a limited fallibilistic interpretation of 
Aquinas (S. MacDonald 1993, pp.1 79-180). There are, for Aquinas, two 
other kinds of justification besides this ideal case; one is demonstrative 
justification, that is scientia, i.e. scientific knowledge, and the other is non-
demonstrative that is the product of probabilistic/dialectical reasoning. The 
latter is based on uncertain and non-necessary propositions held by most 
people, which produce a positive epistemic status in the agent regarding the 
truth of such propositions. The former, scientia in a non-strict sense, is a 
kind and a degree of epistemic justification that only approximates the 
necessity and infallibility of purely formal and a priori disciplines, and is 
not based on immediate self-evident propositions (MacDonald 1993, p.177). 
Encountering sensible objects might give the agent a vague 
apprehension of the natures of the objects. The repetition of this 
encountering might refine their apprehension; however, it is possible that 
the agent fails to grasp the nature of the objects. The apprehension of 
natures is a lengthy process, and it is possible that it not be accomplished at 
all. The abstracting activity of the agent for producing universals out of 
particulars is a gradual process. The agent might not fulfill the apprehension 
of natures and universals, and so fails to recognize the evidence of those 
propositions (MacDonald 1993, pp.179 &184). 
This interpretation, as Jenkins (199 1, p.623) points out, is in fact a 
weak interpretation of Aquinas ' notion of the veracity of the intellect 
according to which the intellect's veracity is consistent with it having 
imperfect conceptualizations of natural kinds, which should be improved 
through time using fallible reasoning. As Jenkins (1991 , p.623 ) holds, 
MacIntyre, along some other prominent 20th century Thomists such as 
Etienne Gilson and Bernard Lonergan, has adopted this interpretation which 
lends support to a fallibilistic understanding of Aquinas ' thought. In my 
view, this interpretation is clear in Maclntyre's thought when he argues for 
a gradual understanding of first principles and fixed ends of objects of 
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knowledge, as will be explained further in this chapter regarding his anti-
epistemological account of first principles (2006f, p.148). 
The argument so far in this section indicates that despite Aquinas' 
optimistic account of the human intellect, there remains room for mistakes 
on the part of the intellect, particularly when it composes propositions that 
contain the quiddity of things. This exposition of Aquinas ' thought supports 
Maclntyre's case for offering a fa llibilistic interpretation of Aquinas ' 
account of knowledge, because although Aquinas is optimistic regarding the 
possibility of knowing essences, he thinks it necessary to have a discursive 
method to acquire such an understanding. 
111.3.1.5 The Fallibilistic Interpretation based on an anti-
Epistemological Interpretation of Aquinas 
A fifth way to explain Macintyre's fallibilistic interpretation of 
Aquinas- besides his argumentative style, moral aspect, his notion of the 
intellect 's adequacy and activity, and his interpretation of the intellect's 
veracity-is by explaining Maclntyre 's anti-epistemological construal of 
Aquinas' theory of knowledge. I explained in the fo regoing chapter 
Maclntyre's view of the first principles of practical r~asoning. The main 
point was that MacIntyre, following Aquinas, distinguishes first principles 
into two categories. The first are those principles that are known by all 
rational human beings such as the truth of the proposition "a whole is bigger 
than its parts", or the formal rules of logic such as the non-contradiction 
law. This group of first principles is epistemological, because their evidence 
is known by the analysis of subject/predicate, and so can be made evident to 
all rational human beings. 
The second kind of first principles are substantial first principles which 
are or become evident to those minds that are formed and trained in 
particular traditions. This group of first principles is not epistemological; 
that is to say, they are not like Descartes' distinct and indubitable ideas 
(2006f, p.148). 
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Aquinas' argument for this distinction is slightly different from the 
way I articulated it above on the basis ofMaclntyre's account. For Aquinas, 
any first principle is self-evident in two senses; it is self-evident in itself if 
the predicate is included in the subject, whether we know this or not. The 
same first principle might or might not be self-evident in "relation to us" 
depending on whether we know sufficiently the subj ect/predicate to admit 
the fact that the predicate is present in the subject; as Aquinas explains this: 
For instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, 
in its very nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says 
"a rational being": and yet to one who knows not what a 
man is, this proposition is not self-evident (ST, 1-1!, Q.94, 
Art.2). 
In Aquinas' view, the terms of some propositions like the examples 
below are known to all, but the terms and so the self-evidence of some 
propositions are only known to "the wise": 
.. such are those propositions whose terms are known to 
all, as, "Every whole is greater than its part," and, "Things 
equal to one and the same are equal to one another." But 
some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who 
understand the meaning of the tenns of such propositions: 
thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is 
self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: 
but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot 
grasp it (ST, l.ll, Q.94, Art.2). 
The first principles that are only known to the wise are substantial first 
principles which we come to know through our enquiries. The wise in this 
process should argue dialectically from contingent beliefs that are valid in 
their tradition based on its standards, and then continue to evaluate them, 
particularly when they face intellectual challenges, which MacIntyre calls 
epistemological cri ses24, to arrive fina lly at an adequate account of things. 
MacIntyre (2006f, pp.147-148), as discussed in the previous chapter, is 
against the epistemological interpretation of all first principles and calls 
them "mythological beasts". He disapproves of the attempts of some Neo-
24This notion wi ll be explained at length in the next chapter. 
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Thomists from Joseph Kleutgen onwards to interpret Aquinas as being 
engaged in an "epistemological enterprise". To the contrary, MacIntyre 
(2006f, pp.14 7-148) holds that if the Thomist is faithful to the intentions of 
Aristotle and Aquinas, he will not be engaged in an epistemological 
enterprise except incidentally. 
In Macintyre's view (2006f, p.148), an epistemological enterprise is 
one conducted from a first-person perspective; that is to say, it involves the 
activities ofan "I" who attempts to assess the conformity of judgments to an 
external reality, so as to provide ')ustified certitude regarding their truth and 
error". This approach, MacIntyre holds, faces a sceptical challenge 
regarding the relation between subjective judgments and reality. 
As contrasted with this, in the anti-epistemological interpretation of 
knowledge which MacIntyre upholds, the intellect by knowing becomes 
formally identical with the object, and so its capacity for knowing becomes 
actualized. The intellect by becoming formally identical with the object 
does not stand in an external relation to the object; in other words, the object 
will not be external to it, and so the sceptical challenge regarding the 
relation of inner judgments to an external reality dissolves; as MacIntyre 
puts it: 
The mind, actualized in knowledge, responds to the object 
as the object is25 and as it would be, independently of the 
mind's knowledge of it. The intellect knows itself only in 
the second-order knowledge of its own operations and is 
known also by others in those operations. But even such 
knowledge when achieved need not entail certitude of a 
Cartesian sort (2006f, p.149). 
I take MacIntyre here as saying that the intellect is intertwined in the 
world; it does not have knowledge of itself and its procedures before 
starting its operations, thus the un-actualized mind at this stage does not 
face epistemological questions about the justification of its judgment and of 
25Here again the simplistic realist element comes to the fore, which points to the possibility 
of knowing reality as it is, and that an adequate theory corresponds with reality. I think at 
this stage the linguistic challenges, which put this relation into question, have not yet been 
leveled against Aquinas. 
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the first principles of its knowledge. When the intellect receives the form of 
the object in the knowledge-process , its capacity for knowing becomes 
actualized, and the intellect becomes formally identical to that object. The 
intellect at thi s stage might or might not acquire knowledge of its 
operations; that is to say, the intellect as a matter of fact has the knowledge 
of the object by being formally identical with it, though it might not be self-
conscious of this knowledge, the first principles that underlie its judgments, 
and the procedures that it follows for attaining certainty. To put this more 
simply, it is not the case that the intellect as an empty entity consciously 
follows a procedure to move from self-evident first principles to subordinate 
truths; rather, the intellect is embedded in some given circumstances and 
develops its contingent knowledge of things, and then finally might become 
conscious of its underlying first principles, which of course are not 
necessarily justifiable to all rational agents. Accordingly, Aquinas ' theory of 
knowledge is construed primarily in metaphysical terms, as it involves 
notions such as the actualization of the intellect in the knowledge-process. 
M. D. Jordan (1986, pp.118-119), along lines similar to Maclntyre 's 
metaphysical interpretation of Aquinas' theory of knowledge, argues that 
Aquinas attends to epistemological questions only in the framework of 
ontology. In his view, Aquinas is not concerned with finding some reasons 
to make a subject assured of the truth of his thinking, and to assuage 
epistemological doubts. In Jordan's view, a theory of knowledge or a 
cognitional theory does not appear in Aquinas' works in an organized way. 
Aquinas' epistemic views are thus located in the realm of ontology where he 
discusses the operations of the soul as an embedded intellect. Aquinas, thus, 
is not attempting to find reasons to assure the conscious subject of the 
verac ity of his thought; instead, he is trying to disclose the operations of an 
embodied intellect. 
Jordan (I 986, pp.118-119) maintains the term and the substance of 
epistemology is a modem coinage which does not appear in Aquinas ' 
works. The absence of epistemology in Aquinas' psychology amounts to the 
differences that ex ist between his psychological remarks and the meanings 
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of modem epistemological vocabulary. For instance, in Jordan ' s view, the 
term certainty has a broad sense for Aquinas, and its typical contexts are 
moral rather than epistemological. For instance, Aquinas uses the term 
certainty in the phrase "certainty of hope and faith" which is strikingly at 
odds with the modem epistemological sense of the term certainty which 
stands in opposition to faith an.d uncritical thinking. 
This metaphysical account of Aquinas' theory of knowledge is relevant 
to Maclntyre 's CT, as it has less universalistic aspects than does an 
epistemological account. The paradigmatic case of an epistemological 
account of knowledge for Macintyre is Descartes' theory of knowledge in 
which he sought to find some indubitable foundation for hi s beliefs by 
means of methodological doubt. These foundations should be valid for all 
rational human beings, and should not need further justification (2006f, 
p.148). 
By contrast to this, in the metaphysical account, the evidence of first 
principles is known only to those minds that have been engaged with the 
object and have become adequate to it. This evidence cannot be 
demonstrated for all rational human beings, as these principles are 
substantial in the sense that they are infonnative about the world, and are 
not analytic propositions; accordingly, their knowledge requires the intellect 
having engagement with the object and having "theoretical achievement" 
(2006f, p.148). 
The intellect begins with the beliefs it happens to have, and moves 
from less adequate theories to more adequate theories by holding them open 
to revision. This metaphys ical account has a particularistic aspect, because 
the intellect starts with the beliefs around it in its tradition, and moves 
dialectically toward more adequate accounts. This account refers to the 
methodological sense of the CT as was explained in the previous chapter. 
Although I used this metaphysical explanation to clarify Maclntyre's CT 
and its associated fallibilism, it raises some questions regarding its 
consistency with inter-traditional fallibi li sm and discursive reasoning, which 
wi ll be explained below. 
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111.3.1.5.1 A Partial Criticism of MacIntyre Concerning the 
Consistency of His anti-Epistemological Approach with His inter-
Traditional Fallibilism 
As was argued above, in Macintyre's view, theoretical achievement is 
a condition for knowing evident first principles. This theoretical 
achievement is obtained primarily in a tradition. This sense of 
belongingness to a tradition regarding first principles is clearer in 
Macintyre's idea that first principles are evident for a mind that is "formed" 
in a tradition (2006f, p.148) than in his idea of theoretical achievement as a 
condition for knowing first principles. If knowledge of first principles can 
also be acquired by the enquirers who are outside a tradition, it would point 
to the dilution of the role of tradition, and sets some limits for the 
metaphysical and anti-epistemological explanation of first principles 
provided by MacIntyre. 
The explanation is that, if we stick to a thick metaphysical explanation, 
it would be difficult to make sense of the discursive and fallibilistic 
interpretation of Aquinas' theory of knowledge offered by MacIntyre, 
because one element of this metaphysical view is that we do not have 
knowledge of the knowledge that we have at the beginning of our enquiries, 
or because we start from contingently valid points in a tradition; whereas 
discursive reasoning requires access to the underlying reasons we have for 
our theories and convictions, and being able to reflect on the starting-points 
of our enquiries to compare them with other traditions'. 
One possible answer to this objection lies in the way I described above 
Macintyre ' s theory of truth as being "partly epistemic". The explanation is 
that, in my understanding, the discursive and fallibil istic features of 
Aquinas ' thought would come to the fore after this metaphysical phase. 
When the agent becomes self-conscious of his knowledge and of his 
underlying first principl es, he can evaluate them against rival reasons to 
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assess his position 's adequacy. The knowledge-process starts with 
contingent starting-points, and the question of their necessity does not arise 
at this stage, and when the agent reaches the epistemological stage he can 
engage in discursive reasoning about them. Accordingly, we can expect that 
when the CT applies to the epistemological stage, it does not mean that 
different traditions cannot communicate with each other. Nevertheless, a 
serious question again arises here, that is, limiting the di scursive and 
fa llibilistic reasoning to the epistemological phase might render this 
interaction sterile, because this discursive reasoning might reach first 
principles and starting-points of enquiries which are based on a tradition 's 
contingent metaphysical convictions; as a result, the inter-traditional 
disputes about them may prove indecisive. Maclntyre' s emphasis on starting 
enquiries from contingent starting-points in a tradition, and that rationality 
in a tradition reflects the progress in that tradition faces the question 
regarding how we can compare traditions' starting-points with each other. 
This comparison might prove necessary during inter-traditional intellectual 
encounters. This is important particularly if we take into account that 
MacIntyre takes first principles as revisable and refutable (2006f, p.160). 
MacIntyre might argue that first principles would -be evaluated on the 
basis of the evaluation of the systems in which they are operating (2006f, 
p.160). In other words, we do not directly assess first principles; rather, we 
evaluate them on the basis of the relative adequacy of the theories that 
involve these principles. I, however, find this response unconvincing for the 
following reasons. 
My first reason is that we cannot expect the traditions that have 
different contingent starting-points to agree on the measures of the adequacy 
of their systems. They might simply disagree about the meaning and the 
measures of adequacy and superiority used to evaluate their theories against 
each other. These di sagreements might be insolvable due to their different 
metaphysical backgrounds, particularly taking into account that 
epistemology is supposed not to enter into this metaphysical stage. 
137 
My second reason is that the superiority of a whole system of thought 
does not necessarily mean that its first principles are more adequate or 
justified than other systems'. It needs further reasoning to show that the 
superiority, if it is agreed on, is logically related to some particular first 
principles. 
My own answer to this question is that, in order to make the process of 
discursive reasoning fruitful , we should acknowledge the existence of some 
shared substantial measures of rationality across traditions in the light of 
which different theories from different traditions can be evaluated. I will 
return to this issue in my discuss ion of relativism in the next chapter. 
Accordingly, I think, although the acculturation of an agent in a tradition 
might give him a kind of certitude regarding the convictions he has grown 
up with, this kind of certitude does not prove helpful in inter-traditional 
discursive reasoning, unless this certitude is translatable into a language of 
reasoning based on some substantial universal measures of rationality. In 
other words, we cannot, on the one hand, emphasize the tradition-bound 
nature of rationality, and on the other hand, argue for the necess ity of an 
inter-traditional discursive and argumentative method, unless we admit the 
existence of some shared measures of rationality, and that agents are not 
totally captured by their traditions. 
MacIntyre explains Aquinas' contention that the first principles with 
substantive content are only evident to the wise (ST, I.II , Q.94, Art.2), by 
holding that this evidence is only known to "those with an intellectual grasp 
of the theoretical framework in which they are embedded" (2006f, p.148). 
This description, namely, having the intellectual grasp of the theoretical 
framework, suggests that MacIntyre does not have in mind an ontological 
relation between the mind and the tradition in which it is embedded. This is 
in line with the point I made in the preceding chapters that an ontological 
interpretation of MacIntyre might lead to a misleading interpretation of him 
by suggesting that traditions are closed frameworks. The wise, and those 
with an intellectual grasp of the theoretical framework might come from 
outside a trad ition- and this is in line with Maclntyre 's view regarding the 
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possibility of knowing a tradition's claim in its own terms from outside it, 
which will be explained in the next chapter. This explanation supports 
Maclntyre's discursive and fallibilistic method; however, a problem 
surfaces, namely, it is not clear how this explanation fits with Maclntyre's 
metaphysical and anti -epistemological account explained above regarding 
the intellect's operations. The metaphysical account of the knowledge-
process fits better with the misleading ontological interpretation referred to 
above than with the discursive method which entails having access to 
reasons, which is a feature of an epistemological account. 
Furthermore, Maclntyre ' s point that the metaphysical explanation of 
the intellect's operation discards sceptical doubt regarding the relation 
between mental objects and the world lacks any application with regard to 
moral issues. It is not a main question in the moral field whether the mind 
represents the world; rather, a main question here is how to secure an 
agreement on moral norms, and how to arrange our relationships properly in 
a situation in which people do not share a comprehensive account of the 
good. To say that the intellect does not err in grasping the nature of things, 
as Aquinas thinks, does not tell us anything regarding how we can manage 
our moral disputes, particularly if some of these theories appeal to the 
human good that is based on human nature. 
111.4 Conclusion 
This chapter serves as an introduction to Maclntyre's theory of truth 
which forms the subject of the next chapter. I argued that Macintyre takes 
Aquinas' theory of truth as a realist theory of truth that involves an account 
of correspondence that is different from modem correspondence theories. 
The difference is that for Aquinas truth primarily holds in a relation between 
the intellect and objects, and not between propositions and facts, and 
involves his metaphysical theory of forms. For Aquinas the intellect, which 
of course later forms concepts and propositions, should become adequate to 
and fonnally identical with the object in order to grasp the truth. This gives 
a metaphysical sense to Aquinas's theory of truth, because the intellect and 
the object become actualized in the knowledge-process. 
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This metaphysical explanation, unlike the epistemological 
interpretation of Aquinas' theory of truth, has particularistic aspects which 
suit Maclntyre's CT, particularly in its methodological sense sketched in the 
previous chapter. The intellect, on this basis, is an embodied entity in the 
context of the body and the tradition in which it is located. The intellect 
cannot leave aside all these particularities in order to formulate universal 
and convincing-for-all principles. The intellect should begin with its 
currently held positions, arriving at more compelling and more adequate 
beliefs by a constant process of revision and refutation. 
I attempted to articulate Maclntyre's reasons for offering an 
interpretation of Aquinas's thought that is compatible with and, in fact, 
supports fallibili sm and CT. I offered five reasons for this based on 
I) Aquinas' argumentative methodology; 2) the virtue and moral aspect of 
his theory of truth, which requires openness to all criticisms; 3) The notion 
of the intellect' s adequacy and activity in the knowledge-process 
emphasizes a gradualist progress toward adequate theories; 4) Maclntyre's 
weak interpretation of Aquinas' notion of the veracity of the intellect, 
according to which there is room for the intellect's errors, and fallible 
reasoning is necessary for grasping the accidents and essentia ls of things; 
5) Maclntyre's anti-epistemological interpretation of Aquinas's thought, 
which di smisses the epistemological ambition of providing certitude at the 
beginning of enqui ries, and instead, holds that first principles of practica l 
rational ity are the destinations of our intellectual enquiries achi evable 
through dialectical methods. 
I, however, argued that this metaphysical interpretation might pose 
hindrances in the way of discursive reasoning which Macintyre endorses. 
The reason is that in so far as we lack conscious reasons for our beliefs we 
cannot participate in a fully productive dialogue with our opponents, 
particularly when it concerns the contingent starting points of traditions. 
I also argued that Aquinas' optim istic epistemology regarding our 
abi li ty to know the nature of things, though it leaves some room for errors, 
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does not do justice to the modem condition of value-pluralism. As evidence 
for this claim, I will mention Aquinas ' account of blasphemy in chapter 5. 
In the following chapter, I will explain Macintyre ' s theory of truth the 
Thomistic bases of which were discussed in this chapter. I will again, on 
different occasions, return to Aquinas ' metaphysics and theory of 
knowledge to explain and evaluate Maclntyre ' s theory of truth. 
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IV- Chapter 4: Maclntyre's Theory of Truth 
IV.I Introduction 
I argued in the previous chapter that MacIntyre ascribes a 
correspondence theory of truth to Aquinas, which he thinks is different from 
a modem version of such a theory. The difference, in sum, lies in the point 
that for Aquinas the correspondence relation does not primari ly hold 
between propositions and facts; rather, it holds between the intellect and its 
concepts, on the one hand, and objects on the other hand. The inclusion of 
the intellect in this relation makes correspondence and the truth-relation apt 
for non-observational and non-factual relations, as is required in mora l 
issues. In moral cases, we cannot speak of a correspondence relation as we 
do in describing objects and states of affairs; instead, the truth holds when 
the intellect is adequate to its objects; that is to say, when the theory 
withstands the most challenging objections.26 
MacIntyre (1988, p.35 8) maintains that his theory of truth is a 
correspondence theory of truth as described above. I explained in the 
foregoing chapter how MacIntyre, invoking Aquinas ' notion of the 
adequacy of the intellect, gives a fa llibilistic sense to hi s theory of truth in 
line with his constitution thesis. In the present chapter, I aim to expl ain 
further Macln tyre's theory of truth by comparing it with relati vism and 
perspectivism which both make claims akin to Maclntyre's CT. The 
importance of this discussion lies in the fact that the CT intrinsica ll y has 
some relativistic and perspectivistic implications. According to the CT, 
there are no measures of rationality independent of traditions. Any 
rationality, in thi s view, belongs to a tradition . As thi s explanation implies, 
among the first things that come to the mind regarding the CT is whether it 
means all rati onalities are the same, that is relati vism's claim , or if it is not 
26All told, I do not think appeal ing to a fallib ilist ic and d ialectica l reasoning necessari ly 
needs such a metaphysical account of the inte llect and of the correspondence theory of truth 
which MacIntyre has favored. In the previous and current chapter, I am in fact try ing to 
offer an inte lligible picture of Mac lntyre's espousal of this version of the theory of tru th, 
which is open to the question whether indeed we need such a complicated metaphysical 
theory to conc lude the kind of fal libilism that MacIntyre seeks to justify. Instead, I think it 
is commonsensical that we need to have gradualist and fallible reasoning in our enqui ries. 
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possible to know reality as it is independent of perspectives, that is 
perspectivism's claim. Therefore, by exploring the borders between the CT 
and relativism/perspectivism we can come to a better understanding of the 
CT. Due to the importance of the charge of relativism levelled against 
MacIntyre, a significant part of this chapter will be devoted to this issue. 
IV.2 Maclntyre's Realist Theory of Truth 
Maclntyre's theory of knowledge, in general, and his theory of truth , in 
particular, are metaphysically reali st. This includes two claims as follows. 
I ) Ontological realism according to which there is an ex istent world 
independent of any mind. For MacIntyre, this existent world is orderly and 
hierarchical. 2) Epistemological realism according to which human beings' 
minds are capable of knowing this order, as it is in reality (2006h, p.204). 
Both realistic elements appear in Maclntyre 's theory of knowledge. Truth, 
in this view, lies in the mind being receptive of that order, and in the 
correspondence of its judgments about the world to the world (2006h, 
p.206). An important element of Maclntyre's realism is that his theory of 
truth, despite its universal scope, is mainly concerned with ethics. In other 
words, Maclntyre's focus here is on moral realism. Moral realism for 
MacIntyre does not mean that virtues and vices refer to factual entities; 
rather, it means moral truth is a relational notion that holds between 
objective relata. For MacIntyre (198 1, p.52) these two relata are human 
nature and the human good which is human-nature-as-it should be, between 
which moral virtues mediate. As the two notions refer to objective 
properties which are independent of subjective judgments about human 
beings ' nature and about the good, this theory falls under the category of 
realism. 
Maclntyre's objection to the Enlightenment account of mora lity can be 
understood in line with this realism, when he explains its fa ilure to 
rationally justify morality in terms of denying any essence to human beings, 
which defines their true ends (198 I , p.54). That human beings have an 
essence as the basis of their morality certainly conflicts with a strong 
interpretation of the CT that denies the possibility of having a shared 
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morality for human beings qua human beings, as will be explained further 
in this chapter. To explain Macintyre's realism further, I shall sketch below 
a misunderstanding that presents MacIntyre as being influenced by the 
linguistic turn in philosophy. R. Smith (2003, p.214) explains Macintyre's 
epistemic and moral theory as follows: 
But with the shift into the linguistic turn ... the locus of 
construction shifts to the social, linguistically formed 
community. So Macintyre ' s and Hauerwas's presupposition 
that we cannot get outside of language is a more recent 
development in this same trajectory of thought that 
presupposes we cannot get to a real world, and that the 
mind's contact with the world is one of making, not 
matching. 
There are of course some hints of such a linguistic interpretation in 
Macintyre's texts, for instance, when he denies the notion of value-free facts 
as the objects of knowledge: 
What is and was not harmless, but highly misleading, was 
to conceive of a realm of facts independent of judgment or 
of any other form of linguistic expression, so that 
judgments or statements or sentences could be paired off 
with facts, truth or falsity being the alleged relationship 
between such paired items (1988a, pp.357-358). 
However, Smith's interpretation is not supported by Macintyre's 
advocacy of Aquinas' theory of truth and his insistence that there is a 
hierarchical world independent of our minds and of our language as the 
object of knowledge (2006h, p.204). MacIntyre explains Aquinas' theory of 
truth approvingly as follows: 
It is a central feature of all crafts, of furniture making and 
fishing and fanning, as much as of philosophy, that they 
require the minds of those who engage in the craft to come 
to terms with and to make themselves adequate to the 
existence and properties of some set of objects conceived to 
exist independently of those minds. The embodied mind, in 
and through its activity, has to become receptive to fonns 
(eide) of what is other than itself and in being constituted by 
those formal objects becomes, in the appropriate way, them 
(1990a, p.68). 
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It is then a metaphysical presupposition of this view of truth 
that there is an order of things and that this order exists 
independently of the human mind, just as do the objects and 
sets of objects that find their place within it. And to make 
true judgments about the order of things is for the mind to 
be receptive to that order, so that its judgments about that 
order agree with how things are just because it is how 
things are in respect of that order that determines how the 
mind thinks about it · and this not accidentally (2006h, 
p.204). 
The quotes above run counter to the linguistic interpretation of 
MacIntyre offered by Smith, as they point to the necessity of grasping the 
order of the world which is independent of our minds and languages. 
Despi te the existence of some textua l evidence suggesting that for 
MacIntyre facts are intertwined with theories, there are plenty of passages 
that present him as epistemologically realist, in the sense that human beings 
have the capacity to know things as they are, and that this happens when the 
mind is adequate to them: 
What is it to attain truth? The perfected understanding in 
which enquiry terminates , when some mind is finally 
adequate to that subject matter about which it has been 
enquiring, consists in key part in being able to say how 
things are, rather than how they seem to be from the 
particular, partial, and limited standpoint of some particular 
set of perceivers or observers or enquirers (2006c, p. 58). 
In line with this reali sm, Maclntyre' s theory of truth, following 
Aquinas', has a moral aspect. Truth is a kind of good; it is the intellect's 
good to arrive at truth. This feature is related to the ontological reali sm 
discussed above. A judgment when it is true helps the agent to be in a right 
relationship with the aspect of reality that he is thinking about. Accordingly, 
a true judgment should be believed and a false judgment should not be 
believed. False judgments and beliefs, when they are believed or acted 
upon, mediate between agents and reality, and distort their relationship. 
False judgments are not worthy of "judgmental assent"; otherwise, they will 
di sable agents in their everyday activities and enquiries, since these 
judgments do not present reality as it is (2006h, p.201). The role of the mind 
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is to find the place of the thing in the order of things; the mind by playing 
this part fulfills its role and its good. The intellect, as a result of having thi s 
role, should always remain open to the fa lsification of its beliefs in order to 
arrive at the best possible account of things. Another feature ofMaclntyre's 
theory of truth, relevant to its reali st aspect explained above, is its non-
relativistic and non-perspectivistic character, as wi ll be discussed below. In 
fact, Macfntyre's epistemological reali sm requires him to be able to rebut 
these two charges. 
TV.3 Maclntyre's Realist Theory of Truth as Distinct from 
Relativism and Perspectivism 
MacIntyre (1988a, p.9) has emphasized constantly that there are 
different versions of rationality and justice in different traditions. Despite 
thi s, he believes his theory of truth is di stinct from relativism and 
perspectivism, and that it is possible to speak about truth beyond particular 
traditions (2006c, p.58). In what fo llows, I shall discuss Maclntyre 's case 
for thi s claim. It is no exaggeration to say that most critiques of Maclntyre's 
CT have been levelled against this claim, that is, whether he can make his 
aperspectival and non-relativistic notion of truth consistent with the 
constitution thesis employed in hi s theory of truth. 
IV.3.1 The Distinction from Relativism 
Any comparison makes sense in a context where there is or appear to 
be some similarities between things. The comparison between Maclntyre's 
CT and relati vism indicates that there are some similarities between the two 
notions. By relativism here I mean both cogni ti ve and moral relativism. 
Cognitive relativism is the view that there are different incommensurabl e 
standards for theoretica l and practical understanding. As N. Rescher (2003, 
p.151) defines the tenn, cognitive relativism is the view that "any group 's 
standard of knowledge is on a par with any other's, seeing that there is no 
' higher,' as ituational standard from whi ch those groups' standards 
themselves can be assessed." By the same token, moral relativism is the 
view that the moral standards and va lues of different groups and cultures are 
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on a par, and are not properly subject to objective rational appraisal based 
on other groups' standards. 
How does the CT approach relativism in its two senses? The CT 
borders on cognitive relativism when MacIntyre (1988a, p .9) emphasizes 
that there are rationalities and justices in different traditions instead of just 
Rationality and Justice. The existence of different notions or norms of 
justice implies moral relativism if their merits cannot be compared 
objectively. Moral relativism is also suggested by that aspect of the CT 
which underlines the relation between social and cultural settings and the 
virtues in those settings, as will be explained below. 
JV.3.J.J Maclntyre's View as Distinct from Moral Relativism 
In this section, I will explain the proximity of Maclntyre's CT to moral 
relativism, and show how he thinks he can avoid this charge. I, then, will 
argue how he can make his case against moral relativism stronger, that is, 
by qualifying his claim that different social settings require different 
accounts of the virtues, and by giving more attention to the notion of telos 
or the shared facts of human nature than to the context-relative notion of 
functions. To recall, I argued in chapter 2 that one aspec:t of the CT is that it 
provides a context for the definition and exercise of the virtues. Maclntyre's 
explanation of this in some respects comes close to moral relativism. 
Macintyre's point is that cultural and social settings according to their needs 
and requirements necessitate or pave the way for some virtues to appear and 
become paramount; as he puts the point: 
The standard list of the virtues will include some items 
which derive their status from the part they play in all 
human life. It will also include other items which derive 
their status from some more particular set of beliefs or 
forms of understanding, which is restricted to some 
(perhaps to only one) form of culture and social order 
(1975, p.14). 
On this basis, for instance, MacIntyre claims that children in a 
Lutheran culture were taught to tell the truth whatever consequences; but 
"traditional Bantu parents" brought up their children not to tell the truth to 
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strangers as this could make the family vulnerable to witchcraft; or as 
MacIntyre holds we in modern culture are taught not to tell the truth "to 
elderly great-aunts who invite us to admire their new hats" (1975, p.14). 
In another example, MacIntyre maintains, thrift is a crucial feature of 
individuals in a social and cultural order based on protestant work-ethics, or 
chastity becomes an important quality and virtue in a social order in which 
it is believed that "certain forms of marriage and virginity are the will of 
God" (1975, p.14). 
These remarks about the relation between social orders and their li sts 
of virtues are close to moral relativism which states there are 
incommensurable values in different cultures, without there being a vantage 
point to evaluate these values between these different cultures. 
MacIntyre is aware of the proximity of his CT to moral relativism 
which he rejects as "facile relativism" (1975, p.13). The explanation from 
Maclntyre's perspective is that although there are different li sts of the 
virtues, different justifying criteria and rank-orderings for the virtues in 
different cultural and social settings, there are also similarities between 
these settings in light of which we understand their differences; there are 
also some shared elements between different li sts, which is against the claim 
of relativism: 
We are able to identify in each of these societies one and 
the same focus upon a set of human qualities, the presence 
or absence of which in a man determines how he is to be 
assessed as a man. Were this not so, we wou ld not be able 
to understand these various cultures as differing from each 
other over one and the same thing. Our perception of 
difference presupposes a perception of resemblance (1975, 
p.13). 
It is striking that MacIntyre here appea ls to the notion of humanity in 
the phrase "human quality" in a way that provides a cross-cultural measure 
for morality. He maintains that a society that does not recognize the value of 
honesty, justice and courage lacks the genera l fea tures of human society and 
degenerates into a Hobbesian state of nature (1975 , p.14). 
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If MacIntyre invokes the notions of humanity and human qualities in 
his moral theory, it indicates that at least in his judgment his theory is not 
vulnerable to the criticism of relativism, because these notions provide some 
minimal requirements for different traditions to meet. These notions as used 
by MacIntyre here are context-independent. Nevertheless, Macintyre's 
arguments here move in a direction that, in my view, conflicts with this 
minimally universalistic approach sketched above. This conflict surfaces in 
the passage below: 
Societies differ in their accounts of the virtues. There are 
not only differences as to which human qualities are to be 
accounted virtues; but there are, of course, also differences 
as to the criteria by means of which the virtues are to be 
justified. Fifth-century Athens is in many ways at odds with 
twelfth-century Iceland; . . . [however] we are able to 
identify in each of these societies one and the same focus 
upon a set of human qualities, the presence or absence of 
which in a man determines how he is to be assessed as a 
man (1975, p.13). [Italics added] 
The conflict is that MacIntyre, on the one hand, claims there are 
different qualities as human qualities and different measures for justifying 
these qualities in different cultures and periods, and- on the other hand, 
claims we can find a similar focus in different cultures on certain human 
qualities. 
One way MacIntyre has taken to resolve this tension is by arguing that 
the essentiality of the virtues of justice, truthfulness, and courage for any 
human society is compatible with the existence of varied codes for these 
virtues in different cultures. He defines justice independently of its different 
codes as follows. 
Justice requires that we treat others in respect of merit or 
desert according to uniform and impersonal standards. To 
depart from the standards of justice in some particular 
instance defines our relationship with the relevant person as 
in some way special or distinctive (1975, p.13). 
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However, he goes on to hold that the recognition of these essential 
features for any human society is compatible with the existence of different 
accounts of these virtues: 
Thi s recognition that we cannot escape the definition of our 
relationships in tenns of such goods uustice, courage, 
truthfl.dness, etc.,] is perfectly compatible with the 
acknowledgement that different societies have different 
codes oftruthfulness,justice, and courage (1975, p.14). 
In my view, Maclntyre's view regarding thi s compatibility does not 
hold, because it is possible that some of these varying codes of the vi1tues 
run counter to the general requirements of the virtues that these codes 
should represent, that is, an impartial treatment of people, as the earli er 
quote from MacIntyre indicates. To explain further, MacIntyre offers a 
definition of justice that, in his view, holds true for different cultures as far 
as they want to qualify as a human culture along the lines that justice 
requires impartial treatment of people ( 1975, p.13). This general definition 
sets some limits upon the poss ible forms that codes of justice might take in 
different cultures. This is al so true for the other virtues such as courage and 
truthfulness. This general requirement, if MacIntyre observes it and 
qualifies accordingly his claim that there are different codes for the virtues, 
would save him from moral relativism. 
Maclntyre 's definition of justice explained above provides some 
measures for the evaluation of particular codes of justice. Particular codes of 
justice are status quos and ex isting measures of justice in a socia l and 
cultural order. They might not be true standards of justice whose criterion is 
the definition quoted above. For instance, the fact that a given society fo r 
some reasons teaches its citizens not to tell the truth to strangers is not per 
sea valid claim to truthfulness and justice. The society by the same reason 
might allow its citizens to eat strangers when they are hungry. These 
differing codes of the virtues cannot be taken for granted and treated as non-
criticizable. 
If MacIntyre allows the eva luation of different ex isting codes of the 
virtues based on some universa l cri teria, li ke the one he offered for the 
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definition of justice, or based on the vulnerability approach which will be 
explained in chapter 6, his CT would be immune to the criticism of moral 
relativism. The view that there are some universal requirements for the 
virtues is compatible with there being qualifications to these universal 
requirements in different cultures but not with the view that there are 
incommensurable accounts of the virtues in different traditions. These 
universal virtues take different forms when they are realized in different 
contexts due to the requirements of these contexts. MacIntyre has defended 
such a view as follows. 
MacIntyre approves Aquinas ' distinction between the primary precepts 
of the natural law, which are universal, and the secondary precepts which 
concern the application of those primary precepts, and are context-sensitive 
(2006j, p.65). MacIntyre, in line with this, criticizes Kant, arguing that his 
moral theory cannot legitimately allow qualifications and exceptions to 
moral rules such as the rule of truth-telling. By contrast, MacIntyre holds his 
own moral theory, which is based on human beings' good, can fulfill this 
task, because in his theory the good of truth-telling as well as the good of 
breaking this rule on necessary occasions both are derived from the same 
good (2006m, p.132). 
Maclntyre's point is that moral exceptions are valid, in so far as they 
serve the same good that a moral rule in its unqualified manner serves. If 
this interpretation of MacIntyre is correct, he should tailor his CT such that 
it does not imply that any human quality that plays a part in a social setting 
should count as a virtue, because this role might not be in line with the good 
that is the basis of Maclntyre's moral theory; otherwise, his teleological 
morality will tum into a functionalist one. The distinction between 
teleological and functional accounts was explained in chapter 2 in the 
discussion of Maclntyre ' s stance toward moral arbitrariness. I argued there 
that MacIntyre thinks some virtues might indeed be dysfunctional to their 
social setting, which shows MacIntyre from his Aristotelian perspective 
appeals to some normative measures independent of a particular setting. 
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The notion of telos is wider than the notion of function. A functio n is 
defined in a limited system; but a telos or a fina l end with regard to a human 
being encompasses different systems in which he is living. If we accept, as 
does sometimes MacIntyre on the basis of hi s Ari stotel ianism and the 
natural law tradition, that there is an essence to human nature (1981 , pp.52-
55),27 it wi ll provide a vantage po int for the eva luation of existing moral 
codes. For instance, if a social setting requires its people to be mean, which 
is different from frugality, we are not justified to take this qua lity as a 
virtue, despite the role it plays in preserving that social setting, because our 
human nature is such that we are vulnerable to natural and economic 
scarcities as a result of which we mutually depend on each other to live 
well. This view of human nature rejects the qua lity of meanness as a 
genuine human and moral quali ty. This point supports my c laim in the 
foregoing chapters that Maclntyre 's social method which was based on 
practice- narrative- tradition cannot provide a full measure of morality, 
and-as he himself has admitted- it needs to be based on some features of 
human nature. 
Macintyre's moral theory, thus, is different from moral rel ativism in 
virtue of the fact that it offers some universal meanings fo r the virtues, 
wh ich can be used for the evaluation of different existing states of affai rs. 
The universa l definitions of the virtues share the point that our transactions 
with each other should not be governed by individual and subjective 
preferences; rather, they shou ld be managed by objective and non-
discriminatory measures which direct us toward the internal goods of 
practices. This uni versal definition of the virtues is compatible with the 
ex istence of di ffe rent codes for the virtues in different contex ts, but it sets 
some limits on this variation as this quali ficat ion fo ll ows a logic, which 
makes it different from relativism. 
27 My reason for using the qualification "sometimes" is the point I have frequently 
mentioned in the previous chapters, namely, that there seems to be a conflict in Maclntyre 's 
works between, on the one hand, hi s view that the indi vidua l is not a substantial moral 
agent independent of his social and cultural setting, and, on the other hand, the view that 
there is a true end for human beings which requires us to take a human being as a 
substantial moral agent. 
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Macintyre's social teleology works well ; however, it fails when an 
entire human culture degenerates into a state in which some of genuine 
human values such as hospitality and generosity do not any longer count as 
good. An example for this is the case of the Ik people, as it is described in 
the anthropologist Colin Tumbull ' s work The Mountain People (1973), who 
as a result of natural calamities and scarcities lost the recognition of genuine 
values such as hospitality and generosity. MacIntyre (1975, p.14) claims 
that discoveries show that the Ik had once enjoyed genuine human social 
bonds; however, in my view, in order to determine what genuine human 
social bonds are we need an account of human nature that specifies what its 
genuine and real needs are, which apply to different traditions and 
circumstances. Macintyre 's later tum to a metaphysical account of the 
natural law tradition is a useful move in this direction; nevertheless, I will 
argue in chapter 6 on the basis of a vulnerability approach that human basic 
goods would work better for this purpose than does the notion of the good. 
Accordingly, I think the tenor of Macintyre's thought as a result of his 
Aristotelian and Thomistic background is alien to relativism of any sort, but 
I think he should revise some of his rhetoric regarding the existence of 
different codes of the virtues in different cultures _ in order not to imply 
relativism. For this purpose, his distinction between the primary and 
secondary precepts of the natural law is useful , as according to this 
distinction the particularity of the secondary precepts follows a logic that 
can be inter-traditionally evaluated. That this logic can be inter-traditionally 
evaluated might seem question-begging, as this requires the existence of 
some trans-traditional measures which relativism denies. However, I will try 
in chapter 6 to provide an answer to this on the basis of the basic human 
goods that apply to all human beings. 
It would be difficult to hold that all values are tradition or culture-
relative. There are some values that even the relativist cannot deny are true 
in all traditions, among which are what MacIntyre calls the virtues and 
ethics of enquiry. The relativist in order to justify that relativism is true 
should acknowledge that truth is good, and this requires him to abide by the 
ethics of enquiry when he is arguing with his opponents. Among these 
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virtues are "justice in conversation", that proponents of different views have 
appropriate time and possibility to present their reasons, and to expect to be 
addressed "truthfully and undeviously" and be trusted to speak truthfu lly 
and undeviously (I 999c, p.6). These virtues are in fact the precepts of the 
natural law. Accordingly, MacIntyre should revise his saying that the 
existence of essential human qualities is compatible with there being 
different codes of them in different cultures, in a way that firstly admits the 
restriction upon this variation, and secondl y clarifies that this limited 
variation fo llows a logic which itself can sometimes be used to evaluate 
cultures. This logic if it can be argued for inter-traditionally differentiates 
Maclntyre's case from relativism. Let us now consider some criticisms of 
MacIntyre on moral relativism. 
S. Feldman (1986, pp.312-316) criti cizes Macintyre's moral theory as 
being prone to relativism. Her view rests on her di scontent with Maclntyre 's 
account of practice/narrative/tradition. As was pointed to above, MacIntyre 
considers it poss ible to find some universal features as human qualities in 
the di versity of the virtues. Feldman (1986, p.31 7) objects to thi s claim, and 
argues that MacIntyre in fact has assumed the role of a novelist or fictioni st 
in his moral theorizing. A novelist knows well the moral character of hi s 
characters, because he has written them in the novel. The moral life of 
characters in a novel is thin ; whi le we as real moral players have thick moral 
lives informed by competing practices, narratives and traditions. We are not 
informed by single and consistent narratives. In Feldman's view, MacIntyre 
cannot withstand the criticism of relati vism, because each stage of 
practice/narrati ve/tradition is open to different internal standards among 
which individuals have to decide, and so these stages cannot accord 
objectivity and rational ity to our moral life. 
In my view, Feldman errs in holding that the interna l goods of 
practices quite often depend on individual choices. Let us consider her own 
example of a tennis player who should decide which rule to abide by: 
Let us suppose I am playing tenni s. The ball is returned to 
me and hits very close to the li ne. I must now ca ll the ball 
" in" or "out". I am unsure how to call thi s ball; however, 
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since I must make a call so that the game can continue I 
must decide whether the ball hit the line or not. In other 
words, I must decide how to apply the rule to this given 
case (Feldman 1986, p.311). 
I disagree with Feldman's suggestion that how the individual should 
apply the rule is just up to him. The application of rules, like their 
definitions, is not an individualistic enterprise. Individuals learn the 
definition and the correct application of rules from others. In all practices 
and traditions there are authorities for the correct application of rules. In rare 
cases, when there is silence regarding the correct application of rules, the 
individual should decide how to apply the rule not qua an individual but qua 
an agent who acts according to the internal good of the practice, and 
chooses according to some established norms in the practice. For instance, 
in the above example, the agent is not free to call the ball in or out as he 
wishes or as his interests require. He learns to do so through hi s collective 
experience of how people normally behave in these circumstances. Of 
course, there remain places for disagreements in each practice and among 
different traditions regarding how we regulate our relationships or how to 
apply some rules; however, the extent of this disag:eement can be limited 
when our basic needs are at stake. Feldman's account of practice, in which 
she insists on individualistic and conflicting measures, is a modem liberal 
version different from Maclntyre's account. Maclntyre's definition of 
practices indicates that individual choices should be governed by standards 
of excellence and of the good (1981, p.190). 
The discussion so far has addressed the difference between 
Maclntyre ' s moral theory and moral relativism. I argued that MacIntyre can 
escape this charge, because both his earlier social and his later metaphysical 
approaches appeal to some criteria, the human telos or universal human 
qualities respectively. The notion of telos is wider than the notion of 
function which is defined in social contexts. If there is a context-
transcending notion of telos or essence and the good for human beings qua 
human beings, it will provide some independent measures for dismissing the 
charge of moral relativism. Maclntyre ' s account of practice is also different 
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from moral re lativism in that he sees a li st of necessary virtues fo r all 
genuine human cultures, but as was di scussed above, a problem for his view 
is that he thinks this account is compatible wi th the existence of different 
codes and criteria for these virtues; a claim that I argued should be qualified 
to draw a clearer line between hi s account and mora l relativism. In the next 
section , I will compare Maclntyre's theory of truth , or its constitution thesis 
element, with cognitive relativism. 
IV.3.1.2 Maclntyre's View as Distinct from Cognitive Relativism 
After di scussing Maclntyre ' s case against moral relativism, in this 
section I will compare hi s CT with cognitive relativism. By cogn itive 
relativism, I mean the view that measures of truth and rationality are 
context-dependent. According to cognitive relativism, MacIntyre (I 988a, 
p.364) holds that, since standards of rationali ty and truth are context-
dependent, a tradition 's claims to rationality and truth should always be 
sustained; in other words, because there is no transcending perspecti ve from 
which to evaluate the tradition 's standards of rationali ty and truth, its claim 
to rationality and truth is not thought to be challenged.28 
Though Maclntyre's CT surely has some relativi stic connotati ons, as it 
emphas izes the dependence of measures of rationality on traditions, he 
believes thi s notion is distinct from relati vism. In an interview, MacIn tyre 
(1994a, p.46) states this anti-relativistic attitude as fo llows: " I don't think 
that cultural difference has the last word, for I am, after all , an Ari stotelian. 
But I do think that cultural diffe rence ought to have the first word." He also 
holds that we can recognize and respect a variety of views without being 
moral relativists ( 1999c, p. 8). The fact that cultural differences are starting-
28 In passing, I thi nk Mac lntyre 's contention here that according to re lativ ism the truth-
claims of traditions are always valid and inviolable is flawed; because, it is possible for 
traditions at any stage of their life to change their own internal measures, such that what 
hitherto has been taken as true, turns out now to be false. In other words, I do not think that 
al l relativists hold that the claims of traditions are or shou ld always be valid based on their 
own standards. They could allow, in agreement with their relati vism, that their claims 
might be refuted, as a result of the replacement of the old measures by some new measures. 
In this case, the dependence of the new clai ms on the internal standards, whi ch is the 
relativist' claim, still persists. 
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points that can and should be grappled with in order to achieve truth 
indicates Macintyre's non-relativism. 
MacIntyre disputes the relativistic assumption that a tradition's truth-
claims remain valid, and argues that traditions' claims to truth and 
rationality indeed might be vitiated according to their own internal measures 
of truth and rationality. A tradition might discover its inadequacies on the 
basis of its own standards of truth and rationality (1988a, p.364). 
According to relativism, no standpoint can make truth-claims in the 
sense of corresponding to reality. In this view, truth-claims are only claims 
about the rational justification of beliefs according to the standards of a 
tradition. The claim to rational justification or to warranted assertibility 
cannot transcend the tradition in order to correspond with reality. MacIntyre 
(2006h, p.207) is against these minimal understandings of truth, and defends 
a substantial realist theory of truth which indicates the correspondence of 
true claims to reality. Accordingly, if MacIntyre can justify the distinction 
between truth and rationality, he would be able to refute cognitive relativism 
as this assimilates truth to warranted assertibility in conceptual schemes. 
This realist notion of truth had been criticized by M. Dummett as 
involving a conceptual leap from justifiability to truth for which there is no 
justification. The use of the predicate "truth", in Dummett's view (1990, 
p.14), "is deeply embedded in our implicit grasp of the use of our 
language", but this is not per se a defence of a realist notion of truth. 
Dummett (1990, pp.13-14) holds that "sophisticated linguistic operations, 
and, above all, the use of compound tenses and of conditional sentences ... 
demanded a tacit appeal to the conception of objective truth"; while, in fact, 
this realist sense of truth does not hold, and it is a product of our linguistic 
operations to assume such a realist relation. 
MacIntyre (2006c, p.55) is opposed to this reductionist approach. One 
reason which MacIntyre offers for a realist notion of truth is that the 
partisans of competing views who have intractable disputes over a practical 
issue due to their incompatible internal standards of rational justification do 
not present their arguments as being only valid in their own conceptual 
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scheme; each of them, rather, considers his own view true and rationally 
superior to its riva ls (2006c, p.60). Each of them considers the compatible 
theories as being related and as being about one single subject-matter; and 
of course, each of these partisans takes his own theory as the true one; 
otherwise, if the partisans took their views as only va lid in their own 
framework, these views did not conflict with each other, and so any 
poss ibility of refutation would di sappear, except on internal grounds. 
MacIntyre (2006c, pp.62-63) al so to justify his view rega rding the 
di stinction between truth/justification takes sides with Peter Geach by 
holding that assertions have truth-value; the thesis that Geach then calls the 
Frege point. To clarify thi s point, I shall draw upon J. Haldane 's 
explanation. In Haldane 's account (1999, p.165), the point in summary is 
that assertion , which is a logical category distinct from assertiveness as a 
psychological category, by its nature aim s at truth. There is a conceptual 
link between assertion and truth such that to assert p is to hold that p is true. 
Asserting it is ra ining means that one is claiming the truth of the proposition 
"it is raining". From this perspective, premises in a syllogism in order to 
have a logical connection with each other shou ld be truth-assessable; in 
other words, propositions should have truth-va lue. 
In my view, this linguistic approach is not suffi cient to defend a reali st 
theory of truth. This approach, at best, points to our natural and li nguistic 
incl ination to have a rea list theory of truth, which as Dummett ( 1990, pp.13-
14) pointed out above, might be the result of our complex linguisti c needs, 
and it does not guarantee that we can arri ve at objective truths in our 
enquiries, parti cularly in our moral enquiri es which are fraught with va lue-
judgments. In other words, this lingui stic point does not per se justi fy the 
poss ibility of having a reali st theory of truth, and it onl y shows our tendency 
to claim truth in the sense of correspondence with rea li ty. 
MacIntyre in order to ill ustrate the distinction between the notions of 
truth and rational justification compares their relation to the relation 
between physical objects and sense-data, and between pain and the bodily 
expressions of pa in. A phys ica l object cannot be reduced to its relevant 
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sense-data, and it cannot be constructed out of its sense-data; the same is 
true for pain and bodily expressions of pain; the latter in each case 
presupposes the former; as MacIntyre puts it: 
Bodily expressions of pain have to be already understood in 
terms of pain, if they are to be understood as expressions of 
pain and not as something else, and not vice versa, and 
sense-data equally have to be already understood in terms 
of physical objects and not vice versa. So too justifiability 
has to be already understood in terms of truth and not vice 
versa. There is no conceptual gap waiting to be crossed 
(2006c, p.65). 
Rational justifications as well as the idealization of rational 
justifications, MacIntyre (2006c, p.58) holds, are conducted and assessed in 
systematic enquiries in different traditions. We can, however, evaluate these 
different systematic enquiries when the truth about the subject-matter of 
these enquires is at stake; when the truth is achieved, "the relevant set of 
rational justification has served its purpose" (2006c, p.58). 
Based on this, I think R. Stern (1994, p.151) makes a mistake by 
comparing MacIntyre to L. Laudan in that both emphasize the internal 
evaluation of rationality and conceptual changes. _ Stem has interpreted 
Macintyre's method for inter-cultural and inter-traditional evaluation 
exclusively on the basis of the efficacy of a theory in puzzle-solving and has 
not explained Maclntyre 's appeal to a realistic theory of truth according to 
which truth lies in knowing how things are in reality independent of 
particular perspectives. 
In Maclntyre's view (2006h, p.207), it is meaningless to ask a 
proponent of a minimalist theory of truth, like that of warranted assertibility, 
who asserts that p, whether "indeed things are really as they are described in 
p"; because it does not make sense for a relativist to speak of indeed and 
really which conveys a kind of independence from traditions. MacIntyre is 
against the reduction of the notion of truth to a minimal notion such as 
warranted assertibility which does not go beyond justification, or to a 
redundant notion as is the case in redundancy and disquotational theories of 
truth according to which the predicate "is true" does not add anything to a 
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proposition which contains an assertion (2006f, p.147). However, as was 
explai ned in the foregoing chapter, we should note that MacIntyre is not 
claiming that truth-claims do not need to be justified, or that there is no 
re lation between the two. On the contrary, in hi s view, any claim to truth is 
accompanied with a claim regarding its rational justifiability. The holder of 
a true claim is committed to believing that his claim is justified, or in my 
terms, at least justifiable, and that the counter-arguments against it are not 
sound arguments, due to some false premises or invalid inferences. In other 
words, a true theory or a true account should be the most adequate account 
of an object, and the truth-holder should be able to justify thi s adequacy by 
measures that are not just internal to that perspective (2006c, p.5 5);29 
MacIntyre also states the same point a good deal earlier: 
... the question of the truth or fa lsity of the belief studied is 
to some degree independent of the question of rationality ; 
but, although this distinction must not be ignored, truth and 
rationality are both conceptually and empirically related. 
For to advance reasons is always to advance reasons for 
holding that a belief is true or false; and rational procedures 
are in fact those which yield us the only truths of which we 
can be assured. Thus, to recognize a belief as rationally held 
is to lay oneself open to at least the possibility of its truth 
( 1971 a, p.249) 
The discussion so far shows that MacIntyre intends to di stinguish hi s 
theory of truth from relativism. The question which remains is whether he 
can truly justify the possibility of thi s di stinction, in order to be immune to 
cognitive re lativism. 
I di scussed in the second chapter the ro le of trad itions in consti tuting 
practical rationalities ; if thi s is the case, how is it possible to give priority to 
a particular version of practical rationality over other versions in terms of its 
29We should note that MacIntyre, contrary to perspectivism, believes that we can know the 
thing as it is independent of our perspective. The rational justification that leads to a true 
account should be open to challenges from outside the tradition. This shows that indeed 
rational justification should not be internal to just a tradit ion, as it has to deal wi th different 
objections and accounts from a variety of traditions. I f this is the case, Macfntyre's 
emphasis that " Rational moral enquiry then is always conducted from within 
someone['s]particular moral standpoint" would be problematic ( 1999c, p.7). Dialogue with 
others might make a view transcend single perspectives. 
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truth-claims? Or, how is it possible to appeal to a correspondence theory of 
truth on occasions where there are disputes among traditions? Which 
tradition can claim truth on these occasions? This question becomes more 
pressing when we are theorizing about moral issues which are heavily 
affected by value-judgments, and in which we do not have a direct access to 
reality to check the truth. 
Maclntyre's main notion invoked here, which can be used to address 
these challenges, is the notion of "epistemological crisis", to be explained 
below; but suffice here to mention that, in Maclntyre 's view (1988a, 
pp.361-363), when a tradition faces an epistemological crisis by its own 
standards, it might find resources in other traditions which resolve the crisis 
better than does the tradition itself. This means that in this situation the alien 
tradition is rationally superior to the first tradition according to the first 
tradition's own internal measures. In line with this, Maclntyre 's main 
argument against relativism is that it is possible for any tradition to face an 
epistemological crisis according to its own measures, and to overcome the 
crisis using others' resources (1988a, p.364); which shows we can compare 
traditions with each other to refute relativism. 
That and how, in Maclntyre's view, rational theorizing depends on 
traditions was discussed in chapter 2. The main point related to this issue is 
that rationality is always measured by some standards that might vary from 
tradition to tradition. The main task for MacIntyre in his theory of truth is to 
justify how this tradition-relevant rationality can allow a correspondence 
theory of truth with non-relativistic and non-perspectivistic features. Due to 
the importance of the notion of epistemological crisis (hereafter EC) in 
Maclntyre's argument against relativism, I devote the next section to this 
issue, and then continue the discussion of Maclntyre's distinction from 
cognitive relativism. 
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fV.3.1.2.1 EC as an Occasion and Method for Inter-traditional 
Intellectual Exchanges 
MacIntyre (2006a, p.3) has explained the notion of EC by giving an 
analogy. He depicts a situation in which an employee thin.ks that he is really 
va lued by his employer, but contrary to his expectation, the employer 
suddenly fires him. The employee in this case faces an EC, because for him 
the relation between seems/is has been ca ll ed into question. The employee 
used to think that he was satisfying the employer, wh ich later on turns out 
not to be the case. In the same manner, ordinary people encounter 
epistemological problems, like the problems of other minds, j ustification 
and induction, which consist in the question about how we can transcend 
our mental personal knowledge to know about others or the world, or how 
we can generalize the results of our limited observations. 
There are at least two issues involved in the different kinds of EC as 
understood by MacIntyre. The first is that the crisis-theory/tradition 
discovers a defect in its own cognitive or explanatory capacities. It faces a 
situation which it cannot consistently make intelligible, and which it cannot 
understand or justify using its own cogni tive and explanatory resources. 
The second is that this state might be recognized according to the internal 
standards of the tradition or the theory. Indeed, what is crucial about an EC 
is that it is identified by the very standards of the tradition or the theory in 
which the EC occurs . If the tradition/theory adheres to its own hitherto val id 
measures, it will fall into an inconsistency over a situation that it cannot 
handle. For instance, the discovery of a new truth might render a narrative 
unintelligible (2006a, pp.3-5). However, the mere occurrence of some 
counter-evidence cannot simply falsify a theory or make a narrative or 
tradition unintelligible. Theories or traditions usuall y, as MacIntyre (1988a, 
p.355) has argued, resi st an EC by provid ing some new interpretations of 
their own positions or of the counter-evidence to accommodate them within 
the existing frameworks; or they simpl y try to bracket and neglect the 
inconsistencies; however, the theory/tradition might reach a critica l stage at 
which it can no longer handle the challenges with its own resources. At thi s 
stage, the theory/tradition might invent some new methods and resources to 
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make itself coherent and intelligible from within itself, but again the crisis 
might be so devastating that it leaves no possibility for the theory/tradition 
to contain the crisis based on its new resources; accordingly, it is possible 
for the "tradition-constituted" enquiry that by its own standards of truth and 
progress, its hitherto valid methods and resources become barren (1988a, 
pp.361-362), and this is the procedure that MacIntyre uses to distinguish his 
theory from relativism. 
The barren tradition has no resort but to look to the resources of other 
or even rival traditions. 30 If the barren tradition finds appropriate resources 
in other traditions, it should admit by its own standards that the rival 
tradition is better equipped and so rationally superior than it itself to resolve 
the EC ( 1988a p.365). The rival tradition in this way exposes the 
inadequacies of the crisis-tradition, and so reveals that the beliefs of this 
tradition, which were hit by crisis, do not correspond with reality: 
What the explanation afforded from within the alien 
tradition will have disclosed is a lack of correspondence 
between the dominant beliefs of their own tradition and the 
reality disclosed by the most successful explanation and it 
may well be the only successful explanation which they 
have been able to discover. Hence the claim to truth for 
what have hitherto been their own beliefs has oeen defeated 
(1988a, p.365). 
That MacIntyre, as the quote above indicates, derives the falsity of an 
inadequate theory/tradition from its inadequacy to withstand 
epistemological crisis points to (I) his appeal to Aquinas' notion of 
adequacy in his theory of truth, which here applies to a theory (1988a, 
30 A question that comes to my mind in passing is that why we should limit the occasions on 
which traditions learn or should learn from each others to these critical situations. The way 
in which Macintyre presents the issue suggests that traditions pursue their paths based on 
their own standards until they face an epistemological crisis. By contrast, I think traditions 
have contact with each other in their ordinary lives when they have not yet faced crises. In 
fact, it is difficult to imagine traditions to conduct their enquiries in a pure environment in 
which they only employ their own standards of rationality. 
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p. 356)3', and (2) the conceptual connection that he draws between the two 
notions of rationa lity and truth, that is, the lack of rational justifica tion for a 
truth-claim shows that thi s claim cannot be held anymore. 
The application of the idea of EC explained above requires that the 
cri sis-agent be able to understand the conceptual resources of a ri val 
tradition as they are understood by its exponents , and to apply these 
resources to its own cri sis-tradition (2006a, pp.8-9); however, this 
interaction, in Maclntyre ' s view, should occur in the context of the cri sis-
tradition to count as an intelligible and rational way of solving the EC 
(2006a, pp.8-9). Tn other words, the tradition should recognize its crisis and 
the so lution offered by the rival tradition according to its own standards of 
truth and rationality; but thi s depends on an earli er stage invo lving a 
charitable understanding of the rival traditi on. 11,e point is that the cri sis-
tradition should understand the other tradition in the ri val 's own terms by 
learning their language as "a second first language", as will be explained 
later in the present chapter, applying the resources of that tradition to itself 
based on its own internal measures. 
As an example of th is, MacIntyre (1991 b, p. 11 7) argues that the 
Aristote lian tradition needs to access the history of Confuciani sm written 
from a Confucian point of view, and vice versa. This indicates that the 
understanding of other traditions should be by the others ' own measures, but 
the application of these resources, their assessment and effi cacy in so lving 
an EC should be judged internally. 
As the di scussion above suggests, Macln tyre's view of rationality 
allows a rational relation and exchange between riva l traditions. There seem 
to be, in Maclntyre's view, no impenetrab le barri ers in the way of mutual 
understandings of developing traditions (1988a, p.3 58). Tt is poss ible at 
some point fo r a developing tradition to recognize that some of its issues are 
being discussed in other tradi tions, and so the possibi lity of agreement and 
31 I note here again that this point, i.e. the fal sity of an inadequate theory, a lth ough it might 
be someth ing that we can infer from Aquinas, is a very straightforward issue which does 
not need the perplex ity of Aquinas ' thought. 
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disagreement among them develops. In my terms, though traditions might 
have some incompatible measures of rationality and the like, they still are 
able to have a second-order understanding of each other, which means they 
can understand what they are arguing about; they understand the claims of 
other traditions in their own terms, even if the claims are formed from a 
rival perspective. In other words, the fact that the advocates of a tradition 
differ substantially from others does not mean that they are cognitively 
unable to understand their claims charitably from the rival ' s perspective. 
This issue is relevant to my discussion in chapter 2 of the distinction 
between normative and ontological transcendence by an agent. The agent in 
order to have a true understanding of others' claims, which is an 
understanding faithful to their own intentions and the meaning they give to 
their own concepts, does not need to abstract himself ontologically from his 
formed identity; it will suffice for him to have the capacity to detach himself 
normatively from his beliefs in order to have a charitable knowledge of 
others. This is why I claimed in chapter 2 that the conceptual and 
ontological interpretation of traditions might lead us to a misunderstanding 
of MacIntyre by interpreting him in a conservative manner; while his theory 
has reformist, and indeed, revolutionary aspects. 
A new tradition that might resolve an EC, in Maclntyre' s view (1988a, 
p.362), should meet three conditions. The first is that the new and the 
conceptually richer scheme should provide systematic and coherent answers 
to the insoluble questions of the first tradition. The second is that the new 
scheme must be able to explain what has been wrong with the former 
scheme, which has rendered it sterile or incoherent or both. The third is that 
the new concepts and structures added to the fonner scheme must show 
some "fundamental continuity" with the defining shared beliefs of the crisis-
tradition to preserve its integrity: 
It is perhaps in the capacity to recognize the poverties and 
defects of one 's own culture and to move, so far as is 
possible, towards remedying it, without in the process 
discarding that culture in its integrity, that the greatness of a 
social and cultural order is shown (2006b, p.50). 
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The new theses that resolve an EC are either adopted from a new 
tradition or are the products of " imaginative conceptual innovation" from 
within the crisis-tradition itself. In Maclntyre's view ( 1988a, p.362), these 
new theses are not derivable from the older theses which have not been 
capable of resolving the crisis. The emphasis on "imaginative conceptual 
innovation" again suggests that, in Maclntyre's view, individuals are not 
firmly constituted by their traditions. They can use other traditions' 
resources, or exercise imaginative conceptual innovation, provided that they 
are not trapped in a closed society governed by an ideology like that of 
Stalinism which attempts to delimit " the stock of concepts" that are 
available to them ( 1962, p.60). Accordingly, Maclntyre's CT is not too 
thick to prevent this inter-traditional understanding. As argued above, 
MacIntyre here demands that inter-traditional exchanges be conducted in 
continuity with the measures and the foundations of a crisis-tradition; a 
condition that refers to the CT in the methodological sense which was 
explained in chapter 2 (1988a, p.362). 
The examples of conceptual innovation mentioned by MacIntyre 
include a new interpretation of the notion of the Trinity in the fourth 
century, which ended the controversies over the issue at that time, and 
Aquinas' attempts to reconcile the Aristotelian and Augustinian traditions 
(I 988a, p.362). 
A key element in traditions' mutual relations and understandings is 
learn ing the language of ri va l traditions. MacIntyre (1988a, p.364) 
maintains that the people in crisis-traditions should learn the languages of 
alien but richer traditions as a second first language. By this, MacIntyre 
means the person should become as a child again to learn the new language 
and the new culture. The new language should not be learn t through 
sentence by sentence translation. A chi ld does not learn its language in this 
way, as it does not have any prior language to match the new language with. 
Individuals by living in a different cu lture fo r a long time can transform 
themselves, to the extent that is possible, into native inhabitants. If it is not 
poss ible to live in certain other cu ltures as they no longer ex ist, people can 
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immerse themselves in texts left by them to become as far as possible 
"almost, if not quite surrogate participants" in these societies. The new 
language should be learnt as a second first language or not at all. The people 
who are so participating in the new culture, or are immersed in its texts, 
come to understand which sentences of the two languages are not 
translatable into each other (1988a, p.374). 
Maclntyre's insistence that the enquirer should become as a child in 
order to learn an alien language as his second first language has misled A. J. 
Roque (1991) to argue for its impossibility. Roque (1991, p.614) asks how it 
is possible for an adult to "acquire the linguistic fluency of a native" : 
Once initiated into a tradition by/in learning a language (and 
vice versa), how can an adult become a child again, 
particularly in light of Maclntyre ' s insistence that (1) a 
tradition cannot be adopted or discarded as a change of 
clothing and (2) that pre-conceptual interests do not operate 
in sustained forms in independence of theory-informed 
presuppositions (Roque I 99 I, 6 I 5-6 I 6)? 
In my view, Roque has not grasped well MacTntyre 's notion of 
becoming as a child for the purpose of understanding an alien language. 
MacIntyre by this notion has a metaphorical sense- in mind. Becoming a 
child is a metaphor for MacIntyre to show that the empathetic translation 
from an alien tradition should not be by way of sentence-to-sentence and 
literal translation. The language learner should immerse himself in the new 
tradition to learn the cultural and the belief background of its words and 
expressions, and to realize what is or is not expressible in the new language 
given its background. The agent in having and exerting this capacity does 
not need to actually return to his childhood; all that is needed is a 
sympathetic understanding of alien beliefs. 
With regard to Roque ' s reference to Maclntyre 's idea that "a tradition 
cannot be adopted or discarded as a change of clothing" cited above, I 
would argue that the empathetic understanding of others is different from 
adopting or discarding their positions. MacIntyre himself (1988a, pp.367-
368) has disputed the perspectivistic interpretation of adopting positions as 
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clothes-changing. MacIntyre has brought to our attention that "genuinely to 
adopt the standpoint of a tradition thereby commits one to its view of what 
is true and fa lse and, in so commi tting one, prohibits one from adopting any 
rival standpoint" (1988a, p.387); however, in my view, the commitment to a 
particular standpoint does not make the agent incapable of understanding 
what it means to believe and li ve in other traditions, as MacIntyre argues to 
be necessary regarding the Aristotelian-Confucianism relationship ( 199 I b, 
p.11 7). Though the agent might not be able to apply those alien concepts 
consistently to hi s own tradition, he is able to understand the belief-system 
of the alien tradition as it is understood by them. 
Roque expects MacIntyre to prove thi s capacity fo r human beings, and 
not only to assert it, as being consistent with hi s CT. What g ives thi s 
asserti ve, rather than argumentative, sense to Maclntyre 's idea here is that 
he has expressed his ideas through metaphors that sometimes are 
misleading. Maclntyre 's view here needs some metaphys ical support. One 
way of providing this metaphys ical support is by invoking the Thomisti c 
account of the soul/intellect as an abstract enti ty that is not totally tied to a 
materia l body or to a social setting; an explanation which at least the later 
MacIntyre would be sympathetic to . 
The immateriality of the soul/intellect and its uni versa lizing activity, 
which were di scussed in chapters 2 and 332, gives it the power to di stance 
itself from contingent situations in which it has been operating. This feature 
allows the soul/intellect to have a second-order understanding of itself and 
others. By a second-order understanding, I mean the soul/intel lect is able to 
consider its own or others' thoughts from a higher perspective in order to 
see what it means to think in thi s or another way from the others ' 
perspectives. 
32 As I explained in chapter 3, for Aquinas the intell ect only formall y becomes equal to the 
object. This, as will be explained further in this chapter, supports the notion of the 
immateriality of the intellect, which means the intellect always sustains its distance from its 
objects. My point here is that MacIntyre, consistently with his Thomism, cannot think 
other.vise on this issue. 
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This capacity of abstraction is acquired by the soul/intellect in a 
process of gradual practice and apprenticeship, and so has some moral 
aspects. As was argued in chapter 3, MacIntyre (2006j, p.78) holds moral 
enquirers should possess moral and intellectual asceticism in order to be 
immune to influences which debar them from the truth. This requires an 
enquirer to enter into rational dialogue with opposing views and not to 
assume from the outset that he is in the right; as MacIntyre puts it, "It may 
be that we are in the right or it may be that those who hold the opposing 
view are in the right or it may be that neither of us is . We have therefore to 
resort to enquiry as to what the truth about these matters is, in company with 
those others who hold opposing views" (2006j, p.76). Although any rational 
moral enquiry is conducted from within a standpoint, its proponents can 
enter into a constructive conversation with their rivals and find shared 
standards if they incorporate the ethics of enquiry into their own perspective 
( 1999c, p. 7). 
Such an enquirer is able to adhere to his beliefs and conceptual scheme 
in an alien context, and to feel "to some degree at home" there (1988a, 
p.395); nevertheless, he can and is morally required to assume a 
transcendental perspective relative to his own and to-the alien viewpoint to 
understand what it means to believe in the new way. For instance, a theist 
whose personal character and way of enquiry are informed by theistic values 
is still able to look at the world through the eyes of an atheist to see what the 
world is like from that perspective. This does not mean that he should 
commit itself to two incompatible values and norms. As MacIntyre ( 1988a, 
p.370) has pointed out, the fact that rival traditions can see each other as 
rivals indicates that they can understand each other to some significant 
degree. This approach to inter-traditional exchange does not commit 
MacIntyre to neutrality, as is claimed by Roque (1991 , p.616). The 
individual who seeks to understand an alien tradition can temporarily put 
aside his own perspective to assume new values and norms. The new 
measures are not neutral, so the agent in adopting new measures is not 
neutral. The agent in this state is informed by different kinds of values, for 
instance, the value of coming to understand other people fairly in their own 
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terms, or as MacIntyre (2006b, p. 74) puts it " the virtues of objectivity", or 
the virtues of enqui ry (1999c, p.7); accordingly, the agent is not neutral at 
this stage either; of course the agent should be neutral temporaril y with 
regard to the truth of hi s views and of the opposing views while he still 
holds on to his views in a first-order perspecti ve. MacIntyre cites Aquinas in 
support of the idea that, by looking from other perspectives, individuals can 
overcome their own one-sidedness (2006j , p. 73). 
To explain this another way, human beings have multi-layered 
personali ties some of which might be consti tuted in traditions; however, 
along with the constitution of these layers, they deve lop meta-layers from 
which they can understand what it means to think from other perspectives. 1t 
is poss ible to explain thi s capacity in evolutionary tenns as a condition of 
survival and competence. It is also possible to explain it in light of Aquinas ' 
metaphysics of knowledge as being based on the immateriality of the 
intellect, as MacIntyre has also used thi s idea which will be explai ned later 
in this chapter in my discussion of perspectivism. 
A culture or tradition when it encounters another culture or tradition 
might be able to recognize the superiority of the other tradition according to 
its own standards. An illuminating example here given by MacIntyre is a 
culture that lacks an advanced colour-vocabulary when it faces another 
culture with a greater vocabulary and a wider range of colour di stinctions. 
The first culture by its own standards, which are embodied in its practice of 
painting, comes to learn the superiority of the second culture with respect to 
colour di stinction. Though colour-vocabularies might vary from culture to 
culture, this does not lead to relati vism regarding colours and the world, 
because some cultures might prove to have more developed vocabulari es 
and colour di stinctions as a result of their invo lvement in practices of 
painting; as MacIntyre puts the point, "what type of color vocabulary 
pa inters need and the range of uses to which they put that vocabulary 
depends in part upon the tasks specific to different periods of painting" 
(2006b, p.48). The inhabitants of a culture with a limited stock of colour-
vocabulary through their re lation to other cultures might come to rea li ze that 
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the practice of painting in those cultures offers a more adequate colour-
vocabulary and more colour distinctions than does their own conceptual 
scheme, and thus it is more adequate to "the realities of colour disclosed by 
the practice of painting" (2006b, p.50). A culture in which blue and green 
count as one single colour-category, due to the fact that its inhabitants had 
not felt the need to distinguish between them according to their current stage 
of the practice of painting, might come to know that it can better describe 
reality using these two colours as distinct ones. After explaining 
Maclntyre's notion of EC as a way that he has taken to show his own 
di stinction from relativism, in what fo llows I shall put forth some criticisms 
of him on this issue, and then J fina lly evaluate his response to relativism. In 
sum, Maclntyre 's point here was that, contrary to relativism, a tradition 
might be refuted, and acknowledge the rationality superiority of a rival 
based on its own standards, and this is what, in his view, di spels the charge 
of relativism. 
IV.3.1.2.2 Some Criticisms of MacIntyre on His Stance toward 
Relativism 
Several critics have pointed out that there is an inconsistency in 
Maclntyre's account of rationality in traditions and between traditions. H. 
Putnam (1995, p.268), J. C. Isaac (1989, p.667), R. J. Wallace (I 989, 
p.337), T. Mosteller (2006, p.70), on simi lar grounds, have argued that 
MacIntyre cannot make his view that traditions can rationally defeat each 
other consistent with his CT, and so cannot overcome relativism. Let us 
consider their arguments. 
Putnam (1995, p.267) contends that Maclntyre's view of rationali ty is 
like that of Kuhn with regard to paradigm-change in science; however, 
Putnam holds that MacIntyre has left out one important element of Kuhn 's 
enterpri se which is experiment associated with the idea of fallibi li sm. In 
Putnam ' s account (1995, p.267), Maclntyre's methodology is "deeply 
flawed" as it is bereft of this fa ll ibilism. As a result, Maclntyre's 
methodology is closely related to what C. S. Peirce rejects, which is the 
method of "What Is Agreeable to Reason", as not being fall ibi li stic and 
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experimental like the methodology of the sciences; I quote Putnam (1995, 
pp.267-268): 
To judge ideas simply on the basis of their ability to reso lve 
diffi culti es without putting them under strain , without 
testing them, without trying to fal sify them is to proceed 
prescientifically. Peirce would agree with MacIntyre that 
rational decision between paradigms requires reflection and 
discussion. More than any scientific philosopher of his 
time, Peirce stressed that scientific method is not just a 
matter of experimentation , but experimentation and testing 
remain crucial in the formation of rational beliefs about 
matters of fact. 
I think Putnam's criticism of MacIntyre on the infallibility of hi s 
account is mistaken, and it is not based on an adequate attention to 
Maclntyre 's works. MacIntyre has emphas ized on different occasions the 
fa llibilist ic feature of his theory of truth. I discussed in the preceding 
chapter Maclntyre 's attempt to read a Peircean/Popperi an fa llibili sm into 
Aquinas' theory of truth based on the notion of adequacy of the intellect. 
Suffice it here to recall that for MacIntyre (2006c, p.59) a necessary 
condition for any perspective that claims rational superiority or truth for its 
theories is to hold them open to fa lsification and intellectual challenges. 
Accord ingly, it is not fair to claim that Maclntyre's theory of truth does not 
feature fa llibilism. 
Another objection to Putnam ' s view here is that Macln tyre's account 
of rationality and truth is mainly in the field of morality, and not in the fi eld 
of the natural sciences. If thi s is the case, a question arises regarding how 
we can apply experiments and tests to moral theories. The kind of 
experiments that are applicable to moral theories includes fall ible reasoni ng 
upon which MacIntyre has laid much emphasis. The onus is upon Putnam to 
explain how the notion of experiment as it app lies to natura l sc ience can 
work in morality. 
While the idea of experiment might not fit morali ty, we can in thi s field 
appea l to a notion of experi ence. This might find app li cation to mora li ty 
along the lines of the vulnerability approach which I wi ll introduce in the 
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final chapter. Based on this approach, we can observe the practical results of 
the application of a moral theory with regard to the people who are affected 
by it. We can see whether the application of a theory makes its subjects 
better off or not, and whether the provision of some goods enhances their 
normal and desirable functioning. This, however, requires us to consider 
long-term results, which might be different from a direct experimental 
observation. Accordingly, the kind of falsification that is found in the 
natural sciences cannot be expected for moral theories. 
Putnam (1995, pp.268-269) also holds that MacIntyre, as a defender of 
the Golden Age, tends "to immunize institutionalized oppression from 
criticism". But if MacIntyre admits the possibility and the necessity of 
criticism as a way to move enquiries forward, and lays emphasis on "the 
virtues of objectivity" in order to save us from influences that might distract 
us from accepting our faults, this line of criticism would not work against 
him, either. 
Maclntyre ' s moral and political theory, in fact, has a democratic 
aspect, as it emphasizes the necessity of disagreement and conflict as 
conditions for enriching the common life of groups. He presents suppression 
as an evil, and welcomes the toleration of any point of view that is not 
disruptive to the possibility of "arriving at the kind of consensus necessary 
for effective shared decision-making" (2006p, pp.206-207). In other words, 
in Maclntyre's view, disagreement should be tolerated in as much as it does 
not produce the evil of disruption (2006p, p.206). This democratic aspect 
also appears when he defends the idea of "an educated public" which 
deliberates on the issues of general concern in public life, which in modem 
times has been deformed into professionalized intellectual groups and 
specialized publics which lack this function (1987a, p.25). 
MacIntyre (I 981, pp.194-195), in fact, by drawing a distinction 
between practices and institutions as places for respectively internal and 
external goods points to "the coTTUpting power of institutions" which tend to 
divert practices from their internal goods; the cooperative nature of practices 
and their care for the common good is vulnerable to the acquisitive nature of 
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institutions, and th is makes clear that fo r MacIntyre no institution is immune 
to criticism and correction , in part, by the virtues which are necessary fo r 
sustaining practices (T. Burns 201 I , pp.44-45). 
Putnam ( I 995, p.268) further puts forward another criticism which I 
think is more nuanced than the ones presented above, and is shared by other 
critics including those who were li sted above. The main point of the 
argument is that MacIntyre cannot make hi s account of rationality, as it 
app lies to the relation between traditions, cons istent with hi s view that 
rationa lity is internal to traditions, and that there are rationalities instead of 
rationality. The result of this inconsistency is, it is claimed, an entrenched 
relativism in Maclntyre's account; Putnam ( 1995, p.268) states the point as 
fo llows. 
MacIntyre insists that rationality (but not truth) is relati ve to 
one's paradigm. No historical or universalistic account of 
rationality can be given at a ll , he ins ists . And, he argues, 
rejecting claims to unrevisable possess ion of truth makes 
one a fa lli bilist. The charm of Maclntyre 's writing lies 
precisely in displaying how such a "postmodern" mind can 
come to such traditional conclusions! But I cannot accept 
this defense for two reasons. First, a lthough rationa li ty is 
relative and hi storica l (perhaps too relative and historical), 
in Maclntyre 's view, there is a fixed principle governing 
rational di scussion between paradigms, which allows one 
paradigm to sometimes "rationally defeat" another. It is in 
the app lication of thi s principle that MacIntyre is forced 
back upon what amounts to "What Is Agreeab le to 
[Maclntyre's] Reason". 
Before evaluating Putnam 's claim, it is worth quoting from the other 
critics li sted above, who have pointed to the all eged inconsistency 
mentioned above. 
MacIntyre is unclear about the status of his account. He 
consistently maintains that there is no such thing as 
rationality outside of constituted traditions. But it is clear 
that his theory of immanent criticism and encounter 
between traditions cannot be attributed to any of the 
traditions that he discusses. ln short, Maclntyre ' s theory of 
rationality would seem to contradict his own claim about 
the tradition-bound character of all rationalities (J. C. Isaac 
1989, p.667). 
174 
And even if such pluralism [ about the good] can be avoided 
within the context of a single tradition, it seems bound to 
arise again when competing traditions of enquiry come into 
contact with one another. Here, it seems, we cannot appeal 
to the notion of tradition without falling prey to a kind of 
relativism: if traditions are what guide enquiry about the 
good, then when competing traditions lead to different 
answers there would appear to be no context for resolving 
the disagreement, hence no possibility of a non-arbitrary 
decision between the competing answers (R. J. Wallace 
1989, p.337). 
There is an inconsistency faced by anyone who claims both 
that there is no neutrality between competing tradition-
bound knowledge claims, and that some particular 
perspective or tradition is better suited for enquiry than 
others, and that one can avoid relativism by giving an 
account (which is itself tradition dependent) of how 
traditions defeat one another, when that account may be 
rationally acceptable from within the tradition in which it is 
given, but not from within other traditions (T. Mosteller 
2006, p. 70). 
To evaluate these claims, it is possible to understand the inconsistency 
charge in two ways. Let me first recall Maclntyre' s claims regarding 
rationality within and between traditions. 
(I) Rationality is internal to traditions. 
(II) Traditions should hold themselves open to falsification, and indeed 
it is possible that they become refuted based on their own standards. 
(III) A tradition that helps another tradition overcome an EC is 
rationally superior to the crisis-tradition based on the internal standards of 
the crisis-tradition. 
(IV) As a result of establishing this rational superiority based on 
internal standards of rationality the charge of relativism is dispelled. 
Some critics seem to take (I) to be inconsistent with the rest of the 
statements including (II). Mosteller (2006, p.64), for instance, holds this and 
also interprets Putnam as so stating: 
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If someone from a tradition different from Maclntyre's who 
maintains - iii [the reverse of iii; (iii) here is the view that 
there can be rational defeat of one tradition by another] is 
confronted with Macintyre ' s claim that iii , then how is one 
to adjudicate between them? According to ii [(ii) here is the 
view that there is no neutra l and tradition-transcending 
measure of rationality], there can be no appeal to some 
standard that is neutral between both traditions. Item iii 
seems to be functioning as something which is neutral 
between traditions, but according to ii, there is no such 
thing, and thus MacIntyre is inconsistent in maintaining ii 
and iii. 
In response, I would argue that the point (i ii) in the quote above, which 
is almost equivalent to my point (III) mentioned above, is not a measure or 
standard of rationality; rather, it is a matter of reasonableness. This is a 
response in terms of which we can defend MacIntyre against the charge of 
inconsistency, which is also clear in his insistence on the virtues and ethics 
of enquiry which require us to listen to and learn from our rivals (1999c, 
p. 7). The explanation is that we should hold our views open to revision and 
falsification, even open to a falsification that originates from outside our 
tradition. This fa llibilistic attitude, however, is necessary for being 
reasonable not for being rational. A tradition that claims to be irrefutable 
might be rational but is not reasonable. Measures of rationality are those 
foundational notions that fonn the bases of our premises. As contrasted with 
this, reasonableness does not address foundations of our premi ses; rather, it 
concerns the way we hold our beliefs against others; for instance, whether 
we impose our beliefs on others, and take them as dogmas; or rather, we are 
happy to enter into discursive reasoning with others to expose the possible 
inadequacies of our views. 
J. Rawls ( 1993, p.53) also draws this di stinction between the notion of 
rationality and reasonableness. Rationality for Rawls means the effective 
pursuit of one ' s ends; while reasonableness means the readiness to li ve with 
others upon equal terms which are reciprocally justifiable. 
If we accept thi s di stinction between rationality and reasonableness, we 
will not expect MacIntyre to derive this principle of reasonableness from 
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within a tradition, even though he holds that measures of rationality are 
tradition-specific. Based on this, I think M. Baghramian's (2004, p.136) 
claim regarding the inconsistency between, on the one hand, the universal 
value that MacIntyre assigns to "dialectical reasoning, test of coherence, 
dialogue, debate and method of argumentation", and on the other hand, his 
CT, does not hold, because these values are not matters of rationality, but 
are matters of reasonableness which apply to any reasonable human 
tradition. In other words, no reasonable human tradition can deny the role of 
listening to other traditions, as this condition relates to the undeniable 
limitedness of any human tradition; however, the problem arises regarding 
how different traditions after listening to each other can substantially learn 
from each other if they have different accounts of rationality and different 
values. In other words, if they employ different and incommensurable 
premises as measures of rationality, how would they be able to learn from 
each other? 
In response, I would say we should not construe traditions as 
completely heterogeneous, and without any substantial agreement with each 
other. Although traditions might have disputes about controversial ethical 
views and about the human good and the best way of life, they might have a 
lot of agreements including about human basic needs. In the final chapter, I 
attempt to offer an account of morality that is based on basic human goods 
which apply to all human beings qua human beings. MacIntyre also does 
not deny the possibility of finding inter-traditional agreements; as he stated 
traditions by exercising the virtues of enquiry and entering into constructive 
conversation realize their shared values and agreements (1999c, p .7). 
Another way to explain the rationality/reasonableness distinction is by 
holding that reasonableness, which governs the relation between rational 
agents, is a second-order rationality. First-order rationality is based on the 
internal measures of rationality in a tradition. The first-order rationality of a 
Thomist is different from that of a utilitarian and that of a Confucian; as 
MacIntyre holds what count as good reasons for divorcing a wife differ 
between these three incommensurable perspectives (2006c, pp.52-53). 
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Measures of second-order rationality, by contrast, are not dependent on 
traditions, and MacIntyre has not made such a claim either, though he has 
not explicitly drawn this distinction. Traditions, in so far as they are 
traditions of human beings, should abide by some minimal principles 
regarding their relations to outsiders, one of which is to hold themselves 
open to criticisms by these outsiders , which might possibly complement or 
refute their tradition. 
MacIntyre has implicitly recognized the universality of measures of 
second-order rationality in his argument for the precepts of the natural law, 
which are valid for all human beings qua human beings. Recall his notions 
of "the virtues of objectivity" and "justice in conversation" which enjoin us 
to leave as ide the psychological interests and influences that might unduly 
impede us from admitting the truth of a rival view (I 999c, pp.6-7; 2006j , 
p.74). The willingness of a tradition to listen to other traditions is a 
condition of reasonableness which does not need to be derived from within 
the traditions. This condition sets some limits on traditions ' measures of 
rationality, such that a tradition whose standards of rationality do not let it 
communicate with others is unreasonable. 
To recall, I was arguing that some critics seem to see an inconsistency 
in Maclntyre's view between (I) and (II), that is, between taking rationality 
as being internal to a tradition, and the view that traditions should hold 
themselves open to revis ion and refutation. I argued that the latter is not 
basically a matter of rationality, so it does not conflict with the former. 
However, I think MacIntyre cannot dismiss the inconsistency between (I) 
and (III)/(IV) to which the cri ti cs li sted above have also pointed. In other 
words, though the principle of li stening to other traditions to enhance our 
views should not be expected to be derived from a tradition33 , the 
fruitfulness of thi s relation relies on the existence of some shared common 
standards between traditions. To put this more simply, the mere fact that a 
33Note that this does not deny that a tradition might promote this principle; however, my 
point is that this principle is an a priori principle which does not depend on the substance 
of traditions. 
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tradition is open to its rival or to different traditions does not guarantee that 
it can learn from them, unless there are some substantial shared measures 
binding for all traditions by appeal to which they can correct each other; 
without these shared measures, it is not possible to refute relativism. In 
other words, in so far as MacIntyre overemphasizes the internality of 
measures of rationality even in acknowledging the rational superiority of 
another tradition, he cannot decisively defeat the charge of relativism, 
because the main tenet of relativism is that there are no valid canons of 
rationality beyond the scope of particular frameworks. 
As was explained above in my discussion of EC, MacIntyre holds that 
epistemological crises might be known based on the crisis-tradition's own 
measures of rationality. But if MacIntyre does not go beyond internal 
measures of traditions, even when traditions discover their ECs, he cannot 
adequately dismiss the charge of cognitive relativism. 
The appeal to the idea of reasonableness, as was explained above, 
cannot work well without assuming some shared standards. Reasonableness 
is a tendency on the part of individuals and traditions, but its practicability 
requires the existence of substantial shared measures. In the final chapter, I 
will offer an argument for justifying some shared - measures for human 
beings qua rational beings. 
Another critic of MacIntyre on the issue of relativism is R. M. Hare. 
Hare (1989, p.114) interprets MacIntyre as holding that words, not only 
evaluative words but also words in science and even proper nouns, are 
culture-bound. Based on this, Hare (1989, p.114) ascribes the view to 
MacIntyre that inter-cultural communication and rational argument are not 
possible, and this leads to relativism, because, as a result of the lack of 
sufficient shared vocabulary and values it is not possible to rationally 
evaluate the truth of the claims formed in different cultures. The root of this 
relativistic conclusion, Hare (1989, p.J 17) holds, lies in Maclntyre 's 
descriptivist approach by which Hare almost means moral cognitivism, in 
the sense that moral statements have truth-value as they refer to moral facts. 
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To explain, Hare ( ! 989, p.11 7) divides evaluative words into the two 
groups of primary and secondary evaluative words. Examples of primary 
evaluative words include the words "wrong" or "ought" . The characteristic 
of these words is that all languages share them, and by means of them they 
can communicate with each other. As contrasted with this, secondary 
evaluative words such as the word "cruelty" have closer ti es to specific 
cultures and depend on the attitudes of the people in a different culture. For 
instance, in some cultures what we would take as bad treatment of animals 
might not count as cruelty; however, if their attitudes in this regard change, 
the use of this term will be extended in that culture to include bad treatment 
of animals. 
Since MacIntyre is a descriptivist, Hare ( ! 989, p.1 17) maintains, and if 
descriptivism were correct, then the word "wrong" would become a purely 
descriptive tenn, and it cannot then be used for communication, because it 
could not be univocal in different cultures. The problem for inter-cultural 
communication is that the meanings of eva luative words, in Maclntyre's 
view as understood by Hare ( 1989, pp.120- 121), are determined by the 
truth-conditions of the propositions in which the words are used. Having 
truth-conditions, in turn, requires conditions for the correct application of 
the descriptive express ions in them; as a result, all evaluative words become 
culture-bound which leads to relativism. The solution to this problem, fo r 
Hare ( I 989, p.128), is to insist on primary evaluative words such as 
wrongness which are not tied to cultures. 
Hare (1989, p.122) contends that the descriptive meaning of primary 
evaluati ve words is secondary to the evaluative meaning and by a change in 
attitude, for instance toward animals, this descriptive meaning is more li kely 
to give way; while the eva luative meaning remains unchanged. To put thi s 
more simply, prescriptive words do not get their meaning from truth-
conditions; therefore, they are not affected by Maclntyre ' s view that there 
are different culture-bound measures of rationality and truth; neither are 
these prescriptive words inc luded in Wittgenstein ' s insight that the 
application of language as a means of communication depends on 
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agreement not only in definition but also in judgments. In Hare ' s view 
(1989, p.127), this principle applies only to descriptive words which get 
their meanings from truth-conditions. 
Hare (1989, p.128) concludes that there is no need for Macintyre's 
pessimism regarding untranslatability and inter-cultural communication, 
because we can change our attitudes by rational arguments starting from 
more general evaluative words, i.e. primary evaluative words which cultures 
are more likely to share. As an example, the Sudanese and the American can 
reach agreement regarding the wrongness of the practice of female 
circumcision by forgetting the descriptive meanings of these words and 
emphasizing their shared notion of wrongness. If they become fully aware 
of the suffering caused by this practice and ask themselves if they are happy 
to universalize this suffering such that it includes themselves, they 
recognize the wrongness of this practice. lf they do not have the word 
"wrong", they can learn it, which then leads them to admit the wrongness of 
some of their previous mores and customs. Accordingly, by the distinction 
between descriptive/prescriptive and the use of prescriptive resources many 
moral disputes can be resolved (Hare 1989, pp.129-130). 
To assess Hare's criticism of MacIntyre, firstly I would say that his 
interpretation is not based on an adequate reading ofMaclntyre 's works. His 
construal is essentially based on chapter 19 of Maclntyre's Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality? entitled "Tradition and Translation" in which MacIntyre 
maintains that language is tied to the constituting shared beliefs of a 
tradition, and that this may lead to untranslatability of that language into 
another language which lacks those beliefs (1988a, p.375). In this view, 
indeed the use of proper nouns carries with itself commitment to some 
beliefs without which these names would not be used or mean the same; as 
MacIntyre (1988a, p.377) puts it "their [the names of people] use 
presupposes commitment to a belief, such that were this belief discovered to 
be false, the name could not cont_inue to be used in the same way. " 
What MacIntyre concludes from this is not relativism but the difficulty 
of translation which even sometimes becomes impossible. As will be 
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discussed in my discussion of perspectivism later in this chapter, I assume 
MacIntyre here means that literal and word to word translation is sometimes 
impossible between incommensurable trad itions; but translation by 
interpretation and glosses is, in principle in Maclntyre 's view, always 
possible if translators pay sufficient attention to reconstruct the context of 
the language from which they want to translate: 
It seems clear that where we have sufficient textual and 
other materials from a culture which no longer ex ists, those 
with the requisite linguistic and histori ca l ski ll s can so 
immerse themselves that they can become almost, if not 
quite, surrogate participants in such societies as those of 
fifth-century Athens or twelfth century Iceland (I 988a, 
p.374). 
The view that agents can transcend their existing circumstances, and 
act as "surrogate participants" is a metaphysica l claim about the se lf, which 
points to the fact that the self is not fundamentally tied to its context, and it 
can take a higher perspective to evaluate that context and understand other 
contexts. This metaphys ical view is compatible with the metaphysics of 
Aquinas ' theory of knowledge according to which the intell ect in the 
knowledge-process becomes formally, and not materially, identical with the 
object. I will return to thi s issue in my di scuss ion of perspectivism in the 
present chapter. 
Another problem regarding Hare's view is that sharing some general 
evaluative words which he calls primary evaluative words like that of 
wrongness is not sufficient for having constructive inter-cultural 
communication. Communication is conducted on the bases of beliefs, 
statements and propositions, and not only words. We use words in our 
premises; so what matters in addition to the meanings of single words is the 
way we use the words in fo rming premises and the subjects of which we 
predicate these words. In other words, sharing the word "wrong" does not 
suffice for communication ; in addition to thi s, we should share judgments 
regarding what we take to be wrong, and this is context-specific. By this I 
do not mean that we cannot find some common subjects of wrongness 
among human beings; I seek here to say that the sheer insistence on primary 
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evaluative words does not necessarily conduce to rational communication, 
because these words have a referential character which is context-
dependent. Hare does not take into account Maclntyre's method for inter-
traditional communication based on the notion of EC outlined above. 
In another criticism, Habermas ( 1994, p. l 00) argues that MacIntyre is 
"entangled in precisely the relativism he tries to avoid by means of his 
learning theory." By learning theory, I think Habermas points to 
Maclntyre's theory of inter-traditional communication based on his notion 
of EC. Habermas offers three reasons for his claim. The first reason is that, 
in his view, Maclntyre 's model is too selective, by which he means all the 
traditions and the ethical systems MacIntyre has in mind are in the discourse 
of Western philosophy, "so they can learn from each other without 
compromising their identity" (Habermas 1994, p.100). I think this charge 
does not apply to MacIntyre; because if we consider 
Aristotelian/Thomistic/Scottish traditions, on the one hand, and the 
Enlightenment and liberal tradition, on the other hand, we can recognize the 
deep differences between their worldviews, even if they are geographically 
located in the West. The rational superiority of Thomism over these 
traditions, if vindicated by MacIntyre, endangers the- identity of the liberal 
tradition, due to their different and conflicting views of the good and the 
place they accord to the good. 
Habermas ' second reason is that Macintyre's "metatheoretical claims 
about stages of increasing reflexivity" either holds true for any tradition, in 
which case they have not developed from within the context of a particular 
research tradition, or only have local validity, which means MacIntyre is 
subject to relativism (Habermas 1994, p.100). It is not entirely clear what 
Habermas means here by the stages of increasing reflexivity; I assume he 
means the kind of awareness that people from different traditions can 
gradually acquire about their own and other traditions. If it is the case, in 
response I say that what MacIntyre has introduced is a procedure that can 
apply to all traditions. As was argued earlier regarding the distinction 
between rationality/reasonableness, the procedure of holding one's tradition 
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to be fallible is a matter of reasonableness, and not of rationality. On this 
basis, I reject the first part of Habennas' claim, because this procedure does 
not need to develop from within traditions; rather, it applies to traditions 
that reasonably take into account permanent inadequacies of all human 
beings' minds and theories. 
Habermas' third reason is that the recognition of the rational 
superiority of an alien tradition can be motivated " if the learning subject can 
compare the explanatory power of both traditions in relation to the same 
problems", which Habermas thinks is im possible, because the two traditions 
are incommensurable in the absence of "a zone of rational overlap" 
(Habermas 1994, p.101). My discuss ion of Macintyre 's view of 
incommensurability later in thi s chapter can serve as a response to this 
criticism. I will explain that in Maclntyre's view, it is possible to make 
attempts to change the relation between incomrnensurables using hi s theory 
of learning and translation, and his account of narrative thinking, which 
places different traditions of thought in a narrative to see which one can 
make the failure of the others intelligible, and so they become to some 
extent commensurable. MacIntyre has not denied the existence of some 
shared beliefs and positions among traditions either ( 1988a, p.350). 
Another criticism made by Habermas concerns the issue of " inflexible 
identity" or "split personality" in Macln tyre 's notion of learning an alien 
language as a second first language. In sum, Habennas' point runs as 
follows. Suppose there is a language speaker whose identity has been 
formed in the tradition and li fe-forms of his mother tongue, such that it 
remains unaltered by the acquisition of a second first language, as described 
by MacIntyre; in other words, he has an inflexible identi ty. In the process of 
learning the new language, when the two languages prove to be mutually 
impervious, the speaker has two alternatives: either converting to the 
rationally superior language, or acquiring a new identi ty that he cannot 
bring into relation with his first identi ty; in short, the speaker suffers a sp lit 
personality (Habennas 1994, p.103). 
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This criticism concerns the relation between the new and the old 
requirements upon an agent in a state of EC. One possible rejoinder on 
behalf of MacIntyre would be that Maclntyre ' s CT does not oblige him to 
take identities as inflexible, because it allows the agent to transcend his 
current situation to reflect on his obligations formed in his own tradition. 
The agent's identity is not a solid one, and the individual can look at his 
current identity from a higher perspective to compare it with other 
identities; if the individual derives gradually some elements from an alien 
source, he can make his identity consistent by offering some new 
interpretations of his older identity and tradition, or by discarding some 
parts of his identity. Individuals seldom have fully consistent identities, and 
they might endeavour ceaselessly to render their identities consistent 
through time. 
Another way to respond to Habermas is by appeal to Macintyre's view 
that the recognition of the EC and its solution occur on the basis of the 
crisis-tradition' s measures of rationality; we recall that one condition which 
MacIntyre mentioned for a successful solution of an EC is that the new 
tradition shows some "fundamental continuity" with the old tradition; so we 
can expect that the agents in this tradition do not face a split personality, due 
to the existence of this continuity between the old and new traditions 
(1988a, p.362). 
The other way to reply to Habermas is based on the vulnerability 
approach which I will defend in the final chapter. The explanation is that if 
we can justify that some norms apply to human beings qua human beings, 
then the acceptance of these norms, which are necessary for normal 
functioning of human beings, does not split the identity of individuals, as 
these norms and basic goods are in fact prerequisites for any functional 
personality. 
In another criticism, M. Colby (1995, p.55) has argued that 
Maclntyre's appeal to notions like "the best theory so far" , "epistemological 
crisis", and "puzzle-solving" cannot dispel the charge of relativism. The 
core of Colby's argument is that according to the CT, "there can be no 
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external reasons or meta-standards, methodically binding on all traditions"; 
the judgments about the existence of a crisis, provisional superiority or 
inferiority of traditions, and the resolution of crises become necessarily 
relative "to each tradition's own unique cognitive content and claims" 
(Colby 1995, p.55). In hi s view, without a "tradition-shared criterion of 
adequacy" for identifying an epistemological cris is, rival traditions accuse 
each other of fa iling to acknowledge the epistemological crises they face 
(Colby 1995, p.56). 
In Colby's view (1995, p.57), "no criteria of problem-solving and 
crisis-resolving effectiveness can be formulated across traditions if the CT 
relativises all standards, especially that of progressiveness"; in hi s view, the 
term "continuity" used by MacIntyre as a condition of the genuine so lution 
of epistemological crisis is formal and open to interpretive disputes. 
Colby (1995, p.71) also appeals to the Duhem-Quine thesis to maintain that 
the claims of traditions cannot be evaluated individually; even if some 
claims and elements of a tradition prove to be rationally superior, it does not 
establish that the whole tradition is rationally superior. 
In my view, Colby's attention to the context-based application of 
Maclntyre 's key expressions such as ep istemological crisis, adequacy etc., 
is insightful; however, I think his interpretation of the CT is excessive, as 
Colby takes this to mean that there are no shared measures among 
traditions. MacIntyre has not denied the possibi lity of the existence of some 
shared texts and beliefs among traditions, even though they are not 
sufficient to settle their di sputes ; as he puts it, " traditions which differ in the 
most radical way over certain subject matters may in respect of others share 
beliefs, images, and texts" (1988a, p.350). 
Furthermore, MacIntyre has insisted that the identification of a superior 
tradition occurs on the basis of a tradition's own standards, and thi s so lves 
the problem that Colby refers to, namely, that Maclntyre's method is not 
compatible with his CT, as every tradition assesses the superiority of a rival 
tradition by its own standards; nevertheless, as I have suggested earlier, a 
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full response to Colby and to the charge of relativism requires an appeal to 
some trans-traditional measures ofrationality. 
As J. Annas (1989, p.401) indicates, there is a move in Maclntyre's 
works from a strong thesis of CT, which she calls the "essential location" of 
ideas and the self, to a weaker claim which points to the necessity of 
"historical understanding" of ideas and theories. There is a difference 
between holding that ideas and theories have a history that should be 
understood as their context, which hints at the CT in the methodological 
sense, and holding that ideas and theories are essentially located in and 
locked into their context and are governed by exclusively internal standards. 
The former as distinct from the latter, does not have relativistic 
implications. 
J. A. Herdt (1998, p.535) shows more sympathy with MacIntyre, and 
maintains that there "seems" to be a contradiction in Maclntyre's thought 
when he introduced a universally valid and tradition-independent solution to 
the issue of inter-traditional relationships; however, in Herdt 's view, the 
appearance of the contradiction can be dismissed by holding that MacIntyre 
has appealed to standards that are universal, but not independent of 
traditions. In her view, MacIntyre has thus appealed lo some standards that 
are valid in all traditions: 
It is important to note, first, that although MacIntyre insists 
that traditions will have different such standards, he also 
indicates that they will always be standards of cogency and 
illumination. This implies a degree of universality, however 
minimal, among such standards (Herdt 1998, p.535). 
Herdt (1998, p.538), on such a basis, proposes a third alternative to the 
notions of tradition-dependence and tradition-independence, that is, the 
notion of tradition-transcendental. By this notion, Herdt (1998, p.538) 
means that MacIntyre in his discussion of different traditions "moves into 
thoroughly general terms, speaking of what is 'presupposed by' traditions of 
enquiry, and therefore of something that is, in a logical sense, situated 
before all such existing traditions ... [these general standards of justification] 
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are avai lable to traditions in the sense that they are already presupposed by 
them." 
She ( 1998, p.534) further di stinguishes between the valid ity of a notion 
and its ori ginal ity in a tradition. In her view, the fact that a notion has 
originated from/in a tradition does not mean that the notion is only valid in 
that tradition. For instance, the notion of empathetic imagination used by 
MacIntyre to explain inter-traditional communication is a libera l concept 
which sti ll is va lid for other traditions, and has application for them. To 
justify her interpretation of MacIntyre as having invoked tradition-
transcendent measures which in her view are different from tradition-
independent measures, Herdt ( 1998, p.538) refers to the following passage 
from MacIntyre: 
Notice that the grounds for an answer to relativism and 
perspectivism are to be found, not in any theory of 
rationality as yet explicitly articulated and advanced within 
one or more of the traditions with which we have been 
concerned, but rather with a theory embodied in and 
presupposed by their practices of enquiry, yet never fully 
spelled out (MacIntyre 1988a, p.354). 
She ( 1998, p.538) then concludes that MacIntyre, to di smiss the charge 
of relativism and perspectivism, has appealed to measures that are 
presupposed by all traditions of enquiry, and which therefore, in my terms, 
can provide valid measures for evaluating different traditions. A few points 
are worth mention ing about a ll this. 
( I) Herdt (1998, p.535) has admitted that these transcendent norms are 
formal; in her view, the notion of empathetic imagination is a forma l 
procedure; if that is so, how can formal measures sett le substantive di sputes 
between traditions? MacIntyre ( 1988a, p.350) has also pointed to some 
degree of logical similarities and even some substantia l agreements among 
traditions, but he is clear that these are not sufficient for terminating 
disagreements among them. Accordingly, the sheer existence of these 
forma l procedures cannot dispel the charge of relativ ism. 
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(2) My second point is with regard to Macintyre's passage quoted 
above. MacIntyre in his more serious criticism ofperspectivism, which will 
be explai ned below in my discussion of perspectivism, has gone beyond the 
approach suggested in the quote that bases a theory of rationality on grounds 
embodied in and practiced by all traditions; instead, MacIntyre has based his 
substantial criticism of relativism and perspectivism on his account of 
Thomism. I will discuss later how MacIntyre has used the non-nominalistic 
metaphysics of Aquinas to distance himself from perspectivism. This 
metaphysics is not shared by rival traditions. As a result, MacIntyre in his 
response to relativism and perspectivism does not completely move in the 
direction suggested by Herdt, that is, by appealing to measures of rationality 
that are presupposed by all traditions. 
(3) I am sympathetic with Herdt's general approach which is based on 
measures presupposed by all traditions; however, I think these measures 
need to be extended to include substantial shared measures in order to 
di smiss the charge of relativism. MacIntyre should acknowledge that our 
shared beliefs are in fact rich enough to form the basis of moral agreements. 
I will pursue this direction in the fina l chapter to show how different 
traditions can build a shared threshold of morality. 
C. S. Lutz (2004, p.67) has fo llowed M. Krausz's (1984) distinction 
between relativism and relativity to defend MacIntyre aga inst the charge of 
relativism. In this view, relativism means truth is relative to a conceptual 
framework, and relativity implies that cultural entities are to be understood 
in the cultural setting in which they appear; relativity in their view does not 
entai l relativism. Lutz (2004, p.67) holds that MacIntyre has appealed to the 
notion of relativity, and not to relativism. He refers to Maclntyre's view that 
"while the rationality of judgments concerning human excellence remains 
relative to culture, the truth about human excellence does not" (Lutz 2004, 
p.67). 
The di stinction between relativity/relativism seems to parallel the 
distinction between essential location and historical understanding made by 
Annas discussed above. However, in my view, we should note that both 
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notions of relativism and relativity, and not only the notion of relati vity, 
appear in Maclntyre 's thought. The notion of relativity appears in 
Maclntyre 's (1988a, p.22) emphasis on the ro le of narratives and traditions 
in making our actions inte lligible. The notion of relativism comes to the fore 
in Macin tyre 's (1988a, p.9) emphasis that there are different notions of 
rationality in different traditions of enquiry. The latter idea has strong 
relativistic overtones if MacIntyre adheres to a strong reading of it, and does 
not admi t the existence of any shared measures of rationality. 
A "relatively" good way of understanding Maclntyre 's attitude to 
rationality and truth, and his stance toward relativism is by the distinction 
that is drawn by T. D. D ' Andrea between the particularism of procedures 
and the universa lity of outcomes. D ' Andrea is more sympathetic with 
Maclntyre's response to relativism, and believes that interpretations to the 
contrary are due to "a not entirely careful reading of things he [MacIntyre] 
has said" (D ' Andrea 2006, p.403). In his view, the particularism of 
MacIntyre, which some critics like Haldane and George have pointed to as 
having re lativistic implications, is "a parti culari sm of procedure, not of 
outcome" (D ' Andrea 2006, p.403). By particularism, I assume D ' Andrea 
points to Maclntyre 's CT, namely, the view that there are no universa l and 
neutral measures of rationali ty . As was argued above, in Maclntyre's view, 
traditions, while they have their own rationalities, are not closed entiti es, 
and they can and should learn from each other. This implies the very 
di stinction made by D ' Andrea between the particularism of procedures and 
outcomes according to which whi le a tradition has its own particul ar 
procedures, its outcomes might be va lid fo r other traditions; however, it 
needs to be expla ined why and how the particularism of procedures does not 
lead to particularism of outcomes. D 'Andrea does not explain this 
di stinction and its possibi lity adequately; a distinction which, in my view, is 
question-begging. In fact, the main issue of relativism concerns how 
particular measures and methods can result in a universa li stic content. This 
idea is at the heart of Maclntyre 's universa li sm and particularism regarding 
truth and rationality respectively. 
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The procedures and methods of enquiry act as spotlights that di ffuse 
light on some area at the expense of leaving other areas dark. However, as 
the world is independent of our minds and our methods of enquiry, it will 
expose the inadequacies of these minds and methods from time to time. 
Rationality and reasonableness require of us to complement these methods 
by holding them corrigible even on the bases of rival resources that we can 
use consistently with our trad itions' resources. This analysis is what 
MacIntyre has presented by the notion of EC (1988a, pp.36 1-363). 
Regarding D ' Andrea ' s distinction between procedures and outcomes, 
we should note that it is possible for an EC to befa ll procedures and 
methods of enquiry, in addition to the resources of traditions. Accordingly, 
we cannot expect a particularistic method to always take us to a conclusion 
that is universally valid. The reali st theory of truth enjoins enquirers to hold 
their methods and procedures fa llible, because reality is independent of 
these methods, and some of its aspects might prove uncaptured by these 
methods. In other words, the particular procedures of a given tradition do 
not necessarily arrive at truth, though the proponents of the tradition take 
the result of their enquiries as universally valid. 
A question ari ses here regarding how to evaluate a tradition 's 
procedures. In order to refute relativism, we should find a way in which the 
internal measures and procedures of traditions can be evaluated externally. 
It does not suffice to hold that each tradition using its own procedures will 
arrive at universal outcomes; we should find a way of assess ing both what 
traditions take as universally valid, and their internal measures and 
procedures. This can be done to some extent by appealing to some minimal 
shared measures that apply to all human traditions, as will be di scussed in 
the final chapter. Accordingly, the di stinction between procedures and 
contents in terms of their particularism and universalism does not always 
hold, and we cannot in this way support MacIntyre against relativism; 
rather, we need some measures to assess both contents and procedures. 
In this section, I di scussed the critics of MacIntyre who level the 
charge of relativism against him in tenns of the consistency between his CT 
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and hi s realist theory of truth; there is also another kind of criticism that 
emphasizes the incompatibility of Maclntyre's CT with hi s Thomism. In 
this literature sometimes relativism is referred to as particularism, both of 
which here convey that all measures of rationality and justice are defined in 
particular traditions. 
IV.3.1.2.3Some Criticisms of MacIntyre on the Consistency of His 
Particularism with Thomism 
In the previous chapter, I pointed to some criticisms of MacIntyre on 
the incompatibility between his particularism and his appea l to Aquinas' 
thought which is universalistic in nature. I need to recall those arguments in 
more detail here as they are relevant to the issue of relati vism. 
I there put forth J. Coleman's criticism (1994, p.8 1) that Aquinas' 
account of knowledge is inconsistent with hi storicism, "a definition [for 
Aristotle and Aquinas] is not culture bound nor is it temporal. Both names 
and definitions which grasp the essence of a subject have no temporality." 
Based on this view, Coleman (1994, pp.81-82) concludes that MacIntyre 
cannot be a Thomist, because he holds that we cannot be initiated into a 
practice without accepting the best standards in the history of that tradition; 
a view that "places definition in the hands of cultures with conventional 
codes of self-expression"; while definitions for Aristotle and Aquinas are 
universal and timeless. 
I also explained R. P. George ' s view (I 989, p.593) that Mac!ntyre's 
particularism regarding practical rationality and justice is not compatible 
with Thomism and Aquinas' thought, because in Aquinas' view there are 
some evident truths accessible to a ll competent human beings despite their 
different heritages. George (I 989, p.593), furthermore, argues that 
Maclntyre's final assertion that he is after a true account of justice and 
rationality, which is a Thomistic account, is at odds with hi s initial emphasis 
that there are different versions of these notions based on different 
traditions, and that these notions are not comparable neutrally. He (I 989, 
pp.601-602) then advises MacIntyre to weaken his mora l particularism to 
remedy this inconsistency, and finally admits that MacIntyre has made a 
192 
powerful case against the strong form of relativism by appealing to the 
notion of EC, but that this does not serve to respond to a weaker form of 
relativism which, however, is not defined by George. By the strong form of 
re lativism, George (1989, p.602) has in mind a relativism that holds all 
traditions will necessari ly be vindicated on their own terms; a view which 
MacIntyre rejects. Tn response to this line of criticism, I there argued that if 
MacIntyre did not admit any sort of universality regarding human beings ' 
nature and practical rationality, he could not make his CT consistent with 
Thomism, because, otherwise, his CT would be relativistic which is 
incompatible with Thomism. But as his CT, in part, means a gradualist 
approach from particulars to universals, he is immune to this charge. 
It is true that for Aristotle and Aquinas real definitions include 
essential features of things, which are culture-independent; however, thi s 
universalism is compatible with a gradualist approach according to which 
we do not have access to perfect knowledge at the beginning of our 
enquiries, and that we should dialectically approximate to that perfect 
knowledge; as MacIntyre holds in line with his weak interpretation of the 
veracity of the intellect explained in chapter 3: 
Both Aristotle and Aquinas recognize a distinc tion between 
those timeless truths about natural kinds, essential 
properties and the teleological ordering of things and 
persons in terms of which all true and justified explanation 
and understanding has to be framed and the varyingly 
adequate attempts to formulate those truths which marked 
the history of enquiry (1994b, p.300). [Ttalics added] 
The passage above indicates that particularism for MacIntyre, which is 
associated with his CT in the methodological sense and might have some 
relativistic implications, means a gradual and dialectical progress toward 
universally valid definitions and notions. Different theories facing EC can 
check the relative adequacy of each other, and investigate how they can 
obtain accounts of things that are closer to how they are in reality. 
The kind of charge that takes Aquinas' thought as incompatible with 
particularism does not take into account the distinction in Aquinas' work 
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(ST, I, Q.2, Art. I) between two senses of self-evidence. As was explained in 
the previous chapter, for Aquinas, any first principle is self-evident in two 
senses; it is self-evident in itself if the predicate is included in the subject, 
whether we know this or not. The same first principle might or might not be 
self-evident in " relation to us" depending on whether we know sufficiently 
the subject/predicate to admit the fact that the predicate is present in the 
subject. For instance, the existence of God is per se self-evident, but it may 
not be evident to us. The self-evidence of the latter kind of principles needs 
some kind of development on our part through argumentation. This view 
supports a gradualist and dialectical interpretation of Aquinas' s theory of 
knowledge; accordingly, the kind of universali sm ascribed to Aquinas by 
George is dubious. 
I argued in the previous chapter that despite Aquinas' epistemic 
optimism, there remains room for errors and dialectical corrections in the 
knowledge-process; in fact, we often should use nominal definitions which 
are based on accidentals, instead of real definitions which are based on our 
knowledge of essences. 
In Aquinas ' view, perfect knowledge is possessed by angels, who do 
not need " to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth 
simply and without mental di scussion ... " (ST, I, Q. 79, Art.8); accordingly, 
a kind of gradualism is seen in Aquinas ' theory of knowledge, despite his 
partia l optimism and theological convictions which might give him some 
sense of epistemic absolutism . This interpretation would propel Maclntyre ' s 
CT in its methodological sense in the direction of a dialectical and 
graduali st understanding in both theoretical and practica l issues, which is 
immune to the charge of relati vism; but it needs to be improved by 
explicitly accepting the existence of some shared substantial measures of 
rationality. 
M. Kuna (2005, pp.268-269), as opposed to the charges mentioned 
above, argues, in line with my responses, that Maclntyre 's moral 
particulari sm is consistent with Thomism's universalisti c truth-claims. Hi s 
main argument to thi s effect is based on Mac ln tyre' s Thomisti c view of first 
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principles as sketched above, according to which there are two kinds of first 
principles: (I) epistemological which are accessible · to all, and (2) 
substantial which are accessible to those in a particular field. In Macintyre's 
view, discussed earlier, we start from substantial first principles without 
knowing their justification; we use dialectics to reach the point where we 
can claim necessary truths about these substantial principles some of which 
might be universally valid. Kuna (2005, p.271), based on this view, 
concludes that "the particularity of our standpoint does not imply that we 
cannot arrive, via dialectical argument, at conclusions which are necessarily 
and universally true." He takes this position as being related to Macintyre ' s 
metaphysical and teleological approach to truth the absence of which has 
rendered contemporary anti-metaphysical philosophies unintelligible. 
Kuna 's point, in sum, here is that we start from particularistic starting-
points, but that is possible for them later to tum into universally valid 
claims. 
IV.3.1.2.4A Final Evaluation of Maclntyre's Distinction from 
Relativism 
My evaluation of Maclntyre 's arguments against relativism and the 
criticisms argued above in this section is that some· parts of Maclntyre's 
works, in particular chapters I and 18- 20 in Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality?, tend to prevent MacIntyre from getting around the charge of 
relativism. In these chapters, MacIntyre emphasizes the intemality of 
rationality to social orders and traditions. MacIntyre succeeds in outlining 
the communicative relation between traditions; but as he insists that this 
communication and the removal of EC are judged on the basis of traditions ' 
internal measures of rationality he falls back into the trap ofrelativism. This 
is despite his intentions, and is incompatible with the tenor of his thought 
including his Aristotelianism and Thomism. 
To remove this inadequacy, in my view, the best option for him would 
be to revise these parts of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? along the 
lines of his earlier book After Virtue. To explain, MacIntyre contended in 
After Virtue that "the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a way that 
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restores intelligib ili ty and rationality to our moral and socia l atti tudes and 
commitments" (198 1, p.259). This indicates that for MacIntyre the 
Aristotelian tradition provides a rationality that is more adequate and 
superior to the rationality of the liberal tradition, as was explained in chapter 
I ; however, it would be a mistake to expect the liberal tradition to 
acknowledge this superiority according to its own standards of rationality, 
because there are in some respects fundamental disagreements between the 
two, for instance, with regard to the place of the good in the public sphere. 
The liberal state is based on the ideal of neutrality between different goods, 
in so far as they do not threaten public order; while the Aristotelian polis is 
expected to honour the virtues and the good life (1990b, p.346). Therefore, 
while MacIntyre (I 995, p.xxix) maintains that rationalities are related to 
and, indeed, are aspects of practices and of li ves in traditions, he does not 
mean by this that the rationalities of different traditions are equally good 
and adequate such that it is not possible to judge one particular tradition 
embodying a more adequate account of rationality than that of others. 
In chapter I, I distinguished moral traditions from Maclntyre's 
perspective into the two groups of traditions in a genera l and an idea l sense. 
I explained idea l traditions from Maclntyre's perspective as those traditions 
that are progressive and rest on widespread agreements about the virtues 
and the good. The social structures in thi s idea l sense support a life that 
honours and promotes the virtues and the good; as MacIntyre puts the poin t, 
" [Aristotle and Aquinas] argued that it was only within a particular type of 
political and social order that rationally adequate practica l and moral 
concepts could be socia ll y embodied" (2006d, p.111 ). 
Thi s passage clearly stands contrary to relati vism of any sort. A 
question might ari se here regarding what MacIntyre means by the notion of 
rationality that is provided in some traditions and social orders better than in 
others. In chapter 1, I claimed that the idea l rationality fo r Macintyre in 
ethics is the ideal of objectivity as against the notion of subjectivity, and a 
narrative account of the inte ll igibility of actions. This objectiv ity is provided 
best, in Maclntyre's view, in Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions, and 
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basically, to some degree, in any tradition that possesses shared accounts of 
a human being's nature and its good. These shared grounds confer 
objectivity to moral judgments, which is denied to moral judgments in an 
emotivistic culture, as was discussed in chapter 1 (1981, p.52).34 The ideal 
intelligibility also depends on having the notion of a final good or final end 
in order for agents to be able to make their moral actions intelligible to 
themselves and to others in the course of a narrative unity and a single life 
(1981, p.217). 
In Maclntyre's account, "moral agency thus does seem to require a 
particular kind of social setting" (1999b, p.317). The appropriate social 
setting is one in which the moral agency of agents as individuals is not 
reduced to fulfilling the requirements of their social roles; rather, they as 
human beings have moral responsibilities based on the notion of the 
common good. This view is required by the natural law tradition according 
to which all human beings should acknowledge the morality of the precepts 
of the natural law, and any social order that educates its inhabitants to 
ignore them is flawed. 
The preceding remarks suffice to show that Macintyre ' s view of 
tradition and rationality is a nonnative one which sides with Aristotelianism 
and Thomism. In light of this, he needs to revise his emphasis that a crisis-
tradition by its own standards of rationality admits the rational superiority of 
a rival tradition. He should explicitly allow that a tradition might indeed 
come to know that its standards of rationality are defective; in other words, 
the scope of the EC should be extended in order to possibly reach the very 
standards of rationality in a crisis-tradition. Insisting that an EC is admitted 
and overcome by internal measures of a tradition leaves MacIntyre caught 
up in relativism. 
In fairness to MacIntyre, he acknowledges the possibility of putting the 
internal standards of practices into question: 
34 I, however, will argue in chapter 6 that these notions of objectivity and intelligibil ity are 
not required for the rationality and intelligibility of actions, and so Maclntyre ' s claim about 
the superiority of Aristotelianism and Thomism on these grounds would lapse. 
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Practices of course, as I have just noticed, have a hi story: 
games, sciences and arts all have hi stories. Thus the 
standards are not themselves immune from criticism, but 
nonetheless we cannot be initiated into a practice without 
accepting the authority of the best standards reali zed so far 
(1981,p.190). 
However, he needs to place more emphasis on the possibility and, in 
fact, necessity of evaluating standards in hi s arguments about inter-
traditional communication and exchange. By doing so, he would strengthen 
hi s case against the charge of relativism. The fact that we can question the 
internal standards of practices requires the existence of some foundational 
norms that are valid independent of different conceptual schemes. Without 
these norms we cannot avoid relativism, even if traditions improve their 
own internal measures. These foundat ional norms might be formal or 
substantial. Formal norms include the norms of consistency and productivity 
of theories and conceptual schemes. 
MacIntyre (1988a, p.351) indicates the formal rules of logic are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions of rationali ty. They can serve as 
minimal conditions which all conceptual schemes should observe. Over and 
above thi s, I am arguing that we need al so to have some substantial 
foundationa l norms independent of al I conceptual schemes in order to refute 
relativism more substantiall y than we do based on purely formal nonns. By 
substanti ality here I mean the norms or statements that are not va lid as a 
matter of analyticity, but by referring to some facts about the world 
inc luding hwnan nature. The truth and necess ity of the law of non-
contradiction or that of basic mathematical rules are by definition, not 
referring to the world. But the proposition that human beings have rights 
which should be satisfied in different cultures is a substanti al claim. 
These shared substantia l norms derive their position from objective 
facts about human nature, whi ch are the same across cultures. As J. Annas 
(2005 , p.17) indicates, from an Aristotelian perspective, human nature 
constrains our rationality and our ability to choose different ways of life. ln 
her view, human nature is not plastic and able to take any shape people 
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wish; for instance, it would be difficult for a human being to live under 
social conditions that deprive him of his basic rights which are necessary for 
his normal and appropriate functioning. 
Indeed, MacIntyre appeals to some substantial foundational values as 
the precepts of the natural law tradition. The primary precepts of the natural 
law, for instance, the wrongness of theft, enjoin some norms upon all human 
beings irrespective of their existing social orders (1988a, p.180-184). In 
fact, Macintyre ' s view that some social settings threaten moral agency 
implies that he has substantial convictions about the human good in 
Aristotelian and Thomistic senses. By making these convictions more 
explicit, he can reject the charge of relativism. The main point is that though 
different traditions and practices have different rationalities , some traditions 
can yield better accounts of rationality in terms of objectivity and 
intelligibility. 
In chapter 2, T argued that Nussbaum has misinterpreted Maclntyre' s 
virtue-ethics as being relativistic. Here I again refer to Nussbaum, where she 
states "there is a striking divergence between Aristotle and contemporary 
virtue theory", on the grounds that for the latter, including MacTntyre ' s 
virtue-theory, "the return to the virtues is connectea with a turn towards 
relativism" (Nussbaum 1988, p.33). As opposed to this interpretation, I 
think that in much the same way as Aristotle uses his ethical essentialism 
and his view regarding facts about human nature to criticize existing social 
settings (Annas 2005 , p.17), MacIntyre also employs his account of the 
virtues as a critical and corrective tool for the current modem social orders. 
In chapter 2, I explained Maclntyre ' s revolutionary account which is not 
compatible with moral or cognitive relativism. A revolutionary has an ideal 
model in terms of which he assesses existing states of affairs. 
MacIntyre, therefore, should explain his particularism in such a way 
that it does not have relativistic connotations; as he explains his 
particularism: 
Without those moral particularities to begin from there 
would never be anywhere to begin; but it is in moving 
forward from such particularity that the search for the good, 
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for the universa l, consists. Yet particularity can never be 
simply left behind or obl iterated. The notion of escapin g 
from it into a rea lm of entirely un iversa l max ims which 
belong to man as such, whether in its eighteenth-century 
Kantian form or in the presentation of some modem 
analytica l moral philosophies, is an illusion and an illusion 
with painfu l consequences ( I 98 1, p.221) 
To think that it is not possible to escape moral particu larism, an idea 
which is clear in the above passage from MacIntyre, runs contrary to hi s 
natural law tradition. MacIntyre (1988a, pp .1 80-1 84) holds that, in a 
Thomistic view, the pri mary precepts of the natura l law such as the 
wrongness of theft are true for all human beings. This shows that there are 
at least some universal moral principles . However, one way to make sense 
of Maclntyre's c laim regarding the unavoidabil ity of particulari sm is by 
paying attention to hi s Aristote lian and Thom istic notion of phronesis as a 
judgmenta l capacity that is not rule-governed and is acquired by practical 
education. This practica l judgment targets the most relevant goods which 
are at stake in each particular situation, the knowledge of which is not 
captured by uni versal moral rules . Accordingly, although the precepts of the 
natural law are un iversa l, and in fact, are presuppositions of theoretical and 
practi cal enquiries, they might be qualified if the good that is at stake in a 
situation requires it, and thi s again gives a particulari stic aspect to 
Maclntyre's moral theory, because the knowledge of these processes is not 
rule-governed, as was explained in chapter two regardi ng Macln tyre's 
virtue-ethics. Nevertheless, we should note that this particularism does not 
enta il relati vism, and MacIntyre should clarify thi s, because the breach of 
the primary precepts of the natural law, for instance, saving a life by te ll ing 
a lie, tracks the good of saving an innocent li fe , and so fo llows a logic that is 
trans-cultura lly valid, though there remain many occasions on which we 
cannot reach agreement. Having and fo llowing a logic means that the 
adequacy of this logic can be assessed by rational arguments between 
different peoples and traditions; an idea which runs counter to relativism. 
The logic that backs particu lari stic judgments turns the judgment in some 
cases to a universa l claim; for instance, the fact that saving an innocent li fe 
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outweighs telling a lie can be justified due to the importance of a human 
being's life, and this judgment would not depend on a particular culture. 
Therefore, we see that the particularism that MacIntyre favours is not a 
particularism entangled in a given tradition, which results in relativism or a 
non-ruled and arbitrary particularism. Particularistic judgments, if they 
follow some goods that can be universally argued for, are open to rational 
assessment which might lead to some inter-traditional and universal 
agreements. In sum, this notion of rule-based particularism should be made 
distinct from relativism. 
Regarding George 's point mentioned above that MacIntyre should 
weaken his notion of CT, I would say that this notion is already a thin one; 
otherwise, it would be incompatible with Maclntyre 's advocacy of 
Aristotelianism and Thomism . For MacIntyre cultural differences that point 
to particularism are not the last word ( 1994a, p.46), which means it is 
possible to tackle the kind of cultural and moral pluralism we encounter. 
If we interpret Maclntyre's notion of CT as a gradualist move from 
particular positions toward more universal ones, or as a rule-based 
particularism outlined above, it will not conflict with Aristotle ' s and 
Aquinas' thought, as it will not have relativistic connotations. We should, 
however, bear in mind that this gradual move and its assessment require the 
acceptance of some shared measures of rationality which are not restricted 
to a single tradition. MacIntyre, as will be explained in the next chapter, 
believes that the Thomistic tradition has proved more adequate than the 
other traditions he has investigated. This position is not compatible with 
interpreting MacIntyre as advocating historicism in the sense of there being 
different incommensurable norms and measures of rationality in different 
periods and traditions. 
To sum up this section, Maclntyre ' s moral theory is immune to moral 
relativism, as he favours a way of life that honours the virtues and the good. 
However, he needs to revise some parts of his Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? along the lines of his earlier book After Virtue to make this 
point clearer. With regard to cognitive relativism, Maclntyre' s intention and 
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the tenor of his thought are anti-relativistic, as he has proposed a method for 
determining the rational superiority of a tradition over others based on the 
idea of EC. Two problems arise here fo r MacIntyre against his intention. 
The first is the rhetori c of his constitution thesis that borders misleadingly 
on relativism. This problem can be so lved along the lines I proposed in 
chapter 2, i. e. by changing its terminology to tradition-guided and directed 
rationality, or the like. The term constitution is too much demanding for 
Maclntyre's purposes. Beyond thi s terminological issue, he should 1) 
exp licitly acknowledge the uni versal validity of some nonns, which is, 
indeed, required by his espousal of the natural law tradition; 2) clarify if 
what he means by CT is nothing more than a gradualist move toward 
un iversal positions, or a rule-based particularism the logic of which, in at 
least some cases, can be subject of inter-traditional agreement. 
The second problem is the way he articulates his method for 
acknowledging the rational superiority of a rival tradition. His method is 
based on internal standards, and thus approaches internalism which should 
be avoided in order to defeat relativism. To so lve thi s problem, I suggested 
there should be some substantia l universal measures for all reasonable 
human traditions, in light of which inter-traditional exchanges can occur. 
After discussing the charge of relati vism against Maclntyre, I wi ll 
consider in the next section his case against perspectivism; a topic which is 
closely related to the issue of relativism. This di scussion is necessary as it 
might be implied by Maclntyre 's CT. 
IV.3.2 The Distinction from Perspectivism 
There is a subtle difference between relativism and perspectivism. The 
former denies the idea of truth as a kind of knowledge that corresponds with 
reality; the latter accepts the poss ibility of correspondence with real ity, but 
holds that any correspondence occurs from a particular perspective, such 
that the results obta ined from different perspectives are incommensurable. 
MacIntyre thinks that his CT and theory of truth is also different from 
perspectivism, as he thi nks truth means we can know the object as it is 
independent of the partia lities of any particular perspective. Truths obtai ns 
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when the mind is adequate to the object; i.e. when it is known in its 
wholeness and not as limited perspectives disclose it. As MacIntyre opposes 
perspectivism, this shows that his CT is not a thick notion that limits 
enquirers to their traditions or perspectives; rather, traditions, when they 
have developed to become traditions of enquiry, encourage people of 
different traditions to engage in discursive reasoning as a way to extend 
their own perspective and approach truth. Maclntyre's references to some 
virtues such as the virtue of objectivity, the virtues of enquiry, and justice in 
conversation all point to the moral necessity of leaving aside our partial 
points of view by learning from others (1999c, p.7). In line with this, 
MacIntyre holds that the Enlightenment' s idea of thinking for oneself 
should be distinguished from the idea of thinking by oneself. Reasoning for 
oneself would be achieved when the individual is not thinking by himself; 
by thinking with others, the reasoning of any particular person would be 
rescued from "the vagaries of passion and interest" (1987a, p.24). However, 
this moral outlook against perspectivism requires some metaphysical and 
ontological explanation regarding its possibility. 
Maclntyre's Thomism does not let him think that the individual is 
limited to his tradition, as the intellect for Aquinas. is an abstract entity 
which is not tied to its existing set of knowledge. As was explained in the 
preceding chapter, in Aquinas' view, the intellect receives the fonn of the 
object; but by this reception the intellect does not become the same as the 
material object of knowledge. Aquinas, in the wake of Aristotle ' s view in 
De Anima, explains the immateriality of the knowledge-process as follows . 
Wherefore it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio of 
materiality. And consequently things that are not receptive 
of forms save materially, have no power of knowledge 
whatever-such as plants, as the Philosopher says (De Anima 
ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing receives the fonn 
of the thing known, the more perfect is its knowledge (ST. I. 
Q.84. Art.2).35 
35 For a ful l discussion of the immateriality of knowledge in Aquinas 's view see: S. M. 
Cohen (1 982). 
203 
In Aquinas' view (ST, l. Q.85 Art.! ), truth consists in the confom1ity of 
the intellect and object; in this process the inte llect receives the form of the 
object, and becomes identical with the thing formally not materia lly. 
MacIntyre points to this Thomistic line of reasoning in his critici sm of 
perspectivism, for instance, when he writes "a mind thinking about a jug is 
not a jug" (2006h, p.201 ).36 
We can, given Maclntyre's espousal of Thomism, use Aquinas ' notion 
of the immateriali ty of the process of knowledge to provide a metaphysica l 
fo undation for the claim that the individual is not tied and limited to its own 
perspecti ve, since the soul/intellect is immateri al and capable of getti ng over 
its current perspective . 1n this view, the intellect remains an abstract enti ty, 
though it is embodied in a particular individual and socia l setting. 
When the truth is obtained, the intellect reaches the status of co-
fonna li ty with the object, in the sense that both the intellect and the object 
share the same form; however, the intellect as an abstract and active entity 
reta ins its cognitive superiority, which means it is capable of di sentangling 
itself from its current perspective to look at the obj ect from other 
viewpoints. The intellect, due to its immateriali ty, retains its transcendental 
stance, and can go beyond its particu lar perspective and if necessary use 
rival resources to resolve an EC; as Aquinas puts it: 
For although the human soul is a form united to the body, it 
is not embraced completely by the body as though 
immersed in it as other material forms are, but transcends 
the capacity of the whole of corporeal matter . sti ll the 
soul has an intellectual nature in virtue of that part whereby 
it transcends the capacity of the body" (Quaestiones 
Diaputatae De Anima 11). [Italics added] 
Aquinas' emphasis on the capacity of the soul to transcend the body, 
and that the forms received by it are not materia l can be very usefu l in 
understanding how the mind can go beyond a particular perspective, and 
36lt should be noted that Maclntyre ' s use of this reasoning is in the context of his argument 
for realism which, in his view, runs counter to perspectivism, as will be explained later in 
this chapter; however, I think we can use the same line of reasoning in thi s context about 
the immateriality of the intellect. 
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how it can be partially released to discard or revise its current commitments. 
These remarks indicate that MacIntyre in line with his ·Thomism cannot 
adhere to a strong interpretation of his CT. 
Besides the point above regarding the immateriality of the intellect, 
another feature of Aquinas' and Maclntyre's thought, i.e. ontological 
realism, is used by the latter against perspectivism. The impact of Aquinas 
on MacIntyre is very clear on this issue. According to Aquinas' realist 
ontology, the order of things and their features are independent of our 
apprehensions of them. The substantial features that we ascribe to things, if 
they are true, are theirs due to their inherent essences; while, for instance, 
according to nominalist pragmatism these features are the products of 
human beings ' minds, developed according to the practical use the things 
have for us. 
In W. James ' pragmatic account, for instance, language has a basic role 
in conceptualization. This view puts James in the nominalist group. As 
James puts it "experience merely as such does not come ticketed and 
labelled"; individuals mark regularity in their own experience with the help 
of language, but this does not mean that the regularity so experienced exists 
in reality (James 1907, lecture V; R. S. Prawat 2003, pp.284-285). 
In Aquinas' and MacIntyre' s view (2006g, p.190), by contrast to this 
pragmatic account, we can only properly apprehend things and classify 
them as a result of their own features by which they impact causally on us. 
In Aquinas ' account, MacIntyre (2006g, p.190) holds, things exist prior to 
and independently of our understanding of them; they are potentially objects 
of our perception; but they are already "actually whatever they must be in 
order to be perceptible and intelligible". According to this non-nominalistic 
view of MacIntyre, we do not make things intelligible by categorizing and 
conceptualizing them; rather, they are intelligible per se, and we can 
categorize them truly, because they have the properties that make them apt 
for getting categorized in a particular way. Our true knowledge is acquired 
through a causal relation between the object and the intellect; the object as it 
is affects the intellect: 
205 
A mind thinking about a jug is not a jug. And that this is so 
is crucia l to a second aspect of true judgment. When we 
take our assertions to be true, when we take it that their 
content is identical with how things are, we also take it that 
this is because our thoughts in the assertive mode have been 
made what they are by that same reality about which we are 
thinking. We presuppose, that is, that some causal 
relationship holds between our mind and the realities 
external to it about which we judge and that our thoughts 
are in this particular case determined to be what they are by 
those realities being as they are (2006h, p.201 ). 
We sometimes categorize things in our minds wrongly, due to our false 
categories and conceptual schemes which should be revised. By revis ing 
these categories and conceptual schemes, we move toward more adequate 
categories, and realize that the objects known thorough the new categories 
are the very realities apprehended earlier by less adequate categories, and 
that their existence and features are independent of our categories (2006g, 
p.190). 
In Macintyre's view (2006g, p.190), that the orders of things are 
independent of our choices, desires and will, and that these orders give 
meaning and significance to our choices and projects are at odds with 
contemporary pragmatism and nominalism. According to pragmatism, the 
orders of things and the categories which we use to structure our 
experiences are based on the kind of use that the things have for us. 
According to nominalism, the orders of things are defined and constructed 
by human beings ' minds. MacIntyre (2006g, p. 191) holds, pragmatism and 
nominalism complement each other, and support the idea that intelligibility 
is a "mental artefact" assigned to the things by the mind with in particular 
perspectives. This view, MacIntyre (2006g, p. 190) maintains, is not 
compatible with the realism of Aquinas. 
Maclntyre ' s view that objects are intelligible in the light of their own 
features and not in the light of our perspectives indicates how different his 
view is from the linguistic interpretation which was explai ned at the 
beginning of the chapter. The role of language for MacIntyre is not to render 
things intelligible; rather, it is to let us communicate on the basis of our 
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understandings of independent realities. If the world and its regularities are 
independent of our minds and perspectives, then this can pose a challenge to 
perspectivism, because the independent world is apt to reveal itself against 
partial perspectives, and to di sclose their limits. In other worlds, the world 
itself moves against perspectivism, because it is independent of our 
perspectives, and tends to disclose their limitations, and so it is not the case 
that what every perspective presents is true. The world, in other words, is 
not indifferent regarding existing perspectives. 
As my concern here is mainly with MacIntyre as a moral philosopher, I 
should also address the issue of perspectivism in the moral arena. 
Perspectivism in morality indicates that moral norms are incommensurably 
different from one perspective to another. However, in line with the realism 
outlined above, I would argue that if we hold that human nature, at least to 
some degree, remains the same across traditions, such that it requires some 
norms for its normal functioning, this would set some limits upon 
perspectivism in morality; because, we have at least some norms by means 
of which we can compare different moral perspectives, as will be discussed 
further in the final chapter. 
Maclntyre' s stance against perspectivism indicates that, in his view, we 
can tackle the issue of the incommensurability of different perspectives; 
otherwise, the charge of perspectivism persists; therefore, as a part of this 
discussion I should address Maclntyre 's account of incommensurabili ty. 
IV.3.2.1 Maclntyre's Account of Incommensurability 
In this section, I refer to three related aspects of Maclntyre's response 
to incommensurability, and attempt to explain and evaluate his response. 
The first aspect of Maclntyre's response addresses value-
incommensurability by appealing to a unifying notion of the good. This 
concept of the good, prevailing over other subordinate and 
incommensurable goods, provides a shared measure for their evaluation. 
This view of the good is related to Macintyre's interpretation of Aristotelian 
ethics according to which there is a unifying conception of the good and the 
virtues that applies to human beings as the members of a species; whil e 
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from the standpoint of modernity there is no uniquely rational way of 
ordering goods within the scheme of li fe (1981, p.1 84; 1988a, p.133). On 
such a basis, MacIntyre maintains ( 1988a, p.142) that Aristotle subordinates 
moral and political virtues to the contemplative activity of citizens, and this 
can dissolve mora l traged ies. 
The second aspect invokes using a third tradition or theory that is more 
comprehensive than two incommensurable theories or traditions, which can 
compare their merits and demerits. When the state of incommensurability 
holds between two theories, it is possible for a third theory to emerge, 
combining the two incommensurable theories, modifying their cla ims, 
tailoring them into a more comprehensive theory, that is, by collecting and 
improving their strengths. This is what happened, in Maclntyre's view, in 
Thomism 's amalgamation of Aristotel ianism and Augustinianism. This third 
theory, as is the case in the relation between Aristote lianism and Thomism, 
on the one hand, and Liberali sm, on the other, might be able to show the 
defects of what is thought to be incommensurable with it, and what has 
rendered them incommensurable (1990a, p.146). A more resourceful theory 
or tradition provides a narrative to explain the merits and defects of its ri val, 
making it at least partly commensurable. 
The third aspect ofMacintyre's response to incommensurability, which 
is also related to the second aspect mentioned above, invo lves a textual 
understanding and translation along with interpretations and glosses. This 
means that when two traditions which seem to be incommensurable face 
each other and do not have suffic ient lingu istic background to translate the 
cla ims of each other, they can adopt a translation method other than a 
sentence-to-sentence and literal trans lation. They can interpret each other's 
cla ims along with explanations and glosses in order to understand them as 
are understood in the riva l's own context; and this is what MacIntyre means 
by learning a language as a second first language; that is, a contextual 
learning ( I 988a, p.3 74). 
By learning an alien language as a second first language, we can 
understand the context in which the language finds its meaning, and then we 
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can understand which parts of the language are not translatable into our 
language; but this recognition of untranslatability and inaccessibility 
requires that we have understood those claims in the tradition's own tenns. 
We have acquired a bilingual capacity to understand the claims in their 
context and in the tradition's own terms. 
The results of translation from an alien language might be incompatible 
with the destination language's belief-system, but they need not be 
incommensurable; as MacIntyre ( 1985, p.11) puts it, "commensurability and 
incompatibility are not incompatible." This means that two theories or 
propositions might be incompatible, but incompatibility assumes their 
comparability and translatability into a third or into each other's language. If 
we could not compare two incompatible theories we cannot in the first place 
identify their incompatibility. 
MacIntyre (1988a, p.370) thinks appeals to linguistic innovation, 
explanations and glosses can furnish a tradition with new concepts and 
theories which are necessary to understanding an incommensurable theory, 
to rendering it commensurable, which allows people to compare the merits 
and demerits of the theories and their relation to each other. 
Epistemological crises are occasions on which rival traditions that 
embody incommensurable foundations and values can approach each other. 
This requires a contextual understanding of each other's claims in order to 
compare their merits and demerits. As MacIntyre in his comparison of 
modem morality and Aristotelian/Thomistic morality has done, it is possible 
to provide a narrative to compare prima facie incommensurable notions . 
This narrative explains the relation between these notions and what has 
made them incommensurable. For instance, according to MacIntyre, the 
absence of the notion of the human good in modem morality has led to the 
emergence of a new and fragmented moral scheme. 
In Maclntyre's view (1988a, p.370), if different traditions take each 
other as incompatible and rival, ii shows that they can understand each other 
to some significant degree. This understanding and representation of a rival 
view sometimes relies on historical transformations on the part of both 
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rivals, and on conceptual and linguistic innovations. These traditions 
sometimes need to enrich their own stocks of vocabulary and concepts to be 
able to render riva l claims understandable and comparable. However, we 
should note that this comparison between rival theori es is conducted from a 
tradition 's perspective, and so its results might not be accepted by others. 
M. Krausz (2007, p.67) rightl y ascribes the view to MacIntyre that 
" languages not full y trans latable between one another need be no barrier to 
one 's understanding them." If we do not have suffic ient conceptual parallels 
for translating an ali en language into our own, th is does not necessarily pose 
an impassable barrier between us. Untranslatabi li ty might temporarily lead 
into incommensurability; however as J. Stout (1988, pp.64-65) holds, 
cultures are not hermeneutically sealed, and they can undertake conceptual 
and linguistic innovations to understand each other. Stout here approaches 
Macintyre' s view mentioned above that we can take initial steps toward 
rendering incommensurable traditions commensurable by acqu iring the rival 
language in its own context and as a second first language ( I 99 I b, p. l 11 ). 
In this section, I di scussed Maclntyre 's notion of incommensurability 
in connection with his view that his CT is di stinct from perspecti vism. A 
corollary of this is that he should not believe in a strong form of 
inconunensurabili ty between theories deve loped within different 
perspectives; otherwise, he could not defend hi s theory aga inst the charge of 
perspectivism. 
MacIntyre, thus, intends to tackle incommensurability between 
traditions in part by forming a narrative that can compare their strong and 
weak points; however, clearl y this process is not immune to the partiality of 
this narration. For example, Maclntyre's commitment to Thomism informs 
hi s judgment that this tradition can form a wider context for comparing 
Aristote lianism and Augustinianism, or that Thomism can explai n the 
inadequacy of Liberali sm. This partiali ty, however, might result in a 
comparison that is denied by other sides, as they do not share thi s 
underlying commitment. 
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To solve this problem in the realm of morality, I asswne, we should 
appeal to some basic human goods which no reasonable theory or tradition 
can reject. Maclntyre's appeal to the notion of the final human good to solve 
value-incommensurability does not work either in conditions of moral 
pluralism, as there are rival incommensurable accounts of the good. 
Nevertheless, we can try to achieve agreement in the context of human basic 
needs which can serve as the basis of morality, as will be discussed in the 
final chapter. 
IV.4 Conclusion 
This chapter intended to provide an account of Maclntyre's theory of 
truth which is a Thomistic correspondence theory of truth. This version of a 
correspondence theory of truth is based on the notion of adequacy of the 
intellect for its objects, according to which a theory counts as true if it can 
withstand all existing challenges. Throughout the chapter, I investigated the 
compatibility of Maclntyre's theory of truth with his CT. In line with thi s, 
his theory was compared with perspectivism and relativism, which bear 
some similarities with his CT. With regard to relativism, I argued that 
MacIntyre believes a tradition might be refuted according to its own 
standards; a position which MacIntyre takes to be contrary to relativism. 
However, I argued that in so far as MacIntyre insists on the identification 
and the assessment of epistemological crises based on the internal measures 
of traditions, he cannot fundamentally dismiss the charge of relativism, as 
this internal assessment is the main point of relativism. 
To solve this problem, I argued that we should interpret Maclntyre 's 
later account of rationality in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? along the 
lines he offered in his earlier book After Virtue in which he declared that 
Aristotelianism is the tradition that can restore rationality and intelligibili ty 
to Western philosophical traditions. This means that although he points to 
the tradition-bound nature of rationality, he does not mean that the 
rationality of all traditions is equally good. By this substantial advocacy of 
Aristotelianism and Thomism, Maclntyre can reject the charge of relativism 
against his CT, as it proves inclined toward a way of life and enquiry that 
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honours the virtues and the good. Accordingly, whi le Maclntyre 's intention 
and his tenor of thought are anti-relativistic, his method based on EC due to 
its intemalism cannot adequately justify his position against relativism. To 
revise this method, I argued we need to hold on to universal measures that 
are and should be valid across traditions, which can be used to evaluate 
these traditions. 
I also held that MacIntyre should clarify whether what he means by his 
constitution thesis is nothing more than a graduali st and rule-based 
particularism, and not that traditions possess incommensurable measures of 
rationality, though rule-based particularism itself requires some norms that 
can be agreed upon inter-traditionally. 
With regard to perspecti vism, I argued that the inhabitants of particular 
perspectives are capable of understanding the beliefs and the concepts of 
other perspectives, particularly when they face EC, even though they cannot 
always use them in their own perspectives. I then discussed Macin tyre 's 
account of incommensurability to show how in his view it is possible to 
make initial attempts to make incommensurable theories commensurable. 
One way of doing thi s was to have a notion of the good which can rank 
order our incommensurable values. Also I referred to Macintyre ' s notion of 
translation that is accompanied with explanations and interpretations based 
on a contextual understanding of incommensurable notions. In addition , a 
theory which is more adequate than others can develop a narrative to show 
the strengths and weaknesses of incommensurable theories. Nevertheless, I 
cla imed that beyond some specific nonns which can be shown to be 
necessary for all human beings, it might not be possible to solve value-
incommensurability. 
I al so argued that MacIntyre has employed the Aristotelian and 
Thomistic idea of the immaterial ity of the intellect to support the capacity of 
individuals to transcend their existing perspectives. The non-nominalistic 
ontology of MacIntyre is also at work in his idea that the world is apt to 
reveal itself independently of our categories. This reali sm is incompatible 
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with the linguistic interpretation of MacIntyre according to which we cannot 
get out of the language in use to grasp reality. 
In sum, Maclntyre 's theory of truth suggests that agents are not 
essentially located in their traditions. Traditions provide starting-points and 
directions for their inhabitants, but they do not, in principle, restrict the 
cognitive capacities of those who grow up in them. As his theory of truth is 
a realist one, and as MacIntyre insists on the possibility and necessity of 
knowing how things are in reality independent of different perspectives, his 
notion of CT should be understood as different from the way the role of 
language was understood by philosophy after the linguistic tum. The CT for 
MacIntyre, as Annas (1989, p.401) points out, eventually would mean 
contextual understating of theories and ideas, and not that there are different 
intractably incommensurable norms of rationality which lead into relativism 
and perspectivism. As MacIntyre himself(l988a, p.10) puts it, "From the 
standpoint of traditions of rational enquiry the problem of diversity is not 
abolished, but it is transformed in a way that renders it amenable of 
solution." This points to Maclntyre 's account of attempting to make 
incommensurables commensurable, as explained above. 
MacIntyre thinks that Aristotelianism and Thomism are superior to 
their rivals, and that the rivals are rationally required to admit this 
superiority, indeed, upon their own standards.37 Two points ari se here. The 
first is that even if MacIntyre is right in this claim, this kind of 
acknowledging the superiority of an alien tradition does not refute 
relativism, because it is based on the internal measures of traditions; 
something which relativism would welcome. The second point is that 
Maclntyre's view regarding the superiority of Aristotelianism and 
Thomism, despite his claim that the rivals should come to admit this 
internally, stems from some meta-ethical positions which are the objectivity 
of the good and the narrative account of the intelligibility of actions. These 
37 Maclntyre is, in fact, equivocal here, because according to his EC these crises should be 
known according to the tradition ' s own measures of rationality; while he also holds that the 
parti ali ty of a standpoint cannot simply be discarded in this process ( 1993, p.17). 
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two posi tions underlie Macintyre' s claim about the superiority of these two 
traditions. In chapters 5 and 6, T wi ll explain further thi s claim and di scuss 
whether these meta-ethica l positions are necessary for all accounts of 
mora li ty. 
In the next chapter, I will explain why MacIntyre thinks his notion of 
adequacy applies to the Thomisti c tradition. To anticipate the di scussion in 
the next chapter, I would say that it is not poss ible to expect rival traditions 
to acknowledge the rational superiori ty of Thomism based on their own 
standards of rationality. In fact, Macintyre 's method of EC in which he 
insisted that traditions might come to admit the superiority of thei r ri va ls by 
their own standards does not hold true here. In my view, MacIntyre, due to 
the meta-ethical positions sketched above, presupposes the superiority of 
Thomism rather than legitimately concluding it from within these ri val 
traditions. 
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V- Chapter 5: the Rational Superiority of Thomism Based on 
Maclntyre's Dialectical Approach 
V.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, l explained how MacIntyre thinks his CT is 
distinct from relativism and perspectivism. One major tenet of Maclntyre's 
thought was that traditions might be defeated by their own measures of 
rational ity, and that a tradi tion might acknowledge the rational superiority 
of its rivals based on its own standards; accordingly, MacIntyre thinks this 
method dismisses the charge of relativism. 
In the present chapter, I seek to show the practical implication of the 
discussions in the previous chapter; i.e. to investigate why MacIntyre thinks 
Thomism is more adequate a tradition to withstand ECs than other traditions 
in the western world, and whether these tradit ions are obliged to admit 
Thomism's superiori ty based on their own standards. 
There are two strands to Macintyre's discussion here. The first 
involves establishing the rational superiority of_ Thomism over the 
traditions, i.e. Aristotelianism and Augustinianism, that do not have 
fundamental differences with regard to their accounts of first principles and 
enquiry. In this case, the rationally superior tradition would be the one that 
can integrate the others, and is more comprehensive, and can increase their 
consistency and explanatory capacity. 
The second strand concerns rational debate between large systems that 
lack significant co=on grounds. in this case, rational superiority lies in the 
ability of the superior tradition to explain the defects of the opposing views 
in terms of their own standards, and to explain why they are experiencing 
such irresolvable problems, and why they themselves cannot resolve them 
( I 990a, pp.145-146). 
The first strand, that is, the superiority of Thomism over 
Aristotelianism and Augustinianism does not concern me here. As one 
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objective of thi s chapter is to show that Thomism's riva l traditions do not 
necessari ly have to acknowledge its superiori ty, I shall emphasize the 
second strand which dea ls with the relation between Thomism and its riva ls. 
V.2 The Rational Superiority of Thomism over Rival Theories 
MacIntyre claims that the superiority of Thomism over later 
challenges, i.e. Cartesian, Humean, Kantian and N ietzschean critiques can 
be shown provided that the advocates of Thomism do not assume they share 
with their opponents in respect of their concepts of rational enquiry and first 
principles more than they in fact share. The rational superiority of Thomism 
over these alternatives means that Thomism can account for the limitations 
of these rivals according to their own standards, in a way that they 
themselves cannot, and then can provide these traditions with resources to 
overcome these crises ( 1990a, p.146). 
Maclntyre 's criticism of modem epistemological accounts of Thomism 
after Joseph Kleutgen, German Thomist theologian and phi losopher ( 1811-
1883), can be understood in line with thi s approach (2006f, p.148). The neo-
Thomists since Kleutgen fo llowed Descartes ' method by trying to offer an 
epistemological picture of Thomism in which they start from first principles 
to prove subordinate truths; thi s method is different from the dialectica l and 
metaphysica l picture offered by MacIntyre. As opposed to thi s, in 
Macintyre' s view, the superiority of Thomism over its ri va ls consists not in 
its ability to establi sh its c laims on the basis of its first principles such that 
they become convincing for any rational human being; rather, it lies in its 
resourcefulness and capacity to explain and remove the defects of its ri vals 
(2006f, p.148). 
The rational superiority of Thomism claimed by MacIntyre app lies to 
the Scottish En lightenment, Kantian deontology, genea logy and Liberalism 
in general. I shall start with Maclntyre ' s critic ism of the Scottish 
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Enl ightenment in 17th and 18th century, which appeared in the theories of 
Hutcheson, Reid, Stair and Hume.38 
Excluding Hume, the picture of the Scottish Enlightenment depicted by 
Mac! ntyre is as follows. According to the dominant account of practical 
rationality in this tradition, we can conclude subordinate truths by deduction 
from first principles. Moral phi losophy had a significant and increasing role 
in thi s tradition in order to defend fundamental moral principles. The 
justification of first principles gradually was extended from within the 
Church of Scotland to phi losophical forums. 
Four important characteristics of the Scottish tradition in Maclntyre's 
view are as follows. I ) It was a theological and Calvinist tradition, 2) a 
certain knowledge of God was the keystone of all enquiries, 3) its 
conception of justi ce was not based on pass ions or interests; rather, it was 
based on certain mora l principles, and 4) reason was regarded as the master 
of the pass ions, and as being capable of motivating human beings to abide 
by first principles (1988a, pp.253-255). 
In Maclntyre's account, Hutcheson is the moral philosopher who tried 
to provide a moral epistemology for this tradition. Taking the idea of 
affection from Shaftesbury, Hutcheson sought to show how morality is 
grounded in human nature. In his view, moral sense supplies human beings 
with the first principles upon which we can base our moral thinking. For 
Hutcheson, the role of reason is limited to subordinate ends and to what is 
conducive to our final end about which there is no reasoning. It is the moral 
sense that furnishes us with these final ends which are first and evident 
principles of our practical rationality. Accordingly, in this view, reason is 
impotent and actions are produced by the kind of motivation that is caused 
by the moral sense, and in this respect Hutcheson confronted the fourth 
point above regarding the mastery of reason over passions in the Scottish 
tradition (1988a, pp.255 & 267). The role of reason is limited to the second 
level of the two-tiered structure of duties and rights that Hutcheson 
38 ln the present discussion, I confine myself to the interpretations of these figures offered 
by Maclntyre, and do not discuss where these accounts are correct or not. 
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depicted. At thi s level , reason can deduce secondary ri ghts and duties from 
the ri ghts that the moral sense enjoins upon us ( I 988a, p.275). 
Hutcheson has narrowed the role of reason compared to Aristotle. 
MacIntyre (1988a, p.272) states that, in Aristotle's view, though we do not 
deliberate about final ends, we reason about them, which means we use final 
ends as the major premises of our practical reasoning, and draw conclusions 
from them. By comparison, in Hutcheson 's view, as he states in A System of 
Moral Philosophy (book 1, ch.Ill) "We prosecute them [ultimate ends] by 
some immediate di sposition or determination of soul", which is always prior 
to all reasoning. I think Maclntyre's point here, which is al so made about 
Hume, is that for these phi losophers we do not put the commands of 
passions or of the moral sense in the frame of practica l syllogisms; our 
actions do not hang on the results of practical reasoning; we act or should 
act spontaneously upon desires or the command of the mora l sense; while 
for Aristotle we fonn practical syllogisms on the basis of the good. 
Another significant difference between Hutcheson's and Aristotle 's 
accounts of practical rationality concerns the role of"phronesis" in practical 
reasoning, which has been reversed by Hutcheson. In Aristotle's view, the 
intellectual virtue of phronesis is prior to practical reasoning, which means 
we should be virtuous before being ab le to think what is right. The wisdom 
of righteous action is known to the virtuous agent. Aquinas, also, considers 
phronesis, translated by him as prudenlia, as the first virtue of the four 
cardinal virtues. As opposed to thi s, in Hutcheson 's view, the moral sense 
can inform us of right actions prior to learning how to be prudent and 
practically intelligent (1988a, p.276). By prudentia, Hutcheson did not 
mean phronesis; rather, he meant the ab il ity to cons ider in advance what is 
or what is not advantageous, which then guides our natural affections in 
tem1s of wh ich he defined the virtues (1992c, p.1 760). 
Accordingly, whi le Hutcheson inherited hi s account of mora li ty from 
scholastic Aristote lianism and Ca lvinism, he was led into what MacIntyre 
( 1988, p.278) calls a "philosophical artefact", that is, the idea of the mora l 
sense as a common faculty in human beings. The Scholastic background of 
218 
Hutcheson is clear in hi s theory of justice according to which justice is 
desert-based, independent of our interests and passions. Hutcheson's aim 
was to provide a motivating reason available to anyone by basing morality 
on the moral sense. 
I take MacIntyre to mean here that Hutcheson's failure is due to his 
departure from Aristotelianism, in particular in respect of his account of 
phronesis. By dropping the role of phronesis and the moral role of 
community, Hutcheson has based his ethics on human nature as such which 
cannot account, in Maclntyre's view, for the diversities in what people feel 
as moral sense. 
Two further aspects of Hutcheson's thought indicate this departure 
from Aristotelianism, causing problems for hi s moral theory. The first is 
that Hutcheson adopted the new way of ideas from Malebranche, 
Shaftesbury, and Locke. In Maclntyre's view, the problem with all these 
versions of the new way of ideas is that they only allow for the derivation of 
particular perceptions from particular experiences, and not the kind of 
substantially general claims of the moral sense. In Hutcheson's view, there 
are socially shared standards about rightness and justice. However, these 
common standards, in Macintyre's view, cannot be derived on the basis of 
the new way of ideas which is individualistic and particularistic in its nature 
(1988a, p.270). 
The second problem with Hutcheson 's method is related to Locke' s 
nominalistic approach which started to become a commonplace approach 
against the rational and metaphysical methods of Descartes, Leibniz and 
Spinoza. MacIntyre (1988a, p.254) holds that Locke' s nominal ism was 
incompatible with the knowledge of universal principles which was central 
to the Scottish tradition. 
To explain, nominal ism rejects the view of human beings as having an 
essence that is common to all humankind; as a result, it would be, in 
Maclntyre's view, inconsistent with formulating moral principles based on 
universa l claims about human nature, since the existence of a shared thread 
of human beings, which accounts fo r their common moral principles, is 
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denied by nominali sm; as MacIntyre puts the point, "Locke 's nom inalism 
was in crucia l respects incompatible with the claim to a knowledge of 
universal principles so central to this Scottish tradition" (1988a, p.254). 
These remarks indicate the kind of epistemological crisis that 
MacIntyre implicitly imputes to the Scottish Enl ightenment. The main 
points in this regard can be summed up as follows. Thi s tradition attempted 
to provide rational and objective explanations for morality independently of 
its own theological and Scholastic background. Its nominali stic ontology, 
the emerging new way of ideas and reversing the relation between the 
virtues and practical rationality prevented the accomplishment of thi s task. 
I assume it is clear why MacIntyre would claim the rational superiority 
of Thomism over the Scottish tradition, since all these defects, in hi s view, 
can be both explained and overcome by it, as there is an essentialist account 
of human nature and an emphasis on the role of the virtues in this tradition, 
which can provide a rational justification for ethics; an ethics that is both 
universal and particular. It is universal since it appeals to the essence of 
human beings as the basis of ethics and to the universal precepts of the 
natural law, and is particularistic since it takes into account the role of the 
vi rtues and the secondary precepts of the natural law which guide the mora l 
agent to act morally in particular situations. 
Two alternatives were rai sed against Hutcheson to make his moral 
theory consistent, as his notion of the moral sense fail ed to prove credib le 
about human nature. Hume and Adam Smith retained his moral 
epistemology, and changed his view of moral principles and justice . Thomas 
Reid and Dugald Stewart did the reverse, and rejected hi s moral 
epistemology ( 1988a, p.280). 
MacIntyre seems to mean here that these subsequent moral 
philosophers became aware of the epistemological crisis in Hutcheson 's 
work, and attempted to resolve it. Hume followed Hutcheson in that for both 
reason is inert, and onl y the passions activate us. They also based mora li ty 
on an account of human nature that was thought to be universal , and so 
fa iled to account for moral di versity (1988a, p.285). 
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For Hume, passions are thought of as original existences that are not 
susceptible to rational evaluation; in other words, there is no further 
criterion for judging passions as rational or irrational ( 1988a, p.30 l ); 
whereas in Aristotle 's view, desires become rational as a result of the 
exercise of the virtues (1988a, p.136). For Aristotle, desires as such are not 
the final measures of moral judgments, and they are subject to rational and 
mora l evaluations by the standards of the virtues and the good. 
Nevertheless, in Hume's view as presented by MacIntyre (1988a, p.306), 
passions are not totally without any evaluative criteria for their assessment. 
Hume distinguishes between calm and violent passions, defining the calm 
passions as those pass ions that help us become sociable and amicable 
toward others. Violent passions are expressed in our immediate reactions to 
particular situations in which we do not think about their effects on our 
interests. Virtues require the cultivation of calm passions ( l 988a, p.300). 
This distinction shows that, in Hume's view, it is possible to reason 
about passions, but this process of reasoning, unless it is backed by some 
kind of passions, is not active and would not be translated into action 
(1988a, p.301). In this view, passions and their satisfaction are not subject to 
practical rationality. Practical rationality is limited to instrumental reasoning 
about the satisfaction of passions and desires. ln this view, virtues and vices 
are defined respectively in terms of the sentiments of approbation and 
di sapprobation which arise in us toward some actions; moral attributes are 
features of our sentiments and passions, not objects and matters of fact 
(1966, p.164). 
In Maclntyre 's view (1988a, pp.294-295), though Hume depicted a 
universal picture of human nature, this account was only at home in a social 
setting in which the expression of pride was central, and property rights 
which were used in hi s theory of justice were absolute. MacIntyre on this 
basis criticizes Hume's moral theory as fo llows. 
The first point is that Hume's account of human nature, which served 
as the foundation of his morality, was not universal and took as its ideal 18th 
century England as a commercial society in which the expression of pride is 
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central ; furthermore, the characterization of passions and the objects of 
humility and pride depicted by Hume are particular to a specific culture and 
socia l setting, though he was not aware of this local ity ( I 988a, pp.293-295). 
The second problem with Hume's moral thought lies in his theory of 
justice which is based on preserving property rights that are unmodified by 
human needs. This view of justice, in Maclntyre's view, is al ien to the 
Platonic and Aristotelian conviction shared also by Aquinas and Scottish 
society according to which gross inequalities might lead to social conflict 
and revolution. This Aristotelian and Thomistic view does not take 
appropriation of others ' properties out of severe need as a violation of 
justice. Accordingly, wh ile in Hume's view the rights of property and the 
idea of justice would serve to establi sh social stability, his view regarding 
the absoluteness of property rights might cause socia l instability and 
contradict their function (1988a, pp.307-308). 
Maclntyre 's th ird criticism of Hume, which is more fundamenta l and 
also related to the second objection, concerns Hume's systematic adoption 
of the new way of ideas. As was explained earlier, the language of the new 
way of ideas, either in its Cartesian or empiricist version, is from the first-
person point of view; i.e. it is about my impressions and ideas. This makes 
Hume' s transition from the egoism of a first-person point of view to a third-
person observer in his moral theory problematic. Based on a first -person 
point of view, the notion of personal identity which is attained socia lly and 
from others' point of view disappears (I 988a, p.291). 
Mac!ntyre ' s fourth criticism of Hume concerns the existence of the 
elements of emotivism in his moral theory. MacIntyre (198 1, p.14) contends 
that it was in the I 8th century that emotivism appeared as a theory on its 
own. The problem with emotivism, in Maclntyre 's view, is that moral 
arguments on this basis are inconclusive, as they are only express ions of 
subjecti ve sentiments. This state, in Maclntyre 's view (198 I , pp.33-34), is a 
result of the rejection of the Aristotelian and the Thomistic notion of the 
human final end which was used to provide an objective and common 
measure for the evaluation of moral sentiments. 
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The universalistic attitude to human nature appears also in Thomas 
Reid ' s moral theory according to which the exercise of practical rationality 
does not require a particular social setting or an agreement about human 
passions; rather, the truths of common sense are available to all people of 
sound mind. As opposed to Aristotle and Hume, who stigmatize some 
people as barbarians, in Reid's view, these people might have a better grasp 
of these fundamental truths as they are not misled by philosophical 
theorizing (1988a, pp.324-325). 
MacIntyre in After Virtue is basically against the attempt to provide a 
picture of human nature that is prior to particular cultures. In his view, the 
biological features of human beings as a species cannot provide us with the 
standards of utility or pleasure for a human being qua an animal which is 
prior to and without any particular culture. He admits that our biological 
nature surely puts some constraints on the possible cultural forms that we 
may happen to take, but not to the extent that it can create a man without a 
culture; for MacIntyre "man without culture is a myth . . . a creature of 
whom we know nothing" ( 1981 , p.161 ). 
Based on this approach, MacIntyre (1981 , p.160) holds that the objects 
of pleasure and pain depend on the kind of person we are, which in tum is a 
matter of our virtues and vices. In line with this, MacIntyre criticizes the 
Enlightenment project for attempting to provide a universal formulation for 
morality. Maclntyre's main point here is that this project construed tradition 
as an external authority that is mixed with superstitions. The pervasive 
account of human nature at the time was at odds with a teleological 
approach to the world including human nature. MacIntyre (1981 , p.54) 
ascribes to all of the Enlightenment philosophers, Kant, Hume, Adam 
Smith, Diderot and later on Kierkegaard, a denial that human nature has an 
essence that defines its true ends. Hence the idea of a human being ceased to 
be a functiona l concept in moral propositions, the functions of which were 
once used to provide an objective basis for morality. This change, in tum, 
led them to propose an unqualified version of Hume's principle that 
evaluative arguments cannot be directly derived from factual premises. This 
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principle, in Maclntyre's view ( I 98 I, p.57), is not universa l, since it does 
not app ly to factual statements about human nature if a functiona l and 
te leo logical picture of human nature is at work, as a functional account of 
things embodies the basis of normative judgments about them based on their 
function; for instance, we can judge a watch good or bad based on its 
function. 
Each of the Enlightenment philosophers and their heirs in the 19th 
century has tried in a way to fi ll the gap between the factua l premises and 
the evaluative conclusions in their mora l reasoning. Hurne and Diderot 
appeal to human desires, Kant to the notion of categorical imperatives, 
Kierkegaard had recourse to radica l choice, Bentham and J.S . Mi ll to the 
notions of utili ty and maximum happiness. These are among the attempts 
toward the objective justification of moral principles in a non-teleo logical 
context, and independently of theology. 
Macintyre's criti cism of the Enlightenment project is that the moral 
principles and rules that they arrived at were forma l, but the content they 
had in mind for these rules implicitly presupposed the codes of behaviour of 
their particular culture and society; accordingly, they could not justify 
substantial universal moral principles to app ly to all moral agents 
irrespective of their local tradition (1981, pp.44-46). 
In particular, MacIntyre (1981 , p.46) holds that Kant's method of 
categorical imperative does not work, because there are some immoral and 
trivial non-moral issues which pass thi s test, but are not moral principles; 
for instance, 'Keep all your promises throughout your entire li fe except 
one ', 'Persecute all those who hold fa lse religious beliefs ', and 'a lways eat 
mussels on Mondays in March ' are respecti vely immoral and trivia l non-
moral principles which can be acted upon universa ll y, and so they meet the 
categorical imperative test of Kant without being the kind of mora l 
principles which he had in mind. 
Maclntyre's point here is that, as was explained in chapter 2, Kant 's 
mora l theory is a fonna l one whose substance is derived from his Lutheran 
background, not from his moral theory as such ( I 98 1, p.44). MacIntyre 
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likens the categorical imperative of Kant and its ensuing categorical moral 
obligations to the taboos that Captain Cook encountered in the Pacific 
Is lands . Cook and his sailors were told that men and women could not eat 
together. The islanders were not able to explain the reason for this taboo, 
except by saying it was an absolute requirement that could not be explained 
further ( 1971 b, p.166; [ 1977] 1981 b, pp.124-125). 
To explain, the Islanders ' taboos had been intelligible in a context that 
once had been avai lable; so they cannot justify the moral obligation of these 
taboos to those who are out of this context, like Captain Cook and his 
sai lors, or indeed, to themselves as they do not have access to those 
background bel iefs. 39 By the same token, I take MacIntyre here to mean, the 
unconditional moral obligations that Kant deduces from his method of 
categorical irnpetrative derive their binding power from their particular 
social and cultural context without which they cannot be universally 
justified for all rational agents. Based on this, MacIntyre ([ 1977] 198 I b, 
p.125) concludes that "We do not take taboo seriously; why then should we 
take seriously Kant' s or Prichard's ought?". 40 
MacIntyre also criticizes util itarianism as a project that proposed to 
posit new conceptions of telos for morality in a context in which the 
Aristotelian account of the good was not prevalent any longer. Jeremy 
Bentham, MacIntyre (1981, p.63) argues, thought of morality as being 
pervaded by superstition until we admit that the only motives for human 
actions are aversion to pain and attraction to pleasures. The maximization of 
pleasure became a telos. The task of the social reformer, for Bentham as 
presented by MacIntyre (1981 , p.63), is to reconstruct social orders such 
39 l am grateful to Lutz for correcting me on the point that these taboos, in Maclntyre's 
account, had even become unintelligible for the [slanders, because the taboos had lost their 
social and cultural background. 
40l think this judgment is un fair to Kant, because although the character of Kant's morali ty 
like any other moral philosopher's is related to its social and cultural sett ing; however, his 
moral theory follows a logic, that is respecting the dignity of humani ty as an end in itself; 
therefore, a Kantian can justify his morality following this logic; while the islander might 
lack this possibility. 
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that the individual pursuit of happiness coincides with the greatest possible 
happiness for the greatest poss ible number of people. 
J. S. Mill, instead of Bentham's quantitative method, adopted a 
qualitative approach to the notion of happiness in which he distinguishes 
between higher and lower pleasures. The effect of this amendment, in 
Maclntyre 's view (1981 , p.63), was the conclusion that made 
utilitarianism's appeal to the notion of happiness useless; namely, the view 
that the notion of human happiness is not "a unitary, simple notion and 
cannot provide us with a criterion for making our key choices" ( 198 1, p.63). 
The argument at thi s point relates to the notion of value-
incommensurability, which was explained in the previous chapter. The point 
is that, in Maclntyre's account, different pleasures are not a single state of 
mind to which different activities are means. The pleasure of "drinking 
Guinness" is not the same pleasure as "swimming at Crane 's Beach"; the 
happiness of "the way of life of the cloister" is not the same as that of the 
military li fe. These pleasures are incommensurable; and an appeal to the 
notion of happiness or pleasures per se does not let the individual decide 
which kind of pleasure to choose ( 198 1, p.64). 
The continuous refonnulation of utilitarian ism in the 19th century 
culminated in Sidgwick's intuitionism. Sidgwick admitted the failure of 
restoring a teleological framework for ethics, and that our moral beliefs are 
heterogeneous and are based on some final intuitions for which no rational 
justification is possible. Intuitionism provided the ground for emotivism in 
Britain, the same way as pragmatism did in the USA (I 981, pp.64-66). 
According to emotivism, moral judgments are nothing other and more than 
the expression of individual preferences which cannot be predicated as true 
or false (198 I, p.60). 
Another criticism of utilitarianism offered by MacIntyre is that it does 
not feature the di vision of pleasures into those internal and ex ternal to 
practices. From the Ari stotel ian perspective, some pleasures supervene on 
actions as external goods such as fame, money and prestige; while some 
pleasures are the result of the ach ievement of the internal goods of practices. 
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Utilitarianism, including the utilitarianism of Benjamin Franklin, 
cannot accommodate this distinction. In other words, there would be 
different pleasures and goods some of which are internal and some of which 
are external to practices. The resulting problem is that Utilitarianism cannot 
rank order these different kinds of pleasure, and they become 
incommensurable. When people have different accounts of pleasures, "the 
notion of summing goods and happiness in terms of one single conception 
of utility makes no sense" (1981, pp.198-199); whereas in Aristotelianism 
an overriding notion of the good can serve as a basis for the subordination 
of external goods and pleasures to the internal ones. 
MacIntyre also made an earlier criticism of utilitarianism, which 
reflects his Marxist background. In this criticism, he emphasizes that our 
desires are not given facts; rather, they are constructed according to the 
objects of desires, which are offered to us. What we desire and want are not 
just biological features; they are an "intelligible response to what we are 
offered". In this view, we learn to want and desire something rather than 
something else, and modem capitalism through advertising and its social 
order manipulates people' s desires (1964, p.8). 
MacIntyre (1964, p.2) maintained there that we-have come to admit 
that moral disagreements cannot be settled, and we take this as an inherent 
feature of morality. In these circumstances, we appeal to "our second 
morality", that is, utilitarianism in order to organize public policies. 
Uti litarianism claims that it does not enjoin the performance or non-
performance of any action; its only measure is the performance of any 
action, whatever it is, that produces the maximum happiness for the 
majority of people. In other words, utilitarianism does not stigmatize actions 
as good or bad on their content. An action might be good or bad in different 
circumstances based on the consequences it produces. As a result of the 
dominance of utilitarianism, our society and our education system cannot 
discover ends on the basis of which to provide people with sufficient 
reasons for their actions; MacIntyre holds, for instance, "Last year a student 
whom I knew well had a breakdown as a result of taking seriously the 
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question, ' What am I studying for?' The chain of reasons had no ending" 
(1964, pp.1-2). 
Utilitariani sm, thus, does not enter into the di scuss ion about the 
intrinsic value of actions; it cla ims to be neutral regarding different moral 
theori es which ass ign moral worth to different actions, and only concerns 
the maximization of whatever notion of happiness the greatest poss ible 
number of people have. This theory, in Maclntyre 's view, leaves the 
questions about what notion of happiness is worthwhile for us to pursue, 
and what our final end is, unanswered; whereas Aristotelianism and 
Thomism can provide us with an account of the good and of the common 
good. 
The preceding remarks show that as a result of purging morali ty of the 
Aristotelian notion of the good and appealing to a notion of practical 
rationality independent of the particularity of traditions, in Maclntyre 's 
view, neither Kantian deontology, and other moral philosophers of the 
Enlightenment, nor the teleo logy of utilitarianism was capable of providing 
a uni versal account of morality. 
In Maclntyre 's view morality in such a non-teleological context is the 
linguistic survival of the classical tradition in which human beings by nature 
had the function of moving toward the common good and their individual 
good which were in harmony with each other. In the new mili eu and in the 
absence of the common good, which once was used as a common criterion 
to vindicate moral judgments, there are only some moral judgments 
wrenched from their context. Whatever these moral judgments mean and to 
whatsoever objective criteria they appeal, they do not revea l anything but 
personal preferences; so MacIntyre ( 1981 , p.22) maintains that emotivism is 
deeply rooted in our culture. 
Based on this exposition, it is not diffi cult to understand why 
MacIntyre claims rational superiority for Ari stotelianism and Thom ism over 
the other traditions sketched above. The main point here is that, as the 
explanation above indicates, these two traditions can, in Maclntyre ' s view, 
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analyse and remedy the malaises of modem individualistic moral theories 
better than can they themselves ( 1990, p.146). 
Accordingly, if we construe the challenge of emotivism as an 
epistemological and moral crisis, the way MacIntyre prescribes getting out 
of it, as was argued above, is by an appeal to an Aristotelian and Thomistic 
notion of the final end for human beings, which can prioritize the 
acquisition of the virtues, including the virtue of phronesis, over the 
capacity of practical reasoning. The good serves as the measure for the 
definition of genuine human desires, pleasures and their comparison with 
each other; a feature which utilitarianism, in Maclntyre's account, falls short 
of. 
While genealogy fails in providing an etiology for the fai lure of the 
En lightenment and the post-Enlightenment moral philosophies in the 
rational justification of morality, as will be explained below, Thomism can 
carry out this task. In Maclntyre's view (1990a, pp.192-193), Thomism's 
diagnosis of this quandary is that the concept of morality that underlies this 
situation is a modem notion which consists of the remnants of a previously 
valid system. This poses unsolvable difficulties, unless the concepts are 
returned to their prior context. Modem individualism and unconstrained 
pluralism undermine the meaning and the authority of moral oughts. 
MacIntyre also extends the claim of the rational superiority of 
Thomism to include the anti -Enlightenment genealogy of Nietzsche and 
post-Nietzscheans. In Maclntyre's view (1990a, p.50), there is "a self-
endangering paradox" in the genealogy project. The explanation is that this 
project sought to deconstruct the self and reduce Western morali ty and the 
19th century Encyclopaedia's pattern of the rational justification of ethics, in 
Nietzsche's case,. to the wi ll to power. However, MacIntyre (1990a, p.54) 
argues that this deconstruction project itself makes sense only for a 
"persistent and substantial" self that is not perspectival; i.e. it has a 
continuous identity that does not dissolve into masks and moments. In this 
view, genealogy would founder by its own standards, because it cannot 
make itself intelligible if its account of the self, with regard to both the 
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audience and the speaker, lacks fixity. There should be a fixed self to speak 
or to be addressed. 
As D ' Andrea (2006, p.347) states Maclntyre's point, the genealogical 
critique should be communicable to an audience if it wants to succeed. This 
communication assumes that there are a-temporal standards of reference, 
reason-giving and reason-assessing. This view, in tum, assumes a 
metaphysics that is at odds with genealogy, so universal genealogy fa il s on 
its own grounds. In D ' Andrea's view (2006, p.348), Maclntyre's point here 
is that there needs to be a continuing self behind the transitory unmasking 
selves which discard their identities once the task of unmasking is 
completed; thi s continuing self is necessary to make inte ll igible the 
narrati ve of success and fa ilure in urunaslcing projects. 
M. Cli ffo rd ( 2001 , p.1 61) maintains that the di fference between the 
Thomist and the genealogist li es in that the latter rejects "the grounded, 
epi stemological or metaphysical given-ness of the I" , in favour of a self that 
is "bound to and effected by anonymous fac tors that precede it and sustain it 
as such." Interpreting MacTntyre's claim, Cli fford presents the same thesis 
about genealogy as does MacIntyre. He holds that genealogy fin ds itself 
using the same kind of metaphys ical postulates that it was cri ticizing 
regarding Western ethics; for instance, the notion of the will to power used 
by Nietzsche is a kind of metaphysical entity in the conventional sense; as a 
result by "the end of Beyond Good and Evil, we see Nietzsche turning his 
criti cal suspicion against hi s own thoughts, and in so doing, attempting to 
effect their erasure" (Cli ffo rd 200 I , p. 159). 
MacIntyre fu rthers his critique of genealogy by saying that this 
tradit ion in two ways discredits the notion of accountability; one is by 
denying any notion of aperspectiva l truth, and the other is by proposing the 
poss ibi li ty of indefinite plurali ty in the interpretation of texts. As opposed to 
th is, Thomism, on the one hand, considers texts as relatively fixed, though 
related to each other and historica ll y developing, and on the other hand, 
takes it to be possible to rescue ourselves from power-relationships through 
Socratic dialectica l and August inian confessional activities; while 
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genealogy understands these activities as the disguises of the impersonal 
will to power (1990a, p.205). 
In Maclntyre ' s view (1990a, p.147), Thomism can provide a genealogy 
for Nietzsche 's "genealogizing", based on Aquinas' injunctions about the 
roots of intellectual blindness in moral errors and in the corruption of the 
will by the sin of pride. The Thomist can argue that Nietzsche's notion of 
the will to power is a disguise for the corrupted will; on this basis, the 
acti vity of unmasking itself would be a mask for pride. In this Thomistic 
view, the will to power would be construed as an " intellectual ficti on 
disguising the corruption of the will" (1 990a, p.147). 
These remarks show that, in Maclntyre ' s view, genealogy, though it 
has been right to rej ect the Enlightenment' s and the post-enlightenment 's 
endeavours to provide a rational and objective justification for morality, 
inherently embodies an epistemological crisis that is not resolvable based on 
its own internal standards; furthermore, Thomism, as explained above, can 
provide an intelligible narrative about the moral tradition that has cleared 
the ground for the emergence of genealogical morality, and explained why 
this tradition itself cannot resolve its epistemological and moral 
predicaments. In other words, just as Hume's principte regarding the non-
derivability of normative judgments from factual judgments is not a non-
conditional principle, and only applies to morality after it has lost its 
functional and teleological account of the human being, the genealogical 
thought that all rationa l justifications are disguises for wills to power does 
not apply to morality as such; rather, it is a feature of a morality that is 
devoid of any notion of the good. Aristotelianism and Thomism, in 
Macintyre's view, can explain why a genealogical interpretation of morality 
has emerged, and how it is possible to di scard it. 
V.3 An Evaluation of Maclntyre's Claim Regarding the Rational 
Superiority of Thomism 
In my view, Macintyre's account of the rational superiority of 
Thomism as presented above is not convincing, and, in addition, he has 
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deviated from the method he himself has proposed for evaluating rational 
superiority, as wi ll be explained below. 
As was argued in the previous chapter, in Maclntyre 's view (1988a 
p.365), the disclosure and solution of epistemological crises should be based 
on the internal measures of the cri sis-traditi ons. On this bas is, the rationally 
inferior tradition "A" should come to the conclusion that that the superior 
tradition "B" can resolve A 's crises using "B" resources but based on A's 
own standards. Maclntyre ' s exposition of the superiority of Thomism does 
not fit this scheme, particularly with regard to radically rival traditions. 
One condition for a successful resolution of an epistemological crisis in 
Maclntyre's view (I 988a, p.362) is that, as pointed out in chapter 4, the new 
concepts and theories designed for the resolution of the crisis should 
"exhibit ... some fundamenta l continuity" in the tradition before and after 
the resolution. However, when radical disputes and radically rival traditions 
are at play, it would be almost impossible to keep this continui ty. For 
instance, Genealogy based on its own account of the self and its standards of 
enquiry surely opposes the Thomistic explanation of its predicament, and 
indeed it might not recognize the ex istence of such a predicament within 
itself; furthermore, it considers Maclntyre 's diagnosis of this predicament 
and his prescription for it as an further affirmation of its own idea of the will 
to power. 
The non-neutrality of MacIntyre reveals itself furth er in hi s view that 
the genealogical notion of the will to power can be taken and explained in 
terms of the Thomistic notion of sin and the corrupted will. I am not arguing 
that MacIntyre has avowed to be neutral in his prescriptions; as he puts it, 
" there is no theoretically neutral , pretheoreti cal ground from which the 
adjudication of competing claims can proceed" (1990a, p. 173); 
nevertheless, my point is that this exegesis is not based on the internal 
measures of the genealogical tradition which rejects any place fo r the 
notions of God and sin . There still remains a way for MacIntyre to defend 
his theory, whi ch will be explained below. 
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This methodological problem for MacIntyre also surfaces in his 
discussion of Hutcheson and Hurne. Maclntyre ' s point was that Hutcheson 
and Hurne could not make their moral theories consistent with their notions 
of the new way of ideas which is particularistic and is conducted from the 
first-person point of view. The new way of ideas is associated with 
conceptualisrn or norninalisrn according to which only mental concepts 
abstracted from individuals are universal ; in this view, anything that exists 
is individual and does not need to be made individual (R. Campbell 1992, 
p.206). Based on thi s view, there is no notion of the human essence as a 
shared feature of human beings, which can be used as a basis of morality. 
The corollary of Maclntyre's claim would be that these authors should 
tum back to Aristotle's and Aquinas' non-norninalistic way of ideas to 
resolve their tensions, from which they have many reasons to dissent. I am 
not claiming here that this non-norninalistic view is wrong, but that it is not 
acceptable from within Hutcheson 'sand Hume's conceptual scheme. 
A proponent of utilitarianism also may argue, in response to 
MacIntyre, that in conditions in which people have and pursue different 
incommensurable values and goods, the best option is to ensure that the 
majority of them satisfy their happiness. Surely, as MacIntyre pointed out 
above, the pleasure of drinking is not the same as the pleasure of swimming, 
and the principle of utility does not tell us how to choose between the two 
and between many others; but the utilitarian might well argue that we can 
take utilitarianism as the moral philosophy of public policy, and not as a 
philosophy that will instruct individuals what kind of pleasure they should 
choose in their private lives. In other words, individuals are free to make up 
their minds regarding whether they should drink or swim, in so far as they 
do not threaten the public order which maintains the public good and the 
utility of the rnajority.4 1 
41 My main purpose in this discussion is to show how different tradi tions might have 
reasons to dispute Thomism's claim to superi ority. These reasons sometimes might be 
ideological in the sense that individuals might have non-epistemic reasons for clinging to 
their received beliefs, for instance, for the sense of belonging whi ch they have in light of 
these beliefs or under the influence of a tyrann ical government. Lutz has pointed out to me 
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Having briefly explained some possible responses that the rivals of 
Aristotelianism and Thomism might make against Maclntyre 's claims, in 
what fo llows I sha ll po int to some defects in Thomism, which challenge 
Maclntyre's claim about its rational superiority. MacIntyre has not 
sufficiently di scussed the possible criticisms of Thomism by its riva ls, and 
has not exposed it to its rivals' critiques to support the c laim that its account 
of practical rationality and justice would survi ve once they are exposed to 
criticisms; as MacIntyre puts it: 
Those who have thought their way through the topics of 
justice and practical rational ity, from the standpoint 
constructed by . . . Aristotle and then by Aquinas, have 
every reason at least so fa r to hold that the rationali ty of 
their tradition has been confirmed in its encounters with 
other traditions (1988a, pp.402-403). 
However, MacIntyre has not subj ected Thomism to its riva l's critiques 
to check its adequacy. For instance, one possib le objection against Thomism 
concerns the coherence between Aquinas' account of human nature and his 
account of the natural law tradition. W. T. Jones (1969, p.298, cited in M. 
Fuller (1998, p.35)) holds that there is an inconsistency between Aquinas ' 
account of post-Fall man and his view that human beings have a capacity to 
become virtuous which can be developed by education through their life in 
fam ily and community. If human nature is corrupted as a resu lt of original 
sin, how does it have this capacity to become virtuous and to move toward 
the good and the best by nature? 
Another critic ism concerns the issue of individuals' moral 
responsibility. Aquinas emphasizes the necess ity of having the infused 
theologica l virtues of charity, hope, etc. , to remedy the radical defect in 
human nature; but if these virtues are infused, and they are based on di vine 
grace, it would be difficult to make sense of the mora l responsibility of 
that MacIntyre is aware of this, where he argues in the "The End of Ideology, and the End 
of the End of Ideology" in AgainsT The Self-Images a/The Age that ideologica l commitments 
might prevent people from asking some questions; however, my discussion here goes 
beyond ideological comm itments, as I seek to argue that people in ri val traditions might 
have genuine intellectual reasons for not succumbing to a ri va l tradition's claim to 
superiority; reasons wh ich are different from mere ideological commitments. 
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agents. In Aquinas' account, as the passage below indicates, our turning 
toward God is dependent on His tum toward us, and ·th is makes our 
blameworthiness as a result of wrongdoing difficult to justify, as it has not 
been within our control: 
Man's turning to God is by free-will; and thus man is 
bidden to tum himself to God. But free-will can only be 
turned to God, when God turns it ... 'Convert me and I 
shall be converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God' (ST, I, 
Q.23, Art.3). 
Aquinas' answer (ST, I, Q.23, Art.3) to this criticism, that is, 
reprobation42 by God does not take anything away from the power and the 
liberty of the choice of the reprobate, is not compelling, because the 
possession or the lack of theological virtues surely affects individuals ' 
power of decision-making and their resistance against corrupted desires. 
Another criticism refers to Aquinas' explanation about people of 
religions other than Christianity. l. Markham (1991, p.263) points to two of 
these explanations particularly regarding Islam and Judaism, based on 
human sinfulness and predestination. This kind of explanation about the 
existence of rival traditions does not fit with the faJlibilistic account of 
Thomism presented by MacIntyre. Fallibilism requires us to take other rival 
views as attempts toward the truth, from which we should learn, and not 
simply to reject them as mistaken on the grounds of sinfulness. 
This daunting picture of Aquinas particularly comes to the fore in his 
attitudes toward heretics. Aquinas (ST, 11 , Q.11, Art.3) opposes the view 
that heretics should be tolerated so that they have the opportunity to repent. 
In his view, heresy is a sin that corrupts the faith, and so makes the heretic 
deserve not only to be excommunicated from the church, but also from the 
world by death. He makes the analogy that as there is reason for the capital 
punishment of a person who forges money and other evi l-doers by secular 
authority, there is more reason for putting the heretic to death. 
42 lt means here to abandon to eternal damnation 
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S. M. Okin ( I 99 I) from a feminist position attacks the 
Aristote lian/Augustinian/Thomistic view of woman and their inferiority to 
men, and so cha llenges Maclntyre's claim about the superiority of Thomism 
over Libera li sm. Okin (1991 , p.44) writes that MacIntyre uses "a false 
gender-neutral language"; for instance, MacIntyre uses "he or she", "his or 
her" ... , in hi s writing about contexts, that is ancient Greeks, in which this 
kind of language is absurd, because women were not citizens and did not 
have access to different goods available in the polis. The good life in the 
Aristotelian sense excludes a majori ty of people including all women from 
achieving it (Okin 1991, p.52). Okin (1991 , p.54) casts doubts on 
Maclntyre's account that this aspect of Aristotle's moral theory can be 
rectified w ithout denying his central claims about the best kind of polis, 
because Aristotle's view of women is related to his biological writing in 
which women are introduced as a deformi ty that occurs in the ordinary 
course of nature. B. Barry (1989, p.163) emphasizes the same point, holding 
that as Aristotle 's sociology is rooted in his biology "a good deal of 
generosity" is required to maintain thi s his views about natura l slaves and 
women are nonessential to his political theory. 
Okin ( 1991 , p.57) also points to Augustine's account of women as 
being of lower reason or sensuality, which is symbolized by Eve 's role in 
the Fall. In Okin 's view (1991, pp.57-58), thi s account of women as 
assoc iated with sin is also synthesized with Aristotle's teleological bio logy 
in Aquinas' work; this is despite the fac t that MacIntyre finds in Aquinas' 
work the best account of practical rationality and justice. Aquinas considers 
a woman as "a misbegotten male" who is natura lly subject to man in whom 
reason predominates. Aquinas di scusses whether women should be 
resurrected as men, and if they have been included in the original Creation 
(Okin 199 1, p.60). Okin (199 1, p.60) concludes that women cannot find the 
ki nd of"calm coherence" which MacIntyre fin ds in Aquinas' tradition. 
The preceding remarks the full development and evaluati on of which 
are not my present concern indicate that first ly Maclntyre ' s claim about the 
rational superiority of Thomism is not based on its rival traditions' internal 
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measures, and secondly, these traditions, as partly alluded to above, have 
genuine reasons to reject this claim to superiority. 
As I pointed out above, there remains a way for MacIntyre to respond 
to the criticism that his evaluation of Thomism is not conducted in terms of 
internal measures of rival traditions. This response is in line with my 
argument about the distinction between Maclntyre's CT and relativism in 
the preceding chapter. I argued there that in so far as MacIntyre holds the 
disclosure and rectification of epistemological crises are to be conducted on 
the basis of internal standards he cannot discard the charge of relativism; 
then J pointed to MacTntyre's view that he thinks it possible, and indeed, 
necessary for the very internal standards of a tradition to undergo evaluation 
and modification which needs to be done on the basis of some measures 
independent of that tradition. 
The fact that, in Maclntyre's view (1981, p.2), modem morality is in a 
state of crisis and intellectual destitution suggests that modern morality 
itself cannot recognize the occurrence of this crisis, at least, upon its own 
measures. In other words, traditions might degenerate to such a degree that 
they do not have the measures to recognize, let alone the resources to 
overcome, their epistemological crises. Accordingly, -that the recognition 
and resolution of epistemological crises might not be in terms of internal 
standards is compatible with Maclntyre's general moral thought, as in his 
view modem morality has deteriorated into a state in which it cannot 
acknowledge its own decline. This answer, however, violates Maclntyre's 
method for discovering epistemological crises, and it means that MacIntyre 
has in mind a sense of moral decline informed by norms derived not from 
these traditions. MacIntyre is not hesitant to admit his partiality in his 
defence of Thomism: 
We cannot vindicate the objectivity of good except from 
positions which already presuppose it.. .Any profession of 
neutrality on fundamental value questions will always tum 
out to be a covert and therefore misleading commitment to 
a subjectivist preference-based view of good (1993 , p.17). 
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But the question that arises here is that if the belief in the superiori ty of 
Thomism is informed by Maclntyre's avowed prior partiality regarding this 
tradition, why are riva l traditions which lack this orientation, rationally 
obliged to admit this superiority? And how can we understand the 
"disquieting suggestion" about modem morality ' s catastrophic situation 
with which MacIntyre begins his After Virtue. This judgment, if it is 
supposed to be accepted by a tradition, should be based on measures that 
can be shown to be binding for it. 
In fairness to MacIntyre, some part of his criticism of Hume's account 
of justice, along the lines that it does not consider that too much social and 
economical inequality might hinder public participation in di scussions about 
the common good and the good as was mentioned earlier, is not dependent 
on particularly Aristotelian and Thomistic convictions. Without these 
convictions, we still are able to admit the truth of this claim, because basic 
human goods are at stake here, the necessity of the provision of which can 
be argued for independently of these two traditions. This is in line with my 
vulnerab ility approach which will be explained in the next chapter. 
In this section, I sketched how Thomism 's rivals cannot admit the 
rational superiority of Thomism on the basis of their own measures. They 
also can challenge Thomism on different grounds as briefly explained 
above. As a result, I here concur with Thomas Nagel's contention that 
"Maclntyre's religion is driving his philosophy. He wants to produce an 
argument that does not rely on religious premises to show that only 
something like a religious morality is possible. This cannot be done" 
(Nagel 1995, p.209). 
If a tradition, like Thomism, cannot establ ish its superiority over its 
rivals based on the rivals' own measures, another option here is to argue for 
the existence of some shared substantial measures of rationali ty for 
traditions, which can be used to minimally evaluate them against each other, 
as did MacIntyre above regarding the relation between inequalities and 
practical reasoning. This is the strategy that I wi ll adopt in the next chapter, 
and I think it is the best option in our pluralistic world in which there is no 
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consensus regarding a notion of the human good. This approach will both 
set some minimal constraints upon different accounts of the good life, and 
let us cope with the pluralistic nature of social life. 
V.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, J tried to investigate how MacIntyre thinks Thomism is 
rationally superior to its rivals, and so can make truth-claims. Maclntyre's 
argument consists of two parts. In the first part, MacIntyre claims the 
rational superiority of Thomism over Aristotelianism and Augustinianism 
by showing that Thomism has been able to make a consistent amalgam of 
these two traditions which in part have been conflicting. The role of free 
will , the role of supernatural virtues, the consistency between faith and 
reason, the afterlife-based notion of happiness and a more comprehensive 
theory of truth were among the areas in which Thomism has exceeded the 
limits of the two other traditions. As the evaluation of this claim does not 
relate to the issues with which I have been concerned in the present chapter, 
I have not undertaken it here. 
In the second part, Maclntyre attempted to demonstrate the superiority 
of Thomism over its radical rivals by showing that these rivals are in a state 
of disarray, and these crises are not general features of morality; rather, they 
are related to the expulsion of some of the basic notions and ideals of the 
Aristotelian and the Thomistic traditions, i.e. the teleological and 
theological notion of human beings and the Aristotelian notion of the 
common good. In such a context, the Enlightenment project for the rational 
justification of morality failed, because the content of its morality stemmed 
from its own cultural background, which then was not possible to be 
formulated in terms of universally binding rules or procedures. The 
utilitarian alternative is not successful either, because in the absence of the 
Aristotelian notion of the common good, there would be incommensurable 
goods, which make the idea of maximizing the happiness of the majority 
nonsensical. Furthermore, this theory, MacIntyre holds, does not inform 
people of what their ends should be. 
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In Maclntyre's account, Thomism can provide a narrative for 
understanding the fa ilures of its rivals, in a way that they themselves cannot 
accomplish. This argument is in line with Maclntyre 's view of 
incommensurab ili ty as di scussed in the previous chapter. Maclntyre 's point 
is that we can make initial attempts to render some incommensurable 
schemes partly commensurable by depicting a narrative that can show and 
explain their merits and demerits, and can explain why some of them face 
an insuperable epistemological crisis. For instance, genealogy and Thomism 
might appear to be incommensurable, as there are no significant common 
standards by which to compare them; Thomism is based on theological 
convictions that genealogy would interpret as the wi ll to power or in terms 
of power-relationships. There is no common ground by which to start 
rational and non-subjective argwnents between them. As was argued above, 
in Maclntyre 's view, despite thi s state of incommensurability, Thomism can 
disclose the self-defeating nature of genealogy, and explain what has 
happened to morali ty, directing it in the path of genealogy. 
I then proceeded to show that Maclntyre 's claim about the rational 
superiori ty of Thomism over its riva ls is not convincing in two respects. 
Firstly, his exposition of this claim runs contrary to his method explained in 
the foregoing chapter in which he insisted that traditions must conclude the 
superiority of another tradition based on their own internal measures of 
rationality, and MacIntyre, as was di scussed there, used thi s method against 
the charge of relativism. There is, however, plenty of latitude in each of 
these traditions to reformulate themselves in order to respond to what 
MacIntyre takes to be an epistemological crisis. Even if Maclntyre 's method 
were successful , it would face the problem of intemali sm, and thus would 
fa ll short of providing a complete answer to relativism, as was explained in 
the previous chapter. 
As I have shown that Maclntyre's method does not sati sfy thi s 
intemalism condition, and that his claim regarding the superiority of 
Thomism springs from measures outside these traditions, we can then 
conclude that his case against relativism is strong, because he in fact 
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violates his intemalism, but at the expense of a failure to justify the 
superiority of Thomism. In other words, MacIntyre avoids the problem of 
relativism by di stancing himself from the intemalism of hi s method43; 
however, he then encounters the issue of justifying some external measures 
that amounts to the superiority of Thomism. These external measures, i.e. 
external to rival traditions, are Maclntyre's meta-ethical positions regarding 
the necessity of the objective account of the good and the narrative account 
of intelligibility for morality. I will return to this issue in the next chapter. 
Secondly, I argued that Thomism itself faces severe intellectual 
challenges, including the position of women, the status of infidels and those 
of other faiths, and the issue of moral responsibility and its relation to divine 
grace. 
In sum, Maclntyre ' s a priori inclination to Aristotelianism and 
Thomism explains hi s claim about the superiority of these two traditions 
over their rivals, which itself is based on Maclntyre's explicit expectation of 
a practical justification as an objective justification based on the notion of 
the good, and of intelligibility as based on a narrative unity. In the next 
chapter, I shall argue that these two accounts are not essential to morality, as 
di stinct from ethics; a distinction that will be explained there. I will then 
conclude that Maclntyre's claim about the superiority of Thomism and so 
the occurrence of moral and epistemological crisis in modern times is not 
sound. If there is a crisis in modem morality it can be resolved by appeal to 
the resources that are ava ilable in its di scourse, without the need for a 
Thomistic or Aristotelian notion of the good. 
43 1n other words, MacIntyre in theory approaches this internalism; but in practice, he adopts 
extemalism in the sense of having some external standards. 
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VI- Chapter 6: Criticizing Maclntyre's Notion of 
Narrative Intelligibility and Objective Practical 
Rationality 
VI.I Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Maclntyre 's claim about the 
rational superiori ty of Thomism over its ri va ls does not hold on the basis of 
the internal reasons of those traditions that MacIntyre thinks are, in fact, 
inferior to Thomism; MacIntyre, rather, has some meta-ethical assumptions 
which direct him toward this conclusion. These assumptions are 
Maclntyre 's view of narrative intelligibility and objecti ve practical 
rationality. In other words, when MacIntyre assumes the superiority of 
Aristote lianism and Thomism over its ri vals, and that modem morali ty is in 
a state of crisis, it is because he has in mind an ideal of narrative 
intelligibili ty and of objective practical rationality based on an objective 
good. The aim of thi s chapter is to challenge these two presuppositions, and 
to argue that these two accounts are not essential to either the intelligibil ity 
or the morality of actions, as distinct from the ethicality of actions in a sense 
that wi ll be explained later. I wi ll, thus, provide an alternative to 
Macintyre 's theory of morality and intelligibility. I finally will conclude 
that modem morali ty has resources within itself to handle moral issues 
without the need to acknowledge the superiority of Thomi sm or the need for 
an Aristotelian conception of the human good. 
My approach in thi s chapter, for reasons that wi ll be explained later, 
can be best described as a vulnerability approach, and is inspired by a 
particular interpretation of Kant ' s eth ics, which takes it not as a rigorously 
rule-based morality; but rather, takes it as a kind of moral ity that allows and 
cult ivates the necess ity of moral judgment in applying moral rules. I shal l 
begin with Maclntyre 's account of the intelligibility of actions, and then 
move on to di scuss his account of the objecti vity of the good. I should note 
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here that due to the considerations of space, the discussions in this chapter 
provide just an outline of a response to MacIntyre, and do not claim to offer 
a complete response to Maclntyre's critique of modern morality. 
VL2 Maclntyre's Account of Narrative Intelligibility 
The notion of narrative has received intensive attention in Maclntyre's 
work. This notion is tantamount to his notion of CT (the constitution thesis 
in particular in its methodological sense that was explained in chapter 2), as 
both emphasize a kind of continuity that is found in traditions. In the present 
discussion, I will be concerned with narrative in relation to human actions 
and their intelligibility, and will leave aside its methodological aspect. To 
explain, as was discussed in chapter 4, a recurring theme in Macintyre's 
work is that by offering a narrative we can attempt to resolve the 
incommensurability relation between two theories or two traditions in order 
to compare them with each other. MacIntyre (2006a, p.5) also emphasizes 
that "we are never in a position to claim that now we possess the truth or 
now we are fully rational." The most we can claim, according to MacIntyre, 
is that an account is the best account so far, and that our appraisal of the best 
account is always open to change in unpredictable ways (2006a, p.6). 
The above point is relevant to the methodological role of tradition, 
which was explained in chapter 2, according to which the best measures and 
accounts are defined in the context of a tradition. Based on this 
methodological interpretation, MacIntyre argues that the history of 
epistemology and ethics should be written as a moral narrative within 
evaluative frameworks, such that its different stages can be compared to 
each other. An example of this approach was given in the previous chapter 
in which MacIntyre narrated a story about the emergence of the tradition of 
genealogy. However, I am not concerned in this chapter with this aspect of 
narrative, and instead I shall emphasize Maclntyre's notion of narrative as a 
part of his philosophy of action which deals with the intelligibility of 
actions. 
To recall, as was explained in chapter 1 in connection with Maclntyre 's 
social teleology, a narrative is a story that merges an agent' s different 
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practices and episodes into each other in order to fo rm a unified li fe which 
runs from hi s birth to his death ( 198 1, p.217). The narrative account of life 
posits a notion of the good that should be pursued by the agent through the 
in ternal goods of his various practices. Practices, in Maclntyre's view 
(I 986a, pp.74-75), are necessary but not always sufficient condi tions fo r the 
inte lligib ili ty of actions. To explain this, I need to discuss further 
Maclntyre's account of action. 
Action in "any full-blooded sense", MacIntyre ho lds, cannot be 
unintelligent. An unintelligent action is not an action. Neither can an action 
be an individual isolated one. An action is an action only in light of its 
relation to the agent 's "antecedent states, relationships and transactions". 
The idea of an action without relation to a context is, he claims, a myth 
(1987b, pp.24-25). MacIntyre di stinguishes an action from a body 
movement in that the fonner is purposeful and intentional. For instance, the 
act of nodding is an action when it is performed for some purposes that are 
socially recognized as related to that act, for instance for showing consent; 
otherwise, the nod might be a nervous tick that happens to the agent without 
him having particular purposes. Nodding as an action requires reasons; by 
contrast, a tick requires causes ( 1959a, p. 89). 
Other conditions apply, in Maclntyre's account, to render a purposeful 
action intelligible. An action should occur in a sequence of and in relation to 
other actions to become intelligible. Suppose that a person stands in front of 
you and nods without having any background relationship with you. The 
agent in thi s case might have purposes, but you cannot understand what his 
purpose or intention is due to lack of thi s background relationship. As 
contrasted with thi s, a student's action of nodding in a classroom to hi s 
teacher is intelligible, i.e. meaningful , and indicates that he is in agreement 
with the teacher, or that he has understood a point. As MacIntyre ( 1982a, 
p.664) puts it, "What makes a particular sequence of human actions 
intelligible or unintelligible is both its relationship to antecedent ep isodes 
and its present character. " 
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Intelligibility, in Maclntyre's view, is an objective feature of actions, in 
the sense that others should acknowledge the intelligibility of an action, and 
"it is not in the eye of the beholder" (1986a, p.64); however, this makes it 
difficult to understand MacIntyre where he holds that some actions might 
seem unintelligible to others, while they are in fact intelligible, and vice 
versa; in other words, if intelligibility is an objective feature, how an action 
might be intelligible to the individual and not to others, and vice versa. This 
latter possibility gives a sense of subjectivity to the notion of intelligibility. 
due to ignorance or a mistake regarding the sequences of actions on the part 
of these observers (1986a, p.64). 
An agent might rightly take his action as intelligible due to his 
knowledge of the sequences of actions in which this act has occurred; 
whereas the observers lack this knowledge, and so intelligibility here 
becomes subjective and in the eye of the beholder. In my view, we can 
distinguish between intelligibility to others and to the agent44; a distinction 
that does not appear in Maclntyre's work, as he holds "We become what 
others already took us to be" (1986a, p.64).45 As opposed to this, we can 
imagine individuals who resist the kind of identity that others impose on 
them. I will return to this issue below. 
The relation of an action to the agent' s antecedent states and 
transactions, for MacIntyre, is not sufficient for rendering all actions 
intelligible, particularly those actions that happen in practices and contexts 
which are different from that of ordinary and routine life. Maclntyre's 
44 As will be explained below, this distinction does not mean that the inte lligibil ity to the 
agent is in principle a private issue, and so it does not face Wittgensteinian private language 
problems. 
45 It seem s that we can understand how MacIntyre might be able to expl ain the subjectivity 
of the notion of intelligibility in the sense explained above by appealing to this text where 
he writes that "we can only become the authors of intelligible action through making our 
own a kind of understanding and a certain set of judgments which were originally imposed 
upon us by others" (1 986a, p.64) (Italics added). The term "originall y" suggests that we 
might be able to revise later what others have imposed upon us; however, thi s 
interpretation, which lessens the difference between me and MacIntyre, requires a bit of 
change in Maclntyre's text, in particular, where he writes that intelligibility " is not in the 
eye of the beholder" ( 1986a, p.64). My argument presented in chapter 2 for defending that 
MacIntyre is not a conservative communitarian also supports this possible interpretation. I 
am also grateful for Lutz for his note on this point. 
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example for this is a person eating out of hunger the last member of a fruit-
spec ies in a research practice (1986a, p.73). This action is intelligible in the 
context of nonnal life, unlike in thi s research practi ce, because the action 
can be accounted fo r w ith good reasons in the fonner, but not in the latter 
case. 
The limits of intelligibility, then, are the limits of the stock of good 
reasons that we can provide for an action, and what counts as a good reason 
depends on the context of particular practices that, based on their internal 
goods, detennine what a good reason for acting is. The good reason should 
be recognized as such in the practice, and thi s would not be a matter of 
arbitrary or purely individual decision; as MacIntyre (1986a, pp.67-68) puts 
it: 
It is central to initiation and education into practi ces that we 
have to learn both what counts as a good reason for acting 
in one way rather than another and how to be guided by 
good reasons. To be good at whatever it is- architecture, 
say, or fanning or geometry or chess-is to be guided 
towards the recognized goods of the particular practice by 
di spositions informed by ri ght reasoning . 
All good reasons, thus, are good reasons in a particular context and 
practi ce, even when the agent cites these reasons to himself. The express ion 
of desires and "wants", which in Anscombe's view does not even count as a 
piece of practical reasoning at all , for MacIntyre could serve as a reason in 
some contexts, for example, if a child eats the aforementioned fruit, hi s 
hunger would be an intelligible piece of practical reason ing ( 1986a, p.73). 
An important point here is that, MacIntyre ( 1986a, p.76) contends, an 
appeal to basic wants and needs in appropriate con texts counts as a good 
reason in any cultura l order. The provision "any cul tural order" is 
sign ificant, as it provides a minimum basis for the eva luation of differen t 
cu ltures . To go intel ligibly beyond these basic needs requires the context of 
a practice. 
The limits of intelligibility, thus, are the limits of the good reasons that 
the agent can provide for his actions in a given culture at a specific stage of 
its development. The limits are not fixed , just as a poet can go beyond the 
246 
existing stock of vocabulary and expressions; however, the poet's utterances 
would be intelligible if he utters them in light of the practice of poetry so 
far. This practice, like other ones, is not a closed domain, and can 
indefinably extend, "albeit only stage by stage" (1986a, p.76). 
Besides practices, and contexts at the level of practice, there is a larger 
framework that is essential for the intelligibility of some actions. This 
framework is a narrative which integrates an agent's different practices, his 
past events and memories into a single life. Maclntyre 's example for thi s 
runs as follows. Suppose that X's wife has been tortured to death in a 
concentration camp. X goes to a supermarket for his shopping, and 
exchanges the same kind of friendly conversation with the owner that he is 
used to doing with other shopkeepers. All of a sudden, X recognizes in the 
supermarket 's owner a guard who has served in the concentration camp 
where his wife has been tortured to death. MacIntyre holds that if X 
continues to have amiable conversations with the supermarket's owner, his 
action would be unintelligible due to the place of this agent in the tragic 
narrative of his life (1986a, p.74). 
Practices and enacted narratives provide a public world in which there 
are public standards for intelligibility. The agent 's inner li fe would be 
intelligible to him, if it has been constructed according to these public 
standards. Agents' private consciousness of their inner lives depends on 
their ability to interact socially with others in practices, and to understand 
and to recognize as true what others impute to them (1986a, p.74). 
Genuinely human consciousness is a consciousness that has been 
scrutinized by the consciousness of others, and thus it is necessarily 
embodied, despite the Platonist and Cartesian view (1986a, p.78). 
As was remarked above, in Maclntyre's view, the intelligibility of an 
action lies in its relation to the agent' s antecedent states and transactions 
among which are actions that stand in relation to further actions, such that 
"the intelligibility of an action derives ultimately from narrative continuities 
in the agent' s life. The form of our understanding of intelligib ility is 
therefore [a] narrative form" (I 987b, pp.24-25). According to this narrative 
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understanding, an action becomes intelligible as a part of a story in the 
agent's life- a story with more or less coherence, which may encompass a 
greater or lesser part of hi s life ( 1987b, p.25). 
MacIntyre (I 98 I , p.2 16) holds that a human being is essentia lly a 
story-telling animal. He is not the author of his own stories; he enters into 
human society wi th one or more " imputed characters" which should be 
understood as a condition for maintaining interactions with others . A child 
learns the requirements of different characters and "the ways of the world" 
through stori es . The kind of unity that a character has in a story provides the 
background for a personal identity. The empiricists such as Locke and 
Hume and contemporary ana lytical philosophers, MacIntyre ( I 98 I , p.217) 
states, have fa iled to notice this background of a personal identity. In thi s 
view, the person is what he is taken by others to be in the course of li ving 
out a story that runs from his birth to hi s death. Without this unity, and if a 
person's narrative does not belong to larger narratives, as J. R. Weinstein 
(2003 , p.53) ascribes to MacIntyre, his li fe becomes meaningless and 
un inte lligible to him, which occurs when his narrative loses its point and 
climax ( I 98 1, p.2 17). 
Maclntyre's ideal of life, thus, is a un itary life as it is depicted in the 
li fe of a character in a story. This account makes the notions of narrative, 
intelligibility and accountabi lity interdependent. A person who is the subject 
of an encompassing narrative is accountable for his actions and experiences 
which form the narrative, and if he could provide good reasons for his 
actions, they would be intelligible. All these three concepts, i.e. narrative, 
intelligibility and accountab ility, presuppose the notion of personal identity 
formed through narratives (1981 , pp.217-218). 
Maclntyre's narrative account runs against any philosophical or 
sociological view of the self that does not take it as essentially continuous 
through its different roles, or does not take actions as intrinsica ll y belonging 
to a kind of narrative, or what takes a narrative as a form imposed by the 
agent on his absurd actions to make them intelligible (I 987b, p.25). 
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An example of the first view referred to above, MacIntyre (1981, 
pp.204-205) holds, is Erving Goffman's sociological theory in which the 
self and his life are liquidized into the series of unconnected roles and 
episodes. The second view is represented by Sartre 's existentialism and in 
the sociological theory of Ralf Dahrendorf, according to which the self is 
segregated from its roles. Besides these two kinds of theories, the tendency 
in analytical philosophy to analyse human actions and to think atomistically 
about them constitutes, in Maclntyre 's view, a barrier against the narrative 
understanding of human life and human actions. MacIntyre states these 
views which are characteristic of modem thought and practice make the 
uni ty of human life invisible to us (I 981, pp.204-205). 
One salient feature of contemporary social life, in Maclntyre's view, is 
the compartmentalization of human roles ; i.e. individual and social life has 
been partitioned into separate spheres such as home, workplace and 
consumption each of which has its own measures of success and failure, and 
requires particular habits for the effective pursuit of these roles. In such a 
view, "The self is distributed among a multiplicity of roles" ; whereas for 
Aristotle or Hume, "virtues are attributes of the whole person" (1992a, 
p.195). As a result of this compartmentalization, .Macintyre ([ 1999b] 
20060, p.197) holds, individuals as they move between different 
independent roles dissolve into these roles, and there remains no external 
position from which they can scrutinize these roles and their requirements. 
This explains how MacIntyre thinks the modem self has lost its unitary 
feature by being di ssolved into different roles and spheres. 
MacIntyre favours the Aristotelian account of the virtues and of the 
se lf as opposed to the modem socio-philosophical views mentioned above, 
because the Aristotelian virtues assume a unitary life, and the virtues are 
expressed in a whole life in its entirety, not like professional skills in 
particular roles and areas of a life. A virtuous person, in the Ari stotelian 
view, is expected to exhibit the same dispositions on different occasions on 
some of which they might not even be as efficient as professional skills 
(I 98 1, p.205). 
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At this point, Maclntyre's discuss ion of intelligibility as narrative 
intelligibi li ty relates to his account of the good as being objective. The 
Aristotelian account of the se lf paves the way for a narrative understanding 
of actions, because it is based on a notion of the good that consists in 
fulfilling human functions, and presents the good life as a single move 
toward the good; MacIntyre captures thi s point as fo llows. 
What is important is to recognize that each life is a single, if 
complex, narrative of a particular subject, someone whose 
li fe is a whole into which the different parts have to be 
integrated, so that the pursuit of the goods of home and 
family reinforces the pursuit of the goods of the workplace 
and vice versa, and so too with the other di verse goods of a 
particular li fe. To integrate them is a task, a task rarely, if 
ever, completed (2002, p. I 0). 
The preceding remarks suffice to explain what Maclntyre's account of 
narrative intelligibility is, and how it relates to an overarching account of 
the good which informs the unity of thi s narrative. In what follows, I shall 
sketch further Maclntyre 's account of the good in order to explain his 
underlying reasons fo r espousing Aristotel ianism and Thomism, and will 
fina lly deliver my own criticism of his entire moral theory. 
In my view, it is poss ible to find at least three accounts of the good in 
Macintyre ' s work. The first one is an account of the good that is rooted in 
human nature. Human beings as the members of a natural kind have an 
essence that awaits actualization through the good life. In th is Ari stotelian 
view, moral precepts are instructions about "how to reali ze our true nature 
and reach our true end" ( 1981 , p.52). This rea lization occurs by di sciplining 
our desires and by cultivating those habits of action that ethics prescribes. 
This account of the good implies the existence of a state of affa irs which 
should be realized as a result of the observance of morality; it is "human-
nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-rea/ized-its-te/os " ( 1981, p.52). 
The second account is the good in the sense of being in quest of the 
good, that is, "the good li fe fo r man is the life spent in seeking fo r the good 
li fe for man, and the virtues necessary fo r the seeking are those which wi ll 
enable us to understand what more and what else the good li fe for man is" 
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(1981, p.219). This means that we are on a journey that does not have a 
specific destination beyond what is involved in the journey-itself, and does 
not depend on a specific content of the good. 
The third account is the good as a kind of happiness that is internal to 
an activity performed for the sake of its internal goods ( 1978, p.17), that is, 
"the state of being well and doing well in being well" (1981 , p.148). In this 
account, the good is not something to be achieved in the future; rather, it lies 
in the way our whole life is structured. 
I think, with Maclntyre 's later metaphysical and Thomistic tendency 
(2007, p.xi), the first account of the good has dominated the two others, and 
directed them toward itself; as a result, being in search of the good or 
enjoying a well-structured life is not sufficient for human flouri shing. In 
other words, according to Maclntyre ' s later approach good functions of 
practices and traditions are related to the fact that human beings are directed 
toward their specific ends set by their nature. MacIntyre makes this point in 
his 2007 prologue to After Virtue: 
1 had now learned from Aquinas that my attempt to provide 
an account of the human good purely in social tenns, in 
terms of practices, traditions, and the narrative uni ty of 
human lives, was bound to be inadequate ~ntil I had 
provided it with a metaphysical grounding. It is only 
because human beings have an end towards which they are 
directed by reason of their specific nature, that practices, 
traditions, and the like are able to function as they do (1981, 
p.xi). 
This account of the good based on features of human nature gives 
unification to human life from the agent's birth to his death; as MacIntyre 
puts it: 
In what does the unity of an individual life consist? The answer 
is that its unity is the unity of a narrati ve embodied in a single 
life. To ask ' What is the good for me?' is to ask how best I 
might live out that unity and bring it to completion (198 I , 
p.218). 
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The argument so far indicates that the good li fe for MacIntyre is a 
unified single li fe which is directed toward the good as the reali zation of the 
true essence of human beings. This unified life imparts intelligibi li ty to 
human actions and li fe, because, as argued above, intelligibi li ty requires the 
posi tioning of an action in the sequence of the agent' s antecedent states and 
actions which necessari ly continue to form a whole life. Also, intelligibility 
requires the form ation of actions and their underlying intentions on the basis 
of socially and contextually recognized standards. 
Despite Maclntyre's contention that the objectivity of the good is 
recognized only from specific perspectives that already presuppose that 
objectivity, and that it is not possible to vindicate it without a prior 
ob ligation to a perspective (1993, p.17), the best interpretation of his view is 
that, as F. Trifir6 (2006, p.131) attributes to him, "objectivity in ethics is 
poss ible only within the Aristotelian scheme of moral reasoning and 
practice based on a functional conception of a human being as having an 
essential purpose, function or telos". 
The socio-narrative intelligibili ty of actions and the objective good are 
two underlying reasons for Macintyre's belief that modem morali ty is 
fragmented, and that the Aristotelian/Thomistic account of practica l reason 
and morality is superior to their modem rivals. As I discussed in the 
fo regoing chapter, this superiori ty, despite Maclntyre 's claim, would not be 
acknowledged internally by these ri va l traditions, and it should be 
understood in light of Maclntyre 's meta-ethical positions regarding the 
notions of intelligibility and the good. 
My main criti cism of Maclntyre's proj ect, on the basis of which I wi ll 
conclude thi s thesis, addresses these two meta-ethical pos itions. I shall start 
with Maclntyre ' s account of the intelligibility of actions, and then tum to 
hi s account of the objecti ve good. 
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VI.2.1 A Criticism of Maclntyre's Account of the Intelligibility of 
Actions 
In this section, I shall criticize two aspects of Macintyre's account of 
intelligibility. The first aspect is his view, explained above, that "the 
intelligibility of an action derives ultimately from narrative continuities in 
the agent's life" (1987b, p.24). The second aspect is his view that 
intelligibility " is not in the eye of the beholder", and that it should be based 
on good reasons recognized as such by others (1986a, p.64). 
With regard to the first point, in my view, the narrative account of 
intelligibility is neither necessary nor desirable for all actions. We do not 
need, and it is not always good, to place all our actions in the context of a 
narrative continuity to make them intelligible. I oppose Maclntyre 's claim 
that "behaviour is only characterised adequately when we know what the 
longer and longest-term intentions are and how the shorter-term intentions 
are related to the longer" (1981 , p.208). As J.B. Schneewind (1982, p.653) 
puts it, narrative continuity and story-telling are not necessary for 
intelligibility: 
It is not true that the only characterization of behaviour 
which is adequate to make it intelligible requires setting it 
in the frame of the " longest-term intentions" of the agent. 
We may adequately explain some movements by saying 
that the person is dancing a jig and we can explain what a 
jig is without telling a story; ... But the actions in which we 
do a dance or carry on a tradition need not themselves be 
explained by a narrative. An account of just what the dance 
is may suffice. 
Macintyre 's response to Schneewind is along the lines that "his 
[Schneewind's] use of explain is very different from my [Maclntyre 's] use 
of 'make intelligible '. For, someone's dancing a jig on a particular occasion 
is never intelligible just because his or her action falls under that description 
and that we understand what a jig is. Someone's dancing during a 
philosophical discussion is primafacie unintelligible" (1982a, p.664). 
I agree with MacIntyre that actions need a context from which they 
derive their meaning and intelligibility, but this context does not need to be 
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as wide as a story or a whole human life. We do not need to take into 
account the relation of each action to its infinite antecedent actions. For 
instance, my act of pressing the keys on the keyboard becomes meaningful 
as an act of typing when we consider the whole function of a computer for a 
student. The intelligibility of thi s act is not dependent on my life stories or 
my longest-term intentions. My intention might be to spam people by 
sending fake emails to them, or to type a chapter of my thesis, for both of 
which the pressing of the keys would count as an inte lligible act of typing. 
These two intentions, to follow MacIntyre, are in fact related to my 
life ' s past stori es . If I intend to spam, it is perhaps because I need money, 
and this is, in tum, related to what has happened to me that has rendered me 
poor. It is also related to the fact that I am not constrained by moral ideals 
which would rule this action out, which can further be explained in relation 
to the social and educational setting in which I have grown up, and thi s 
chain could endless ly continue. 
A simi lar story can be told for my act of writing a piece of my thesis. 
This act is related to the past events in my life, which have directed me to 
become a student, then a student of philosophy, then to select a particular 
topic. None of these background stories are necessary for the intelligibili ty 
of my action. What is sufficient here is a socially recognized function such 
as typing, using an instrument known as a computer. My intentions do not 
contribute to my act becoming as an intelligible stance of typing, in so fa r as 
it complies with the genera l framework that is socially recognized as typing. 
If I trespass against that estab li shed framework, fo r instance by using my 
toes for pressing the keys, my action might not be regarded as typing 
proportionate with the degree it deviates from that recognized framework. 
The outward conformity of my actions to a socially recognized form of 
behaviour in appropriate contexts makes them intelligible in the eyes of 
others. These contexts, which are determined by conventions, do not need to 
take the shape of long-term intentions or stories, let alone of a narrative 
unity. We do not need, as MacIntyre (1981, p.212) thinks, to take actions as 
having a basica ll y historical character; the act of typing has a hi story or 
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histories, but my position in this history is not required for the intelligibility 
ofmy action. 
The action of a person who dances a jig in the middle of a 
philosophical discussion is unintelligible as it is unconventional ; in this 
case, the reasons that would be offered by the person or guessed by us might 
be along the lines that he had been puzzled by a difficult issue in the 
discussion, or he has received unexpected exciting news, and these reasons 
suffice to render that action intelligible. There is no need to investigate his 
long-term intentions and why he has had difficulty in understanding that 
issue which has made him dance in an inappropriate context. There is no 
need for an appeal to a narrative unity for the intelligibility of an action, in 
so far as we can provide short or middle-range reasons for it. 
I also think this appeal to a narrative unity is not always 
psychologically desirable. All people usually have bitter experiences in their 
lives, which they are better off forgetting. To insist on a unified life and 
story-telling as a feature of human beings might mean that we can never 
discard these experiences. The self is capable of breaking with a disturbing 
narrative in order to start a new story. On this basis, I think Maclntyre's 
point mentioned earlier regarding the unintelligibility of the cordial 
conversation of the man whose wife had been killed in a concentration camp 
is not compelling, because he may have decided to forget his past upsetting 
memories, and to forgive those people who have contributed to those events 
in order for him to lead a happier life. The emphasis on long-term intentions 
and past stories might cause obsessive patterns of thought and behaviour. 
So far, I have argued that the narrative account of intelligibility 1s 
neither necessary nor always psychologically good. In what follows, I shall 
attend to the second aspect of my criticism of MacIntyre concerning his 
view that intelligibility is an objective feature, and in the eyes of others not 
in the individual 's. 
In my view, MacIntyre here has unduly dissolved the individual into 
the social. Our actions sometimes are unintelligible to others, in the sense 
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that whatever good reasons we offer for them they would not be acceptable 
to those outsiders, while they are intelligible to the agent himself. 
The story of Noah and his ark is a good example fo r thi s. When Noah 
and his few supporters were building the ark on the basis of a belief in God 
and His decree, the majority of the people took their action to be 
unintelligible; as the Quran says, "And he [Noah] constructed the ship, and 
whenever an assembly of the eminent of hi s people passed by him, they 
ridiculed him . He said, 'If you ridicule us, then we wi ll ridicule you just as 
you ridicule us"' (Quran, 11.38, Sahih International Translation). In fact, the 
construction of a ship in that geographical position was not thought by these 
people to be based on good reasons; but this was so because they did not 
have the background faith which was availab le to Noah and his supporters. 
On similar grounds, the act of Abraham in breaking down the city's 
idols was not at all intelligible to the people, while it was intelligib le to him 
against a background of monotheistic beliefs. It is true that Abraham 
appeals to the act of destroying which is socially recognized as a sign of 
protest in order to express his attitude; however, the application of thi s act to 
the idols was not socially intelligible. As a result, I think, intelligibility 
retains a significant degree of subjecti vity, without enta iling the existence of 
a private language. Thus, Maclntyre's claim that "We become what others 
already took us to be" is not warranted ( 1986a, p.64). 
So far, in my criticism of Maclntyre 's account of intelligibi lity, I have 
addressed two points, namely, I have argued that the intelligibi li ty of actions 
does not depend on a narrative unity of intentions, and that intelligibility is 
not totally an objective feature of actions. The underlying principle which 
connects these two points together is that the locus of intelligib ili ty and 
practical rationality lies or should li e in the individual. 
The individual has the capacity to count what others think 
unintelligible as intelligible due to a backdrop of beliefs that is accessible 
only to him. He also has the capacity to break out of a long-term narrati ve to 
start a new course of actions based on intentions that might appear to be 
un intelligible from the point of view of that narrative; while they are 
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intelligible from his current perspective. If the agent shares his grounds for 
the intelligibility of this action, the reasonable public should be convinced 
of that intelligibility; however, as the public might not be conscious of that 
background, or not willing to accept it, it might not judge the action 
intelligible; nevertheless, the reasonable audience is expected to admit the 
intelligibility of the action if it is aware of the relevant background beliefs; 
accordingly, my argument here does not entail the existence of a private 
language. The individual communicates with the public on the basis of a 
shared language. As an example, the aforementioned man whose wife had 
been killed in the camp can quite reasonably expect to convince the public 
of the intelligibility of his cordial greeting with the former official, because 
this performance is based on the justifiable goodness of having a 
psychologically happy life which requires forgetting, to the extent that is 
possible, past painful narratives of life. This underlying ground is in 
principle mutually justifiable, though it might not be at first glance 
accessible to observers. Accordingly, my appeal to the individual here does 
not lead to having a private language, because the grounds of his reasoning 
are basically accessible to the reasonable public. 
In order to support this claim about the self, according to which it is 
able to break its entangling narratives, I again appeal to Aquinas' account of 
the intellect which is endorsed by MacIntyre. The intellect, as was explained 
in chapter 3, becomes formally, and not materially, identical with objects in 
the knowledge-process. The intellect does not become the thing by 
absorbing its form; as a result, the intellect always retains a higher 
perspective from that of the object, and is not dissolved into its particular 
perspective. I used this argument in chapter 4, on behalf of MacIntyre, 
against the charge of perspectivism. Here, I intend to employ this argument 
against the narrative account of intelligibility offered by MacIntyre. 
The Thomistic account of the intellect has individualistic aspects. The 
individual intellect, by the aid of other intellects, comes to perceive the 
world and form its own normative judgments based on the standards that it 
seeks to collectively justify; however the intellect and the self are not 
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passive constructs of the social. The view that we understand ourselves as 
others take us to be is more compatible with Mac[ntyre's earlier social 
approach than with his later metaphysical view. The point is that if we take 
human beings as possessing an essence that should be realized through their 
social and moral li ves, or a nature that requires some norms for its nonnal 
functioning, it follows that they are not totall y social creations; as T. R. 
Machan ( 1998, p.1 69) states the point: 
Thomism draws on Aristotle and thus affirn1s the role of the 
individual ethical agent, since Aquinas takes seriously the 
place of the individual's moral choice or initiative, as did 
Aristotle. As such, there appears to be no major opposition 
between the main thrust of Western Chri stianity and 
indiv idualism, especially if one adds to this the distinctive 
Chri sti an doctrine that every individual person is a child of 
God and has the responsibility to achieve everlasting 
salvation by his or her own chosen beliefs and perhaps 
deeds. 
The point is not that the individual is free to choose the grounds of hi s 
identity or arguments, or that he should not be concerned with the public 
justification of hi s claims; rather, the point is that the individual is entitled to 
di sagree with the group of which he is a member; nevertheless, he shou ld 
believe that he would, in principle, be able to show the rational ity of hi s 
di ssenting posi tion to others. 
What the agent finds as good reasons, which form the basis of the 
intelligibility of his actions in hi s own eye, might be different from the point 
of view of the community, and so the agent is not necessaril y what the 
community takes him to be. In order to avoid the private language 
implication, [ again ins ist that the individual should hold that hi s beliefs are 
rationally justifiable to a reasonable audience. 
Despite Maclntyre's view that the individual is not a substantial moral 
agent, that is to say, we cannot arti culate a moral ity for him without taking 
into account his place in a socia l and cultural setting (1983a, p.454) , the 
position that is required by hi s interpretation of the natura l law tradition is 
that the individual by nature has an inclination toward a particular kind of 
morality, though this inclination needs a particular socia l and cultural 
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context for its cultivation. So my evaluation is that MacIntyre in his 
treatment of the notion of intelligibility unduly dissolves the individual into 
the community or into his past narrative unity. The passage below from 
MacIntyre, which presents the notion of the individual as a modem 
linguistic innovation, reveals his attitude. 
The classical view begins with the community of the polis 
and with the individual viewed as having no moral identity 
apart from the communities of kinship and citizenship; ... 
the word "individual," used as I have been using it, is itself 
a linguistic innovation in the period which marks the origins 
of modem morality. Until the seventeenth century the word 
"individual" is almost exclusively a technical term of logic, 
contrasted with the word "class," ... (1978, p.23). 
This approach reflects Macintyre ' s earlier social teleology according to 
which the identity of a human being is the identity of a character in a story 
with a single life through that story; an identity which is constructed in the 
eyes of others; as he put it, " I am what I may justifiably be taken by others 
to be in the course of living out a story that runs from my birth to my death" 
(1981 , p.217). 
This view is also indebted to Marx ' s acc01,1_nt as, for instance, is 
reflected in his 6th thesis in Theses on Feuerbach in which he states " .. . the 
essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In 
reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations". 
MacIntyre endorses Marx's criticism of Feuerbach, as the latter takes 
the individual as abstract from social relationships; MacIntyre rejects the 
view that "the human essence must be specifiable by reference only to 
properties possessed by individuals apart from and in independence of their 
social relationships" ([1994]1998a, p.228). MacIntyre would struggle to 
make this social/Marxist view compatible with Aquinas ' s account of the self 
and with his own account of the natural law tradition. The appeal to human 
nature in the natural law tradition requires believing that human beings' 
main cognitive and normative capacity is an asset that already exists within 
them, which needs the proper conditions to flourish. As Aquinas (ST, I-II, 
Q.94, Art.6) contends, the knowledge of the primary precepts of the natural 
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law "can nowise be blotted out from men 's hearts"; only sin can abolish this 
knowledge in particular cases, and not uni versa lly. It is not clear to me at all 
how thi s notion of men or human beings would be different from the notion 
of the individual who MacIntyre so severely criticizes and presents as a 
modem moral innovation. 
The individual so understood is not necessari ly an egoisti c entity who 
faces the problem of rational justificat ion fo r other-regarding moral ity. The 
nature of this individualisti c good is such that its appropri ate development 
requires social relationships and fellow-fee ling. These social relationshi ps, 
however, are not to the extent that, as it is the case in the Aristotelian 
account of virtue-ethics, agents do not know the virtues independently of the 
wisdom of the wise. In this view, onl y the man of phronesis is ab le to 
determine the mean point and thus the virtues. 
In thi s section, I argued that MacIntyre faces a consistency problem 
between hi s account of intelligibility and hi s account of the natural law 
tradit ion according to which moral precepts direct the agent toward hi s true 
essence. Maclntyre 's account of the intelligibility of actions liquefies the 
identity of the individual into the na1Tative unity of his past events, or into 
what the communi ty interprets and takes him to be. As MacIntyre (1986a, 
pp.67-68) stated, the range of intell igibi lity is the range of good reasons that 
the individual can provide; but in my view, the ind ividual can differ from 
the communi ty in what he takes to be good reasons and so in what he takes 
to be inte lligible. The identi ty of the individual is not totally as a social 
creature, and so he has a cogni tive or nonnative capacity to resist 
intell igibly the mora l judgments of the community, and to maintain that hi s 
own view is rationally superior to that of the communi ty to which he 
belongs. In fact, MacIntyre himself confim,s that the individual has the 
capacity to transcend the communi ty, and he wou ld thus enforce the 
criticism that I made above; as MacIntyre puts it: 
Notice also that the fact that the self has to find its mora l 
identity in and through its membership in communities such 
as those of the fam ily, the neighborhood, the city and the 
tribe does not entai l that the se lf has to accept the moral 
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limitations of the particularity of those forms of community 
(1981 , p.221). 
As a result, the narrative understanding of intelligibility, which insists 
on a single and unified life as a condition of the intelligibi lity of human 
actions, is neither required nor psychologically always good for the 
individual. The narrative understanding might be necessary for the 
intelligibility of our entire life as a whole, but not for individual actions 
which occur in our life. Our individual actions will be intelligible in the eyes 
of others if they comply with social ly recognized trends. A limited context 
that contains the individual's proximate intentions would be sufficient for 
the intelligibility or unintelligibility of his actions, both in his and others' 
view. Accordingly, there remains much space for an individual to assess the 
intelligibility of his actions apart from his own past narratives or from his 
community. 
If it is the case that this narrative understanding of intelligibility, as 
espoused by MacIntyre, is not a necessary condition for the intelligibility of 
actions, then one of Maclntyre's implicit reasons for taking Aristotelianism 
and Thomism to be superior to their rivals, and for taking modem morality 
to be fragmented would founder, because we can make our moral 
evaluations and actions intelligible without holding to a narrative picture of 
human life. This was my first criticism of MacIntyre; in the next section, I 
shall discuss and criticize his view that the notion of the human good is 
necessary for morality. Just as proximate intentions can intelligibly explain 
actions, proximate goods can justify morality; in other words, despite 
Maclntyre's claim, the justification of morality does not need to be based on 
the human final telos. 
Vl.3 The Justification of Morality Based on Human Vulnerability 
The basic thrust of this chapter has been to challenge Maclntyre' s 
meta-ethical positions which underlie his support for the superiority of 
Aristotelianism and Thomism. In the previous section, I addressed one of 
these positions, namely, a narrative understanding of the notion of 
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intelligibi li ty. This understanding is best fulfilled in an Aristotelian and 
Thomistic moral scheme due to the fact that an overriding notion of the 
good allows fo r a single and unified life, and thus for a narrative unity and a 
narrative intelligib ility. 
In this section, I shall argue that the justification of the precepts of 
morality does not need to be based on the human final telos. If I show this, 
Maclntyre's claim that modem morality is a fragmented version of the 
classical scheme, and so is bereft of rational justification, would be called 
into question. 
I argued above that we can at least find three accounts of the good in 
Maclntyre 's work, namely, the good as the realization of the human 
essence, the good as being in an enduring search for the good, and the good 
as being well and doing well in being well which is the life of the virtues. I 
also stated that the first account based on the human telos is the dominant 
view of the good in Maclntyre's later work. 
Based on the first account, and in line with the third account, 
MacIntyre claims that "the exercise of the virtues is itself a crucial 
component of the good life for man" (1981, p.1 84); however, what the first 
account adds to the third one is the role of human essence and telos in 
deterrnining what counts as a virtue; as MacIntyre (1981, p.1 84) puts the 
point approvingly from Aristotle 's view, "It is the telos of man as a species 
which determines what human qualities are virtues." The human ultim ate 
good orders human heterogeneous goods into a complex unity, and 
"contributes to the complex unity of the kind of life that it is good and best 
for human beings to pursue" ( 1998c, p.98). 
In this section, I seek to argue that we can have an account of morality, 
which can to a great extent regulate our relationships to each other, without 
introducing the contested notion of the human telos, and needing a complex 
unity of human life. 
My argument here rests on a di stinction between the two notions of 
morality and ethics. By ethics I mean what MacIntyre has in mind when he 
speaks of morality which in hi s view needs the notion of the human good 
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for its justification. His account of morality, as explained above, depends 
on a unified picture of human life in which different stages of a human life 
should be connected to each other on the basis of an ultimate good. The 
morality of actions in this scheme derives from the contribution of the 
actions in bringing about the good and the best. I call this account of 
morality, which is based on an ultimate good, ethics. 
Ethics, despite the intentions of its proponents, is inevitably 
particularistic and related to particular traditions. The reason for this is that 
ethics concerns the good of which there are different accounts in different 
traditions, or indeed, in a single tradition that experiences value-pluralism. 
Ethics is thus loaded with local values which may include metaphysical and 
theological claims. 
By morality, as distinct from ethics, I mean the principles and also the 
virtues that are justified by appeal to basic goods, and not to the ultimate 
good, and that are justifiable to any reasonable agent, as will be explained 
below. 
Tfwe admit that simplicity is a merit for a theory, then a moral theory 
that can justify our moral obligations with less complexity should be 
preferred to a more complicated moral justification. The content of the 
ultimate good, even in Aquinas' and Maclntyre's view, is not accessible to 
secular reason. In their views, what secular reason can ultimately take us to 
know regarding the ultimate good is that no finite object can fully satisfy 
our desires; reason cannot go beyond this to specify the nature of our 
friendship with God as our ultimate good which is to be achieved through 
faith and a life of hope and charity (2009a, p. 75). Accordingly, the ultimate 
good- which directs and supplements the goods of family, political and 
community life- has a theological aspect which can function as the basis of 
a community-based ethics. 
Recall that one of the predicaments of contemporary life in 
Maclntyre's view is the fact that philosophical arguments have become 
sterile and interminable due to an umestricted pluralism and a lack of 
agreement on the notion of the good (I 981, p.11 ). One problem regarding 
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the practi cability of Maclntyre ' s alternative concerns how we can arri ve at a 
shared account of the human telos from this fragmented and plurali sti c state. 
Macintyre ' s response to thi s question is that we should not expect to 
accomplish thi s task via philosophi ca l argumentation; in his view, "The 
philosophy of the virtues has to be transformed into a politics of the virtues" 
(1990c, p.248). His point is that the required agreement on the virtues can 
be achieved in the shared li fe of small local communities in which the 
people have shared beliefs and similar life-styles, and not through 
philosophical arguments. Practi cal habituations in these communities fos ter 
the virtues in the lives of individuals, which then render theoreti ca l 
education effecti ve; as MacIntyre puts it from Aquinas ' perspective, 
" intellectual instruction concerning the virtues is only effective with those 
who already to some significant degree possess them" ( 1998c, p . l 00). 
One difficulty for this view is its impracticability. It would be almost 
imposs ible to convince modem people to return to life in small 
communities. Even if they go back to such a life, they will take with them 
their modern communication tools such as computers or cell phones which 
are probably connected to the internet. Instead of undergoing educati onal 
and character transformation, they are likely to prefer surfing the internet or 
connecting to social networks. Accordingly, Maclntyre ' s moral theory, 
while it contains many insights, is not practicable under modem conditions. 
Besides, another problem pertains to the relation between habit-info rmed 
character and the human telos. There are, surely, various habitual schemes 
in different cultures, leading to di fferent habits fo r people. If we de fine the 
good and the right in terms of these habits, we would face a plural ism that 
might indeed support some ways of li fe that are undoubtedly oppress ive; 
accordingly, we need some minimal principles to apply to all these habitual 
schemes to ascertain their compatibili ty with basic human moral va lues 
which hold true fo r all human beings. In other words, what we become 
habituated to is not necessari ly good fo r us. 
In Maclntyre ' s account, happiness as our final end is more than the 
exercise of the virtues, and consists in the development of all "our powers", 
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but he notes, "the actualization of our higher powers depends on and 
presupposes the actualization of our lower powers" (I 998c, p. l 00). These 
lower powers form a minimum threshold the proper provision of which all 
reasonable ethical schemes should observe; but what are these lower powers 
which can provide the basis of morality? 
Let me start with some suggestions made by MacIntyre himself. 
MacIntyre, in his lecture on Having Survived Academic Moral Philosophy 
(2009c), holds that there are indeed many different ways in which human 
beings may lead a good life, but the following sets of goods are necessary 
for any human being ifhe wants to flourish: 
I-Nutritive needs, clothing, shelter, physical exercise, education, the 
opportunity to work, without which no one can adequately develop his 
physical, intellectual, aesthetic and moral powers. 
2-Affectionate relationships, support from and critical interaction with 
family, friends and colleagues. 
3-Institutional framework for providing security and stability over time 
without which long-term planning and association would be impossible 
4-The powers of practical rationality, self-knowledge, communication 
and enquiry for individuals to become independent rational agents. Any life 
that is defective in one of these goods is less choice-worthy, in Maclntyre's 
terms (MacIntyre, 2009c ). 
These sets of goods are, in Maclntyre' s view, the minimum goods 
which make a life a distinctively human life. This account is strictly secular, 
as there is no reference in it to union with God, which in his account is the 
complete sense of happiness. 
VI.3.1 Introducing the Notion of Human Vulnerability as a Basis 
for Morality 
I seek to propose my account of morality, as distinct from ethics, on a 
basis similar to what MacIntyre presented above. In my account, morality is 
a set of regulations that deals with human beings' basic needs and goods 
like the ones cited by MacIntyre in his lecture. The failure to satisfy these 
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goods makes human beings vu lnerable, such that they would not be able to 
lead a human li fe. Accordingly, human nature is vulnerable in the sense that 
if someone becomes depri ved of the basic goods, which MacIntyre also 
referred to above, not only cannot he normally lead a distincti vely human 
life, which is a li fe of intellectual activity, practical rationality and self-
fulfillment, hi s survi val as an animal might also be endangered. 
Vulnerability applies both to our animality and our humani ty . We need 
some goods, like food, shelter, and clothing, qua animals; we need also 
some goods as rational beings, for instance, the good of having self-esteem, 
participation in our political and social life, which are required by our 
intell ectual aspect, the lack of which generates subtler forms of vulnerability 
than do the goods related to our animality. I use here the notion of 
vulnerability both in the sense of being open to vulnerability, and actually 
undergoing suffe ring which in turn might subject the agent to other kinds 
and degrees of vulnerabi li ty. 
A question ari ses here regarding the clarity of the notion of need which 
I am using in this vulnerability approach. Obvious ly, our notion of human 
need changes and evolves through time. What basic human needs are varies 
between cultures and periods of time. As L. Doyal and L. Gough ( 1984, p. 7) 
have stated, "Many Marxists argue that needs are merely social 
constructions internal to any particular soc iety." The consumer society and 
the welfare state by offering services and multiple options to people create 
expectations in them, which gradually become their needs such that not 
sati sfying these needs makes the people' s li fe di fficult. MacIntyre ([ 1959] 
2008, p.97) a lso from his Marxist perspective holds that in a capitalist 
system "The sati sfaction of real human need di sappears as a purpose", 
because the people are " in the grip of a system which makes their labour-
power into a commodity, which needs their labour to produce as the system 
demands and the ir consumer power to buy as the system demands." 
MacIntyre holds, as was noted in the previous chapter, what we des ire and 
want are not just biological features ; they are an " inte lligible response to 
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what we are offered". Therefore, it is to some degree undeniable that human 
needs are shaped by the socio-economic system in which people are living. 
Accordingly, it would be difficult to deny that the notion of need is 
culture- or even individual-relative. L. Doyal and L. Gough (1984, p.14) 
refer to Runciman's study (1966) as arguing that "groups which are viewed 
by others as deprived may not agree and may even resent the suggestion that 
they are." If the notion of human needs or even basic human needs is a 
relative notion, it would be a serious blow to my approach here, because I 
have tried to use the notion of basic human needs as a platform for 
formulating a universal morality. I, however, attempt to offer an answer to 
this challenge based on a distinction between the two notions of needs and 
wants as follows. 
The two notions of need and want are conceptually distinct from each 
other, such that it is always possible to ask about what we want or desire 
whether we really need it. In some circumstances, as MacIntyre thinks is the 
case concerning capitalistic and consumer society, this distinction becomes 
blurred in such a way that individuals do not deliberate whether their wants 
satisfy their real needs, or whether, in fact, we have real needs 
independently of our desires and wants. 
I share the Aristotelian-Thomistic insight regarding the distinction 
between human beings' desires and good. This is also the point that 
MacIntyre has much emphasized in his virtue-ethics. However, I think that 
we do not need a notion of human beings' final good to maintain this 
distinction. We can draw this distinction by using a mechanism that is based 
on human beings' normal and desirable functioning which is distinct from 
the notion of human flourishing. Based on this, a desire is a need, or a real 
need, if its satisfaction contributes to the individual 's and his community's 
normal and desirable functioning. The more something contributes to our 
normal and desirable functioning, the more basic a need it would be for us. 
The individual needs food and shelter for his normal life, but the need for 
food and shelter might be satisfied in different ways in different cultures; in 
some cases this satisfaction might become luxurious, which then goes 
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further than meeting basic needs. Accordingly, a demarcation mechanism 
regarding the need/wants di stinction is whether the dissatisfaction of a 
desire would impair the normal and desirable perfonnance of the individual 
and the community to which he belongs. For instance, I m ight have a strong 
desire to smoke, but as not smoking not on ly does not harm me and my 
community's performance, but it al so improves our performance and 
conditions in the long-run, we can conclude that smoking is not a need or 
rather a real need. I as a human being might need an automobi le which 
faci li tates my li fe; but I do not need to have the most expensive one on the 
market even if I desire to have it. Indeed, in some contexts a transport 
system as simple as a donkey might suit the needs of the people better than 
does a modem automobile. This demarcation mechanism needs to be 
backed also by other people's judgment to correct us if we are mistaken. 
Thus, although the society and the economic system surely infuse in us 
some fee lings of need, we can employ the mechanism mentioned above to 
see if and how much of these are real needs. My ass umption here is that the 
notion of normal functioning, though it is a normative concept, is to a 
signi ficant degree the same across cultures, though it has the fl ex ibility to 
allow that a need be satiated in di fferent ways in different cul tures. This 
assumption itse lfrests upon the view that human be ings as the members of a 
species enjoy a lot of similarities with respect to their vu lnerabi lities and 
what they need to live nonnally, though the forms in which they satisfy 
these needs vary between cu ltures. Whatever our accounts of the good life, 
we can attempt to find some mora l values that are respected in different 
ethical schemes. If we try to regulate our relationships based on these shared 
norms in conditions of ethica l pluralism, we can so lve some of our moral 
disputes and, at least, manage peacefu lly cases that resist so lution. 
Accordingly, what changes between cultures is more a matter of our 
desires, expectations and wants, rather than our basic needs. This is not to 
say that there is a fixed list of human basic needs through history. We might 
find new needs and things that sati sfy them through time; for instance, 
having access to the internet, to the extent that it facilitates our 
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communications and research practices, might now count as a genuine need; 
rather, my point is that the identification of genuine and basic needs is not 
totally culture-relative. This identification follows a logic, that is, the 
contribution to human normal and des irable functioning for which there are 
objective measures due to significant similarities in human beings ' natures. 
Human normal and desirable functioning does not rely on any particular 
view of human essence and telos; it is independent of, or better to say, it is 
presupposed by all reasonable accounts of human flouri shing. 
Without intending to draw a ranking order among different human 
goods, it is possible to divide these goods, the lack of which amounts to 
human deprivation, into two general groups: I-The goods which address 
human beings' animal aspect; that is to say, the goods and needs which we 
share with other animals, such as the need for nutrition and shelter.2-The 
goods which address human beings ' intellectual aspect; for instance, the 
need to be treated fairly and not arbitrarily, and having our curiosity 
addressed. Basic intellectual goods can be summarized by what R. Forst 
(2007 [201 1 ], p.3) calls "a basic moral right to justification" by which he 
means human beings as "justificatory beings" demand reasons for what they 
are obliged to do or to believe. [n other words, human beings nonnally 
demand or should demand reasons for decisions and regulations that affect 
them. The failure to satisfy the intellectual requirement of human beings 
amounts to human vulnerability in the two following senses. Again note 
here that I use the notion of vulnerability both in the sense of being open to 
vulnerability, and actually undergoing suffering which in tum might subject 
the agent to other kinds and degrees of vulnerability. 
I-The fact that human beings as reason-demanding and justificatory 
beings do not receive convincing reasons regarding the moral system under 
which they live makes them frustrated and feel dominated. Human beings 
are entitled to reasonable justification fo r what they are obliged to do, and 
for the system under which they live. Human beings need moral respect, and 
to be treated as a rational and reasonable being capable of giving and 
receiving reasons. If human beings are subjected to norms that are not 
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justifiable to them, this would cause a sense of exclusion in them, 
diminishing them from the intellectual status of receiving, evaluating and 
giving reasons. This situation would deprive human beings of the 
opportunity to exercise their intellectual capacity for reflection on their 
circumstances, and this deprivation and the subsequent sense of exclusion 
per se constitute a form of vu lnerability.46 Human beings in these conditions 
would be vulnerable as they are denied the opportunity to exercise and 
develop their intellectual capacity. This makes them deprived and 
vulnerable regard less of the consequences that might fo llow from this state, 
which in tum strengthen this vulnerability. These consequences make the 
second sense of vulnerability, as is explained below. 
2-The failure to treat others as mora l and reasonable beings, who have 
a right to justification, excludes them from those decision-making 
procedures which should be conducted collectively. This makes thi s process 
a partial and inefficient one which then affects the wel l-being of the people 
who are subject to that process. Accordingly, not treating others as 
reasonable and reason-seeking beings causes materia l deprivation besides 
the kind of vulnerability mentioned above. When some people are excluded 
from the decision-making process, their interests normally are not taken into 
account, which impacts negatively on their well -being. 
The intellectual aspect of human beings, which applies to them 
irrespective of their traditions and socia l roles, requires that they be immune 
to arbitrary individual preferences in their social and political relationships; 
they have a right to the justification of their social and political setting based 
on good reasons which are acceptable to reasonable people. A main feature 
of good reasons is that they embody the idea that human beings irrespective 
of their notions of the good enjoy inherent digni ty; accordingly, a good 
reason respects this dignity in the best way possible. 
461 should note that this state is different from the one in which indi viduals have good 
reasons to abide by the judgments of a wise person or a moral example. What is important 
here is that the individuals in this case have good reasons for their obedience, and it is not 
arbitrary. 
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It might be objected that for the most of our history our ancestors have 
not realized their right to justification, and that even in modem times there 
is no procedure that can satisfy full y this right. In answer, I would say even 
if this has been the case, not only does not it affect my argument, but rather 
it strengthens it. The most fatal events in the past century, that is, the two 
world wars, besides other destructive conflicts can be explained in terms of 
breaking the chain of good reasons by some people on the basis of beliefs 
about the superiority of a particular race, religion, nationality, etc., or on the 
basis of some individual or sectarian ambitions. When a group of people is 
deprived of their right to justification regarding what affects them, they 
would be prone to vulnerability, even if they are directed by a benevolent 
patriarch. The inclusive knowledge that is required to address various needs 
of different individuals does not obtain without the participation of different 
groups and individuals, that is, without a recognition of their justificatory 
rights. 
J . Nickel (1987) has raised a similar objection, doubting in that "there 
is sufficient agreement worldwide to support anything like the full range of 
rights declared in contemporary manifestos." Not all moralities, Nickel 
holds, condemn racial di scrimination or respect .freedom of conscience 
(cited in M. Freeman (1994, p.493)). 
MacIntyre himself has a similar objection to the idea of human rights 
as has been defended by A. Gewirth, arguing that individuals having 
entitlements such as rights presupposes the existence of some social 
institutions and practices which "only come into existence at particular 
hi storical periods under particular social circumstances" (1981 , p.67). These 
institutions and social roles are required for the intelligibility of right-
possess ion. In the absence of these social institutions and practices, "a claim 
to a right would be like presenting a check for payment in a social order that 
lacked the institution of money" ( 1981, p.67). 
Two points are worth mentioning in response to this kind of objection. 
The first is in line with the point 1 made above, that is, my vulnerability 
approach, as a theory to justify a minimum of morality and rights for human 
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beings qua human beings, like most theories in thi s context, is normative 
and eva luative, and not just descripti ve. In other words, these theories do 
not seek to state that people in societi es as a matter of fact val ue these 
norms; rather, these theories posit some ideals for human beings and their 
associations that are to their good. Based on thi s, the point is not that all 
soc ieties, in fact, va lue freedom of conscience or other rights, but that it is 
better for them to va lue thi s norm due to the fact that human beings have 
intellectual capac ities wh ich should be sati sfied, in part, by offeri ng them 
good reasons for what affects them. This normati ve approach provides us 
w ith a higher perspective to evaluate ex isting val ue systems in different 
traditions . Based on this, we can respond to MacIntyre that societies wh ich 
lack right-institutions should strive to gradually construct them, as these 
rights ensure human beings' normal and desirable functioning. 
The second point is that even if a given tradition or a community in 
some particular circumstances or stages of its development cannot 
acknowledge some norms such as the freedom of conscience, for example, 
by prioritizing some community and securi ty-based norms over it, it should 
justify thi s practice to its subjects based on good reasons that can be 
objective ly j ustified. In other words, the den ial of thi s norm, wh ich is 
strongly tied to human beings' intellectual aspect, should be justified from a 
higher perspective based on good reasons which take into account human 
basic goods and adhere to human beings' inherent dignity independently of 
their accounts of the good. 
To return to my main argument, any account of the human good should 
meet the threshold of basic human goods wh ich addresses human beings' 
anima l and intellectual aspects as briefly sketched above. This condition 
addresses the morality of the good, as contrasted above with eth ics. An 
account of the good life that does not take into account the basic goods and 
the intell ectual needs of people fa il s to be moral. 
If the main featu res of human beings wh ich distinguish them from 
other an imals are their ability to think and reflect on their own lives, then 
any adequate account of the good should sati sfy thi s reflective capacity of 
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those people who are affected by it. This satisfaction happens by providing 
good shareable reasons to the affected subjects. But what counts as a good 
reason? 
The answer to this question takes us back to Maclntyre's main ideas 
presented in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, namely, the idea that there 
are different accounts of practical rationality in different traditions, which 
means what counts as a good and shareable reason depends on a background 
of beliefs and a structure of practical rationality in a tradition; however, this 
view does not entail that there are no general requirements independent of 
different traditions regarding what counts as a good reason. The same 
answer can be offered to Macintyre 's virtue-ethics according to which 
rationality requires the possession of some virtues of thought and character. 
Based on this position, it is held that we cannot speak of a good reason for 
someone independently of the quality of his character. 
I do not deny that what a good reason is, to a significant degree, 
depends on a backdrop of beliefs in a tradition and on the personality of the 
people, provided that minimum requirements of morality is met; that is to 
say, the requirements of our animal and human aspects should be addressed. 
The fact that we need some goods to survive and fun.ction normally, and that 
we as rational beings with inherent human dignity need justification and 
good reasons for what is proposed to us sets some limits to what can be 
offered as good or reasonable in different traditions. In other words, basic 
features of our animality and intellectuality apply to human beings across 
traditions, and thus provide some transcending measures for the evaluation 
of these traditions. The observance of these goods also is a measure of 
having a good character. 
To recall, .in my discussion of relativism in chapter 4, I argued that 
MacIntyre cannot dismiss adequately this charge unless he appeals to some 
basic shared measures of rationality. By these measures, I hope it has now 
become clear that I mean the fulfillment of basic goods as outlined above. A 
tradition, whatever its account of the good, that neglects these basic goods is 
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inadequate. The fo llowing historica l event might shed some light on this 
claim. 
The New York Times (August 17, 2000) reports the Taliban as shutting 
the bakeries that were run by poor widows, allegedly citing Islamic Sharia 
law, holding that women do not have the right to work. The report states 
that "From within one bakery in the war-ruined capital women screamed 
abuse. 'Give me poison and give my five chi ldren poison, then we will die 
fast instead ofa slow death from starving and shame ', one woman yelled."47 
This report depicts we ll the vu lnerabili ty approach I am defending. 
According to the Taliban 's notion of the good, the women do not have the 
right to work. As this account of the good, and its associated ethics, neglects 
human vulnerability we have compelling reasons to dismiss it. This account 
of the good addresses neither human beings' animal nor their intellectual 
aspects. Their animal aspect is not respected, because without the right to 
work the widows in these circumstances cannot satisfy their basic 
subsistence needs. Their intellectual aspect is not respected, because the 
widows are deprived of the right to work in conditions in which there is no 
remedy for them; a claim that cannot be justified to them, and they have 
intelligib le reasons for opposing that social order on the grounds that it 
deprives them of their basic rights to a decent li fe. There is, in other words, 
no compel ling response on the part of the Taliban to the question why a 
most vu lnerable portion of the population is denied the right to waged work 
in the absence of any alternative social and poli tical protection. If the 
Taliban answers that this order is based on God's commands, and so 
requires absolute submission, I would reply that God, as a reasonable and 
rational entity as will be explained further in the final conclusion to the 
thesis, would all ow that His own decrees be adjusted to the requirements of 
the time, which is necessary for the main objective of these decrees, that is, 
human beings' happiness. 
" I owe this example to Shrader-Frechette (2002). 
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There are commonalities between this vulnerability approach and the 
capability approach defended by some thinkers like A. Sen and M. 
Nussbaum. The main similarity is that both emphasize the existence of some 
basic functioning and capabilities for individuals to achieve. For instance, I 
can use the capability approach with respect to the Afghan women in the 
above example to argue that it is not justified to withhold from the widows 
the opportunity to work while they have the capacity to work; however, I 
avoid using this approach here because it might be argued that different 
traditions and cultures differ in terms of the capacities they allow to 
flourish, and the extent to which they allow different capacities to be 
realized. I prefer the vulnerability approach, because it rests on the most 
basic human capacities that characterize human beings as reason-giving and 
reason-demanding beings. These basic human capacities provide some 
minimum context-independent measures of rationality and justice which can 
be used to evaluate normative judgments made in different traditions. 
Accordingly, human vulnerability provides a shared and external 
perspective for the evaluation and modification of different ethical 
traditions. This method would save us from the charge of relativism and 
perspectivism; whereas Maclntyre 's method outlined in chapter 4 in which 
he emphasized the evaluation of traditions on the basis of their internal 
measures approaches an intemalism which, despite Maclntyre's intentions, 
does not get round the problem of relativism. 
The kind of pluralism that pertains to the notion of the good and is 
criticized by MacIntyre would be harmless if it lies beyond the realm of 
basic goods; in other words, the plurality of our final goods can be 
accommodated and lived with if they treat well human beings' animal and 
intellectual aspects. 
We can try to resolve the tensions between clifferent accounts of the 
good and their associated ethics in terms of their internal consistency and 
intellectual adequacy; however, firstly, we should not expect to accomplish 
very much in this endeavour; secondly, the inability to settle ethical disputes 
should not be considered as a catastrophe, as MacIntyre (1981, pp.6-7) 
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thinks. The va lue-incommensurability that MacIntyre ascribes to modem 
moral ity and criticizes would be a harmless phenomenon if ail these 
confl icting va lues do justice concerning the vulnerability of those affected 
and their position as intellectual beings. Even if we accept Maclntyre's 
claim about the intractable pluralism in modem morality, which is a result 
of the lack of agreement on the notion of the good and the common good, 
we yet have some procedures for decision-making in line with the principles 
of morality, that is, respecting the animal and intellectual needs of human 
beings as possessing intrinsic dignity. These procedures let us handle 
morally our intellectual differences with regard to the notion of the good. 
This attitude works both between and with in traditions. Its function 
between different ethical traditions is to arrange the relationship between the 
people who have different accounts of the good through securing basic 
protection against vulnerability by address ing their animal and intellectual 
needs. It also works within traditions in order to protect minorities who have 
an account of the good different from the established one in a given society. 
Access to clean water, good nourishment, hygiene, decent work, education, 
and welfare opportunities in a society should not be on the basis of 
endorsing a particular view of the good. The distribution of ail these 
resources should be based on good reasons as outlined earlier, that is, 
reasons that can be justified general ly in a di scursive dialogue with those 
who are affected by them. 
Rationality requires us to pursue effectively our account of the good. 
Reasonableness, by contrast, requires considering the contingent nature of 
our account of the good. The fact that we have a notion of the good, most of 
the time, is due to the fact that we have been born into and grown up in a 
particular community. This, then, requires us to take into account the 
conditi ons of those people who are di fferent from us in terms of sex, 
language, race, colour, religion, etc., but share wi th us the reflective 
capacity of demanding and weighing reasons. Accordingly, the notion of 
reasonableness relates to the vulnerabi li ty approach, and sets some limits on 
the notion of rationality. 
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Let me clarify further my account of morality by giving an example. 
Suppose that a number of passengers of different sexes, ages, races, and 
religions are on a coach which is travelling in a desert. The coach faces a 
technical problem IO km from its destination such that it cannot take all the 
passengers, and it should reduce its load in order to be able to continue 
moving. What is the most reasonable and moral way of choosing those 
passengers who should be left off? 
In my account, a reasonable and moral decision is a reciprocally and 
generally justifiable decision; that is to say, it is based on good reasons, 
which are non-arbitrary and relevant reasons; reasons that respect human 
dignity by addressing the animal and intellectual needs of those affected, 
without which human beings would be subject to affliction and 
vulnerability. These good reasons hold true independently of subjective and 
partisan preferences. Based on this description, if I hold that Muslim or 
Jewish or Christian passengers on the coach in the above example should 
get off, or that those with coloured skin should vacate the coach, or that my 
relatives should remain on board, I am in fact treating them immorally on a 
basis that cannot be reasonably justified, because there is no defendable 
relationship between religion or colour, on the one h_and, and the burden of 
walking a relatively long distance; whereas, if we hold that sick or aged 
passengers remain on board we have made a decision on a good justifiable 
ground, as there is undeniable relationship between these measures and the 
suffering that wi ll be caused by walking; in fact, in the latter case we are 
taking human vulnerability into account, which informs a mutually 
justifiable process of reasoning. 
There is an implicit normative premise based on human intrinsic 
dignity in this line of reasoning. That human beings suffer from some issues 
is a factual proposition which per se cannot generate an evaluative 
proposition. In the above example, the fact that walking a long distance 
inflicts suffering upon people, particularly upon the aged or the disabled, 
does not in itself mean that they should be treated in proportion to their 
vulnerability, i.e. without considerations of their proximity to us, religion, 
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etc. The normative premise that mediates here is the basic assumption that 
human beings possess intrinsic dignity independently of their accounts of 
the good and ethi cal perspectives. Accordingly, the general fonn of the 
argument would be as follows. 
( 1) There are some basic physiological and intellectual goods for 
human beings the lack of which, as a matter of fact, deprives them of a 
decent human life. This statement is a factual statement enjoined with the 
fo llowing normative statement would yield the kind of moral universal ism 
that l seek to justi fy. 
(2) Human beings irrespective of their accounts of the good and their 
other attachments possess intrinsic digni ty. This is my basic assumption for 
which I cannot argue further on the present occasion. 
(3) Human dignity requires the fulfillment of, at least, the basic goods 
of human beings including the needs they have accord ing to their animal 
and intellectual aspects. Those people, like the di sabled or the sick, who are 
in a more pressing need than others deserve more attention than do others 
due to this dignity, because if their more severely felt needs were not 
sati sfi ed, it would do more harm to thei r dignity than it would when less 
severely felt needs are not addressed. 
(4) Thus, the basic animal/physiological and intellectual needs of 
human beings should be addressed independently of their accounts of the 
good and their relationships with us, and in proportion to their vulnerabili ty, 
as they possess the dignity that is the source of this requirement 
independently of these features. 
In sum, human beings have a basic right to the fu lfillment of their basic 
needs such as the needs of subsistence, security, stability, employment, 
housing, etc. In addition, they have a ri ght to justification of what affects 
them, required by their intellectual capacity. They have a ri ght to be treated 
on the basis of good reasons which are shareable reasons. A main featu re of 
good reasons which are justifiable to any reasonable person is that they 
cons ider the dignity of human beings, which requires the non-di scriminatory 
treatment of human beings in the area of basic needs. In the next section, 1 
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shall discuss some of Macintyre's possible objections to my approach, in 
the course of which I try to explain my view further. 
VI.3.2 Considering Maclntyre's Objections to the Vulnerability 
Approach 
One possible objection that MacIntyre might offer would be that since 
am appealing to the notion of basic human needs independently of 
people 's accounts of the good or the traditions to which they belong, I am 
considering human beings without any culture and as merely biological 
animals, but man without a culture is a myth; as MacIntyre puts the point: 
[It might be claimed that] the standard of utility or pleasure 
is set by man qua animal, man prior to and without any 
particular culture. But man without culture is a myth. Our 
biological nature certainly places constraints on all cultural 
possibility; but man who has nothing but a biological nature 
is a creature of whom we know nothing (1981 , p.162). 
In response, I would say that I am not considering human beings as 
only biological creatures without any cultural elements; rather, my point is 
that any human culture which we can imagine, in so far as it is a human 
culture, should admit that its judgments should be based on good reasons 
which are justifiable to any reasonable person who is affected by them. 
What counts as a good reason is not entirely up to cultures; rather, the 
animality and intellectuality aspects of human beings pose some restriction 
independent of these cultures on the ranges of good reasons, as is clear in 
the Taliban example mentioned above. Facts about human vulnerability, and 
that human beings require good shareable reasons are to a significant degree 
independent of different traditions; but this independence does not imply the 
existence of people without culture. In other words, the sustained normal 
and desirable functioning of human beings requires the regulations that 
govern their interactions be justifiable to them. This justifiability is not a 
criterion-less subjective issue up to personal preferences or to cultures. A 
piece of moral reasoning is a good and justifiable piece of reasoning if it 
traces the relevant moral facts at stake. This relevance is recognized by 
holding that all human beings enjoy equal dignity, and then seeing which 
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option treats the affected human beings better irrespective of irrelevant 
factors; for instance, in the coach example above, if I decide that my mother 
qua my mother remains on board, I am not thinking on a good justifiable 
basis, because if someone asks me why my mother deserves this particular 
attention, I do not have any answer except to say that I am attached and 
obliged to her, to which it might be objected that other people also fee l 
attached to their mothers; but if I hold that my mother qua an elderly sick 
person should remain on board, then my verdict is based on relevant good 
reasons. The fact that a sick elderly human being is more exposed to 
affl iction than a young hea lthy person does not depend on a particular 
culture. Our human natures have suffic ient trans-cultural similarities to 
enable us to extend this ki nd of judgment to other cu ltures. 
MacIntyre, as a second criticism, might also object to my vulnerability 
approach along the lines of hi s criticism of Kant' s deontology; that is to say, 
in the absence of the notion of the ultimate good our moral theory turns into 
a rule-based moral absolutism that cannot accommodate exceptions to these 
rules which might be required in particular situations . 
In chapter 2 on Macintyre 's virtue-ethics, I explained his argument that 
moral rules cannot provide us with the full knowledge that we need in order 
to act morally in all situations. In this account, the appl ication of mora l rules 
itself is not ru le-governed; for instance, the moral rule of truth -telling, 
which MacIntyre takes to be an absolute rule for Kant, does not tell us 
which truth is to be told to whom, when to be sil ent or even when to te ll a 
lie for the sake of a higher good. We need, in Maclntyre 's view, to have the 
virtues, particu larly the virtue of practical rationality or phronesis, and a 
hierarchy of goods in order to be able to apply moral ru les aright in practica l 
situations (1988a, p.117). 
MacIntyre (2006m, p.130) di sagrees with the prudentia l interpretation 
of Kant regarding the moral permissibility of occasional white lies, which 
comes to the fore in Kant's di stinction between untruth and li es (Kant 
280 
[I 750s-1790s] 1997, (27:448) p.203)48. Kant there draws a line regarding 
truth-telling between the cases in which truth-telling will be manipulated by 
bad intentions, and cases in which there is not wickedness at stake, and 
allows lying in the former cases. 
MacIntyre argues that this prudential view is not sustained in Kant 's 
later and more developed works, for instance in Kant's account in The 
Metaphysics of Morals in which he leaves no room for the moral 
permissibility of lying. In Maclntyre's view (2006m, p.128), Kant upholds 
the unqualified necessity of truth-telling for individuals as rational agents, 
and cannot accommodate occasional exceptions to this necessary moral rule. 
Veracity for Kant, in Macintyre's view, is what we owe to humanity, and by 
lying we wrong humanity in general , and by so doing the liar wrongs 
himself. Kant' s moral system, MacIntyre (2006m, p.132) maintains, lacks 
the scale for weighing the good of refraining from lying against, for 
instance, the good of saving an innocent child which might require lying, 
and so any choice between them would be arbitrary. Maclntyre's alternative 
is that we should have a single moral practice that prohibits lying and, at the 
same time, requires it on necessary occasions (2006m, p.134); in other 
words, there should be a single logic behind the_ both kinds of moral 
affirmatives. For this to work, MacIntyre (2006m, p. 135) holds, we should 
start with our social relations in practices which have thei r own internal 
goods, rather than with our individual selves in order to derive our moral 
obligations. Instead of asking what I as a rational individual am bound to, 
we should ask what "we" as potentially or actually rational persons are 
bound to in our relationships. 
MacIntyre, thus, is giving a social aspect to individual autonomy by 
holding that we achieve autonomy through our relationships in which we 
48 Kant's text is as follows. "But if, in all cases, we were to remain faithful to every detail 
of the truth, we rhight often expose ourselves to the wi ckedness of others, who wanted to 
abuse our truthfulness. If everyone were well disposed, it would not only be a duty not to 
lie, but nobody would need to do it, since he would have nothing to worry about. Now, 
however, since men are malicious, it is true that we often court danger by punctilious 
observance of the truth, and hence has arisen the concept of the necessary lie, which is a 
very critical point for the moral philosopher" (Kant [ I 750s-l 790s] 1997, (27 :448) p.203). 
281 
depend on each other and acknowledge our mutual dependence ( I 999a, 
p.xi). Of course, in his view, we can and should hold these relationships 
open to evaluation ; but thi s very ab ility to criticize is atta ined in our 
relationships. This kind of autonomy, which may be called social autonomy, 
does not consist " in total independence from and of the sentiments, 
judgments, and actions of others"; rather, it requires the di stinction between 
when we should be independent and when to be dependent on others 
(2006m, p.136). 
Based on thi s account, for instance, a child is dependent on his mother, 
and the mother owes him an ob ligation to protect him against unjustifi ed 
aggression , if necessary, by telling a lie or even by killing the aggressor. 
Without the permissibility of lying in thi s context, the good of the practice 
of motherhood is not achieved. Accordingly, the internal good of thi s 
practice is the single basis of moral evaluations in this context in both cases, 
that is, when it is necessary to be truthful and to tell li es (2006m, p.1 38). 
Whi le truthfu lness is crucial for every practice wi th internal goods in order 
for participants to learn what they need from each other and to have trust in 
each other, it is also the responsibility of those who are bound to each other 
to protect their re lationships against the destructive effects of moral evil s, 
for instance, by telling a li e, in a way that it produces the least poss ible harm 
to the aggressor (2006m, pp. 136-1 39). 
MacIntyre (2006m, p.1 39) holds that in his moral theory permiss ible 
lying is not introduced as a qualification to truthfulness; rather, both sides of 
the rule "serve one and the same purpose and are justifi ed in one and the 
same way as that part of the rule that enjoins truthfulness in relationships." 
Accordingly, Maclntyre 's main point here is that we should appeal to the 
notion of internal goods in practices in order to have a measure for trade-
offs between di fferent goods, without which we do not know when to ab ide 
by and when to break moral rules; and thi s is what Kant' s moral theory 
lacks, as it is understood by MacIntyre. 
I think Mac[ntyre 's in terpretation of Kant as mora ll y absoluti st is not 
an adequate interpretation. I cannot here, for reasons of space, di scuss the 
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pros and cons of this interpretation in any detail; but it is worth noting that a 
number of Kant specialists, such as 0. O'Neill (1983), R. B. Louden (1986), 
and A. W. Wood (2008), among others, have emphasized an interpretation 
of Kant that allows for contextual moral judgments, which is different from 
Macintyre 's absolutist interpretation. For instance, Wood (2008, p.61) holds 
that for Kant, as well as for J. S. Mill, moral rules cannot be directly 
deduced from fundamental principles, and the relation between the two is 
"looser and more hermeneutical in character", and involves a set of 
intermediate rules developed in light of empirical facts. As Wood (2008, 
p.62) explains, for Kant the dignity of rational nature as an end in itself as 
the first principle provides some guidance for moral judgment, but it cannot 
specify precisely what the moral rules should be and how they should 
change in view of new circumstances or our improved knowledge of a 
situation. Wood (2008, p.62) appeals to J. Mill's metaphor that there is no 
scientific calculus for determining when an existing road which is now 
properly working would become ineffective as a result of new conditions, 
and so when it would be necessary to construct new roads. The same is true 
for moral judgments which require sensitivity to the requirements of each 
practical situation, as is clear from Kant's distinction between untruth and 
lies. 
In response to MacIntyre, I would thus say in order to have an 
adaptable moral theory which serves the good and the best in particular 
situations we do not need to have a hierarchy of goods that terminates at the 
ultimate good. In other words, the point that we should have recourse to the 
internal goods of practices in order to produce a context-sensitive moral 
theory does not suggest that we need a shared account of the good or the 
final telos. The two conditions of meeting human basic needs and being 
based on shareable good reasons can fulfill this function. That saving an 
innocent life reasonably outweighs telling a single lie does not depend on a 
particular ethical point of view which is associated with an account of the 
good. Admitting that survival is a basic human good which can form the 
basis of good reasoning would suffice for this purpose. When there is a 
clash between goods, we can appeal to common sense and experience to see 
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which one is a more basic good the criterion for which is the extent it 
contributes to a human being's normal and desirable functioning. This 
account is different from Aristotle's and Macintyre's insight that 
membership in a community that enj oys a shared account of the human 
good is a precondition of practical rationality: 
Aristotl e gave us excellent reasons fo r believing that both 
rationa l enquiry in politics and ethics and rationa li ty in 
action require membership in a community which shares 
allegiance to some tolerably specific overall conception of 
the ultimate human good (1 99 1c, p.99) . 
We need some virtues to commit ourselves to a process of practical 
reasoning which is subject to the two conditions of sati sfying human animal 
and intellectual needs; in particular, we need to subordinate our personal 
fee lings to good justifiable grounds. The virtues that we need for the 
morality of our actions do not need to be directed toward the good; we on ly 
need some features to commit us to a fair process of reasoning, that is, 
practica l reasoning that is not based on arbitrary and unjustifiable grounds, 
and thi s would be enough for entering into collecti ve practical reasoning. 
A third criticism that could be offered by MacIn tyre of my 
vu lnerability approach consists in hi s disapprova l of utilitarianism. The first 
part of hi s objection, as was explained in chapter 5, is based on the 
incommensurability of the goods that should be ordered; MacIntyre ([ I 977] 
I 992b, pp. I 82-183) captures the point as fo ll ows: 
It is clear that the pleasure of climbing a mountain, the 
pleasure of listening to Bartok and the pleasure of drinking 
Guinness stout are three very disputable things . There is not 
some one state to the production of which the c limbing, the 
listening and the drinking are merely alternative means. Nor 
is there any scale on which they can be weighed aga inst 
each other. But if thi s is true of pleasures, how much more 
complex must matters become when we seek to weigh 
against each other such goods as those of restori ng hea lth to 
the sick, of scientific enqui ry or of fri endship[?] 
The second and related part of hi s criti cism is that there are different 
methods for rank ordering, so that the ranking of goods depends on the 
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method chosen, the person who is rank ordering and the preferences that 
have been assigned more weight ([1977] 1992b, p.183). 
To explain further Macintyre's point, I have so far insisted that moral 
reasons should be good shareable reasons by which I mean reasons that can 
be justified objectively without relying on subjective reasons that do not 
transcend the individual. MacIntyre might object and ask good reasons for 
whom? Good reasons for a person whose preferences are mainly for 
climbing might be different from those of a person who has stronger 
preferences for drinking or for music; nevertheless, in my view, it is 
possible for these different persons to appeal to good reasons in their 
interactions with each other. By good reasons in the latter case, I mean good 
reasons at a meta-level, that is to say, not good reasons from the perspective 
of any of these agents who have different incommensurable preferences; 
rather, good reasons from a higher perspective that regulates their 
relationships on the basis of fair terms, that is, relevant non-arbitrary 
reasons that are justifiable to any reasonable observer. Each of them can 
pursue his own preferences provided that he does not interfere with others' 
preferences and with the public order. The distribution of public goods 
should be based on relevant measures and not on in(lividual preferences of 
the agents; for instance, access to elementary education should be on the 
basis of the equal need of individuals, irrespective of their personal 
achievements and preferences; while the relevant measure for access to 
higher education is individuals' competitive abilities. The reason for this is 
that elementary education addresses the basic needs of individuals, which 
should be met regardless of their particular situations and achievements. 
Accordingly, morality requires managing the relationships between 
individuals on the basis of reasons that can be inter-subjectively justified; 
that is to say, based on reasons which are non-arbitrary and relevant to 
particular contexts. 49 
49 This position is very similar to Michael Walzer's view in Spheres of Justice: o Defense of 
Plurality and Equality (1983) in which he favors justice as complex equality by which he 
criticizes the domination of some goods like education by some other goods like wealth. In 
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I am defending here a rationalistic approach according to which 
individuals are able to adopt a hjgher perspective to refl ect on their existing 
set of des ires to check their rationality and reasonableness. Furthennore, this 
reflection can be motivational for them; that is to say, reason is not the slave 
of the passions, as assumed by Hurne, and can convince the reasonable 
individual to modify his own desires in order to be a moral agent. In other 
words, the agent is not captured by his account of the good and his 
attachments, and can live on fair terms with other agents who have different 
accounts of the good. This is not to say that using this approach will resolve 
all moral tensions and dilemmas; the point, rather, is that moral confli cts can 
be handled in a reasonable way even if they resist solution. At least, it might 
be poss ible to show that the persistence of a moral di spute is not due to 
personal whims, but due to different underlying premises that are all based 
on good reasons from different perspectives. 
I might use again Aquinas ' account of the intellect to support this 
rationalistic view, as this account is adopted by MacIntyre. As explained in 
chapter 3, the intellect for Aquinas has an abstract character by which he 
means the intellect only formally, and not materia lly, becomes identica l 
with the object of knowledge, and this means the distinction between the 
two and the ability of the agent to reflect on his current positions persist. 
Accordingly, in Maclntyre 's example above, the agent with strong 
preferences for drinking has the capacity to imagine himself in the position 
of other agents with different desires in order to regulate their relationships 
fa irly. 
Observing this fair process of practica l reasoning requires intellectual 
and moral virtues fo r agents to know the relevant measures in any particular 
situation and to commit themselves to its consequences; however, we do not 
necessarily need to become educated according to an Ari stotelian or 
Thomistic account of virtue-ethics which is ordered toward the good. We 
need to foster moral virtues in order to infuse in ourselves, in R. Rorty 's 
my account, what justifies the domination of some goods in the process of distribution of 
other goods is that it can be reasonably justified with reference to human vu lnerabil ity. 
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terms, a sense of solidarity with our fellow-human beings. As Rorty (1989, 
p.190) puts it, "we have a moral obligation to feel a sense of solidarity with 
all other human beings"; and this sense can be cultivated through our moral 
upbringing. This requires some virtues on the part of moral agents to curb 
their own egoistic preferences and to see other human beings, in Rorty's 
terms, as "fellow sufferers" (1989, p.xvi). 
MacIntyre might argue that Aristotelianism and Thomism can foster 
the virtues that are necessary for addressing others ' vulnerability better than 
can a liberal account. The reason for this claim is that according to 
MacIntyre, these two traditions define individual goods in light of the 
common good, and by this they can break the dichotomy between self-
regarding and other-regarding morality. If the individual defines his own 
good by reference to the common good the clashes between his goods and 
others' goods disappear, such that he will regard the vulnerability of others 
as his own; as MacIntyre (1999a, p.109) writes, "The individual in order not 
just to pursue, but even to define her or his good in concrete terms has first 
to recognize the goods of the community as goods that she or he must make 
her own." 
The view that the individual should first acknowledge the goods of the 
community in order to define his own goods is very idealistic. It is difficult 
to deny that the individual initially starts with what pleases and belongs to 
him, and then tries to harmonize the satisfaction of his own preferences with 
the satisfaction of those of others. There are both self- and other-regarding 
elements in human beings, and no moral tradition can abolish either of 
them; as MacIntyre (1959b, p.106) himself attested a long time ago, "They 
[human beings] are an intricate mixture of altruism and selfishness and the 
one is not reducible to a form of the other". However, a morality might 
provide justification for subordinating individual preferences to the common 
good. 
MacIntyre (1999a, p.131) holds that the modern state does not serve 
the common good, because the weight it gives to different preferences 
reflects the parties ' bargaining power, which is related to money. The way 
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the modern state distributes goods "does not reflect a common mind arrived 
at through widespread shared deliberation by norms of rational enquiry. 
Indeed the size of modern states would itself preclude this" ( 1999a, p.131 ). 
I have two points in response to MacIntyre. The first is that although 
there might not be an Aristotelian-cum-Thomistic notion of the common 
good in modern times, which is directed toward the notion of the good, we 
can have and form a notion of the common good based on the inherent 
dignity of human beings irrespective of their notions of the good, which 
then leads us to a fair and reasonable process of practical reasoning. The 
second point is that although the big size of the modern state makes 
deliberative decision-making difficult, we can use modem technologies like 
online-surveys to gamer feedback about different policies. The return to 
small local communities does not necessarily faci litate deliberative 
democracy and respect for the common good, as all feudalistic communities 
were local. What is of significance here is to grant human beings dignity 
independently of their accounts of the good, which prepares the ground for 
addressing their basic, including their intellectual, needs. 
A fourth criticism by MacIntyre of my vulnerability approach wou ld be 
along the lines of his criticism of the notion of the neutrality of the modern 
state. To put this briefly, Maclntyre's point is that the modem liberal state 
claims to be neutral between different notions of the good through providing 
a framework that can accommodate different accounts of the good in so far 
as they are pursued within that framework (1988a, p.345). MacIntyre 
(1988a, p.345) argues that there is no neutral position, and that "The starting 
points of liberal theorizing are never neutral as between conceptions of the 
human good; they are always liberal starting points." In line with this, 
MacIntyre (1972, p.333) also criticizes Rawls' view regarding the priority 
of the notion of j ustice over other goods: 
The agents in the initial situation are made by Rawls to 
accept the fact that they are to agree in their conception of 
justice, but to disagree in their conceptions of other goods. 
Certain parts of morals and politics are to be treated as 
essentially areas of human agreement, others as essentially 
areas of human disagreement. But why should we accept 
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this? Might we not rather ask fust, "What is the good for 
man?" and only then decide what justice would be in a 
society where men might realise that good? Rawls simply 
lays it down that justice has a certain primacy. 
This criticism is also reflected in Maclntyre's desert-based account of 
justice, which holds justice should be judged according to the contribution 
of the people to the common good in a community (1981, pp.250-251). 1n 
Maclntyre's view, neither Rawls nor Nozick can appeal to the notion of 
desert due to the lack of agreement on the notion of the common good in the 
society for which they are theorizing (198 1, p.249). 
I think Maclntyre ' s point that there is no agreement on the notion of 
the common good in modem life is not correct. We all agree that the 
reduction of poverty, social inequality, violence, and the like is a part of the 
common good, and that the state should not be neutral about them. We have 
a great deal of agreement on the notion of the common good, provided that 
we restrict this notion to human beings' basic needs and goods. Disputes 
over this notion can be expected to be resolved to a significant degree in a 
process of fair practical reasoning. 
MacIntyre, in fact, in his book Dependent Ratirmal Animals has given 
a central place to the issue of human vulnerability, as was pointed to in the 
first chapter, which shows he is in some agreement with me on this issue. 
He criticizes Western philosophy for its inadequate attention to human 
vulnerability and affliction: 
From Plato to Moore and since there are usually, with some 
rare exceptions, only passing references to human 
vulnerability and affliction and to the connections between 
them and our dependence on others. Some of the facts of 
human limitation and of our consequent need of 
cooperation with others are more generally acknowledged, 
but for the most part only then to be put on one side (I 999a, 
p.1 ). 
MacIntyre holds that human vulnerability and our necessary 
dependence on others should be acknowledged if the individual seeks to 
attain the kind of autonomy that is highly emphasized in modem moral 
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philosophy (1999a, p.8). We need the virtues in order to start depending on 
others, including parents and masters, in our progress toward becoming 
independent practical reasoners. MacIntyre believes Aquinas' interpretation 
of Aristotle 's thought accommodates the virtues of acknowledged 
dependence better than does Aristotle himself, as Aquinas does not share 
some aspects of Aristotle' s view of the nobleman. Aquinas "asks God to 
grant that he may happily share with those in need what he has, while 
humbly asking for what he needs from those who have" ( 1999a, p.xi) . 
If MacIntyre ( 1999a, p.xi) thinks Aquinas' interpretation of Aristotle 
can account for "the virtues that reckoned not only with our animal 
condition, but also with the need to acknowledge our consequent 
vulnerability and dependence", then we can expect him to accept the 
possibility of a shared account of morality for human beings, who actually 
or potentially are open to the different degrees and kinds of vulnerability. 
On such a basis, we have to qualify Maclntyre 's claim that "Indeed, a 
morality has no existence except in its actual and poss ible social 
embodiments, and what it amounts to is what it does or can amount to in its 
socially embodied form s" (1994c, p.143); or hi s claim that "Moral 
philosophies, however they may aspire to achieve more than thi s, always do 
articulate the morality of some particular social and cultural standpoint" 
( 198 1, p.268). This view of morality implies the lack of any measures 
independent of particular social contexts for morality. 
The fact that a morality has its roots in a given social context does not 
mean that its va lidity is limited to that context, or that there are no context-
transcending grounds for its evaluation. If that morality can be sustained on 
the bas is of good shareable reasons which are relevant non-arbi trary reasons 
this shows its validity is not limited to that context. 
Despite Maclntyre's particular attenti on to the issue of human 
vu lnerability, as K. Shrader-Frechette (2002, p. I 00) notes, hi s argument 
against the va lidi ty of the idea of natura l rights does not cohere with thi s 
attitude. MacIntyre ([ 1978) 1985 , pp.1 29- 130) holds that there are no va lid 
claims to the kind of rights that belong to human beings as such 
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independently of their social roles in practices; "such rights are at one with 
unicorns, witches and Meinong's glass mountain. "50 In his view, the 
possession of rights is only intelligible within the contexts of practices that 
set some regulations for the achievement of their internal goods; for 
instance, "In the game of chess each player has a right to move in turn, the 
player who is White having the right to move first" ([1978] 1985, p.130); as 
he puts it: 
The possession of the right is only intelligible in the context 
of a developed and complex form of human practice. The 
exercise of such rights is a necessary part of such practices 
and their violation is to varying degrees destructive of such 
practice. The justification of the claim to possess such a 
right must initially refer us to the rules of the practice and 
thereafter to the possible justifications of the practice 
([1978] 1985, p.130). 
In line with my argument in the first part of this chapter, where I held 
that MacIntyre in his narrative account of intelligibility dissolves the 
individual into the social, I reply to him here that the requirements of our 
animality and intellectuality, that is, our basic needs and our right to 
justification, which belong to human beings irrespective of their social roles, 
can justify the necessity of such natural rights. 
MacIntyre likens, and then dismisses, the existence of natural rights to 
the existence of unicorns and witches, but I think this is a mistake. When we 
say that there are natural rights, this is not to say that the rights exist out 
there like unicorns and witches to be rejected by physics and 
commonsensical observation. The validity of rights is a matter of normative 
necessity in the sense that we need these norms in order to protect human 
beings against vulnerability; as A. Gutmann (1985, p.315) puts the point: 
50 See also Maclrttyre (1981, p.69) where he argues that "we do not need to be distracted 
into answering them [arguments about the existence of natural rights], for the truth is plain: 
there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns ." 
Also, he holds "The dominant contemporary idiom and rhetoric of rights cannot serve 
genuinely rational plllJ)oses, and we ought not to conduct our moral and political 
arguments in terms derived from that idiom and rhetoric" (1991 c, p.96). 
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... believing in ri ghts is one way of regulating and 
constraining our behavior toward one another in a desirable 
manner. This reason does not compete wi th physics; it does 
not require us to believe that rights "exist" in any sense that 
is incompatible with the " laws of nature" as established by 
modem science. 
Maclntyre 's objection to the idea of natural ri ghts seems to have been 
directed at the way of justifying these rights as free-standing and self-
evident truths, and not at the content of these rights; as he puts it, " In the 
eighteenth century the existence of such natural rights was defended on the 
grounds that the statements asserting them were self-evident truths; but the 
required concept of self-evidence could not be sustained" ([1978] 1985, 
p.130).This is clear in what Macintyre says in hi s personal communication 
to K. Shrader-Frechette (200 1), "I am in agreement with many of the 
substantive moral claims by natural rights theorists, but in di sagreement 
with their way of defending these claims. No one ought to be treated in a 
way that is inconsistent with the precepts of the natural law ... [but] I do not 
think that ... 'a right ' adds anyth ing to what is being claimed (cited in K. 
Shrader-Frechette (2002, p. l 15))." 
I agree with MacIntyre that these rights are not se lf-evident truths; 
however, they can be justified as the requirements of human beings ' normal 
and desirable functioning. The fact that human beings have capacities and 
entitlements to basic goods and to a fair process of practical reasoning does 
not depend on having a social ro le or a place in some practice, as these 
features app ly to human beings qua human beings. Of course, social roles 
create a set of rights and obligations, but there are also rights of individuals 
qua individuals as human beings. 
If MacIntyre agrees with the content of natural ri ghts, which indeed is 
required by his espousal of the natural law tradition, and disagrees only with 
the way these rights are justifi ed, he should make thi s position clear, and 
revise his rhetoric against the idea of natural or human rights. This wou ld 
make his attitude toward human vulnerabili ty more cons istent than it is now. 
Attention to these two aspects of human beings, animal and intellectual 
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aspects, which are necessary for their normal functioning, is required by 
Maclntyre's espousal of the natural law tradition; as he puts it, "the precepts 
of the natural law are those rules of reason which a human being obeys, 
characteristically without explicitly formulating them, when that human 
being is functioning normally" (2000, p.108). 
Moral disagreements in so far as they are beyond the threshold of 
morality, and are conducted in a framework which respects human beings' 
basic goods, should not count as a catastrophic situation. The main point of 
my discussion in this section is that if modem morality can be restored in 
order to protect its subjects' basic goods including their right to justification 
and to fair reasoning, then we can dismiss Maclntyre's claim that modem 
morality is the fragmentary remains of the classical moral scheme, and so 
lacks rational justification and intelligibility. For instance, in order to 
respect the priority right of pedestrians to cross a street I, as a driver, do not 
need to know what sort of persons they are, or where their destinations are; 
it should suffice for me to know that wherever they want to go it is good for 
them and for me to cross the street safely. 
In this chapter, in fact, I tried to offer a bottom-up picture of morality 
as an alternative to Maclntyre 's top-down account. -Instead of holding that 
we need an agreement on the notion of the good in order to justify morality, 
I insisted that we can begin with the basic features of human beings, which 
address their animal and intellectual aspects, that remain valid for different 
accounts of the good. Though I agree with the kind of criticism of 
modernity offered by MacIntyre and C. Taylor (1991, p.4) that there is 
nothing in modem times to confer meaning on human life, and that there is 
nothing worth dying for in modem times, I do not think this lack of sense 
for the entire human life would put morality into a justificatory crisis. In 
other words, though the modem individual might experience problems in 
having a meaningful and teleological life due to not having a final aim to 
strive for, he can intelligibly justify his account of morality based on the 
notion of inherent human dignity which represents itself in fulfilling human 
beings ' basic animal and intellectual needs. The unintelligibility of our 
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entire lives does not render all segments of our lives meaningless; to think 
otherwise wou ld be a matter of the fa llacy of divi sion by ascribing the 
properties of a whole to its constituents. That the entire human life might be 
pointless does not necessari ly mean all parts of this li fe have the same 
feature . 
VI.4 Conclusion 
In chapter 5, I showed that the rational superiority of Aristotelianism 
and Thomism, as opposed to what MacIntyre maintains, is not a conclusion 
that riva l trad itions are rationally required to acknowledge based on their 
own measures. MacIntyre has some meta-ethica l positions which inform his 
idea regarding the superiori ty of these two traditions. These two meta-
ethical positions are the narrati ve unity of inte lligibili ty and an objective 
account of the good. I argued that the intelligibility of actions does not 
depend on hi story and story-telling, and that MacIntyre is dissolving the 
individual into the social and the hi storical. MacIntyre, in other words, has 
undervalued the capacity of the individual to di scard hi s past narratives and 
to have hi s own account of intellig ibility based on reasons that are in 
principle shareable, to which others might not have access at the moment. If 
this is correct, then the inability to form narrati ve uniti es about our li ves as a 
resu lt of not having an obj ective notion of the good does not threaten the 
intelligibility of our actions. 
With regard to the objectivity of the good, l held that we can justify 
morality on the basis of some goods that do not have the finality of the good 
which is the subject of ethics . I contrasted morality with ethics, as the latter 
is informed by an account of the good life ; while the former points to 
conditions that respect human beings as rational beings who have basic 
needs and a ri ght to justification. The test for bas ic needs is that the fai lure 
to satisfy them would damage human be ings' normal and desirable 
functioning, and th is demarcat ion criterion lets us have a shared zone 
between cultures despite the fact that there are some other needs, desi res and 
expectations that vary between them. Morality, so understood, sets some 
limits for the reasonableness of ethics, and thus restricts perspecti vism and 
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relativism. A limited consensus on the notion of the common good can 
sustain morality, without the need for an agreement on the good. 
If my argument is sound, then we can consider modem morality not as 
unintelligible fragmentary survivals of the classical morality, as its "oughts" 
can be meaningful in light of their part in securing basic human goods. 
These oughts do not need to refer to the good in order to be intelligible. 
What I conclude from this chapter is that, as opposed to Maclntyre's 
view, the moral crisis in the modem world does not need the Aristotelian 
and Thomistic moral approaches which invoke a notion of the final human 
good. It would suffice for us to check if the grounds of our reasoning derive 
from selfish motives, or from motives that track goods and, thus, are 
reciprocally and generally justifiable. Moral reasons in order to be 
reciprocally justifiable need to consider human beings as possessing 
inherent dignity independently of their other features, addressing human 
beings' needs in proportion to their vulnerability. 
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VII- Final Conclusion 
This thes is was a study on the notion of practical rationality. Its main 
obj ective was to explore whether there is a shared way of reasoning in 
practical and moral issues between di fferent cultures and traditions. For this 
purpose, I chose Maclntyre's notion of tradition-constituted and tradition-
constitutive rationali ty and justice as the key topic of the thesis, which holds 
there is no rationality and justice independent of a tradition. Rationality here 
is mainly practical rationality a most important outcome of which is the idea 
of justice. 
The thes is comprised six chapters. In the first chapter, I di scussed the 
role of traditions from Maclntyre's perspective. To thi s end, I di vided the 
tenn tradition into the two notions of traditions in a general and in an ideal 
sense. The ideal sense of tradition reflects Macintyre's normative attitude 
toward the classical, Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions in which, 
MacIntyre holds, we can find a remedy for the malaises of modem 
Liberalism. I referred to the features of tradition in the ideal sense as 
follows. I-Being progressive and cumulative over time, and thus moving to 
more adequate accounts of its objects than either its own accounts in its 
earlier stages or its rivals' accounts; 2-consisting of arguments about the 
virtues and the good of its members, and enjoying a widespread agreement 
on these notions (mostly applicable to moral traditions than to intellectual 
ones). I then explained the different functions of traditions and the 
constitution thes is in Maclntyre's view as follows. 
I-Traditions as conceptual schemes or paradigms, in the sense that 
traditions provide different understandings of the natural and the social 
world. I argued that thi s function sometimes assumes an ontological 
meaning whi ch points to the fomia tion of the identiti es of indi viduals in 
tradit ions. I argued that this fu ncti on particularly in its ontological sense 
might cause a misunderstanding of Maclntyre 's thought by suggesting the 
idea that individuals are cognitively limited to thei r own traditions. 
2-Traditions as serving a methodological function, by which I meant 
the specia l procedures that direct a research enqui ry in a particular tradi tion. 
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Traditions provide contingent starting-points for enquiries, without which 
the search for the good and the universal cannot conunence. To rationally 
appraise some claim, we have to narrate how the argument in a particular 
tradition has progressed. Rationality is judged on the basis of the best 
existing standards in a particular context. The CT in this sense is related to 
fallible reasoning which was discussed in chapters 3 and 4. 
3-Tradition as a context for defining and exercising the virtues , which 
in Maclntyre's account is a feature of a well-ordered moral tradition. The 
main feature of ideal traditions, which makes them capable of fulfilling this 
function, is their recourse to the notion of the common good which serves as 
an objective and shared criterion for morality. The concept of virtue finds its 
application through some antecedent accounts of moral or social life, which 
are provided in traditions. Morality in a good community is what people 
positively observe to approach their good, and not as only negative rules to 
regulate their relationships. The lack of an adequate knowledge of the 
human good comes with an inadequate knowledge of right rules for action 
in particular situations. I then explained that Maclntyre's appraisal of the 
classical and, in particular, the Aristotelian tradition, in part, stems tacitly 
from his account of practical rationality as an objectivity that, in his view, 
can be provided best in the classical tradition. In the classical tradition, 
internal goods of practices, narratives of human life and traditions can serve 
as objective measures independently of personal preferences to justify moral 
statements. The virtues serve as objective criteria to subordinate individual 
desires, and to direct them toward the good of practices. I argued that 
Maclntyre's earlier social theory without metaphysical foundations lacks 
sufficient content and founders upon the charge of formalism. I pointed to 
the two ways in which MacIntyre has subsequently turned to metaphysics, 
that is, his metaphysical view of the natural law tradition, and his view of 
human essential vulnerability which requires the virtues of acknowledged 
dependence for individuals to become independent practical reasoners; a 
state in which agents move from merely having reasons for actions to 
having the ability to evaluate those reasons. 
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In the second chapter, I explained the constitution thesis on the basis of 
each function as outlined above. MacIntyre criticizes the Enlightenment 
account of rationality on the grounds that there are no substantive princip les 
of rationali ty that stand independent of particular traditions. While the 
enlightenment project, as depicted by MacIntyre, sought to discover the 
universa l norms and rules of rationality, in Maclntyre 's view there are no 
universal measures of rationality, as it is only formal norms such as the law 
of non-contradiction that app ly uni versall y. 
I argued that the term "constituted" used by MacIntyre in hi s 
constitution thesis fits better the function of traditions as conceptual 
schemes and the ontological function than the two others, which are the 
methodologica l and the contextual function s. This might lead to a 
misunderstanding of Maclntyre 's point by offering a conservative account 
of him. 
Regarding the CT based on the role of traditions as conceptual 
schemes, I held that the difference in the role played by des ires between the 
goods of excellence and the goods of effectiveness results in different 
structures of practical rationali ty. In practical rationality based on the goods 
of effectiveness, as in Humean practical rationality, there is no vantage point 
for desires to comply with, and there would be no necessary or causal 
relation between the outcome of a practical sy llogism and an action; 
whereas the practical reasoning based on the goods of excellence employs a 
unified picture of an agent 's desires. In this view, what pleases the agent 
wi ll not per se be a good reason fo r acts; rather, what is conducive to his 
good would be a good reason fo r him to act upon. Distinct types of practical 
rationality have been constituted differently in different traditions based on 
their di fferent notions of human nature and the good, which in turn result in 
di ffe rent accounts of the vi rtues. An Aris tote I ian view of human nature 
results in an approach to practical reasoning based on the education of 
desires which term inates in an action, unlike an emotivistic view of human 
nature and its good. This difference refl ects itse lf in the meanings of 
different virtues bui lt upon di ffe rent practical ra tiona li ties. This account of 
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the constitution thesis, however, runs the risk of offering a conservative 
communitarian picture of MacIntyre, who sees no prospect of transcending 
the horizon of a given community; a view which MacIntyre himself is at 
pains to rej eel. 
Regarding the CT based on the role of traditions as a context for 
defining and cultivating the virtues, I held that practical habituation in the 
exercise of the virtues has to precede education in moral theory. Only those 
who have acquired good habits are able to theorize well about moral issues. 
Only the practically intelligent human being, in this Aristotelian view, can 
judge the mean and the right in practical situations. 
Regarding the CT based on the methodological function of traditions, I 
explained Maclntyre 's view that the rationality of tradition-constituted and 
tradition-constitutive enquiry is a matter of progress that is occurring in a 
tradition; a tradition whose life and enquiries begin from "some pure 
historical contingency, from the beliefs, institutions, and practices of some 
particular community which constitute a given" (1988a, p.354).Based on 
this, MacIntyre, contrary to the Enlightenment view, emphasizes the 
relevance of first principles to the conceptual schemes in which these first 
principles are working, and denies that there are -first principles whose 
evidence can be known by all rational human beings irrespective of the 
traditions in which the theories are formed. I also argued that Maclntyre's 
criticism of the liberal ideal of neutrality in line with his CT is mistaken, as 
it does not consider the possibility of distinction between ontological and 
normative detachment. The individual 's normative capacity for 
understanding other notions of the good is compatible with him inevitably 
having a position in a given tradition. I also held that the wording of the CT, 
particularly the term constitution, does not fit this methodological sense, as 
explained above. I proposed the use of expressions such as "tradition-guided 
rationality", "tradition-directed rationality" or "tradition-related rationality" 
in place of tradition-constituted rationality. 
In the third chapter, the discussion shifted from the issue of rationality 
to that of truth. This was necessary in order to explain how different 
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traditions interact with each other on the basis of their internal measures of 
rationality in order to di scover what truth is, which lies in correspondence 
with reality that is independent of different perspecti ves . In this chapter, I 
explained some Thomistic elements of Maclntyre's theory of truth. 
Maclntyre 's theory of truth like Aristotle's and Aquinas' theory is a rea li st 
and correspondence one, in the sense that there is an independent rea li ty 
which serves as the measure of truth. This correspondence relation is 
different from the modem version in that in the former the relation holds 
primarily between the intellect and the object, and not between propositions 
and facts. The intellect, which of course later forms concepts and 
propositions, should become adequate to and forma ll y identical with the 
object in order to grasp the truth. This gives a metaphysical sense to 
Aquinas's theory of truth, because the intellect' s capacity for knowing and 
the object 's capacity for being known become actuali zed in the knowledge-
process. This metaphysical explanation, unlike epistemological 
interpretations of Aquinas' theory of truth, has particulari sti c aspects that 
suit Maclntyre 's CT. The intellect as an embodied entity cannot leave aside 
all its particularities in order to formulate universa l and convincing-for-all 
principles. It should begin with its currently held positions, and by a process 
of revision and refutation it arrives at more compelling and more adequate 
beliefs. This is also related to a metaphysica l interpretation of first 
principles according to which substantial first princip les are not free-
standing self-ev ident principles; rather, their ev idence is known for a mind 
that is informed by the tradition within which they are formu lated, or for a 
mind that has theoretical grasp of the issue in a tradition. 
I also expla ined Maclntyre 's fa llibilism, which is related to the CT in 
its methodologica l sense, based on some features of Aquinas ' theory of 
knowledge, namely, 1) Aquinas' argumentative methodology, 2) the moral 
aspect of his theory of truth, which entail s openness to all criticisms, 3) the 
notion of the intellect's adequacy and activity, which emphasizes a 
graduali st progress toward truth, 4) Maclntyre's weak interpretati on of 
Aquinas' notion of the intell ect 's veracity, which leaves room fo r fa llible 
reasoning and 5) Maclntyre's anti -epistemologica l interpretation of 
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Aquinas, which denies a Cartesian certitude to be acquired at the beginning 
of our enquiries. However, this metaphysical interpretation might run 
against the discursive reasoning that MacIntyre endorses, or put it off to 
later epistemological phases of the knowledge-process. The reason is that in 
so far as we lack knowledge of first principles that are in fact employed in 
our reasoning we cannot participate in a productive dialogue with our 
opponents over them. Also, it is not clear how it is possible to evaluate the 
contingent starting-points of traditions, when the discussion reaches this 
stage. I suggested that there should be some substantive measures of 
rationality in light of which to minimally assess different traditions and their 
first principles against each other. 
Based on Maclntyre's presentation of Aquinas ' account of knowledge, 
we can infer that his CT points to a gradualist and contextual account of 
knowledge, and that it does not have relativistic and perspectivistic 
connotations. In the fourth chapter, 1 attended more fully to Macintyre 's 
theory of truth. I compared Macintyre ' s theory of truth and his CT with 
relativism and perspectivism as follows. 
With regard to moral relativism, I argued that MacIntyre can avoid this 
charge, because both his earlier social and his later metaphysical approaches 
are oriented toward Aristotelianism and Thomism. The notion of telos 
employed in these two traditions is wider than the notion of function which 
is defined in social contexts. If there is a context-transcending notion of 
telos and the good for human beings qua human beings, it will provide some 
independent measures for dismissing the charge of moral relativism. 
With regard to cognitive relativism, I argued that while Macintyre 's 
intention and his tenor of thought are anti-relativistic, his method based on 
the notion of epistemological crises cannot adequately justify his position 
against relativism, due to its intemalism. To revise this method, I argued we 
need to hold that there are some universal measures that are valid across 
traditions, and can be used to evaluate these traditions. I also held that 
MacIntyre should clarify if he by his constitution thesis means a rule-based 
particularism- that is a particularism that follows a logic, and whether this 
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logic may be shared between traditions, at least when basic hrn11an goods 
are at stake. 
With regard to perspectivism, I argued that MacIntyre thinks it possible 
to understand other ideas from other perspectives, much as they are 
comprehended by those with in the tradition in question. Individuals are not 
captured by their own tradition to the extent that they are not able to 
LU1derstand reality independently of their own perspecti ve. I also appea led to 
the immateriali ty of the inte llect to justify its transcending capacity, and to 
the non-nominali sm of Aquinas and Macintyre, which holds the order of the 
world is independent of our minds, and that it is apt to di sclose itself 
independently of our mental categori es, and reveal their inadequac ies. This 
differentiates Maclntyre's CT from philosophy after the linguistic tum. In 
addition to thi s metaphysical and ontological aspect, Maclntyre's insistence 
on dialogue with others, and di stinguishing between thinking for oneself 
and thinking by oneself highlights the necess ity of overcoming 
perspectivism. 
In chapter 5, I tried to investigate how Macintyre thinks Thomism is 
rationally superior to its rivals, and so can claim truth based on the notion of 
the adequacy of the intellect or a theory against its challengers. I explained 
that Maclntyre 's claim consists of two strands. The first part concerned the 
rational superiori ty of Thomism over Ari stote lian ism and Augustinian ism, 
which invo lved showing that Thomism has been able to make a consistent 
amalgam of these two traditions, and overcome their inadequacies. The 
second part addressed the superiority of Thomism over its radical rivals by 
showing that these rivals are in a state of disarray, and the forrner is able to 
explain and remedy their incapacity to provide a rationa l j ustifi cation for 
morali ty. I then di scussed that, despite Maclntyre' s claim, the superiority of 
Thomism over other traditions is not identifiable from within these 
traditions, and that hi s view in thi s regard is based on hi s own meta-ethical 
convictions, that is, a narrative account of the intelligibi lity of actions, and 
an objective justification based on the notion of the good. 
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In the sixth chapter, I argued that firstly the intelligibility of actions as 
segments of our lives does not require a narrative account of the whole of 
human life, secondly we can have an account of morality that does not 
depend on the notion of the final good; rather, it assumes basic facts about 
human beings, which include their basic and intellectual needs the failure to 
satisfy which damages their normal and desirable functioning. The mark of 
real needs is that their satisfaction sustains and improves our normal and 
desirable functioning, and this point lets us distinguish real needs from our 
acquired desires and expectations. One might undertake a practical study to 
see if the lack of some goods affects our normal and desirable performance, 
and in this respect we might need other peoples ' judgments. 
I contrasted this account of morality with ethics, where the latter is 
informed by an account of the good life, and the former points to conditions 
that respect human beings as beings who have basic needs and a right to 
justification required by their intellectual aspect. This account of morality 
works well in conditions in which people lack an agreement on the notion of 
the good. If we can provide a justification for morality independent of the 
notions of the good, then Maclntyre's view that modem liberal morality 
lacks resources for its justification unless it adopts the Aristotelian and 
Thomistic notions of the common good and the good for each person is 
flawed; for we can justify morality in terms of what is contributing to 
human beings' normal and desirable functioning, and not necessarily to 
human flourishing. Most moral norms that are honoured in a religious 
community based on a notion of the human good and flourishing, such as 
the badness of lying, backbiting, stealing, torturing, murdering, raping, etc., 
can also be justified in terms of human beings' normal and desirable 
functioning in secular terms. A religious justification might possess a 
stronger enforcement mechanism than does a secular justification, but their 
lists of virtues and vices significantly overlaps. 
Let us now, after this summary, return to the main issue of the thesis, 
that is, Maclntyre's idea of tradition-constituted rationality. What, finally, 
does MacIntyre seek to convey by this account of rationality? In the light of 
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the discussions in the preceding chapters, I shall recall what this account of 
rationality is and what it is not. 
I think we can understand Maclntyre 's constitution thesis in contrast to 
Cartesian epistemology and Kant's moral philosophy as they are understood 
by him. The constitution thesis runs counter to Cartesian epistemology by 
its anti-epistemological tendencies; that is to say, we do not and cannot start 
our substantial intellectual enquiries based on some indubitable ideas whose 
evidence can be shown to any rational human being; rather, we start from 
our contingent beliefs and move gradually toward their underlying 
principles whose evidence is clear to minds that have been formed in that 
tradition or have had the intellectual achievement of grasping the ideas in 
that tradition. The adequacy of these principles li es in the superiority of the 
whole system in which they are operating over other systems. Based on thi s 
view, we cannot mathematically prove our beliefs against others by 
abstracting some principles from a whole system; rather, we should note the 
role these principles and beliefs play in the hi story of a tradition and the 
improvement that they make upon the tradition 's previous stages. 
The constitution thesis runs counter to Kantian moral philosophy by its 
opposition to providing a universali stic rule-based account of morality. The 
constitution thesis in this sense is related to virtue-ethics which emphasizes 
the importance of moral education and following moral masters for knowing 
moral duties. The kind of moral knowledge that we need, according to this 
view, is not captured by some universal principles; rather, it requires the 
virtue of phronesis as practical intelligence which lets us know moral 
features that are at stake in particular situations. These are the two main 
features which we can affim1 that the constitution thesis conveys, that is, its 
anti-epistemological and virtue-ethical aspects. 
These two aspects conta in insights for today 's social and moral world; 
one is epistemological and the other is moral. The epistemological insight is 
the relief that we do not need to find out substanti al self-evident principles 
at the beginning of our intellectual enquiries. Thi s wou ld save people from 
what MacIntyre (2006a, p.12) ca ll s "mental breakdown", that is, doubting at 
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once all our existent beliefs in order to construct our beliefs from self-
evident principles. Instead, we proceed from our received beliefs and a mind 
that is shaped in a framework, without trying to build our system from 
scratch on principles that are acceptable to all people. This provides 
individuals with a sense of certitude that is psychologically very fruitful ; 
however, we should recall Maclntyre ' s emphasis that this certitude should 
be open to revision, though its positive point is that it does not require the 
Cartesian insight of starting from ideas indubitable to all rational persons. 
The moral insight that we can gain from Maclntyre's discussion is the 
emphasis that he lays upon our social aspects and the obligations that we 
owe to each other. As was discussed in the course of the thesis, in 
Maclntyre 's view, the common good is indispensable to the individual 
good, and the individual by observing this would acquire the required 
incentive to commit himself to the good of others and of the community, 
knowing that there is in fact no dichotomy between these goods. This 
account of the good can be used to support an account of human rights and 
freedom that is more active and participatory than the classical liberal 
account allows. 
The dominant view of human rights in the classical liberal tradition 
considers these rights as immunities from others ' coercion and interference; 
while the positive account of rights, which can be inferred from Macintyre ' s 
kind of discussion, takes rights as empowering mechanisms that actively 
engage individuals in public life. There are parallels here with D. 
Hollenbach 's (1994) account of the modem Catholic account of human 
rights expressed in the Second Vatican Council; as Hollengach (1994, 
p.142) states: 
This way of interpreting freedom of speech and religion 
views immunity from interference in these domains as in 
service of active participation in the public life of society. 
People should be free to express their political and religious 
beliefs in public in order that the true nature of the common 
good of the community might be more adequately 
understood and pursued. 
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Macintyre 's emphasis on the essentiality of the notion of the common 
good for individual goods can support thi s active account of human ri ghts, 
which in tum can balance the negative view ofhwnan rights and freedom . 
Another moral insight which we can acquire from MacIntyre is the 
socia l aspect that he gives to individual autonomy. As was explained in the 
previous chapter, in Maclntyre 's view, we achieve autonomy only through 
our social practices and by learning our good in our social interactions with 
those others who are more virtuous or wiser than us. This subjection of our 
personal desires to the knowledge and experience of the wise can prove very 
precious in our individual and social lives, as thi s would let us lead our life 
as an unrepeatable experience more efficiently. These two aspects, that is, 
the epistemological insight that we cannot start from self-evident substantial 
principles, and the emphasis on the common good and our moral obligations 
to each other are important lessons which we can take from Maclntyre. 
However, we should be cautious of possible misunderstandings of 
Maclntyre 's constitution thesis, the two most salient of which are as 
fo llows. 
The first is to think of traditions as closed entities that have 
incomparable ideas and ways of li fe. MacIntyre has been aware of thi s 
problem from which he has di stanced himself by rej ecting the charges of 
relativism and perspectivism and also the label of communitarian ism. The 
individual , as was argued in chapter 4, though he is constituted in a given 
tradition, has the capacity to reflect on his identity and learn from other 
traditions, and if necessary gradually revise his positions and identity. As I 
explained in chapter 2, the terminology of "constitution" is too heavy fo r 
this meaning, and other expressions such as tradition-d irected or guided or 
related rationalities are more appropriate ones, as they do not have these 
relativistic and perspectivistic connotations. A related misunderstanding is 
to interpret MacIntyre along the lines of philosophy after the linguistic tum 
which denies the possibility of avo iding the limitations of language to know 
rea lity as it is. 
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The second misunderstanding or misuse of the constitution thesis is to 
justify oppressive policies on the grounds that there are no universal norms 
of human conduct across traditions. Maclntyre's opposition to the idea of 
human rights subjects him further to this misappropriation. To dispel this, I 
argued that we should recognize some rights and norms for human beings 
qua human beings independent of their accounts of the good and their other 
loyalties. In fact, Maclntyre's espousal of the precepts of the natural law as 
conditions necessary for human normal functioning requires him to revise 
his attitude to the idea of human rights . Basic human needs and their 
intellectual need for rational justification can provide a minimum universal 
platform for protecting human beings against different kinds of 
mistreatments and vulnerabilities. 
After this recapitulation of the main points of the discussion, l shall 
return to the theological questions that I raised in the introduction to the 
thesis as my initial incentives to conduct this research, trying to answer 
them based on the kind of approach I have adopted in this work. To recall, I 
stated that my interest in Maclntyre's work has its roots in my engagement 
with some questions in the area of the philosophy of religion. One question 
was whether there is some measure for the justice Qf God independent of 
His decree. In the light of my discussion in the previous chapter regarding 
the necessity of some basic goods for human beings qua human beings, I 
argue here that these goods also hold for human beings in their interaction 
with God. The explanation is that if we consider God as a reasonable and 
rational Being, which is implied by his attribute as being wise, it would 
follow that His judgments should be based on some norms which are 
independent of His word, as is the case also with other rational and 
reasonable beings. By rationality here I mean His creation has a meaningful 
design and purpose such that nothing has been created in vain; therefore, 
human beings and their capacities have a purpose, and should be developed. 
If human beings have an intellectual capacity, this should be respected and 
developed in order to avoid absurdity. A part of this development is to 
consider human beings as being able to understand the grounds of what they 
are supposed to believe or to act upon, and that they are entitled to 
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justification in this regard. This does not rule out that they should also 
educate some of their desires and emotions, or follow some moral 
exemplars in order to be able to understand practical or theoretica l issues; 
however, they should understand why they do so. Accordingly, God as a 
wise and rational Being cannot dictate that I am just but you cannot access 
the measures of my justice, and whatever I do is the measure of justice. 
Neither can He order a normative system whose grounds are not at all 
justifiable to human beings. MacIntyre also would accept my argument 
here, as he holds that we need to have measures of justice independent of 
and prior to the authority of divine commands in order to be able to 
distinguish between false gods and the true God (1986b, p.374).Maclntyre 
(1986b, p.361) also states that an essential characteristic of the Judaeo-
Christian God, and in my view of Islam 's God, is that "He is just and that 
He cannot poss ibly not be". We should note that this "cannot" does not 
count as a limitation upon God' s absolute power, because these 
requirements stern from His intrinsic attributes such as being wise, etc. To 
act unwisely is a contradiction for God and cannot be the subject of his 
power. 
By reasonableness here I mean that God treats human beings and His 
other creations fairly; that is to say, His expectations of them are 
proportionate to the capacities they have, as the following verses from the 
Quran also indicate, "Allah does not impose upon any soul a duty but to the 
extent of its abi lity" (Quran 2:286, Shakir Translation); also, "[A llah] has 
not laid upon you an hardship in religion" (Quran 22: 78, Shakir 
Translation). 
The consideration of human beings' limitations is such that it, indeed, 
in some cases has led to the revision of some verdicts by God Himself; for 
instance, the forbidding of spouses' sexual intercourse on the nights of the 
fasting month of Ramadan has been annul led by God due to the fact that its 
observance has been too difficult for people, leading them to revise it; as the 
verse indicates: " It has been made lawful for you to go to your wives on the 
night of the fast: they are like a garment for you, and you are like a gannent 
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for them. God is aware that you were deceiving yourselves and He has 
turned in mercy towards you and pardoned you (Quran 2:187, Wahiduddin 
Khan Translation)" .51 
Another example of the consideration of human beings ' capacities by 
God, as a reasonable entity, can be seen in the four-step gradualist 
prohibition of drinking intoxicants, in order to pave the way and prepare the 
people for this verdict. In the first step, intoxicants were only compared to 
good provision and nourishments (Quran 16:67); in the second step, the 
intoxicated were asked not to approach prayer until they know what they 
say (Quran 4:43); as a third step, it was pointed out that the sin of drinking 
intoxicants outweighs its benefits (Quran 2:219); and finally in the fourth 
step it was introduced as a deed of Satan, and was more strongly prohibited. 
This gradualist attitude attests to the fact that changing individual and social 
habits is a difficult and time-consuming effort. Thus, if human beings have 
some capacities and limitations, which are largely the same across cultures, 
this would set some limits for the scope of obligations that any reasonable 
legislator, including God, can justly ordain upon them. Accordingly, even if 
we might not be able to understand the whole justice of God due to our 
limited knowledge, basic features of human beings_ including their basic 
physiological and intellectual needs can be a measure of the justice of God, 
and also a measure of the true understanding of His verdicts. 
As human basic needs are time-bound issues, in the sense that by the 
passage of time there might appear new understandings about human 
beings' basic needs, this would provide some measures for streamlining our 
understanding of religion. Some ideas about human rights, such as freedom 
of conscience, which address human basic needs, can play the same 
function. Accordingly, human basic needs and features , which include their 
inherent dignity, can be used to evaluate different traditions' treatment of 
human beings, as well as providing a developing understanding of religion. 
This is in line with the Ejtehad method in Shia Islam as a method for an 
51 A question might arise that why God has not foreseen this issue, but this is not my 
concern here. 
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understanding of religion that is responsive to the requirements of the time. 
Accordingly, my effort in this thesis was to provide a rational justi fication , 
in so far as is possible, for a universal mora lity that is also compatible with 
human beings' cultural di vergences. This account of moral ity would 
regulate our relationships in conditions in which we lack a shared account of 
the good life. Considering human beings' basic needs is required of any 
reasonable moral agent in order to respect the dignity of human beings as 
rational beings. 
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